00:00 Welcome,
00:00 everyone.
00:01 Thanks for joining us for
00:03 a seminar on the
00:05 WDR 2025 uh seminar series.
00:10 Today,
00:10 we are very happy to have Jean-Baptiste Frazos,
00:13 who's professor at the Connional de Ponte Jose
00:15 and senior researcher at CNRS in Paris.
00:19 And uh
00:20 Jean Baptiste is a historian.
00:23 He's interested in science,
00:25 technology,
00:25 and the environment.
00:27 And we discovered a book which was very
00:30 useful for us,
00:32 uh,
00:32 when thinking about how standard emerge
00:35 and how standard can be used to foster innovation
00:38 and to foster the development of the market.
00:41 Which is a book that
00:42 Gian Baptiste wrote
00:44 a few years ago during his PhD and it was just recently published,
00:48 uh,
00:48 sorry,
00:48 recently translated.
00:51 In,
00:51 in English and it's called Happy Apocalypse,
00:54 A History of,
00:54 of Technological Risk.
00:57 Jean Baptiste has also written another very interesting book that I,
01:01 uh,
01:01 recommend you to,
01:02 to read,
01:03 which is more and more and more and all-consuming History of Energy
01:06 in which is
01:07 giving a
01:09 New perspective on what we call energy transition.
01:13 Um,
01:14 I'll leave the floor to you,
01:15 Jean Baptista,
01:16 the,
01:17 as usual,
01:18 we'll,
01:18 uh,
01:18 we'll have the speaker
01:20 speak for about half an hour
01:22 and we'll open up the floor to question and answer
01:25 after that OK.
01:28 Thank you,
01:29 Milo,
01:29 and thank you so much for having me on your,
01:32 on your seminar.
01:33 Um,
01:34 basically,
01:35 I wanted to present the paper but also to
01:37 give a broader context because the the paper I,
01:40 I,
01:40 I sent you
01:41 was part of a much broader project which was really a kind of history of risk,
01:46 uh,
01:47 during,
01:47 during industrialization with a comparison between France and,
01:50 and Britain.
01:51 And the context,
01:53 intellectual context at that time,
01:55 and we are talking about the early 2000s,
01:57 was the debate around risk society,
02:00 which was really a key topic in sociology and
02:02 social sciences where I was trained at the time.
02:06 It's a book by Ulrich Beck,
02:08 a famous German sociologist,
02:11 explaining that there had been a tremendous and profound shift
02:15 in
02:17 the organization of our societies that for a long time.
02:20 The main subject of
02:24 the economy was to produce more and more,
02:27 and now we are shifting to a rich society
02:29 where the key topic was the distribution of risk,
02:32 not so much the distribution of the goods that we produced,
02:35 but the distribution of risk.
02:37 And all the narrative,
02:39 all this
02:40 narrative was based on this idea that there had
02:42 been a profound change in the nature of risk,
02:45 that risk
02:46 had completely changed in terms of scales,
02:48 that
02:50 we were not confronted so much to risk but to uncertainties.
02:54 So it was really this discussion about real society or reflexive modernity.
02:58 It's another key topic at the time
03:01 that I wanted to
03:03 to enter and to address.
03:05 I thought that this narrative was far too optimistic
03:08 and far too
03:10 far too self-gratifying
03:12 about our contemporary moments,
03:15 that it was a way to explain that we were far better than our ancestors,
03:19 basically,
03:20 that we were just ruthless modern modernizers and and
03:25 and
03:26 they were kind of
03:28 productivist but not really environmentally aware.
03:31 So basically,
03:32 the
03:33 part of my work since the early 2000s has been to
03:36 historicize all these ideas of free society and reflexive modality.
03:41 I'm just going to give you before
03:43 describing and presenting the paper,
03:45 I just want to give you
03:46 a few elements of this broader
03:48 argument.
03:49 For instance,
03:50 the idea
03:51 that climate change
03:52 is a new
03:54 problem,
03:54 something radically new which really emerged only in the
03:58 last 40 years with the Rio conference of 1992.
04:03 In fact,
04:04 when you're interested in the history of science,
04:06 you know that the issue of climate change was
04:09 a very deep issue from a very early period.
04:12 Um,
04:13 for one simple reason,
04:14 I mean,
04:15 we have to
04:16 put ourselves
04:17 in a completely different frame of mind,
04:20 a kind of a creationist frame of mind.
04:24 For
04:25 people in the 18th and even 19th century
04:28 who were deeply religious,
04:29 the earth was a creation,
04:31 a divine creation.
04:33 And on this divine creation,
04:34 the forests had a role,
04:36 and
04:37 their role was to participate in the global cycle of water.
04:41 And this is
04:42 a late 17th century description of this global cycle of water.
04:46 The earth was thought as a system,
04:48 as a complex system
04:50 at that time.
04:51 And a system which was perfectly organized
04:54 for the greater good of humanity.
04:57 And
04:57 this providential global cycle of water played a key role
05:02 for agriculture,
05:04 and deforestation was
05:07 in a way putting in danger
05:09 this divine providential cycle.
05:11 So climate change connected to deforestation was a
05:14 key topic for a long period of time.
05:16 And many discourses about the collapse of civilization
05:20 from the 18th and 19th century are
05:23 completely obsessed about this idea of deforestation.
05:26 In a way,
05:26 it was the best way to explain the collapse of societies and past civilization.
05:32 The discovery of ruins like Babylon,
05:34 for instance,
05:35 in the middle of deserts
05:37 was really kind of stunning for these people,
05:40 and the best explanation they had was that people in the Middle East
05:44 had deforested too much.
05:46 They had transformed the climate and created their own collapse,
05:49 right?
05:49 So this is a very standard explanation.
05:51 It's not something
05:53 especially romantic or weird or whatever.
05:55 No,
05:55 it's really the basic explanation for the rise and fall.
05:59 Of Eastern civilization,
06:01 it is over deforestation.
06:04 The issue was serious enough for the French government to order
06:09 a general inquiry on deforestation and climate change in 1821.
06:13 So we've got
06:15 a government.
06:17 Organizing knowledge production on this key topic of deforestation
06:22 and climate change in the early 19th century,
06:24 and we've got the answer of this inquiry,
06:28 thousands of answers,
06:29 and for most people,
06:30 yes,
06:31 there is a link between deforestation and climate change.
06:34 It makes perfect sense
06:35 from their point of view.
06:38 So the global environment was already an issue
06:41 in the 18th or 19th centuries.
06:43 It was always something which was thought upon,
06:46 reflected upon.
06:48 More,
06:48 I mean,
06:49 more obviously the local environments were key
06:51 topics of conflicts and debates during industrialization,
06:57 even more so
06:59 because at that time
07:01 medicine was really
07:03 obsessed with the environment.
07:05 It is before bacteriology,
07:07 before pasteur,
07:08 before cock,
07:08 and so on.
07:09 So to explain epidemics,
07:11 the best way to explain epidemics was to invoke a change in the environment,
07:15 not a microbe,
07:16 not a virus,
07:17 but a change in the environment.
07:18 And in this medical context,
07:22 of course,
07:24 pollution,
07:24 industrialization,
07:25 and pollution was a key,
07:27 key problem.
07:28 And that's why when you've got
07:31 a factory which is set up in any.
07:34 Context,
07:35 you've got complaints,
07:37 people complaining,
07:38 writing petitions,
07:40 saying that if you authorize this uh manufacturer,
07:43 it could be a disaster.
07:45 So nevertheless,
07:47 through complex historical process that I'm not going to detail,
07:51 in the end,
07:52 the way the environment was managed,
07:54 especially in France,
07:55 it's quite clear,
07:56 is through financial compensation.
07:59 Basically,
08:00 the industrialists had to pay for the pollution.
08:03 It is a polluter-based principle.
08:07 From 1810 onwards,
08:09 the the the the industrialists,
08:11 the entrepreneurs in France have to compensate for the damages
08:15 they produce through pollution.
08:17 I think that's why I think history is important because many of
08:21 the things and solutions and regulations that seem to be new,
08:24 like the polluter pays principle
08:26 which is put forward by the OECD in the
08:28 1970s as the solution to optimize pollution and production,
08:33 basically,
08:34 it's a very old principle.
08:36 It is really ingrained in the judicial system of pollution regulation
08:41 from the 19th century onward.
08:44 In the same way
08:45 It is at the beginning of the 19th century that safety standards emerged.
08:50 So,
08:51 I mean,
08:51 I really want to emphasize that the basic,
08:54 really the,
08:54 the,
08:54 the,
08:55 the foundational,
08:56 the,
08:56 the basic principles of regulations for the environment,
09:00 for risk,
09:01 they are invented
09:03 like two centuries ago.
09:06 The,
09:06 I mean,
09:06 the idea of.
09:09 The safety norm,
09:10 the idea that you can create safety by defining the proper shape of an object,
09:14 when you think about it,
09:15 it's a radical idea.
09:18 It's,
09:18 it was a new way to conceive the production
09:21 of safety at the beginning of the 19th century.
09:25 Before that,
09:26 safety was more
09:27 produced
09:28 on a local basis
09:30 or by trade association,
09:32 trade by corporations,
09:33 by trade
09:34 organizations.
09:35 And it was more like a judicial system.
09:37 You would punish
09:39 the entrepreneurs,
09:40 the architects that would
09:42 build
09:43 a house that was not well built.
09:46 He would be punished for that.
09:48 He would pay the damages,
09:50 and it is rather through
09:52 the kind of jurisprudence that safety.
09:55 Safety norms or,
09:56 or,
09:56 or,
09:56 or
09:57 concept of safety emerge,
09:59 right?
09:59 It's rather like this
10:01 uh piece by piece uh
10:03 uh jurisprudential way of producing safety.
10:07 The idea of a safety norm,
10:09 basically you ask the scientists to define
10:14 the way to create a perfectly safe object is reinvented in France in the early 1820s.
10:21 Because
10:22 the French government reacted to the new technologies coming from Britain.
10:26 There were 2 technologies at stake.
10:28 The first one was the gas lighting.
10:31 It's a forgotten technology,
10:32 but it was really an important technology at the end of the 19th century.
10:36 It emerged at the beginning of the 19th century.
10:38 And it emerged because I mean it created a huge scandal in Paris in 1822,
10:44 1823
10:46 because gas holders,
10:47 this kind of
10:48 device,
10:49 were built in the middle of
10:51 a rich neighborhood
10:53 because gas was for theaters,
10:55 operas for rich neighborhoods,
10:56 and you couldn't transport gas on a long distance,
10:59 so you had to build these
11:01 instruments really close to
11:03 the wealthy neighborhood.
11:05 So it's different from the chemical industry,
11:07 for instance,
11:08 which most of the time was built far away from
11:10 the cities and far away from the,
11:12 from the
11:12 wealthy parts of the,
11:14 of the cities.
11:15 So
11:16 this
11:17 instrument was thought as terribly dangerous by the neighbors,
11:20 wealthy neighbors who had the capacity to,
11:22 you know,
11:23 create really
11:24 a kind of political movement against this,
11:26 uh,
11:27 against the gas holder.
11:28 And the safety norm emerged as a way to find a kind of compromise
11:33 between two kinds of bourgeoisie
11:35 the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie investing in
11:37 gaslighting and the classic bourgeoisie
11:41 who
11:41 were affected
11:43 by these new industries.
11:46 For instance,
11:46 this kind of
11:48 industry would of course reduce the rent
11:50 of the people possessing
11:53 lodgings in the neighborhood.
11:56 And that's why the government asked the Academie des Sciences,
11:59 so the most prestigious scientific institution in France,
12:02 to
12:04 define
12:05 safety norm
12:06 around this object
12:07 in 1822.
12:08 It was really one of the first safety norms.
12:12 The other safety norm that was invented at the same time
12:16 and that is the main topic of the background paper is about steam engine.
12:21 I mean.
12:23 High pressure steam engine is a new invention from the,
12:26 I mean,
12:27 appearing in France after Waterloo after 1815,
12:30 and they were thought as extremely dangerous.
12:33 And interestingly enough,
12:34 they are inventions
12:36 about mobilizing the horses in a new way because
12:39 people thought the steam engine was too dangerous.
12:42 There is even a boat,
12:43 which is,
12:44 I mean a series of boats which are built in the 1820s
12:47 that would replace the steam engine with a horse
12:50 because steam engine was thought as too dangerous
12:52 to be put on a boat,
12:53 right?
12:54 So really the high pressure steam engine was dangerous in a way,
12:58 and
12:58 I think strikingly enough,
13:00 the French government banned
13:02 high pressure steam engines from cities
13:04 in 1822.
13:05 That was a huge scandal among engineers
13:08 because they explained that high pressure steam engines had much better yields.
13:12 They were much more efficient,
13:13 so it was a way to economize coal,
13:16 right.
13:17 And so once again,
13:18 the government had to find a kind of compromise.
13:21 And this
13:23 this compromise was once again a safety norm.
13:26 The safety norm was devised by the academicians once again.
13:30 It is probably the first time that you have a mathematical equation defining
13:34 the thickness
13:36 of the boilers and the shape of the boiler.
13:39 The boiler was standardized in many different
13:41 respects the thickness of the boiler,
13:44 the size
13:45 of the safety valve.
13:47 There was also a self-fuusing plate,
13:50 a little bit,
13:50 a little
13:51 piece of metal that would melt at a certain temperature which was below
13:56 the temperature,
13:57 the maximum temperature allowed.
13:59 So it was really
14:01 extremely detailed.
14:02 Interestingly enough,
14:03 the safety norm was based on the idea that
14:07 if there was an explosion,
14:08 it was because
14:11 the engine man had made a mistake.
14:13 And for instance,
14:14 the safety norm made compulsory
14:17 this kind of safety valves which were not accessible.
14:21 To
14:22 the engine man,
14:24 the engine man,
14:25 I don't know,
14:25 I mean
14:27 the worker,
14:28 the idea was that the worker would overload the safety valve
14:32 to get more pressure and more power from the machine,
14:34 right,
14:34 so it was dangerous.
14:35 So you had to forbid this action,
14:37 make it impossible by creating
14:39 a protected safety valve.
14:43 Despite all the regulations,
14:46 all the
14:47 all the safety devices which were invented to
14:50 make the steam engine kind of an automaton,
14:53 steam engines always exploded.
14:56 I mean
14:56 there are many different reasons why steam engines explode.
14:59 There is even like
15:01 a kind of scientific field which is developed around
15:04 the discovery of why safety,
15:06 why
15:07 steam engines explodes,
15:08 I mean why steam boiler explodes.
15:11 I'm not going to enter many details,
15:13 but there are always issues about the safety norm that
15:18 the safety norm could not have anticipated anyway
15:21 when the when the when the steam boiler exploded in France.
15:27 The tricky situation
15:30 was that normally the safety,
15:33 normally the steam engine could not have exploded because it had been
15:36 normalized and because there was a mining engineer
15:40 who had certified the safety
15:42 of the engine.
15:44 And that has an interesting political dimension because
15:48 the mining engineer in charge of the safety of steam boiler
15:53 had a tendency to shift the blame on the worker,
15:56 and there is a striking discrepancy between
15:59 the way liability is organized in Britain and
16:02 the way liability is organized in France.
16:05 In Britain,
16:07 most of the time when there is an explosion,
16:10 what is what is blamed is the poor maintenance of the boiler.
16:15 And in front,
16:15 it's rather the bad behavior
16:18 of the worker.
16:20 And this is because of the safety norm,
16:22 because
16:22 of the guarantee that the government had provided of the safety of the boiler,
16:27 right.
16:28 If the boiler was poorly maintained in a way the
16:32 mining engineer was in part responsible for the explosion,
16:35 that's why they reporter need to shift the blame
16:37 to the worker.
16:40 OK,
16:40 now
16:41 what happens in Britain?
16:43 The British government and the British entrepreneurs,
16:46 more than the British government,
16:48 were very skeptical about the efficiency of safety norm
16:52 of standards.
16:53 They thought it was a way to,
16:55 it would stifle innovation.
16:57 It would create interference from inspectors
17:01 in their,
17:02 in their business,
17:03 and they didn't want that.
17:05 So
17:06 I mean what is striking is whereas in France there is a safety norm as early as 1822,
17:12 in Britain at several times in the 19th
17:15 century after a series of explosions there were
17:17 inquests,
17:18 parliamentary inquests on the safety of steam boilers and
17:23 The the the the the the safety norm,
17:25 the standard was refused,
17:26 was rejected.
17:27 One has to wait
17:29 1852 for maritime steam boiler to be normalized.
17:33 In 1902
17:35 for
17:37 industrial steam boiler to be normalized,
17:39 so one century,
17:41 almost a century delay,
17:42 right?
17:44 It doesn't mean that nothing is done about safety,
17:47 the safety of boilers in Britain.
17:50 after 1852,
17:54 there is a series of explosions in Britain.
17:57 And
17:59 a major engineer called Fairbairn.
18:02 really thought the,
18:03 the,
18:03 the,
18:03 the,
18:03 the the British uh entrepreneurs had to act,
18:07 otherwise,
18:08 there would be
18:09 a,
18:09 a kind of
18:10 safety norm
18:11 imposed
18:12 in Britain.
18:14 And the solution was self-regulation.
18:17 The solution was to say we have to create
18:20 an inspection system.
18:23 In many ways it was a way for like elite entrepreneurs to gain control
18:28 on
18:29 less,
18:30 uh,
18:31 I mean
18:31 less wealthy
18:33 steam boiler owners
18:34 because I mean the explosion took place
18:37 not necessarily in the like the the most important
18:41 manufacturers,
18:41 right?
18:42 It was rather in the kind of
18:43 less prosperous manufacturers.
18:46 Um,
18:48 The,
18:49 the,
18:49 the,
18:49 the first solution of a steam bowlers steam
18:53 bowler Owner Association was a failure,
18:56 and in 1969.
18:59 There is the creation of the first steam boiler insurance company
19:03 or early 1960s,
19:04 the steam boiler insurance companies.
19:08 I mean,
19:08 this,
19:08 this was a huge success.
19:10 In a very,
19:11 in a few years,
19:12 there were
19:14 several
19:15 like
19:16 40,000 boilers that would be insured,
19:18 you know,
19:18 like a significant amount,
19:20 like half of the steam of the steam boilers in Britain would be insured.
19:24 And the insurance companies.
19:27 Their objective was to reduce
19:29 the number of explosions,
19:31 so it's not so much to compensate for the accidents.
19:34 They really
19:36 had a very impressive way of
19:38 proposing services of maintenance of steam boilers.
19:42 They had really a different culture about accidents,
19:45 as I told you,
19:46 when an explosion occurred
19:48 in France,
19:49 most of the time,
19:49 the answer was the safety norm was not respected.
19:53 When the when an explosion
19:56 occurred in Britain,
19:56 it was rather
19:58 the maintenance of the steam boiler was,
20:00 was not really,
20:01 uh,
20:01 was not really good.
20:03 And it was really a way of seeing the object
20:05 through um
20:07 through time.
20:08 I mean,
20:08 the,
20:09 the premium of the insurance would increase very quite steeply with the aging,
20:14 with the age of boilers.
20:16 In France,
20:18 the idea was that if the steam boiler respected the safety norm,
20:21 it had to be safe for all its lifetime.
20:23 That's why there were such thick
20:26 plates on French steam boilers at one point.
20:28 It was to anticipate
20:29 the wear and tear
20:33 of boilers.
20:35 So
20:36 actually the steam boilers were quite good.
20:39 The steam boilers were quite good at reducing the risk.
20:43 I mean this is
20:45 a statistics
20:46 about steam boiler explosions,
20:48 the number of explosions in Britain,
20:50 and the number of casualties.
20:52 As you can see,
20:53 there is a strong increase
20:56 in the 1950s that creates
20:59 the incentive to put in place
21:02 steam boiler
21:04 insurance.
21:05 And
21:06 after the 1870s when the steambolar insurance starts to have
21:10 a major impact,
21:12 that really creates a drastic reduction in terms of the risk
21:17 of steambolar explosions.
21:20 Another graph which
21:22 shows more or less the same thing with a comparison with France.
21:26 Basically,
21:26 the risk in France and Britain was quite similar
21:29 in the first part of the 19th century,
21:31 around 6 to 7
21:33 explosions per 10,000 boilers.
21:36 And then
21:37 after the 1870s,
21:39 you can see the effect of steam boiler insurance.
21:43 Basically in Britain,
21:44 you had two kinds of um.
21:47 Two populations of boilers,
21:48 the one which were insured,
21:49 which were really safe,
21:51 and the ones which were not insured,
21:52 which were not that safe.
21:54 And in France with the safety norm,
21:56 you had a kind of average
21:58 situation,
21:58 right?
21:59 That's why the risk was quite similar,
22:01 but probably with far more discrepancy in Britain and
22:05 like a more average situation in France.
22:08 But
22:09 after the 1860s and 1870s,
22:12 more and more the French government
22:14 Understand that the safety norm is obsolete,
22:17 that it has not really succeeded in creating safety.
22:20 There are too many boilers for the French
22:23 mining administration
22:25 to inspect all the boilers,
22:26 basically.
22:29 The inspection,
22:30 I mean the official inspection could have worked when
22:32 there were like a few thousands of boilers,
22:34 but after the 1860s you had,
22:36 I mean,
22:36 like
22:37 60,000 boilers
22:40 which are starting to make too much work in a way.
22:43 You had like also private engineers who were expert on safety on steam boilers,
22:49 you know,
22:49 probably better expert than the mining engineers which were civil servants.
22:55 And so in the 1860s there is a local association from the eastern part of France
23:03 who kind of mimicked the British way and also the German way actually,
23:07 which created an association of
23:10 of owners of steam boilers
23:12 who would self regulate.
23:15 And this is really like the convergence of both systems in a way.
23:19 At the end of the 19th century,
23:21 the French system and the British system were roughly similar.
23:25 There were,
23:26 I mean,
23:26 the regulation was,
23:27 was really similar.
23:29 Um,
23:31 I want to conclude on the fact that
23:35 We should perhaps,
23:36 uh,
23:37 you know.
23:38 I mean,
23:38 I have
23:40 the need to explain that regulation had effect at this effect or that effect.
23:44 Um,
23:45 we should also study steam boilers in their very local context.
23:48 And that's probably one of the major reasons
23:51 for the huge discrepancy of the number of explosions
23:54 in the US and in Europe.
23:57 A fact which is not very well known,
23:59 but in the US,
24:01 more timberers were used in the countryside and in the forests than in cities.
24:07 For in the end of the,
24:08 at the end of the 19th century,
24:09 you had really,
24:11 I mean,
24:13 More than,
24:13 I mean they are not good statistics,
24:15 but we know that
24:16 more than 8 or 9000
24:19 agricultural steam boilers were produced per year.
24:22 So we can imagine really a huge number of steam boilers working in the fields
24:27 for agricultural reasons,
24:29 in the forestry in the same way,
24:30 and they were much less safe.
24:31 That's why there is such a huge discrepancy between
24:33 the explosions in the US and in Europe.
24:36 So the local contexts play a key role.
24:39 And the last thing I wanted to say is to emphasize that the
24:44 fact that workers had also their own ideas about how to regulate properly
24:48 steam boilers.
24:49 And for them,
24:50 the issue was to
24:52 really,
24:53 it was about power.
24:55 It was really about who has the power to decide
24:58 how you use the steam boiler.
25:02 Workers were considered as responsible in case of accidents in many,
25:07 many trials,
25:08 in many
25:09 after many accidents,
25:10 so they explained that if we're responsible,
25:12 we have to be in charge and really in charge.
25:15 And so there are really different ways of
25:19 discussing about how to produce safety,
25:21 and
25:22 I think
25:23 we should not overestimate the impact of this or that regulation.
25:27 In the end it's about the pressure,
25:30 the local pressure on the steam engine and who has the power
25:32 in
25:34 in the factory.
25:36 OK.
25:36 I will stop here.
25:37 I will.
25:37 I hope I was clear enough.
25:40 And I'm happy to,
25:41 to try to answer your questions.
25:46 Thanks a lot,
25:47 Jean Baptiste.
25:47 Let me.
25:49 Open the floor to question if
25:59 Yeah,
25:59 Say.
26:02 Hi,
26:02 thank you.
26:03 Yeah,
26:03 uh,
26:04 thank you,
26:04 Professor,
26:04 for this,
26:05 uh,
26:05 uh,
26:06 great presentation and,
26:07 and,
26:07 and for the,
26:07 uh,
26:09 You know,
26:09 for the first facts about,
26:10 um,
26:11 you know,
26:12 what,
26:12 what determined,
26:13 uh,
26:14 climate change and,
26:15 you know,
26:15 the link between climate change and deforestation and,
26:18 and,
26:18 uh,
26:19 and sort of,
26:19 uh,
26:20 you know,
26:20 the,
26:20 the,
26:21 the environmental damage.
26:22 But,
26:22 but let me,
26:23 let me focus on the,
26:24 uh,
26:26 On the,
26:27 on the boilers,
26:28 uh,
26:29 example.
26:30 So,
26:30 so I guess the,
26:31 the first question is,
26:35 Why do you think the,
26:36 the,
26:37 um,
26:38 In England,
26:40 they did not,
26:41 you know,
26:41 when,
26:41 when the
26:43 owner association got together and decided to,
26:46 to basically use insurance as a,
26:49 as a,
26:49 as a mechanism to,
26:50 to,
26:51 to enforce safety,
26:52 why did,
26:53 why was it voluntary and not,
26:56 and not,
26:56 uh,
26:57 compulsory,
26:58 um,
26:59 uh,
27:01 you know,
27:01 creating this,
27:02 this dichotomy between the older,
27:05 the older systems and the,
27:06 and the newer systems,
27:07 um.
27:08 So,
27:08 that,
27:08 and then,
27:09 and then basically when France transitioned,
27:12 you know,
27:12 from,
27:13 from using inspectors to using
27:16 insurance,
27:16 uh,
27:17 you know,
27:17 insurance agents,
27:19 um,
27:19 you know,
27:19 was it,
27:20 was it also voluntary or was it then
27:23 mandatory in,
27:24 in France and,
27:25 and,
27:25 and so,
27:25 why,
27:26 why,
27:26 why that?
27:27 And then,
27:27 and then a clarification,
27:29 professor.
27:29 So,
27:30 um,
27:32 So I'm,
27:32 so I'm a bit,
27:33 so I'm a bit confused,
27:34 right,
27:34 because,
27:34 so on the one hand,
27:36 um,
27:37 you know,
27:37 the insurance premium
27:39 raises,
27:40 you know,
27:40 increases steeply with the age of the boiler,
27:43 uh,
27:44 but at the same time,
27:46 I,
27:46 I think you're saying that.
27:48 Maintenance is key,
27:49 right?
27:49 And so,
27:50 and in fact,
27:50 the insurance company offered plans for,
27:53 for the maintenance.
27:54 So they,
27:54 they came in and inspected
27:56 and made sure that everything was clean.
27:58 So,
27:59 so if maintenance is that important,
28:01 then why,
28:02 why is the age of the boiler?
28:03 I mean,
28:03 are,
28:03 are you saying that
28:05 older systems require more maintenance,
28:07 or,
28:07 you know,
28:08 what,
28:08 what,
28:08 what's the,
28:09 you know,
28:09 because I mean if it's about cleaning and oiling and stuff.
28:13 I mean,
28:13 I would,
28:14 I would imagine that then maybe age,
28:16 you know,
28:16 you know,
28:17 an older boiler could,
28:18 could last longer.
28:19 So anyway,
28:20 sorry,
28:20 I,
28:20 I,
28:21 you know,
28:21 as you can see,
28:22 I'm not a,
28:23 I'm not an engineer,
28:24 so I have no idea what the,
28:26 what the trade-offs are there.
28:27 But,
28:27 um,
28:28 oh sorry,
28:28 and you know,
28:29 sorry,
28:30 one last question,
28:31 and you know you take them as you want,
28:33 but basically,
28:34 would it be fair to say that
28:37 Um,
28:38 early on in France,
28:40 there was more of a focus on,
28:43 on safety,
28:43 and so,
28:44 you know,
28:44 you had really engineers and you had scient scientists,
28:48 you know,
28:48 thinking about
28:50 safety features,
28:51 uh,
28:52 and so that the baseline was maybe
28:55 the design and,
28:56 and,
28:57 and,
28:57 and the design and construction of
28:59 maybe safer boilers and so,
29:01 and if that's the case then.
29:03 Did these features eventually find their way
29:07 into the UK,
29:08 right?
29:08 And so,
29:09 you know,
29:09 was there like a sort of a knowledge of,
29:11 a,
29:11 a transfer of knowledge
29:13 from France to the UK saying,
29:15 look,
29:15 I mean,
29:15 these guys are actually,
29:17 you know,
29:17 the safety feature that's
29:19 You know,
29:19 easy to adapt and easy to,
29:21 easy to implement in our boilers.
29:24 Maybe we should do it because,
29:25 you know,
29:25 that,
29:26 that sort of,
29:26 you know,
29:27 uh,
29:27 you know,
29:28 kind of,
29:28 you know,
29:28 it reduces
29:29 accidents.
29:30 And so,
29:31 so,
29:31 so,
29:31 you know,
29:31 yeah,
29:32 in other words,
29:32 was innovation in France,
29:35 you know,
29:35 sort of imported into,
29:36 into England,
29:37 at least,
29:37 you know,
29:38 at least the,
29:39 the,
29:39 the know-how,
29:40 right,
29:40 to,
29:40 to,
29:40 to,
29:41 to improve safety of boilers.
29:44 So that's,
29:44 you know,
29:45 OK,
29:45 you know,
29:45 sorry,
29:46 all over the place,
29:47 but,
29:47 but,
29:47 you know,
29:48 take it,
29:48 take them as you,
29:49 as you,
29:49 as you wish.
29:51 I'm going to take them in order.
29:52 So about the voluntary,
29:54 uh,
29:54 I mean,
29:55 is it voluntary or not?
29:56 Um,
29:57 for the case of Britain,
29:58 it's certainly not compulsory.
30:00 That's clear because,
30:01 I mean,
30:02 insurance companies keep complaining
30:04 about the problem that they only cover at the end of the 19th century,
30:07 only half of the borders.
30:09 So it's true that it is not compulsory.
30:11 Uh,
30:12 and they are fighting for to,
30:13 to make it compulsory,
30:14 right,
30:14 but they failed.
30:15 I,
30:15 I,
30:15 I don't know why,
30:16 but sorry,
30:17 professor,
30:17 yeah,
30:17 professor,
30:18 just,
30:18 just to be clear,
30:19 so
30:19 basically because of the,
30:21 because of the,
30:22 of the.
30:24 The premiums,
30:25 right,
30:25 because of the premiums increase a lot with age.
30:28 So I guess what kind of,
30:30 you know,
30:30 what kind of boilers were not insured typically the older ones,
30:33 right,
30:33 the more expensive ones to insure,
30:35 or what,
30:35 or
30:36 do you have a sense of,
30:37 you know,
30:38 I,
30:38 my sense is I,
30:39 I,
30:39 I,
30:40 I,
30:40 I can't really know,
30:41 but I guess it's where it's the entrepreneurs
30:43 with less.
30:45 I mean,
30:45 I think that there is at the beginning,
30:47 in the 18th when
30:49 the system is created.
30:51 In the 1850s,
30:53 it's really like a kind of bunch of elite engineers.
30:58 William Fairbairn is really like a key specialist about material fatigue,
31:01 for instance.
31:02 He's really a major engineer.
31:03 He has a construction company,
31:04 so
31:05 it's really an elite engineer
31:06 who said that we have to do things properly as we do
31:10 ourselves,
31:10 right?
31:12 And we have to,
31:13 uh,
31:14 to,
31:14 to diffuse the best practices on,
31:17 on poorer or less
31:20 well equipped,
31:20 equipped
31:22 companies,
31:22 factories,
31:23 right?
31:23 So I think
31:24 uh it's,
31:25 it's rather this divide.
31:28 I would say
31:29 end of the 19th century or 1880s,
31:32 like half of the boilers are insured and the other half is not,
31:34 and it's really
31:36 a problem.
31:36 I mean,
31:37 people like,
31:37 I mean,
31:39 insurance companies are complaining about that,
31:41 saying it should be made compulsory,
31:42 but it is not.
31:43 I can't tell you why.
31:44 I've,
31:45 I mean,
31:45 I should check in the parliamentary debates.
31:47 Perhaps there are some,
31:48 I mean,
31:49 they would explain why
31:50 the government did not choose to make it compulsory.
31:54 I think
31:55 we should not
31:56 underestimate the
31:59 I mean
32:00 when the safety norm is invoked
32:03 in the British parliamentary
32:05 discussion.
32:07 The idea that the government could even enter
32:10 the factory
32:11 is a big issue.
32:12 Just entering the factory,
32:13 right?
32:14 So we should not underestimate the,
32:15 the,
32:15 the very strong
32:16 importance of respecting private property.
32:20 Uh,
32:20 that,
32:20 that was really uh striking.
32:23 Um
32:25 And uh once again the,
32:27 the,
32:27 the insurance company was a way to
32:29 protect from the government from the interference of the government.
32:32 It was presented like that,
32:33 right?
32:35 But but safety,
32:35 safety is a public,
32:36 you know,
32:37 safety is,
32:37 uh,
32:37 is in the realm of the,
32:39 of the government,
32:39 right,
32:40 such as pollution might be right.
32:42 So environmental concerns,
32:43 you know,
32:44 London was super polluted and actions were taken.
32:47 Yeah,
32:48 so
32:49 the first time there is something about pollution in in Britain,
32:52 it's in 1862.
32:54 It's the Alkali Act,
32:55 so it's quite late,
32:56 you know.
32:57 We are talking about the second part of the 19th century.
33:00 Sorry,
33:00 was that,
33:00 was that,
33:01 was that when,
33:01 I'm sorry,
33:02 I,
33:02 I,
33:03 I know London,
33:03 London at the peak
33:05 was far more polluted than now is Delhi,
33:08 right?
33:08 Or,
33:08 or that Delhi ever was.
33:09 So,
33:10 so sorry,
33:10 when,
33:10 when is that relative to the act?
33:12 I'm sorry,
33:13 I,
33:13 I just,
33:13 the alkali Act is not about London.
33:17 It's about,
33:18 uh,
33:18 the alkali manufacturer.
33:20 It's Whitney's in Saint Helens near Manchester,
33:22 basically,
33:23 or between,
33:24 or between.
33:25 I mean it's like small villages that's
33:27 really transforming the hub of alkali production.
33:30 Alkali is a key,
33:32 I mean is a key chemicals.
33:34 It allows you to make all sorts of things,
33:36 so it's really a massive industry,
33:38 and they produce
33:39 more alkali here than anywhere in Europe in the 1860s,
33:42 and the pollution is absolutely horrific.
33:46 I mean there are no trees miles around,
33:48 right?
33:48 We're talking about really massive transformation of the landscape.
33:52 The canals are so acid that the hulls of the
33:54 ship are attacked by the acidity of the water.
33:57 So I mean really,
33:58 really enormous pollution,
33:59 and it is only at that time,
34:00 you know,
34:01 that the government start to do something,
34:03 right?
34:03 So I mean
34:04 really the,
34:05 the,
34:05 the,
34:06 the absence of governments in Britain is really striking.
34:12 Um,
34:13 for the safety of workers,
34:15 the first norm which has never been reapplied is 1842.
34:19 It's about protecting some,
34:20 um,
34:22 some,
34:22 uh,
34:23 you know,
34:23 um,
34:23 moving pieces of machines need to have a kind of protection,
34:27 right?
34:28 So it's quite late.
34:29 I mean,
34:29 it's not that late 1842,
34:30 but
34:31 I mean,
34:32 interestingly enough,
34:32 actually,
34:32 the workers complain about norms
34:35 because they are paid by piece.
34:37 It's piecework.
34:39 So if it's slow.
34:40 If it's slow their,
34:41 uh,
34:41 the,
34:42 the production,
34:43 uh,
34:44 they see that as a kind of reduction of,
34:46 of their,
34:46 of their wages,
34:47 right?
34:47 So,
34:47 I mean,
34:47 it's,
34:48 uh,
34:49 it's a complex,
34:50 uh,
34:50 it's a complex issue here.
34:52 So,
34:52 uh,
34:53 just to finish about voluntary or not,
34:55 uh,
34:55 in France,
34:56 it was,
34:57 there was a law
34:58 in 1882 which makes inspection compulsory,
35:01 be it from civil servant,
35:04 mining engineer or
35:06 Uh,
35:07 uh,
35:07 a boiler owner associations
35:09 or an insurance,
35:10 uh,
35:10 a boiler insurance company,
35:12 it is compulsory,
35:13 right?
35:13 So it
35:14 once again there's a,
35:15 uh,
35:15 uh,
35:16 quite a difference,
35:17 um.
35:19 About the age of boiler,
35:20 that's a good question.
35:21 I,
35:22 I think
35:23 I,
35:23 I,
35:23 I should have to check again.
35:24 I think the,
35:25 the,
35:26 the rise of the premium is
35:28 uh
35:29 when you enter
35:30 the insurance scheme.
35:31 So your boiler is old,
35:32 you pay a much higher,
35:34 uh,
35:35 but then when it is properly maintained,
35:37 the premium reduces,
35:38 OK?
35:40 For,
35:41 uh,
35:44 for safety,
35:44 there is a third question and I forgot
35:46 about innovation,
35:48 uh,
35:49 the transfer of knowledge,
35:50 yeah,
35:50 for the safety valve that was developed in France,
35:54 whether the safety valves are not.
35:56 I'm not sure.
35:56 I mean,
35:57 basically there is a safety valve in Britain.
35:58 There is a safety valve in France.
36:00 It doesn't mean,
36:00 I mean,
36:00 it's not because it's not
36:02 compulsory by law that it is not used in Britain.
36:05 I mean the same kind of devices are used in Britain
36:07 like the safety valve is used in most of the boilers.
36:09 It's something
36:10 I mean it's indispensable in a way,
36:12 but you,
36:13 I mean.
36:14 What is true is that the British are very impressed by
36:18 the knowledge production around steam
36:21 and the behavior of steam
36:23 by the French Academy of Science.
36:24 You know,
36:24 you've got like famous scientists making very minute
36:28 measurements.
36:28 It's not very useful,
36:29 but
36:30 they do that,
36:30 so this is impressive.
36:32 You've got examples of safety devices.
36:35 I'm not going to enter into too many details,
36:36 but for the
36:37 gas lighting.
36:39 There is a device
36:40 which allows the pressure on the pipe
36:42 that transports the gas to be stable.
36:46 It's called gaso compensator,
36:47 and it is something which then is exported to Britain.
36:50 So you've got like,
36:51 there are many other devices coming from Britain
36:53 and most of the innovations came from Britain.
36:55 So
36:56 I don't want to,
36:57 you know,
36:57 enter into
36:58 at the end of the 19th century,
36:59 it is true that.
37:02 There is a specific
37:04 design of boilers which are supposed to be
37:08 which cannot explode,
37:09 which are invented in France and have quite a
37:10 significant success for maritime boilers around the world.
37:13 So I mean,
37:14 but I don't want to say this is about,
37:16 you know,
37:16 the safety norm.
37:17 It's probably other reasons.
37:18 They are more efficient as well.
37:20 And there was another question about safety design versus
37:25 No,
37:25 perhaps I answered all the questions.
37:26 That's right.
37:27 That's it,
37:27 yeah,
37:27 yeah,
37:27 yeah,
37:27 yeah.
37:29 Yeah.
37:29 Sorry.
37:30 Well,
37:30 if,
37:30 if I may follow up,
37:31 uh,
37:31 uh,
37:32 so,
37:32 on friends,
37:34 uh,
37:34 and,
37:34 and again,
37:35 maybe you,
37:35 you don't have the data,
37:36 but it would be very nice.
37:39 So if you take France and the transition from,
37:42 you know,
37:42 inspectors,
37:43 you know,
37:44 government inspectors,
37:45 safety inspectors to the
37:47 inspectors coming from the,
37:49 from the industry,
37:50 uh,
37:50 right,
37:51 you know,
37:51 so once you transition from,
37:53 say,
37:53 the public,
37:54 you know,
37:54 the public,
37:55 uh,
37:56 uh,
37:56 sector to the private sector,
37:58 that,
37:58 that,
37:58 that can basically,
38:00 uh,
38:00 stimulate the growth of boilers,
38:02 whether that actually
38:03 if you have the number of boilers.
38:06 Whether that kind of,
38:07 you know,
38:07 so whether that unleashes,
38:08 right,
38:08 I mean,
38:09 you know,
38:09 part of the problem,
38:10 part of the,
38:11 part of the reason for why you wanna,
38:13 why France transition into,
38:16 into insurance and,
38:17 and the private sector is because they,
38:19 you know,
38:19 there,
38:19 there was no capacity
38:21 to,
38:21 to,
38:21 to,
38:22 to monitor all these,
38:23 all these boilers,
38:24 right?
38:24 And so,
38:25 and so the question is basically once they allow for insurance.
38:28 Uh,
38:29 you know,
38:29 the,
38:29 the,
38:29 the insurance inspectors to actually,
38:31 uh,
38:32 you know,
38:32 track compliance and safety
38:34 whether there was actually an explosion of,
38:36 of,
38:36 of boilers,
38:38 uh,
38:38 around that time and,
38:39 you know,
38:39 whether that's something that,
38:40 you know,
38:41 there would be data to actually track that and,
38:43 and,
38:43 I mean,
38:43 and see that
38:45 the,
38:45 um,
38:45 the causality is really the number of boilers expand
38:48 because of economic growth basically and catch up after
38:52 1870,
38:53 uh,
38:55 and.
38:56 And then you've got the private system coming because there are too many
38:59 boilers and actually the safety norm was not respected anymore after the 1860s,
39:03 like the thickness of the boilerplate,
39:05 all that was not even respected.
39:07 It was not,
39:07 I mean,
39:08 the,
39:09 the industry would not comply to the safety norm.
39:12 So it is under Napoleon III,
39:13 1865 that there is a kind of,
39:16 you know,
39:17 they cut down many aspects of the safety
39:20 of the old regulations.
39:22 Right,
39:22 so it's at the same time that insurance companies enter.
39:25 I see.
39:27 Um,
39:29 so,
39:29 I mean,
39:30 basically,
39:30 what was it,
39:31 I think we should not overemphasize the importance of this
39:35 way of regulation on the economy.
39:36 It's rather the economy that is the driving force and the regulation try to adapt.
39:41 So that's why the case of France in the 1820s is strange,
39:45 you know,
39:45 because they're,
39:46 I mean,
39:46 why they could do that is because there were so few steam boilers at that time.
39:50 You know,
39:50 we are talking about a couple of hundreds of boilers,
39:53 like 200 or something like that.
39:55 It's very easy to regulate,
39:56 you know,
39:56 you can,
39:57 you have the staff to regulate 200 boilers.
39:59 You don't have the staff to regulate 60,000 boilers.
40:02 I mean,
40:02 once again,
40:03 the mining engineers,
40:04 they are very elite.
40:06 They come from Ecole
40:07 Polytechnique.
40:08 Uh,
40:09 they,
40:09 there are very few of them
40:11 in each department.
40:12 You've got,
40:12 uh,
40:12 I don't know,
40:13 4 or 5 mining engineers.
40:14 So
40:15 for,
40:16 for if,
40:17 if it's like an industrialized part of France,
40:19 you don't have the staff to,
40:21 to,
40:21 to really look after the borders basically.
40:25 Thank you so much.
40:27 Thank you,
40:27 Philip.
40:31 Yeah,
40:31 thank you so much for,
40:32 for the excellent presentation.
40:34 Um,
40:35 I'd like one question,
40:36 and,
40:36 and I'm sorry if,
40:37 um,
40:38 if you may have explained it.
40:39 I actually like um uh joined a little bit late,
40:42 but I'm curious about the role of standards
40:44 for the inspections itself.
40:46 So like when the insurance companies send inspectors,
40:50 like how important were standards that they all follow the same kind of like,
40:54 you know,
40:55 technical guidelines on how to inspect,
40:58 that's on the one hand,
40:59 and on the other one is
41:01 um
41:03 Were there any schemes in place to
41:06 lower premiums if firms followed standards for maintenance,
41:10 for example,
41:11 or if they actually used
41:13 boilers as per specific specifications so that then,
41:16 you know,
41:17 the insurance was lower or like the
41:19 inspection intervals were like um less frequent.
41:22 Um,
41:23 so I'm like interested in kind of like the
41:24 interaction of standards with the inspection scheme um regime.
41:29 That's.
41:30 Basically,
41:32 the insurance company would not apply standards.
41:35 They would rather check the maintenance,
41:36 and
41:37 it's not like the same thing as just,
41:39 you know,
41:39 checking boxes,
41:40 and it's really about the kind of water you use,
41:44 if the boiler is clean and well maintained,
41:46 if there is the calcite deposit inside the boiler.
41:50 I mean,
41:50 one reason why it's,
41:52 sorry,
41:52 I knew actually why
41:53 the answer to your question,
41:54 why
41:55 inspection was not made compulsory,
41:57 it's because it's annoying.
41:58 You have to stop
42:00 the factory while
42:01 the boiler is inspected because you have to inspect inside the boiler.
42:04 So you have,
42:04 you have to,
42:05 to shut down everything and open it,
42:06 you know,
42:06 so it's,
42:07 it's,
42:07 yeah,
42:07 it's an interference and the,
42:09 and the inspections in Britain,
42:11 there are at least 5 times a year
42:13 and there are 1 or 2 interior inspections per year.
42:16 So it's,
42:16 it's,
42:17 I mean,
42:18 it has an impact on,
42:19 on the,
42:19 on the,
42:20 on the production.
42:21 Uh,
42:23 and,
42:24 no,
42:24 basically the
42:26 The,
42:27 the insurance company,
42:28 they insist more on the quality of the metal.
42:30 It's,
42:31 it's more qualitative.
42:32 It's not like the thickness of the plate.
42:33 It's more qualitative,
42:36 and they,
42:36 they really insist on proper good care,
42:39 proper maintenance,
42:40 very,
42:40 I mean,
42:41 kind of,
42:42 you know,
42:42 not very clear
42:44 standards.
42:44 That's really the major difference with France,
42:46 but you've got
42:47 a minimum thickness to respect.
42:49 You've got the diameter of safety valve,
42:50 which is defined by law,
42:52 etc.
42:52 etc.
42:54 Thank you.
42:56 I mean,
42:56 one last thing that I didn't say,
42:58 uh,
42:58 what I
42:59 found interesting or
43:01 I mean surprising.
43:04 The insurance company
43:05 really defended the worker
43:07 in case of accidents.
43:09 Why?
43:10 Because their aim was to sell
43:12 insurance policies
43:14 to entrepreneurs,
43:15 so they had to make the entrepreneur responsible.
43:18 So after accidents in Britain in the 1850s,
43:21 you've got like pamphlets published by the,
43:24 by the insurance companies.
43:25 1860s rather
43:27 explained that you know this is really unfair to
43:29 blame the worker where they are never responsible.
43:32 What is what is at stake is really the maintenance
43:35 of the border and therefore the responsibility of the entrepreneur.
43:38 So by my insurance company,
43:40 by my insurance policy,
43:41 right?
43:41 So
43:42 that's why there is such a discrepancy between
43:45 the way
43:46 the judicial.
43:48 Deal with accidents in France and in Britain in the 1860s
43:51 where you've got mining engineers trying to protect themselves,
43:54 saying that it's the fault of the worker.
43:57 He was drunk.
44:00 He was not paying attention,
44:01 so the boiler got empty,
44:02 and then when the boiler is empty,
44:04 it starts to heat
44:06 very quickly.
44:07 And if you open the valve and
44:09 insert water at that moment,
44:11 of course the water just evaporates suddenly.
44:13 It creates a lot of pressure and the boiler explodes.
44:15 That's one of the theory
44:16 for boiler explosion.
44:18 And in Britain,
44:18 it was,
44:19 it was really the maintenance and the,
44:21 and the,
44:22 and the,
44:22 and the owner of the boiler which was really under
44:26 to blame.
44:28 Um,
44:29 Professor Ley.
44:36 I think she has a question.
44:37 Yes,
44:38 I'm,
44:38 am I here?
44:39 Yes,
44:39 OK.
44:40 Uh,
44:41 yes,
44:41 thanks so much for this.
44:42 This is really fascinating research,
44:44 and I'm,
44:45 um.
44:47 Also enjoyed very much your opening comments
44:50 about climate risk and the long history
44:53 of concerns about that.
44:55 Um,
44:55 in your paper,
44:56 you,
44:57 uh,
44:58 mentioned a couple of times the United States'
45:01 experience with
45:03 safety standards,
45:04 steam boiler regulation in particular.
45:07 Um,
45:07 and I would
45:08 be,
45:09 this is just a comment,
45:10 I would,
45:10 uh,
45:12 Certainly encourage you to try and expand
45:14 the research you've done on Britain and France
45:17 in the 19th century to include the United States and I would say also Germany.
45:22 Um,
45:23 I've,
45:23 that I think would make a really interesting 4-part,
45:27 um,
45:27 comparison
45:29 and,
45:29 and my question is,
45:31 uh,
45:31 actually related to what
45:33 the background,
45:34 uh,
45:35 for,
45:35 for,
45:36 uh,
45:36 encouraging you to expand the comparative study.
45:40 Um,
45:40 is about the
45:42 difference in political structures,
45:45 uh,
45:46 in your case here,
45:47 Britain and France.
45:48 The early regulations
45:50 in France are coming out of the ministries.
45:53 Um,
45:53 in,
45:54 in Britain,
45:56 throughout the story,
45:57 it seems like it's a
45:58 legislative matter,
46:00 a parliamentary matter,
46:02 um,
46:02 and I wonder if you have some thoughts about what difference
46:05 that makes to the,
46:07 um,
46:08 nature of the standards
46:09 and the political process
46:11 around which standards are created or not.
46:14 Yeah,
46:15 um.
46:17 About the,
46:18 I mean,
46:19 it's not so much the nature of the study,
46:20 but rather
46:21 the nature of the expertise
46:23 which is quite different and
46:25 I was,
46:26 I mean,
46:26 I've studied in detail how
46:29 expertise was produced
46:31 in France and Britain for,
46:33 you know,
46:33 trying to define standards,
46:35 and basically what was striking was that in the
46:37 case of the parliament it was oral procedure.
46:41 So
46:42 the department would interview witnesses,
46:45 and there would be a great variety of witnesses,
46:49 entrepreneurs,
46:49 technicians,
46:50 engineers,
46:51 neighbors who would complain against gas holders
46:55 or steam engines.
46:57 And in France you don't have this variety of people
47:00 because the way it is organized is
47:03 the government orders a report to the Academie des Sciences,
47:07 to the National Academy of Science.
47:10 And it's just scientists who write the report and
47:12 that creates a very different kind of expertise.
47:15 There is much more uncertainty about what to be done
47:18 when you read
47:19 the House of Commons or the parliamentary inquest.
47:23 Than when you read the Academie descience report
47:26 because there is a much greater variety of people,
47:28 you know,
47:29 speaking about the dangers or what I mean,
47:31 is it really a good idea to to to to to to make standards?
47:36 What you really have to regulate,
47:38 what is really the key thing to produce safety?
47:40 All this
47:41 is very blurred when you study the,
47:44 when you read the,
47:45 when you read the parliamentary inquest
47:48 because there is this oral procedure and this
47:49 great variety of witnesses that are interviewed.
47:58 OK.
47:58 OK.
47:59 James Anderson.
48:03 Thanks.
48:04 Uh,
48:04 yeah,
48:05 thanks for the presentation.
48:06 I,
48:06 I read the paper and enjoyed it last week.
48:09 And,
48:09 uh,
48:10 one of the takeaways
48:12 for me are,
48:13 I guess,
48:13 two related takeaways.
48:14 It's very
48:15 closely related to the,
48:16 the response you just gave and the,
48:18 and the previous question,
48:19 but,
48:19 uh,
48:20 one of the main takeaways was about the,
48:22 um,
48:23 The fact that the technology was developed first in Britain and then
48:27 in a way,
48:28 uh,
48:28 France had the,
48:29 the benefit of being the second mover
48:32 and seeing,
48:33 um,
48:34 you know,
48:34 the dangers and risks and,
48:36 and learning from the engineering,
48:38 etc.
48:39 um,
48:39 but I,
48:40 I was also interested in the,
48:41 um.
48:42 Uh,
48:43 activity of interest groups,
48:44 the,
48:45 the industrial groups,
48:46 and,
48:46 um,
48:47 I,
48:47 I guess that insurance as well,
48:49 um,
48:50 and how that might have played out differently in the two,
48:53 the two different
48:54 political systems.
48:55 Thanks.
48:57 OK,
48:58 um.
49:00 I mean,
49:01 insurance companies in France played a very important role
49:05 in the 1880s.
49:08 I mean,
49:08 starting from the 1880s,
49:09 they put for,
49:10 I mean they really defended the idea of
49:12 providing professional insurance for
49:15 workers' accidents.
49:17 And it was really important for them to make.
49:21 This special insurance for workers' accidents
49:25 compulsory because it was the only way
49:27 to get access to this huge markets
49:29 of the of the safety of workers.
49:31 It was not very interesting to try to sell insurance policies,
49:36 worker per worker,
49:36 of course,
49:37 because they had not the money to buy the engine.
49:39 It was a small,
49:40 small business.
49:41 But if you could create this market of
49:43 professional safety,
49:44 that,
49:44 that would be interesting.
49:46 And so there is really a rereading,
49:49 I think,
49:49 to be done of the
49:51 of the law on
49:53 on the kind of,
49:54 you know,
49:54 the first law about social security.
49:55 It's about
49:57 professional insurance,
49:58 workers' insurance.
49:59 It starts in Germany under Bismarck,
50:01 and then in France it's quite late.
50:03 It's 1898.
50:05 And most of the time it is seen as the
50:07 really the first building block of the welfare state.
50:11 It was the classic reading by
50:15 by historians.
50:17 But when you look at,
50:18 you know,
50:18 what was the incentive,
50:20 I mean,
50:20 all these laws were not so the workers didn't really want
50:23 this law
50:25 because they thought it would.
50:27 I,
50:27 I,
50:27 I,
50:27 I mean,
50:27 I,
50:28 I should say that after the 1860s,
50:30 the jurisprudence tended to be more in favor of workers
50:34 when there was an accident.
50:35 I'm not talking,
50:36 I'm not talking only about steam boilers explosure,
50:38 about
50:40 professional industrial accidents in general.
50:43 And
50:44 the fact that judges started to,
50:47 you know,
50:47 grant
50:48 indemnities,
50:50 compensation
50:51 after worker accidents was really a threat to small businesses.
50:57 And
50:58 insurance
50:59 said we have the solution.
51:01 You're going to pay on a regular basis
51:05 some some money
51:06 that would provide
51:08 for the compensation in case of accidents.
51:11 So here I mean there is clearly a kind of
51:13 lobbying being made by insurance companies from the 1880s onwards,
51:17 and it takes time for the law to be passed in 1898.
51:23 In the case of Britain,
51:24 I don't know.
51:24 I haven't studied the topic for the case of Britain,
51:26 but I know there is also a kind of law for workers'
51:30 accidents which is passed at the end of the 19th century.
51:34 It is probable that you got the same kind of flobbing as well,
51:38 but I haven't really studied the topic,
51:40 so I can't really answer for with great confidence.
51:46 All right,
51:47 I.
51:48 Maybe I'll take the,
51:49 the,
51:49 the last question,
51:50 um,
51:51 and this is a little bit outside your,
51:52 your,
51:53 your book and the presentation,
51:54 so.
51:55 Apologize for this,
51:56 but
51:57 I,
51:57 I was thinking about,
51:59 you know,
51:59 technology risk or technological risk and safety standard today,
52:04 and uh.
52:05 You know,
52:06 there are a lot of aspects,
52:07 uh,
52:07 in the French,
52:08 uh,
52:09 in the French
52:11 case that you described that,
52:12 that,
52:13 that strikes me like
52:15 the fact that,
52:15 you know,
52:16 wealthy people were,
52:17 were pushing for standards for safety and that
52:19 a rich entrepreneur were also pushing for standards,
52:22 uh,
52:22 for safety.
52:24 The industry in general benefits from,
52:26 from standard also from,
52:28 from a legal perspective saying,
52:29 you know,
52:29 we comply with the standard
52:31 and
52:32 uh we are not liable or,
52:33 or,
52:33 or,
52:34 you know,
52:34 we did the best that we could to ensure safety and then,
52:37 you know,
52:38 uh,
52:38 in,
52:38 in a sense that if accident happens,
52:40 we,
52:41 we,
52:41 we,
52:41 we,
52:41 we did the best that we could and,
52:43 and on top of that,
52:44 you know,
52:44 scientists were put in charge of designing,
52:47 uh,
52:48 you know,
52:51 The standard,
52:51 you know,
52:52 giving power to science and,
52:53 and,
52:53 and to knowledge.
52:54 Now,
52:54 if I think about,
52:56 you know,
52:56 technology risks today and,
52:57 and how much we are willing to,
52:59 to
53:00 To invest in,
53:01 in safety standard.
53:03 I think the perspective is pretty different,
53:04 you know,
53:04 the,
53:06 we,
53:07 we tend to view standard
53:08 or,
53:09 you know,
53:09 regulation even more generally as,
53:11 as a barrier to,
53:12 to innovation and to the development of,
53:14 of new technologies.
53:15 So,
53:16 um,
53:17 I was wondering,
53:18 you know,
53:18 if you have any view on,
53:20 you know.
53:22 Why we view things so differently today and,
53:25 and whether you have any view on
53:27 the type of risk that we are exposing ourselves with new technologies that,
53:31 that we are choosing not to
53:32 uh
53:33 regulate,
53:34 so to speak,
53:34 or not to impose standards on.
53:37 OK,
53:37 uh,
53:37 I,
53:37 I can answer to the first part of the question.
53:40 I think the situation was very different and,
53:42 and things were seen differently in the 1820s France
53:46 because standard was a way to involve
53:48 the scientists.
53:50 In,
53:51 in technology.
53:53 It was a way to really say that uh because we've got good scientists,
53:57 we will catch up
53:58 Britain.
53:59 We will make better,
54:00 you know,
54:00 they invented the high pressure steam engine.
54:02 Never mind,
54:02 we will do better
54:04 high pressure steam engine because
54:05 the scientists will be involved
54:07 and actually the people involved in designing standards,
54:09 they are not
54:11 only doing standard,
54:12 they're also studying the law of pressure of high pressure
54:15 at high temperature to to
54:16 to make steam engines more efficient,
54:18 to economize coal,
54:20 you know.
54:20 So it's really a more general project of
54:24 perfection,
54:24 which is really a key topic in all this literature.
54:27 And we have to take it,
54:28 I think,
54:28 literally.
54:29 It's about making the machine perfect.
54:31 We,
54:32 you know,
54:32 there is this utopia of through mathematics,
54:35 applied mathematics,
54:36 we're going to make.
54:38 The perfect
54:39 symbo,
54:40 like the best symboler possible,
54:42 right?
54:43 And the safety standard is part of this kind of utopia,
54:46 you know,
54:46 of really a kind of elite science which can
54:52 improve
54:54 objects that were invented in Britain by,
54:56 you know,
54:56 mechanics,
54:57 not really by really good scientists,
54:59 you know.
55:00 So I think that's why the,
55:01 the,
55:01 the,
55:01 the,
55:01 the,
55:02 the situation was very different in France in the 1820s.
55:06 I mean now we are much more in the situation of Britain in the
55:11 In the,
55:11 in the 1850s,
55:12 you know,
55:12 there are so many objects,
55:14 they are so complex,
55:15 they are so,
55:17 you know,
55:18 that the idea that you can have like the,
55:21 that standards are going to be
55:24 outmoded quickly.
55:26 All these,
55:26 uh,
55:27 all these,
55:27 uh,
55:28 all these arguments,
55:30 which is also,
55:30 of course,
55:31 a rhetoric as well,
55:32 uh,
55:32 are very powerful today given the complexity of the objects we are talking about.
55:36 And,
55:36 and,
55:36 uh,
55:37 and if ever we had to standardize,
55:40 uh,
55:41 Uh,
55:42 something as complex as,
55:44 I mean,
55:44 I,
55:45 I've studied also the case of railways.
55:47 In that case,
55:48 France never
55:49 imagined putting standards on all the pieces of the railway system.
55:53 It would be far too
55:54 too complex,
55:55 too impossible.
55:56 So what was,
55:57 uh,
55:59 what was decided was whether we will have a kind of a,
56:02 a posterior regulation.
56:04 When there is an accident,
56:05 we will punish
56:06 the companies.
56:08 So it's a,
56:09 it was a really,
56:09 you know,
56:10 I think the complexity of the objects makes,
56:12 make that standard are probably,
56:14 uh,
56:14 you know,
56:14 not,
56:15 not easily access.
56:16 I mean,
56:17 they're very different nowadays,
56:19 very different situation.
56:23 All right,
56:23 let me,
56:24 uh,
56:25 conclude here,
56:26 Lester.
56:28 Other question and
56:29 so,
56:29 so let me thank my,
56:31 uh,
56:31 let me conclude by thanking,
56:33 uh,
56:33 Professor Frizos for the
56:35 very interesting,
56:36 uh,
56:37 presentation and,
56:37 and all of you for the,
56:39 uh,
56:40 question and for the,
56:40 for participation.
56:42 Um,
56:43 thanks a lot
56:44 and
56:45 thank you very much.
56:47 Thank you.
56:48 Goodbye.
56:48 Thank you.
56:49 Thank you.
56:49 Bye-bye.
- add-style
- lp-body-content