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00:03 For coming for the session,

00:04 uh,

00:05 so I,

00:05 I must thank Farhahlpi for asking me to moderate the session.

00:09 Uh,

00:10 she asked me because I think she wants me to learn

00:13 about,

00:14 about climate resilience.

00:16 Um,

00:17 so,

00:18 uh,

00:18 the,

00:18 the,

00:18 the,

00:19 the,

00:19 the way that I would introduce the session is that natural

00:21 disasters that are due to climate change and other things,

00:25 they cost the world about a quarter of a trillion dollars each year,

00:29 OK.

00:30 And they also cause a lot of debts,

00:32 uh,

00:33 but most of those debts,

00:34 about 80% of them

00:36 are in low and lower middle income economies,

00:39 uh,

00:40 so we think that the severity and the frequency of

00:43 these shocks has been increasing,

00:46 and

00:46 the main question,

00:47 and that's a question for the session today,

00:49 is

00:50 how can governments

00:52 and markets make

00:54 people and enterprises,

00:56 uh,

00:57 more,

00:58 uh.

00:59 Uh,

01:01 much better at handling these shocks in the sense of actually

01:05 both not being affected them nearly as much and to

01:08 the extent that they are affected to actually rebound quicker,

01:11 right?

01:12 So

01:13 to discuss this question we have uh 3 experts and I'm going to introduce them very,

01:17 very quickly and I introduce them all at once.

01:20 Uh,

01:21 so the first one is Michael Carter.

01:22 He'll go first

01:24 and he will discuss

01:25 whether insurance markets

01:27 can build resilience of households,

01:29 OK.

01:31 So I should say a few words about Michael.

01:33 Uh,

01:33 he is distinguished professor for agricultural and Resource

01:36 Economics at the University of California Davis.

01:39 He's done a lot of work in this area

01:41 and he's going to,

01:42 uh,

01:43 uh,

01:44 he's going to share some of that with us.

01:46 The second speaker is Matt Kahn,

01:49 and he'll talk about the interactions between private investment

01:53 and government protection against climate risk.

01:56 Matt is the Provost professor of economics

01:59 at the University of Southern California.

02:01 And the third person is Eko Swehi.

02:04 Uh,

02:05 uh,

02:07 she will go 3rd,

02:08 and she will discuss how the private sector,

02:10 uh,

02:11 can increase the financial protection

02:15 for people in vulnerable countries.

02:17 Uh,

02:18 so Ekoswehi is actually,

02:19 uh,

02:20 very well qualified to do this.

02:22 Uh,

02:22 she's been involved in two innovative,

02:25 uh,

02:25 2 innovative institutions and initiatives.

02:28 The first one is the African Risk Capacity Agency.

02:31 And the other one is the Caribbean Catastrophe

02:34 Risk Insurance Facility.

02:36 She's the general secretary of the Insurance Development Forum,

02:40 which is supported by the UN and the World Bank.

02:43 So

02:44 with those introductions,

02:45 I'm going to ask Michael to start us off.

02:47 Uh,

02:47 he'll speak for between 15 and 20 minutes.

02:52 Sorry.

02:55 There you go,

02:55 Mickey.

02:58 Thank you very much.

03:01 So,

03:01 good afternoon.

03:02 It's a great honor to be here.

03:03 I'm glad to be,

03:05 uh,

03:05 speaking,

03:06 uh,

03:06 with all of you and,

03:08 uh,

03:09 and,

03:09 and on this very important topic.

03:10 So.

03:11 Uh,

03:12 the slide you see in front of you,

03:13 those are women in,

03:15 uh,

03:15 northern Kenya,

03:16 specifically Samburu County,

03:18 who

03:19 have been involved in a graduation program study we did that also combined

03:23 asset building with asset protection.

03:26 Um,

03:26 so we'll talk uh perhaps a little bit about that.

03:30 I'm really gonna,

03:30 I'm doing something slightly unwise.

03:33 Uh,

03:33 I was told by a Jesuit priest many years ago,

03:36 never try to give more than 3 messages in a single talk.

03:39 I'm actually gonna try to mash together 2 papers,

03:42 each of which has about 12 messages.

03:44 So I'm,

03:45 I'm going against,

03:46 uh,

03:46 use,

03:46 I'm going against my training,

03:48 uh,

03:48 by trying to do this,

03:49 but

03:49 hopefully you'll see why I'm,

03:51 uh,

03:51 mashing together,

03:52 uh,

03:52 these things.

03:53 Let me give a small,

03:54 uh,

03:54 amount of credit.

03:55 One paper,

03:56 uh,

03:57 is with Sarah Jansen and Nobu Ik Kagami,

03:59 and it,

03:59 it asked the question,

04:00 if insurance can change,

04:02 uh,

04:02 poverty dynamics and reduce the cost of social protection.

04:05 I'm gonna draw on just a few ideas on that.

04:08 And then the second piece of work is with,

04:10 uh,

04:10 Moa Lus and it's on,

04:12 on measuring resilience with well-defined counterfactuals.

04:15 And so I'm gonna try to make a,

04:17 a transition between,

04:18 uh,

04:18 these two things in a way that,

04:20 uh,

04:20 hopefully will prove to be,

04:22 uh,

04:22 sensible.

04:23 Uh,

04:23 so real quickly,

04:24 let me just

04:26 summarize a little bit of theory of insurance markets and the cost of,

04:29 of social protection.

04:31 So in this paper I mentioned with.

04:32 Uh,

04:33 with Sarah and,

04:33 and Nobu,

04:34 it's a,

04:34 it's a calibrated,

04:36 fairly complicated dynamic stochastic programming model.

04:39 Model assumes households are very smart,

04:41 very forward looking,

04:43 understand probability distributions,

04:45 understand how insurance works,

04:47 um,

04:48 and they,

04:48 they do the best they can in a,

04:50 in a rather difficult environment.

04:52 That model is actually calibrated on

04:54 the area of northern Kenya where we just saw those women,

04:58 uh,

04:58 a moment ago.

04:59 Um,

05:00 so

05:00 what happens in,

05:01 in this model is,

05:03 as,

05:03 as we'll see in a moment,

05:05 but

05:06 the provisioning of insurance or inducing an insurance

05:08 market and specifically an index insurance market,

05:12 uh,

05:12 for people like those women

05:13 actually has substantial impacts

05:15 on,

05:16 on poverty dynamics,

05:17 and it,

05:17 the,

05:17 uh,

05:18 the,

05:18 it has effects through three mechanisms.

05:21 The first is what I call a vulnerability reduction or resilience effect,

05:25 so it,

05:26 it keeps people from falling as far.

05:28 And so if you don't follow as far,

05:30 it doesn't take you as long obviously to get back.

05:32 Uh,

05:33 the second,

05:33 it changes investment incentives for people,

05:36 so it actually has what I call a,

05:38 uh,

05:38 a resilience dividend effect.

05:40 So we actually

05:41 alter the long term

05:43 level of poverty because,

05:45 uh,

05:45 providing insurance for people's assets actually

05:48 enhances their incentives to accumulate and wisely invest.

05:52 And the third,

05:52 which is sort of a strange one,

05:54 and when I first introduced this a few years back to Alain de Genvri at Berkeley,

05:58 he said.

05:58 You're making people pay for their own social protection,

06:01 which is true,

06:02 uh,

06:02 so in this model we're gonna look at the wisdom

06:05 of a partial government subsidy program for insurance,

06:09 um,

06:09 and that actually allows the existing government budget,

06:13 uh,

06:13 to stretch further.

06:14 So we'll get,

06:14 I'll,

06:14 I'll just summarize those results,

06:16 uh,

06:17 really,

06:17 uh,

06:18 really quickly,

06:19 and they can be summarized.

06:20 I think I've been seeing everyone say that this pointer doesn't work.

06:23 So

06:23 what we can see in these two diagrams,

06:25 I don't need to go them in,

06:26 in great detail.

06:27 But the diagram on the left is a poverty headcount that comes out of this,

06:31 uh,

06:32 this,

06:32 this long-term model over a period of 50 years.

06:35 The one on the right is the poverty gap.

06:38 The solid,

06:39 I guess it looks black line,

06:40 the uppermost line in the latter part of the period.

06:43 That's if the government,

06:44 uh,

06:45 if there's no insurance market active.

06:47 The sort of bluish

06:49 line,

06:49 which is in the,

06:50 in the middle in most of them,

06:52 is when there's an insurance market,

06:54 but the government leaves it up to people's own

06:57 devices,

06:57 whether or not they wish to purchase insurance,

07:00 and the red line is sort of a sloppily targeted.

07:02 Subsidy program which the government offers to to bring subsidies

07:06 and so what you can see from this

07:08 is it,

07:09 it really does in the in the context of this model,

07:11 it really does alter

07:13 long term poverty dynamics so

07:15 you can see the headcount measures of poverty

07:17 end up being much lower

07:19 uh when you have an insurance market presence

07:22 uh and also the poverty gap eventually

07:24 uh becomes smaller.

07:25 There's some interesting intertemporal trade-offs there which I,

07:28 we can talk about if,

07:29 if there's time.

07:30 Uh,

07:31 or interest,

07:32 the,

07:33 the main impacts,

07:34 the largest growth there are is actually coming

07:36 from what I call the vulnerability reduction effect,

07:39 OK,

07:40 uh,

07:40 and,

07:40 and then the red line,

07:41 which is when the subsidy comes in,

07:43 uh,

07:44 is the additional investment incentive effect.

07:46 So one of the things that comes out of this work

07:49 is if you are in a dynamic system

07:52 that has a tipping point or a poverty trap,

07:54 if you are vulnerable in the sense that you're close to that dynamic tipping point,

07:58 essentially the shaft.

07:59 The price of money

08:00 is extremely high for you,

08:02 and it turns out it's not optimal for people

08:04 right at the tipping point to buy any insurance.

08:07 It's not that it wouldn't be valuable,

08:09 but the money is,

08:09 it's actually more valuable for them to get as far away

08:12 from the tipping point as quickly as they can.

08:15 When you've subsidize insurance,

08:17 it takes those vulnerable,

08:18 those most vulnerable people,

08:20 and then they,

08:20 then they're,

08:21 they're willing to pay sort of half price on it.

08:23 And so that's where you get some additional poverty reduction effects.

08:27 Uh,

08:27 the,

08:27 the,

08:28 the final kind of exercise we do in the paper is we,

08:31 we provide the following thought experiment.

08:33 Suppose the government comes along

08:35 with a social compact and says,

08:37 let's guarantee

08:38 everyone in this economy

08:40 that we're gonna raise them up to the poverty line,

08:42 OK?

08:43 And the,

08:43 the black solid line now is the budgetary implication

08:47 of the government

08:48 holding on to that social compact

08:50 when there is no insurance market.

08:53 You can see over time the black line

08:55 uh sort of creeps up as government expenditures begin to increase.

08:59 And then we ask ourselves,

09:00 is there really a public finance case

09:03 for

09:03 inducing insurance markets,

09:05 and secondly for subsidizing those insurance markets,

09:08 given the particular behavior

09:10 of the the particular

09:12 behavior of people who are

09:14 in this system

09:15 with a dynamic tipping point.

09:17 Uh,

09:18 when we do the comparisons here,

09:19 let me just focus on the subsidized case,

09:21 that's the red line again,

09:23 um.

09:24 When we do that,

09:25 we,

09:25 we,

09:26 we,

09:26 we measure total government expenditures as closing the poverty gap for everybody

09:30 and also paying for the insurance subsidies.

09:33 So you can see initially,

09:34 the cost

09:35 of that program is rather high,

09:38 but by the time you get to the end of the fifty-year.

09:40 Uh,

09:41 simulation because you've had these investment incentive effects,

09:44 you've reduced vulnerability for everybody.

09:46 Government expenditures are actually less,

09:49 and the paper goes into much greater detail,

09:51 but

09:51 there on the slide you can see that if we take the discounted present value of the.

09:56 Different kind of public expenditure streams,

09:59 the government actually saves money

10:01 even by subsidizing insurance

10:03 because you're basically,

10:05 you're keeping more of the population

10:07 in a,

10:07 in a circumstance where they can

10:10 maintain their economic viability.

10:12 So as I often,

10:13 I think as as the paper actually puts it,

10:16 um,

10:16 we can,

10:17 we can,

10:17 uh,

10:18 we,

10:19 we can imagine a world

10:21 in which.

10:22 Uh,

10:23 you know,

10:23 we might say insurance subsidies are expensive,

10:25 but this is also saying

10:26 not subsidizing insurance is also expensive in,

10:29 in terms of the poverty that,

10:31 that emerges without

10:33 sort of good social protection mechanisms,

10:35 um.

10:37 Something I'll just very briefly flag here,

10:40 we're looking at insurance mechanisms here to achieve this goal.

10:43 It works because people understand and trust the insurance.

10:46 It's reliable.

10:47 It's delivered quickly.

10:48 In principle,

10:49 you can have governments do shock responsive

10:51 social protection programs.

10:53 Uh,

10:53 government of Kenya is experimenting with it

10:55 with something called HSMP 2,

10:57 which is a scalable

10:59 social protection program.

11:01 What I've heard about how that works,

11:02 doing a lot of field work in the area,

11:04 we get a lot of,

11:04 uh,

11:05 rural myths about how that works.

11:07 So I,

11:07 I would say there's not a lot yet that tells us that that works,

11:10 uh,

11:11 necessarily very well.

11:12 Um,

11:13 there's another side thing since we have someone who worked for ARC before,

11:17 um.

11:17 You know,

11:18 there's a side issue if the government is in fact gonna carry that risk

11:21 of stochastic social protection obligation,

11:24 should they in fact

11:25 engage with the Africa risk capacity,

11:26 for example.

11:27 Uh,

11:28 we've been doing some work on when that is good public finance,

11:31 uh,

11:31 or not,

11:32 and that's a,

11:32 that's again a side issue,

11:33 but I think it's actually a really,

11:35 uh,

11:35 important question to consider.

11:37 OK,

11:38 so

11:38 theory is very suggestive,

11:40 right?

11:41 We,

11:41 we've just seen a couple of ways

11:43 through,

11:44 through which,

11:45 uh,

11:45 insurance could actually or insurance markets,

11:48 perhaps subsidized insurance markets could

11:50 increase resilience,

11:51 but if I stop to think about it,

11:53 I realize

11:54 I don't actually know what resilience is.

11:56 I don't think there's any good measures.

11:58 Uh,

11:58 in fact,

11:59 uh,

12:00 excuse me,

12:01 yesterday,

12:01 in Dermit,

12:02 in your introductory remarks,

12:03 you gave,

12:04 you gave a definition of resilience,

12:06 which is pretty close

12:08 to that first bullet point on there,

12:10 right?

12:10 I think

12:11 you said,

12:12 well,

12:12 resilience is kind of when you get back to where you were pretty quickly,

12:15 OK.

12:16 Um,

12:16 so I wanna suggest that we take that definition of resilience seriously

12:20 and figure out how to do it

12:22 because,

12:23 uh,

12:23 I was sort of doing a resilience like analysis in that prior paper,

12:27 but I wanna be a little more formal

12:28 and I wanna I wanna sort of think about it.

12:30 So again.

12:31 If,

12:32 if we really wanna measure

12:34 resilience as,

12:35 as,

12:35 as I think we all really mean it when we talk about economic resilience,

12:39 then obviously we're gonna need to observe

12:42 whatever unit of analysis like households that we're interested in,

12:45 we're gonna need to observe them.

12:47 After a shock,

12:48 right?

12:48 And more importantly,

12:49 we're gonna need a counterfactual estimate of where

12:52 they would have been without the shock,

12:54 right?

12:55 Because if we wanna measure

12:56 the cost of the shock,

12:57 if we say being resilient means we have

13:00 very small loss of current and future well-being,

13:02 then we need a counterfactual if we wanna measure what that would have been.

13:07 So what I'm gonna share with you quickly then

13:09 is,

13:09 is,

13:10 is taking a look.

13:12 At,

13:12 at

13:13 first,

13:13 how we can define a measure,

13:15 I'm gonna do it with fake data because it's always,

13:17 it's a lot easier to shock people inside your computer CPU

13:20 than it is to do it in the real world,

13:22 thank God,

13:23 uh,

13:24 and,

13:24 and then I'm actually gonna use some real data and show you how you can use it

13:28 and,

13:28 and bring it around,

13:29 uh,

13:29 bring both examples if time permits

13:32 to,

13:32 uh,

13:33 uh,

13:33 to this,

13:34 uh,

13:35 to,

13:35 uh,

13:35 to,

13:35 to insurance and,

13:36 and its impacts on resilience more formally,

13:39 uh,

13:40 defined.

13:40 So I'm just gonna jump ahead here a little bit.

13:43 Um.

13:45 So the upper,

13:45 the upper curve there

13:47 is the expected value of income

13:49 for a

13:51 control group that does not receive a shock.

13:53 The lower line,

13:54 so these are people who are behaving dynamically optimally.

13:57 So you can see the control group is,

13:59 is on an upward trajectory converging

14:01 to sort of their solo steady state if you want to think about it,

14:04 uh,

14:04 that way,

14:05 and that's more or less the right way to think about it.

14:08 We take a random sample of the people in our study,

14:11 and we give them a horrific shock,

14:13 OK?

14:14 So they immediately have a very large collapse.

14:16 And then the red line,

14:17 as it slowly recovers,

14:19 right,

14:19 that's actual optimal rate of recovery when people

14:22 are considering in the absence of ability to borrow,

14:25 that's how fast they will

14:27 try to return to their counterfactual state.

14:30 OK?

14:31 So this is made up with fake data.

14:32 I skipped over the slides that say how we estimate it,

14:34 but it's,

14:35 it's pretty obvious.

14:36 Uh,

14:37 and there's a very good literature,

14:38 as I think we all know in this,

14:39 uh,

14:40 in this room that looks at the,

14:41 the impact of shocks on,

14:43 on coping,

14:44 on investment,

14:44 and all,

14:45 all sorts of things.

14:45 So this work really

14:47 draws on that,

14:48 on that tradition.

14:49 Moe and I in this paper suggest we define resilience this way just graphically.

14:54 Uh,

14:54 resilience is defined there in the middle.

14:57 L is the gap

14:58 between,

14:58 it's the loss gap between

15:01 the actual income level of people who were shocked

15:03 and their counterfactual measure of where they would have been.

15:07 OK,

15:07 so that's the core part of the measure.

15:10 And then just to normalize it.

15:12 Then we basically normalize that loss gap

15:16 by

15:16 an imaginary standard if they didn't recover at all.

15:19 So if they didn't recover at all,

15:21 they would,

15:22 they would go along the bottom of that gray

15:23 box at what we call the zero resilience line.

15:26 So defining it with this normalization is,

15:28 is kind of nice,

15:30 um,

15:31 because it makes the resilience measure go between 0 and 1.

15:34 So if you don't recover at all,

15:35 you have zero resilience,

15:37 and if you were to recover instantaneously,

15:40 you would have a resilience

15:41 of 1.

15:42 OK?

15:43 In this particular instance that comes from our dynamic programming model,

15:47 uh,

15:47 the resilience measure is actually 43%,

15:50 and you will note that's cutting off the measure,

15:52 uh,

15:53 uh,

15:53 six years after the shock occurred,

15:56 OK?

15:56 Uh,

15:57 so that's just an example

15:58 that you can take.

15:59 Imagine having panel data like this.

16:01 You could actually measure

16:03 a shock,

16:03 you know,

16:04 subject to some identification

16:06 concerns.

16:07 I'll just mention quickly,

16:08 you can actually also measure it at the individual level

16:12 and so I won't explain the,

16:13 the mathematical expression there,

16:15 but that's just a matching estimator for individual resilience.

16:19 It's the same concept

16:20 of comparing

16:21 how.

16:21 Household eye with their counterfactual estimate of where they were

16:24 and we can,

16:25 we can add up their individual resilience.

16:28 I think that's really important if we measure

16:30 resilience

16:31 because then we can start to look at the determinants of resilience,

16:34 which I think is something that,

16:36 that,

16:36 that we need to,

16:37 uh,

16:37 kind of get to.

16:39 Another reason for doing this,

16:40 it,

16:41 it,

16:41 it allows us to think about

16:43 the,

16:44 the cost-benefit analysis or more generally the economic value

16:47 of resilience promoting interventions.

16:50 So first,

16:50 let me real quickly

16:51 take an example from the computer.

16:53 So,

16:54 uh,

16:54 we imagine,

16:55 uh,

16:56 uh,

16:56 uh,

16:56 a catastrophic insurance policy

16:59 is introduced.

16:59 It only pays off if the shock is really bad,

17:02 OK?

17:03 And we and and and it's calibrated to cover

17:06 1 in 10 year events.

17:08 So to make the analysis kind of balanced,

17:10 we assume that someone's buying this insurance for 10 years

17:14 before the shock occurs.

17:16 And then when the shock after the shock occurs,

17:18 the green line there

17:20 shows the much more rapid recovery

17:22 of households that had their assets

17:24 kind of rebuilt or partially rebuilt subject to a deductible,

17:27 OK,

17:28 and.

17:28 And once you do that,

17:30 the,

17:30 the resilience measure goes up quite substantially.

17:33 Um.

17:35 In the paper we,

17:36 we look at two cases.

17:37 I'm actually sharing with you the non-poverty trap,

17:39 uh,

17:40 paper.

17:41 Uh,

17:41 we can see when we,

17:42 when we provide this catastrophic insurance,

17:45 resilience actually rises to about 70%,

17:48 so this resilience measure goes up substantially.

17:50 If we do a benefit cost analysis and we basically

17:54 take the present value of that area in the middle that's marked Delta.

17:58 OK,

17:58 and we compare that to the the present value of that to the

18:01 present value of,

18:02 of having made insurance payments

18:04 for 10 years,

18:05 you can see the benefit cost ratio is about 1,

18:08 just under 2,

18:09 OK.

18:10 This kind of approach actually accommodates poverty traps.

18:13 I was talking to

18:14 Hebram today wherever he,

18:15 I saw him a moment ago,

18:16 um,

18:17 who's thinking about vulnerability,

18:19 which

18:20 in a sense

18:21 these upper measures are actually perfect measures of vulnerability as,

18:24 as well.

18:25 Um,

18:26 OK,

18:26 let's go real quickly to the,

18:28 to the real world to sort of

18:29 wrap up.

18:30 Um,

18:31 There's a,

18:32 there's,

18:33 if you look at the slides,

18:34 there's a,

18:35 it tells you where to get the different papers here.

18:36 Um,

18:37 and if,

18:38 if God smiles on us,

18:39 this boucher at all will be published before my next birthday.

18:42 Now,

18:43 probably not.

18:43 My birthday is in 2 weeks,

18:44 so

18:45 there's no,

18:46 there's no hope because of referee 4

18:48 is doing it to us again.

18:50 Uh,

18:50 this was a 4 year

18:52 RCT

18:53 in Tanzania,

18:54 Mozambique.

18:55 Uh,

18:55 we were looking at bundling stress tolerance,

18:58 specifically drought tolerant seeds,

19:00 with an insurance contract

19:02 which was intended to cover the risks

19:05 that

19:06 drought tolerant seeds don't.

19:07 I was talking to Chave,

19:08 uh,

19:09 earlier today

19:10 because he said,

19:10 why do you need insurance if you have drought tolerant seeds

19:13 and the reality is drought tolerant seeds

19:15 or even flood tolerant rice only cover a subset of the events that happened.

19:19 So we came up with an index insurance contract

19:22 which I could talk about for hours,

19:23 but I will not.

19:24 Um,

19:25 and,

19:25 and then we end up having a treatment.

19:27 We have a control group.

19:28 This was a spatially diversified RCT,

19:31 so we had two countries,

19:32 Mozambique,

19:33 Tanzania.

19:34 We spent a lot of time looking at weather maps,

19:36 so we tried to maximize the probability

19:39 that somebody somewhere in our study would get,

19:41 would get zapped,

19:43 uh,

19:43 which is an unfortunate way to design a study,

19:45 but that's what we did.

19:46 Uh,

19:47 nature,

19:48 fortunately for us,

19:49 unfortunately for the people in the study,

19:51 the nature was pretty generous in terms of providing

19:54 different kinds of shocks,

19:56 both the kind of shock that is managed,

19:59 um,

19:59 that is managed by the drought tolerant seeds,

20:01 as well as the kind of shock that's covered

20:03 by the insurance.

20:05 Uh,

20:05 I can skip,

20:06 this is junkie,

20:07 we'll get over it.

20:07 I mean,

20:07 that's just saying we regress.

20:09 We're just regressing,

20:11 uh,

20:11 various kinds of outcome measures.

20:13 I'm gonna look at May's income here,

20:14 regressing it on the shocks and the interaction between the shocks

20:18 in the different,

20:18 in the different treatments and controlling.

20:20 For the usual stuff

20:22 you would expect to see controlled for in an RCT.

20:24 OK,

20:25 so now this is real data,

20:26 OK?

20:27 So now the counterfactual line,

20:28 the upper blue line that we're looking at,

20:30 this is what happens

20:32 to our control group,

20:34 who does not receive a shock.

20:36 OK?

20:37 And you can see the importance of the counterfactual here.

20:39 So,

20:39 uh,

20:40 what's labeled there is year 3 was actually not a great year.

20:43 So even the people that weren't shocked were sort of

20:45 not doing great in year 3.

20:47 And then the red line is actually the group of people

20:50 who were hit by severe shock in year 2.

20:54 OK?

20:54 And what we see is

20:56 there's extremely low resilience,

20:58 OK.

20:58 By the following year,

21:00 these families have barely recovered.

21:02 If

21:03 the paper breaks it down

21:04 into drops in investment at the intensive and extensive margins,

21:08 kids don't eat,

21:09 all sorts of terrible stuff is going on there.

21:11 OK,

21:11 but it's sort of summarized here

21:13 as a lack of resilience.

21:14 And then we,

21:15 we sort of ran out of money,

21:16 so the study came to an end,

21:18 but we sort of imagined they would slowly

21:20 start to recover.

21:21 Uh,

21:21 but the way I've written it here,

21:23 the measured resilience is only about 18%.

21:26 OK,

21:27 so there's a lot that could happen.

21:29 Now,

21:29 what happens to our

21:31 experimental treatment group?

21:32 OK,

21:32 so again,

21:33 we have an experimental randomly selected treatment group

21:36 that receives a package of risk mitigation

21:38 technologies,

21:40 OK?

21:40 And so a couple of things are going on here.

21:42 So that's the green line.

21:44 OK,

21:44 and again this is all based on the econometric,

21:46 uh,

21:46 estimates.

21:47 And

21:48 at year two,

21:49 we give the identical shock.

21:52 To the people in the treatment group,

21:53 OK.

21:54 The first thing you notice is they don't fall nearly as far.

21:57 That's because it turns out

21:59 that drought tolerant seeds actually work.

22:01 I actually did not believe they would.

22:03 I thought they only worked on fancy farms with,

22:05 with,

22:05 uh,

22:05 fancy agronomy.

22:07 Turns out they work for like farmers that have pathetic soils,

22:10 use no inputs other than seeds.

22:12 So that's a really interesting finding.

22:14 So first of all,

22:15 they don't fall very far,

22:16 and

22:17 more importantly,

22:18 they're not,

22:18 they're not capitalized for the next year.

22:21 OK,

22:22 so

22:22 for the

22:23 control group farmers that were shocked,

22:26 their input intensity drops tremendously,

22:29 and they actually reduced the area planted

22:31 by about 25% the year following a severe shock.

22:34 So the,

22:34 the household is really hunkered down

22:36 as best they can,

22:37 and they're not at all resilient.

22:39 Um,

22:40 so if we ignore the part for a moment that's labeled

22:43 resilience dividend above the blue line,

22:45 what we find is

22:47 this

22:48 this treatment group has almost perfect resilience,

22:51 and it's a combination

22:52 of the action of,

22:53 of a genetic technology as well as

22:56 index insurance,

22:57 uh,

22:57 kind of financial,

22:59 uh,

22:59 technology.

23:00 The final thing,

23:01 and,

23:02 and I'll kind of end here since the,

23:03 the,

23:04 the buzzer just is going off.

23:06 The final thing,

23:07 are we OK?

23:09 Absolutely fine.

23:09 It's an excellent.

23:10 Oh,

23:10 OK.

23:11 Well,

23:11 thank you.

23:13 Um,

23:15 So just,

23:16 just real quickly,

23:17 the really interesting thing is the year after the shock,

23:21 we see the so-called resilience dividend.

23:23 So those of you who have looked at the literature on insurance,

23:26 at least when it works,

23:28 right,

23:28 there's this ex ante or resilience dividend effect.

23:31 So when people become convinced

23:33 that they have a financial or in this case

23:35 a financial slash agronomic technology

23:38 that will

23:39 help them,

23:40 they actually intensify.

23:41 Investment.

23:42 So what's going on there with that big post-shock jump is

23:46 not only did these mechanisms keep them from falling very far,

23:49 not only did it help the insurance help them preserve their capital,

23:52 but it seemed to have given them confidence,

23:55 and they actually expanded

23:56 the year after a shock

23:58 when everybody else is shrinking

24:00 their production.

24:01 They actually expanded their production from

24:04 2 to like 2.6 hectares.

24:07 So it's a huge jump,

24:08 and they also intensify the amount of inputs that they use.

24:11 OK.

24:12 Now the flip side of this in the paper

24:14 is being tortured by referee 4 who wants us to prove for sure

24:18 that this was a learning effect,

24:20 and we think we've satisfied

24:22 my favorite referee 4.

24:25 but what we think,

24:25 you know,

24:26 if you look at the treatment group

24:28 people

24:29 who did not receive shocks.

24:33 In this year 3,

24:34 they actually run away from the technology,

24:37 and their behavior

24:38 and productivity

24:39 becomes indistinguishable

24:41 from the control group.

24:43 OK.

24:43 So to me this is an example of farmers,

24:46 if a bunch of people come up in,

24:47 in,

24:48 in trucks from cement or wherever our trucks came from,

24:51 you know,

24:51 and they say,

24:52 oh try these magic seeds,

24:53 and they think

24:54 Jack and the Beanstalk,

24:55 my mother warned me about this,

24:56 right?

24:57 But

24:57 most people seem pretty accommodating.

24:59 And they,

25:00 they sort of dabbled in it,

25:01 right?

25:02 And after the first year,

25:03 people that didn't see the benefits,

25:06 uh,

25:07 uh,

25:07 you know,

25:07 walked away from it.

25:09 People that did see the benefits says,

25:10 wow,

25:11 this is amazing,

25:12 and they intensify.

25:13 I think there are huge policy lessons there.

25:16 I've written a little bit actually with Alanda Jadri and Jing Kai,

25:19 who's at Maryland on how do you subsidize

25:22 an input

25:23 which

25:24 delivers its benefits only occasionally.

25:27 Right,

25:27 because people,

25:28 you know,

25:28 the expression I learned as a kid,

25:31 uh,

25:31 was,

25:31 you know,

25:32 fool me once,

25:33 shame on you,

25:33 fool me twice,

25:34 shame on me.

25:35 And I think people in our,

25:36 in our treatment groups,

25:37 you tell them all this fancy stuff

25:39 about insurance and,

25:41 you know,

25:41 how to,

25:42 how to make complaints and how to do this and that,

25:43 the magic bean seeds or maize seeds in this case,

25:47 and

25:47 they'll go,

25:48 well,

25:48 maybe.

25:49 But if they don't see it working,

25:50 and it's a pretty large jump in their expenditures,

25:53 which it was for these farmers,

25:55 uh,

25:55 even when they were dabbling in it,

25:56 they say,

25:57 well,

25:57 that's enough.

25:57 So,

25:58 the,

25:58 the question is,

25:59 for me,

26:00 smart subsidies

26:01 are subsidies that allow people to learn,

26:03 which is a real public good,

26:04 and it spills over

26:05 really rapidly.

26:07 Um,

26:07 but here,

26:08 in fact,

26:08 what we see,

26:09 it's actually really hard to learn about these

26:12 kinds of technologies in the short term,

26:14 and I think that's something we still need

26:16 as kind of a community need to,

26:18 to grapple with.

26:19 So I think I've pretty much said,

26:20 uh,

26:21 most of this.

26:22 So,

26:22 um,

26:23 um,

26:24 thank you very much for your attention.

26:25 Excellent.

26:31 Thank you very much,

26:31 Michael.

26:32 Over to you,

26:33 Matt.

26:34 That was a brilliant presentation,

26:35 Michael.

26:35 It was very,

26:36 really well done.

26:38 So I understood most of it.

26:41 I,

26:41 I don't use this fancy PowerPoint stuff,

26:44 so,

26:44 uh,

26:45 tough room.

26:46 So to,

26:47 uh,

26:47 to prepare for my talk,

26:48 I typed into chat GPT,

26:50 uh,

26:50 give me 1000 words on adapting to climate change,

26:54 and I'd like to read you what the computer said.

26:58 Folks,

26:58 in economics,

26:59 in climate economics today,

27:00 as you know,

27:01 there's two major issues.

27:03 How are we gonna reduce,

27:04 uh,

27:05 the world's carbon footprint at a time when the world economy has to grow?

27:09 We need economic growth to,

27:10 to help all of us.

27:12 How will we decarbonize?

27:14 And at the same time there's a second question of as Mother Nature punches us harder,

27:19 how do we configure the rules of the game and incentives such that we can take a punch,

27:24 and I don't mean evolution,

27:26 uh,

27:26 we're not gonna talk about that in my remaining 9 minutes.

27:29 What I wanna talk about is how do we.

27:31 Set up our markets and the interplay between government and the private sector

27:36 such that we build up resilience.

27:37 I love Michael's presentation.

27:39 How do we build up human capital?

27:41 How do we unleash entrepreneurship and innovation

27:44 such that we get better and better at adapting

27:47 to the scary challenges we face,

27:49 folks,

27:50 for better or worse,

27:51 I'm an eternal optimist.

27:52 My mother says,

27:53 Matthew,

27:53 no magical thinking,

27:55 but I am trained at Chicago.

27:57 Tough room.

27:59 And

28:00 while

28:01 I am a believer in free markets in helping us to adapt,

28:05 I recognize the central role that government can

28:08 and often does play in unleashing the free market.

28:12 But I will also be talking today

28:14 about cases,

28:15 Sam Peltzman cases where government intervention has muffled the free market.

28:20 And want to discuss a research agenda that I'm

28:23 part of and where I have many open questions,

28:26 uh,

28:26 since I'm gonna do no theory,

28:28 since I'm gonna show you no empirics and since you're checking your cell phones,

28:32 uh,

28:32 I want you to know that what I do on a day to day basis is,

28:36 uh,

28:37 as an empiricist

28:38 and as a soft theorist I am always looking

28:41 for empirical benchmarks of are we doing better.

28:44 At adapting to climate change,

28:45 for example,

28:46 we released an NPR paper.

28:48 Sean McLal was one of our co-authors and great to work with him

28:51 with repeated floods that have taken place over the last decade,

28:55 our lights at night dimming less in the aftermath of a flood and recovering faster.

29:00 That's an example of the types of benchmarking I do

29:04 and I'm always interested in for different measures for people.

29:08 For places for farms when the same punch occurs,

29:12 a flood,

29:12 a heat wave,

29:13 how much economic damage occurs coming back to Michael's talk,

29:17 how much would we be willing to pay

29:19 to not face the shock

29:21 and evidence of adaptation is if we're actually willing to pay less over time

29:26 because we're getting better at adapting to the shock

29:28 and so that's sort of the structural benchmark I'm looking for.

29:32 Folks,

29:33 when I was a Gary Becker student and I was not the star of the class,

29:36 I was in Ed Glazer's shadow,

29:38 um,

29:39 what we often were talking about was the household production theory.

29:43 People want to be safe.

29:45 They want to raise happy,

29:47 comfortable children

29:48 and,

29:48 and,

29:49 and productive children.

29:50 Let's not forget that,

29:51 uh,

29:51 in a world where we face increased risks.

29:54 How do we achieve these goals?

29:56 How,

29:56 I'm gonna read from my script.

29:58 How do we remain safe and comfortable in an increasingly risky world,

30:02 folks,

30:02 I wanna start with the boring air conditioner,

30:05 and,

30:05 and can I get a boo?

30:06 I'm looking at intermitt.

30:07 The,

30:07 the,

30:08 the beauty of the air conditioner

30:10 for

30:11 to start a discussion about adaptation is there's a 1 to 1 function.

30:15 If it's extremely hot.

30:17 Side,

30:18 people

30:19 who can afford an air conditioner can buy it and operate it,

30:22 folks.

30:23 There was a paper,

30:23 oh,

30:24 my teleprompter just went out.

30:26 Uh,

30:26 there was a paper in the Journal of

30:28 Political Economy six years ago by Michael Greenstone,

30:31 Karen Clay,

30:31 Joe Shapiro,

30:32 and a few more co-authors

30:34 called The Remarkable,

30:36 it had the word remarkable in the title,

30:37 and here's what it documented.

30:39 In Iowa in the 1930s when it was over 95 degrees for a few days in the summer,

30:45 many people died.

30:46 We didn't have air conditioning and Americans suffered circa 1930.

30:50 So these guys ran regressions at the state level of how many

30:54 people died per capita as a function of how many hot days,

30:57 and they ran this regression every decade

31:00 and showed that over the 20th century,

31:03 fewer and fewer.

31:04 Americans are dying in heat waves,

31:06 and we're not evolving.

31:07 They attribute the success to air conditioners becoming cheaper,

31:11 of higher quality,

31:12 and Americans growing richer to afford these.

31:15 We anticipated a challenge.

31:17 We demanded the product and we installed it.

31:19 Even my mother-in-law in Berkeley is now considering air conditioning.

31:24 And let's be careful,

31:24 air conditioning is not free.

31:26 There's a I have an alternative hypothesis.

31:29 So I think a lot of Indians are moving to Iowa and for us 95 degree days are fantastic.

31:34 So this,

31:35 that was not part of their model.

31:36 This was a closed economy and that,

31:38 but,

31:38 but this is why intermitt's the chief and I have 6 more minutes.

31:41 The,

31:41 um,

31:42 it

31:43 folks,

31:44 but the air conditioner is a convenient example for a free market optimist because

31:49 we have it.

31:50 We recognize that heat causes this challenge,

31:52 and we have this offsetting product.

31:55 Um,

31:56 uh,

31:56 here,

31:57 let me say something productive.

31:58 In my city of Los Angeles,

32:00 there is the recognition that there's many poor people,

32:03 and I have a paper in the Journal of

32:05 Public Economics of the challenges that poor people face

32:08 in the tougher neighborhoods in Los Angeles where

32:10 they live in older housing without air conditioning.

32:13 Karen Bass and Eric Garcetti.

32:15 Have introduced cooling centers and have worked with Uber and other ride sharing

32:19 companies to bring disadvantaged people to cooling centers on the hottest days.

32:24 So while LeBron James and Kim Kardashian can crank up their air conditioning,

32:28 tough room,

32:30 uh,

32:30 at the same time as they privately adapt to the climate change challenge,

32:34 um,

32:34 I.

32:35 Support my being taxed to provide these services for

32:38 the poor to bring them into these cooling centers.

32:41 So that's a case where the government's efforts to provide

32:46 adaptive services to the disadvantaged do not

32:49 crowd out the efforts by private citizens.

32:52 But folks,

32:53 I'm gonna argue that that's rare.

32:56 There is often,

32:57 uh,

32:58 uh,

32:58 there are often Peltzman effects involved,

33:01 and let me give a classic one.

33:03 Carolyn Kowski,

33:04 who

33:04 would be a great panel member today but could not join us,

33:07 she wrote a tremendous paper 20 years ago

33:10 where she said,

33:11 uh,

33:12 a crowding out hypothesis,

33:13 and here's the Peltzman part.

33:15 If there's a city like Miami that floods,

33:18 if that city builds a seawall.

33:21 That can actually be an attractive nuisance as more people move

33:24 to the area because they perceive it to be safe.

33:27 So folks,

33:27 does everyone see that crowding out hypothesis?

33:30 And so a fundamental idea that I'm eager to work with World Bank scholars about is

33:35 unintended consequences.

33:37 If you build infrastructure at a desirable place

33:40 that helps the incumbents,

33:42 but does it make the place even more desirable to move there?

33:45 And if this infrastructure is

33:47 unreliable,

33:48 if it depreciates over time and isn't.

33:50 Maintained you could actually run into an engineering disaster of luring people

33:55 if they overestimate the safety

33:58 uh there can be unintended consequences of crowding out private self-protection.

34:02 So

34:03 one theme I want to stress today is to

34:05 think about when are government efforts a complement of private

34:09 efforts to improve your safety

34:11 in the face of climate change versus when do government efforts

34:15 unintentionally crowd out private

34:18 adaptation efforts.

34:19 And so that is one

34:21 big theme I want to convey today.

34:23 I think I want to convey two more points.

34:26 I want to take a look at my notes.

34:30 Two more segues.

34:32 There's a very interesting literature out of

34:35 Stanford University on government officials' incentives,

34:39 and I think the following merits much more research.

34:42 So again,

34:43 what this,

34:43 uh,

34:44 non-lucid talk it was supposed to be about

34:46 is about how do we configure public and private incentives such that they're

34:51 dovetailed to help us to increase our resilience as we face greater risk.

34:56 Neil Mahorda of Stanford has written several papers

34:59 that in democracies elected officials are rewarded after a

35:04 disaster occurs for bringing back the federal bacon

35:07 and international bacon to help an area rebuild.

35:11 So after Hurricane Katrina,

35:12 after Hurricane Sandy,

35:14 that the FEMA leader,

35:15 the president shows up and shakes the hands with the mayor of the injured place.

35:20 To me this is a very important issue if this holds in the developing world.

35:24 I want us to live in an economy of Gary Becker's economy

35:28 where rational agents invest in self protection before a shock

35:32 to reduce the risk versus taking the gamble.

35:36 Of course it depends on the specifics,

35:38 but,

35:38 but we currently in democracy elected.

35:41 Officials do not appear to be rewarded for prudent investments that

35:45 reduce low probability events to be even less lower probability,

35:50 if that's proper English.

35:51 Instead,

35:51 elected officials are more rewarded for when a disaster

35:56 occurs for bringing back more pork to their region,

36:00 and that strikes me as very bad incentives.

36:03 The takeaway message that I want you to think

36:06 about is I want government to provide public goods,

36:09 to adapt to climate change.

36:11 We need to know where is higher ground.

36:13 We need to know what parts of each nation face less objective flood risk,

36:17 face lower fire risk,

36:19 face lower PM 2.

36:20 5 spike risk

36:22 we need to up zone and change our land use regulations to build up in those areas

36:28 so that poor people and middle class people

36:30 can live there to avoid the climate gentrification hypothesis

36:34 that posits that only Elon Musk will live on higher ground and I.

36:38 Will try to grab his toe,

36:39 uh,

36:40 as the seas rise.

36:41 I wanna live in a world where we,

36:43 uh,

36:43 climate science identifies

36:45 where is higher ground,

36:47 and we have again land use regulation such that we substitute

36:51 capital for land and build up in relatively safer areas.

36:55 In my California

36:57 we face greater fire risk,

36:59 and we,

36:59 uh,

37:00 the officials are not allowing insurance prices to rise in risky areas.

37:05 That sends bad signals.

37:07 Uh,

37:07 ensure regulatory agencies are not passing on insurance costs

37:12 to those in the fire zone.

37:14 I understand that there's incumbents in these fire zones,

37:16 and we could talk about that,

37:17 but I want government officials.

37:20 I encourage them,

37:21 we'll be better able to adapt to climate change if price signals,

37:25 uh,

37:25 send

37:26 that we not muffle the adaptation signals.

37:30 For insurance,

37:31 for electricity,

37:32 in places where there is drought,

37:33 water prices should rise.

37:35 Economists are smart enough to think about

37:37 nonlinear prices such that we protect the poor

37:40 while simultaneously having other interest groups face market

37:44 the correct price signal for these resources.

37:48 So the point of this wacky talk is that we need PowerPoint,

37:52 but we also need market price signals

37:56 to unleash

37:58 capitalism.

37:59 I jumped in my organization of my slides.

38:02 There's tremendous optimism right now that capitalism

38:05 is going to fuel the green economy.

38:07 We keep hearing about Tesla.

38:08 We keep hearing about green power.

38:10 There isn't equal optimism out there about adaptation progress.

38:15 If water prices rise in places where water is scarce,

38:19 if.

38:19 Electricity prices rise in in places where we have trouble generating power.

38:24 This unleashes entrepreneurship,

38:26 and these ideas are public goods.

38:28 So Paul Romer's ideas about ideas as public goods,

38:33 uh,

38:33 will play a key role going forward in helping

38:36 the developing world as the US and other.

38:41 Research nations do the basic research to

38:44 give us the adaptation innovations we need

38:47 and intermitt,

38:47 I'm gonna stop there.

38:52 That.

38:54 That was a completely different presentation from the first one.

38:57 It was fantastic too.

38:58 Excellent,

38:59 excellent.

39:00 So now you have

39:01 the 3rd presentation by Eko Swehe.

39:04 Uh,

39:04 please go ahead.

39:05 I don't know how you're gonna top those two.

39:06 I don't know either.

39:09 Uh,

39:09 no,

39:09 it's really,

39:10 it's really fascinating to be here and to listen to the presentations,

39:13 um,

39:13 because they touch on so many

39:15 points I think impact the work that I do.

39:17 I'm not a researcher,

39:18 but I'm very much

39:20 involved in the messy world of implementation and precisely,

39:23 as was reflected,

39:25 looking at insurance in the context of resilience and adaptation,

39:27 which is,

39:28 uh,

39:29 uh,

39:29 not a conversation that is often top of mind.

39:31 Uh,

39:31 so I've been asked to speak.

39:32 On mobilizing the private sector to reduce the financial protection gap

39:37 um of vulnerable countries and uh that's really my domain.

39:40 It's really a focus on,

39:41 on developing countries,

39:42 emerging markets,

39:43 um,

39:43 and the protection gap being the difference between total losses,

39:47 um,

39:47 and insured losses.

39:48 Um,

39:49 so maybe it's useful to give a little bit of context given,

39:52 you know,

39:52 what we're,

39:53 uh,

39:54 where we work as the insurance development forum.

39:56 Uh,

39:57 the fact that,

39:57 um,

39:58 the estimated figure lost to extreme natural disaster

40:01 events globally over the past

40:03 40 years,

40:04 uh,

40:04 was 4 is approximately 4 trillion,

40:06 and that's a really conservative estimate,

40:09 um,

40:09 and only 2.9 trillion of which,

40:11 uh,

40:11 and

40:11 US 2.9 trillion of which was uninsured.

40:14 Uh,

40:14 this also sits against a background where only 1%

40:18 of those natural.

40:19 Disaster losses between 1980 and 2004 were insured

40:23 um in developing countries.

40:25 So that's quite significant when you think about the impact

40:28 of these events on these countries given the absence of insurance markets.

40:32 At the same time,

40:33 there's also extensive research that demonstrates

40:35 a 1% increase in insurance penetration

40:38 results in a 22% reduction in taxpayer disaster recovery burden.

40:42 So that's quite,

40:43 I think,

40:43 um,

40:44 a lot of figures that we can,

40:45 we can kind of,

40:46 uh,

40:46 think about.

40:47 Uh,

40:48 when we look at some of the figures coming out from 2022,

40:50 and this is taken from Aeon,

40:52 um,

40:52 economic losses from natural disasters were estimated at 313 billion

40:56 in 2022.

40:58 Approximately 42% of losses were covered by

41:01 insurance.

41:02 Again,

41:02 some significant figures.

41:03 I think that should startle us.

41:05 An important point to note is also that those who actually need protection

41:09 are often uninsured,

41:11 right?

41:11 When you look at this map,

41:13 uh,

41:13 there's a lot of work that insurance companies do in terms of tracking,

41:16 uh,

41:16 what this looks like,

41:17 and I think that this is an important

41:19 point

41:20 to note.

41:21 And

41:21 it's also similar when you look at developed markets.

41:24 Poor,

41:25 vulnerable communities often,

41:27 often also don't have access

41:29 to insurance coverage.

41:31 Again,

41:32 stepping back and thinking about developing countries,

41:36 they also exist in a landscape where the humanitarian funding gap is very real.

41:41 In 2022,

41:42 we saw funding requirements spike up to 51.5 billion.

41:47 And

41:47 the system only received 28.7 billion.

41:50 So that's a significant gap in terms of

41:53 an absence of protection in terms of insurance markets,

41:56 but also an absence in terms of financing from the humanitarian

42:00 community that would often step in to support low-income households.

42:04 And that means there's a real mismatch between the commitment to protect

42:08 and the funding model and the funding architecture that we

42:10 have as a global community in terms of disaster protection.

42:14 That speaks to poor preparedness,

42:16 planning,

42:17 underinvestment in data and systems for for response,

42:21 underinvestments in adaptation and risk reduction,

42:23 which,

42:24 which you had spoken about,

42:25 slow politicized tactical decision-making processes that are,

42:29 that are not rooted in the science

42:31 or the existence of systems,

42:33 fragmented,

42:34 poorly coordinated response

42:36 and just limited learning over the decades that we've been,

42:39 been going through this.

42:40 Um,

42:41 an important fact.

42:41 That we should also note is that when we look at COVID-19,

42:45 when it hits,

42:46 only 2%

42:47 of global funding was planned and pre-arranged in advance.

42:52 That's quite startling when you think about

42:54 if we just spent a little bit of time to think about putting some resources,

42:59 making resources available before shocks occur,

43:02 um,

43:02 we could save significantly,

43:05 but the system is currently simply does not

43:08 do that.

43:09 So what is the work of the IDF?

43:11 Um,

43:12 we're constructed as a public-private partnership,

43:15 um,

43:15 and it's really about how do we bring insurance

43:18 and related risk management capabilities,

43:21 and I emphasize this point,

43:23 related risk management capabilities

43:25 to address this financial protection gap.

43:28 Uh,

43:28 it's an industry-led initiative,

43:30 but it's also co-chaired with the World Bank as well as the United Nations

43:34 and

43:35 for us this is very much.

43:37 Focused on the reality that we are seeing,

43:39 which is that all over the world,

43:40 both developed and developing countries,

43:43 we are seeing a widening protection gap.

43:45 There are skills,

43:46 tools,

43:47 practices,

43:48 disciplines that we can employ

43:50 to do better,

43:51 but we simply are not doing it.

43:52 And so our mandate is to really try to explore

43:55 what are the barriers that we see as an institution,

43:57 but also what are the opportunities

43:59 to break some of those barriers through both public and private.

44:03 Uh,

44:03 collaboration.

44:04 Obviously,

44:04 the protection gap is a,

44:05 is a threat to the sustainable development goals.

44:08 That's obvious.

44:09 But for us as an institution,

44:11 we've essentially decided to focus on five areas where

44:13 we believe there are critical contributions that can be made

44:17 and where I think there's also a tremendous amount of opportunity for learning,

44:21 research

44:22 in this space.

44:23 The first is really on risk modeling and we often hear in developing,

44:27 developing countries.

44:28 Data,

44:29 there's data available,

44:30 etc.

44:31 Sometimes,

44:31 yes,

44:32 the data might be available,

44:33 but what's the quality of the data?

44:34 What's the accessibility of the data?

44:36 How is it being used

44:38 to frame discussions with ministries of

44:40 finance around the critical decisions and trade-offs

44:43 that they have to make?

44:44 Very little of that actually takes place.

44:47 So for us within the IDF,

44:49 there are two components to this when we assess the situation,

44:51 which is there is a structural question.

44:54 That we have to ask in terms of making risk analytic data

44:58 more

44:59 prevalent or more available for those communities

45:02 that need it the most.

45:03 And then there is an information gap which we have to close

45:07 when we talk about driving resilience based on an understanding of risk.

45:11 So in terms of the architecture of risk information.

45:15 One of the things that we are really focused on is

45:17 how do we support open risk modeling frameworks and interoperability standards.

45:22 And this is really to facilitate facilitate

45:24 better sharing and cross-sharing of data,

45:27 not only

45:28 between insurance companies,

45:30 but also with the public sector.

45:31 And one of the,

45:32 I think,

45:32 really positive developments,

45:34 um,

45:34 was work that we've been doing.

45:35 With the World Bank on converting the World Bank's

45:38 risk library into a format which could also be

45:41 used by um some of the platforms that we

45:43 are investing in or the industry is investing in,

45:45 in this space.

45:47 The second component is,

45:48 OK,

45:48 if we tackle the architecture element,

45:51 there still remains the substantive gap that exists in terms of risk information.

45:57 And so one of the things that we've done is to partner with the V20

46:01 group of countries,

46:01 which are 58 of the most vulnerable countries in the world,

46:04 to really establish a system where we can work with

46:06 them to try to tackle some of these questions.

46:09 And again,

46:09 part of this,

46:10 and I won't go into it because of the time,

46:12 is really trying to.

46:13 Find

46:14 institutional structures that can allow for the

46:16 private sector as well as the public sector

46:19 to put in resources towards,

46:21 towards tackling what I think is a,

46:23 is an important challenge and also basically

46:25 the development of a global public good if you can consider it in that way.

46:29 Again,

46:30 I've spoken to the,

46:31 the elements in terms of architecture but also in terms of substantive.

46:35 But beyond that,

46:35 I think one of the issues that is really important is that

46:38 insurers for a very long time,

46:40 we often hear them talk about the protection gap

46:42 and we hear this talked about all the time,

46:44 right?

46:45 But at the end of the day,

46:45 there's a real need for investment in what

46:48 solutions need to look like,

46:51 given what we are seeing with climate change.

46:54 The industry,

46:55 I mean,

46:55 for the past 300 years,

46:57 they are very standard products,

46:58 right?

46:58 But given what we are seeing with the kinds of risks,

47:00 there's a need to rethink

47:02 what are some of the new types of insurance,

47:04 risk sharing,

47:05 risk pooling

47:06 mechanisms

47:07 that are required to take us into the next 300 years.

47:11 So a critical part of that work is how can we create again

47:14 the necessary architecture that will allow for an

47:17 exchange between both the public and private sector

47:20 in designing solutions.

47:22 They be at the sovereign sub-sovereign level

47:24 or also importantly with humanitarian actors who are especially relevant in,

47:28 uh,

47:28 developing countries.

47:30 So a critical part of our work is really

47:31 focused on working with sovereigns and sub-sovereigns on this,

47:35 but this is a complex task,

47:37 and at the center of this is

47:40 public-private partnerships.

47:41 And again,

47:41 I would say the messy reality that is involved,

47:44 and I see you in the mids nodding your head,

47:46 uh,

47:46 of of implementing PPPs,

47:49 uh,

47:49 right,

47:49 um.

47:50 If we talk about this case in in Ghana where government is interested in flood risk,

47:54 there are different types of risk.

47:55 You have large riverline risks,

47:58 um,

47:58 floods,

47:58 but you also have urban floods,

48:00 right?

48:00 And

48:01 those can also be induced by man-made behavior.

48:03 How do you translate that into a risk that's insurable,

48:07 right?

48:07 That's a complex task in terms of,

48:09 do you actually have information on historical loss data,

48:13 right?

48:13 How do,

48:14 how does that

48:15 contend if we are thinking about climate change and future.

48:18 Risks,

48:18 right?

48:19 Are we effectively mapping what that is?

48:22 Um,

48:22 many governments have outdated public asset registries,

48:25 right?

48:26 There are issues in terms of challenges with waste management,

48:28 blocked drains,

48:29 etc.

48:29 So where does the insurance fit in

48:32 into this discussion around risk,

48:33 resilience,

48:34 and adaptation?

48:35 What are the boundaries between investments in risk reduction

48:38 and what that risk transfer needs to look like?

48:40 Those are some of the challenges that we have to

48:43 counter when we get to a phase around implementation.

48:46 But again,

48:47 what's the role of public-private partnerships?

48:50 One of the things that we have seen is that we need

48:52 or the industry needs to work with the public sector hand in hand

48:56 to really address some of these challenges,

48:58 and in 2019 we launched a program with UNDP

49:01 with the support of the German government

49:03 to look at how we can support or work with about 20 countries

49:06 towards addressing some of their risk financing,

49:09 uh,

49:09 challenges.

49:10 And as part of that,

49:11 it also involved again thinking through how

49:13 do you align incentives between private sector

49:16 and public sector,

49:17 who pays for what,

49:18 right?

49:18 What are the outcomes.

49:19 Outcomes that we expect.

49:20 How do you even get

49:22 what are traditional insurance companies that

49:24 compete against each other to collaborate,

49:26 um,

49:27 in such a context and so this is,

49:29 I think,

49:29 represents quite an interesting model and I can go

49:31 into a little bit more depth around its structure,

49:34 um,

49:34 and what we have,

49:35 we have delivered with that program in a short space of time.

49:38 But essentially what we are seeing is that there

49:40 is a possibility to work faster and better,

49:43 right,

49:44 through

49:45 public-private partnerships that are designed appropriately.

49:49 They are difficult,

49:50 they are messy.

49:50 There are lots of lessons that we are learning,

49:52 but there is an opportunity,

49:53 I think,

49:53 to really sharpen that,

49:54 that convergence between these communities,

49:57 and we are seeing

49:58 quite a lot of work going on globally

50:01 with governments

50:02 and sub-sovereign entities really looking to,

50:04 um,

50:05 harness,

50:06 uh,

50:06 different types of risk uh financing solutions.

50:09 They range from,

50:09 as was mentioned earlier in the Caribbean with the catastrophe

50:12 risk pool.

50:13 Which was supported by the World Bank

50:15 or in Africa

50:16 with the African risk capacity supported by the

50:18 World Food Program and the African Union,

50:20 or even sovereigns themselves

50:22 who are making these investments.

50:23 If you look at China and,

50:24 uh,

50:25 uh,

50:25 and some of the work that they're doing with agricultural insurance,

50:28 and it takes different forms in different

50:30 countries depending on what the objective is

50:33 that the government or the counterpart of or the partner,

50:36 uh,

50:36 might have.

50:37 But beyond looking at sovereign and humanitarian.

50:40 We also need to look at how are we developing markets

50:43 because you also have a tremendous middle class in many of these countries

50:48 and a significant portion are people who have

50:49 just emerged out of poverty and with one shock

50:53 go right down

50:54 into that into the,

50:56 into a,

50:56 a,

50:57 a real,

50:57 you know,

50:58 difficult circumstances.

50:59 And so one of the things that we are doing

51:01 as the IDF because we've seen and the research shows

51:04 countries where you have

51:05 robust insurance markets,

51:07 capital markets,

51:08 as well as banking,

51:09 uh,

51:09 sectors.

51:10 are able to recover

51:12 faster,

51:13 right,

51:13 from disasters.

51:15 Where one is missing insurance markets,

51:17 you see the consequence of that.

51:19 So,

51:19 a critical part of this effort is how do we work in the development

51:22 of these markets from the bottom up as opposed from the top down.

51:27 And that involves working with regulators.

51:29 How are regulators viewing their role in

51:32 terms of market development versus consumer protection,

51:35 right?

51:35 How are regulators in emerging markets

51:38 dealing with the rapid evolution that we are seeing

51:40 in market develop in development and product development in Western

51:44 developed markets

51:45 compared to what exists in developing countries.

51:48 The gap is huge,

51:49 right?

51:49 So,

51:49 there's a tremendous amount of work that needs

51:52 to go into development of um these markets.

51:55 But importantly,

51:55 as I alluded to,

51:56 there's also the fact that we are talking

51:58 about insurance markets that have to be regulated,

52:00 right?

52:01 So there is work to be done in terms of engagement

52:03 with regulators and we saw recently

52:05 the International Association of Insurance Supervisors

52:08 issue a statement which was quite unusual,

52:10 really encouraging regulators

52:13 to see the protection gap as an issue,

52:15 right?

52:16 And to be more proactive in terms of their policies around,

52:19 uh,

52:19 uh,

52:20 um,

52:20 tackling,

52:21 tackling this.

52:23 And I just referenced some papers which you can,

52:24 you can look up on the IDF website that speak to not only regulatory dimension,

52:28 maybe opportunities in terms of leveraging technology

52:31 to address some of these gaps.

52:33 And then finally,

52:34 one of the things that I think that we are also exploring as the,

52:37 as the IDF is looking at insurers not

52:39 simply as underwriters but also as institutional investors.

52:42 Um.

52:43 It's challenging.

52:45 Most insurers don't invest in

52:48 developing markets.

52:49 Uh,

52:49 there are a variety of reasons,

52:50 capital standards,

52:52 um,

52:52 also constraints around project pipeline,

52:54 etc.

52:55 but we see this as an important space in terms of

52:58 if we are interested in adaptation,

53:00 resilience,

53:01 growth,

53:01 resilience,

53:02 and all these issues,

53:03 we hear

53:04 the conversations that are happening.

53:06 Around the need to mobilize financing,

53:08 then what is the opportunity for insurers to lean into this space?

53:11 There have been some,

53:12 I think,

53:12 innovative work,

53:13 uh,

53:14 done with the IFC on the MCCP program,

53:16 uh,

53:17 through some innovative vehicles that allow for that,

53:19 um,

53:19 but clearly there is a need for more and I think

53:21 an appetite for more also when you think about the long term

53:24 interests of,

53:25 of insurers.

53:26 So

53:27 just to conclude.

53:28 I,

53:28 I think,

53:28 you know,

53:29 this raises some,

53:30 some interesting points for us when we think about growth

53:33 and resilience because for the work that we do,

53:35 it's about

53:36 how do we build effective risk management and protection systems.

53:40 With climate change,

53:41 we're seeing new risks,

53:43 complex interconnected risks.

53:45 We're also seeing a demand in terms of risk management tools and services.

53:50 We're also seeing the need to deepen our

53:53 engagement with governments on improving public financial management,

53:56 and that's challenging because a lot of what we do

53:58 doesn't necessarily reconcile with political cycles,

54:01 as was mentioned earlier,

54:02 right?

54:03 So how do you contend

54:04 with some of the initiatives that require a long-term investment.

54:08 There's also the issue of transition risks and

54:10 opportunity that and the limit the challenges,

54:12 but also opportunities that come

54:13 with that if we step away from the resilience and adaptation,

54:16 uh,

54:17 discussion.

54:18 But it's also about keeping pace with innovation.

54:21 How do we drive and use,

54:22 um,

54:23 uh,

54:24 risk information when we see the rapid evolution

54:26 that is taking place with technology firms,

54:28 how is that filtering into developing countries,

54:31 right?

54:31 And how that information is being absorbed

54:34 into in um

54:35 into informing.

54:36 Action,

54:37 right?

54:37 How are we ensuring appropriate regulation,

54:39 as I mentioned earlier?

54:41 What is the investment in new product development,

54:44 right?

54:45 We can talk about the protection gap and all these different things,

54:47 but are we willing to be innovative and invest and think creatively,

54:51 uh,

54:51 about what these products and feel and learn.

54:54 Right,

54:55 um,

54:55 from what we are doing,

54:56 how are we leveraging technology.

54:58 But central to that is also about fostering collaboration and

55:02 coalitions,

55:03 driving greater scale through knowledge sharing,

55:05 improving systems,

55:07 new structures.

55:08 And focusing on solutions,

55:11 right?

55:11 Learning,

55:12 implementing,

55:13 yes,

55:13 there is some failure,

55:14 but how do we improve a constant process of improvement,

55:17 but also as part of that,

55:19 providing public value.

55:20 It's not just simply about insurance,

55:22 it's about the ecosystem that is created.

55:25 The discipline of it,

55:26 putting resources aside to deal with the potential shock,

55:29 but it's also

55:30 about,

55:31 you know,

55:32 the investment through information that we should be making in fundamental risk

55:36 risk reduction efforts

55:37 that is also part

55:39 when we think

55:40 about growth and resilience of what we need to be doing.

55:42 And I will just close with a little bit of,

55:44 uh,

55:44 maybe a little bit of an anecdote which is

55:46 we're currently having a conversation internally within the IDF

55:49 and amongst many of our members,

55:51 right,

55:51 insurance actors,

55:52 because we are seeing the impacts of these risks.

55:54 We talk about California and State Farm,

55:55 right,

55:56 and the recent

55:57 withdrawal.

55:57 There's a role in terms of

55:59 Sending a signal in terms of price.

56:01 But when you leave vulnerable communities exposed,

56:04 that's a huge reputational risk on every party involved.

56:07 So what is the opportunity for public-private partnerships to figure

56:11 out a way in which we can send those signals

56:13 but also don't leave people stranded.

56:15 So,

56:16 one of the things that we've also been,

56:17 we've been discussing is when we think about

56:20 the 1890s

56:21 when there was,

56:22 we saw the increasing uh electrification,

56:24 engineers,

56:25 industry,

56:26 insurance industry sent out engineers

56:28 to consider,

56:28 should we support this,

56:30 right?

56:31 Or is this a major issue that we,

56:33 we need to,

56:33 you know,

56:34 really pull back in terms of our,

56:36 our investments

56:37 and the engineers,

56:38 I can't remember his name,

56:39 but he was at MIT,

56:40 came back and said

56:41 electrification is inevitable.

56:43 It is the future,

56:44 right?

56:45 What you need to do as insurers is find a way to make it safe to occur,

56:49 right?

56:50 And that was what led to the creation of Underwriters Laboratory,

56:54 which is basically an an entity

56:56 that certifies all electrical equipment

56:59 that you see,

56:59 most electrical equipment that you see around the world.

57:02 So there is a conversation that we are pushing with our members,

57:05 with the industry members,

57:06 but also with the public sector.

57:07 We are faced with a world of increasing uncertainty.

57:11 Huge shocks

57:12 we have to reimagine

57:14 what those solutions need to be for the future and it cannot simply be

57:18 yes with withdrawal in some instances that's appropriate,

57:21 but also trying to think about what does growth and resilience

57:24 look like in the future when we think about climate change

57:26 and what are the opportunities as.

57:29 An institution

57:30 to unlock that and make that happen.

57:32 So

57:33 I'll end there and say that's the work of

57:35 the IDF and hopefully,

57:36 hopefully we can um

57:38 collaborate with others on that.

57:39 Excellent,

57:40 excellent.

57:40 IDF has an excellent general secretary.

57:46 So I attended some of the earlier sessions I,

57:49 I saw a Fast and Furious session.

57:51 This one

57:52 was fast,

57:53 furious,

57:53 and fantastic.

57:54 This,

57:54 this was brilliant.

57:55 This was really,

57:56 really good.

57:57 Uh,

57:58 so now we have,

57:59 we have some time for you to ask questions,

58:01 and I,

58:02 uh,

58:03 uh,

58:03 so I would encourage you to do that.

58:05 Can you,

58:06 uh,

58:07 who wants to go first?

58:08 Or do you want to go home?

58:12 Anybody?

58:13 Yes,

58:13 sir.

58:13 Come on,

58:14 please.

58:15 Just introduce yourself and ask the question.

58:17 Sure.

58:18 Hi,

58:18 uh,

58:19 Rodrigo Garcia from,

58:20 uh,

58:20 Sua Climate Insurance,

58:22 and I,

58:23 I find like the discussion fascinating and it's been mostly about,

58:26 um,

58:27 uh,

58:27 risks transferring,

58:28 right?

58:28 And probably to professors can point,

58:31 uh,

58:31 risk mitigation is something that probably we need the most,

58:34 it could be the most efficient

58:36 in terms of incentives,

58:37 but these two,

58:39 pieces are.

58:40 Uh,

58:40 are filled with market and government failures.

58:43 So,

58:43 uh,

58:44 I,

58:44 I,

58:44 I agree like it's necessary to think through like uh

58:47 economic efficiency,

58:48 but,

58:48 uh,

58:48 I don't see clearly how to think,

58:50 uh,

58:50 like what is a framework to think through these problems

58:53 to begin with.

58:57 Do we have any other questions

58:59 we can ask all at once.

59:01 And then we can,

59:03 and then I also want to thank the organizers at the end.

59:06 So I don't want you,

59:07 I don't want you to leave before then.

59:09 Please

59:09 continue.

59:10 OK,

59:11 uh,

59:11 thanks inermit.

59:12 Uh,

59:12 I'm Tali Kulli.

59:13 I'm with the,

59:13 uh,

59:14 World Bank.

59:14 Uh,

59:15 I have a question

59:16 for Michael.

59:18 Uh,

59:18 Michael,

59:18 so on resilience measurement,

59:20 there's,

59:21 uh,

59:21 obviously there has been an active literature,

59:23 uh,

59:24 particularly over the last 1015 years.

59:26 Um,

59:26 I'm not sure if you've seen

59:28 Chris Barrett's last paper,

59:29 a recent paper on this comparative assessment of

59:32 various resilience approaches where he basically casts doubt

59:36 on existing measures,

59:37 uh,

59:37 and their utility and encourages further research.

59:39 So

59:40 I wanted you to contextualize a little bit your

59:43 measure vis a vis existing measures and in particular.

59:47 Uh,

59:47 what you see the methodological frontier,

59:50 uh,

59:51 for

59:51 the development of that particular measure and how

59:54 longitudinal survey platforms such as the LSMS could actually help propel

59:58 that particular agenda.

59:59 Thank you so much.

1:00:00 Thank you,

1:00:00 Taleb.

1:00:01 Next one.

1:00:02 Next question,

1:00:02 please.

1:00:03 We'll take them all at all at once.

1:00:04 Hi,

1:00:05 I'm Chavi Gine from Deck DCRG uh here at the bank.

1:00:08 So this is also a question for Michael,

1:00:11 uh,

1:00:11 and then for Ecasue,

1:00:13 um,

1:00:14 so.

1:00:15 So,

1:00:16 so I,

1:00:16 I think I missed that,

1:00:17 but,

1:00:17 but basically when you compare the control to the

1:00:19 treated or the controls that had experienced a shock,

1:00:23 so

1:00:24 did you say what happened to the treated that did not experience a shock,

1:00:28 uh,

1:00:28 and so how does that,

1:00:29 so is that the more natural comparison group to the,

1:00:32 to the treated that did experience a shock and then,

1:00:35 so I think you,

1:00:35 I think you mentioned that actually they.

1:00:38 Those that did not experience the shock but were,

1:00:40 you know,

1:00:40 had the seeds and,

1:00:41 and,

1:00:42 and insurance

1:00:43 basically did not,

1:00:44 you know,

1:00:45 behaved as controls,

1:00:46 I believe,

1:00:47 um,

1:00:48 but then,

1:00:48 you know,

1:00:48 this is only after one year so

1:00:51 even,

1:00:51 even if I,

1:00:53 you know,

1:00:53 even if,

1:00:54 if I'm a farmer and experience a shock,

1:00:56 um.

1:00:57 You know,

1:00:58 and I'm more likely to buy,

1:00:59 to buy the bundle,

1:01:01 you know,

1:01:01 what happens in subsequent years,

1:01:02 right?

1:01:02 I mean this is not,

1:01:03 you know,

1:01:04 or,

1:01:04 or,

1:01:05 you know,

1:01:05 do I learn in one period and then,

1:01:07 and then I'm,

1:01:07 you know,

1:01:08 even though

1:01:09 I may not benefit later on,

1:01:10 I still keep on buying this,

1:01:12 right?

1:01:12 And so,

1:01:12 so how,

1:01:13 how should we,

1:01:13 how should we think,

1:01:15 how should we think about this?

1:01:16 and then,

1:01:17 you know,

1:01:17 a related question and so,

1:01:19 so this is again,

1:01:19 these are folks using the same technology,

1:01:22 presumably growing the same kind of crop.

1:01:25 But,

1:01:25 but,

1:01:26 but there's another counterfactual which is,

1:01:28 you know,

1:01:28 are these,

1:01:29 should be,

1:01:29 should be these guys be,

1:01:30 you know,

1:01:30 given the conditions,

1:01:31 given climate change,

1:01:33 should be these guys be growing

1:01:35 whatever it is that they're growing,

1:01:36 or should they just,

1:01:38 you know,

1:01:38 uh,

1:01:38 should,

1:01:38 should

1:01:39 incentives to be provided to.

1:01:41 Either migration,

1:01:42 move away from the farm,

1:01:43 or,

1:01:44 you know,

1:01:44 and,

1:01:44 and,

1:01:45 and,

1:01:45 and you know what,

1:01:46 what would the

1:01:46 what would the resilience gap be if,

1:01:48 if you know with these with these alternative uh kind of policies

1:01:51 and then sorry with with your,

1:01:53 uh,

1:01:54 so you know fascinating uh uh presentation,

1:01:57 um,

1:01:57 but I think you know what what I was after is is what you said at the very end which is.

1:02:03 So I think we're in an environment where there are places,

1:02:06 you know,

1:02:06 coastal Florida,

1:02:07 California,

1:02:08 where actually

1:02:09 private insurance companies are pulling out

1:02:11 now I don't know what's happening in,

1:02:12 in Africa in terms of,

1:02:14 you know,

1:02:14 uh,

1:02:15 uh,

1:02:15 index insurance or so on and so forth where again the prevalence of,

1:02:19 of payouts is increasing and so,

1:02:21 so how,

1:02:21 how is the industry responding,

1:02:23 uh,

1:02:24 uh,

1:02:24 and what are you guys doing about that,

1:02:26 uh,

1:02:26 uh,

1:02:27 um,

1:02:28 yeah sorry,

1:02:28 thank you.

1:02:29 Good,

1:02:29 good,

1:02:29 good,

1:02:29 good,

1:02:30 good question please,

1:02:31 please ask.

1:02:32 Um,

1:02:33 yeah,

1:02:33 hi,

1:02:34 uh,

1:02:34 I'm Claudia from the research department,

1:02:37 and I wanted to pick up on Matt's point about,

1:02:39 uh,

1:02:39 unintended consequences of some of these,

1:02:42 uh,

1:02:43 measures,

1:02:43 for instance,

1:02:44 uh,

1:02:45 the,

1:02:46 uh,

1:02:46 air conditioning which made it,

1:02:48 uh,

1:02:48 more habitable to live in

1:02:50 super high countries.

1:02:52 They also,

1:02:53 uh,

1:02:53 um,

1:02:54 contributed to

1:02:56 the

1:02:56 hole in the ozone layer back.

1:02:58 When I was a kid,

1:03:00 which the Globe

1:03:01 was successful in.

1:03:04 Getting together to ban those chemicals and uh

1:03:08 so I like that as both the unintended consequence for the ozone layer

1:03:13 as well as the world getting organized to address the problem,

1:03:17 but as far as I,

1:03:18 as far as Google tells me they continue to

1:03:21 contribute to greenhouse gasses.

1:03:22 So,

1:03:24 uh,

1:03:24 I just wanted to

1:03:25 pick up further on that point.

1:03:27 Thank you.

1:03:27 Good question.

1:03:30 Hi,

1:03:31 uh,

1:03:31 I'm Alessandro Barratiri from the World Bank,

1:03:33 and a short question for Xuedi.

1:03:35 I'm not an expert of this.

1:03:36 It was,

1:03:36 uh,

1:03:36 very fascinating,

1:03:38 and I was wondering if you could

1:03:39 tell us a little bit more about the history of the

1:03:42 institution,

1:03:42 so the,

1:03:42 the,

1:03:42 the,

1:03:43 the incentives,

1:03:44 and,

1:03:44 uh,

1:03:45 that have led the industry to,

1:03:46 to,

1:03:47 to provide this,

1:03:48 uh,

1:03:48 uh,

1:03:49 proposal of PPP,

1:03:50 and so the scalability also,

1:03:51 now you mentioned 5 billion clearly is,

1:03:53 is a small drop in the,

1:03:54 in the need,

1:03:55 and so how we go forward with that.

1:03:58 Excellent set of questions.

1:04:00 So why don't we go first Ecowe,

1:04:02 then Matt,

1:04:02 then,

1:04:03 and then Michael.

1:04:04 Yeah,

1:04:05 yeah,

1:04:06 great.

1:04:06 Uh,

1:04:06 so I'll start with the history,

1:04:08 um,

1:04:08 of institutions

1:04:10 of the institution.

1:04:11 Actually it came from quite a lot of

1:04:13 conversation that was happening within the UN system

1:04:15 for many years around shocks that were happening in developing countries

1:04:19 and just the concern in.

1:04:20 In terms of how do they work,

1:04:22 can they work with the private sector

1:04:24 to improve the financing for response.

1:04:27 So it was actually through that that there was a concerted

1:04:29 effort to see how can we create an institution where the industry

1:04:33 could work as a collective with the public sector,

1:04:36 uh,

1:04:36 because I mean there were so many institutions,

1:04:38 if I can put it that way,

1:04:40 from UNWFP to UNDRR to World Bank.

1:04:43 Institutions

1:04:44 that the feeling was let's create a single entity

1:04:46 where there could be a collective approach to this.

1:04:48 So that was the history and it was formally launched at COP 21

1:04:52 in Paris,

1:04:53 um,

1:04:54 not

1:04:54 because we are only focused on climate change,

1:04:57 but because that was when,

1:04:58 you know,

1:04:58 it was the opportune time for that.

1:05:01 So

1:05:01 again,

1:05:01 I hope that clarifies in terms of,

1:05:04 of,

1:05:04 of the history of the institution.

1:05:06 It's hugely important because I think that's the first

1:05:08 good thing that's come out of the UN.

1:05:12 I,

1:05:13 I did not say that.

1:05:15 Uh,

1:05:15 I think,

1:05:16 I think it's,

1:05:17 uh,

1:05:18 it's,

1:05:18 it's a good thing that has come out in terms of collective action,

1:05:23 um,

1:05:23 and I think,

1:05:24 you know,

1:05:24 there are lots of opportunities to

1:05:26 learn from that.

1:05:31 Um,

1:05:31 so,

1:05:32 in terms of the second question,

1:05:33 which was,

1:05:34 um,

1:05:34 the industry's response when you took,

1:05:37 when you think about climate change,

1:05:38 I will say,

1:05:38 OK,

1:05:38 we tackle this on two fronts.

1:05:41 With a focus on emerging markets.

1:05:44 We've focused a lot in terms of improving

1:05:46 the engagement at a global policy level around putting this issue on the map.

1:05:52 You would be surprised that this conversation that

1:05:55 we're having here in terms of the protection

1:05:57 gap is not one that is prevalent or often understood or even seen in many contexts.

1:06:03 So that for us is a critical contribution that we

1:06:06 have made or we are making to this space because

1:06:09 without that acknowledgement,

1:06:10 there's very little investment that will actually go into tackling the problem.

1:06:15 The second component is

1:06:16 what do you do in terms of the practicalities around this,

1:06:19 and I,

1:06:20 and as I said earlier,

1:06:21 we are talking about developing countries where you have

1:06:24 between 1 to 3% in terms of insurance penetration rates.

1:06:28 So part basically non-existent,

1:06:30 right?

1:06:31 And so there is some fundamental work that needs to be done in terms

1:06:34 of thinking about how do we actually develop those markets in the first place.

1:06:38 But there's an added layer of complexity indeed,

1:06:41 as you alluded to in terms of climate change and what this introduces.

1:06:44 So a lot of what we do is really looking at different types of

1:06:47 risk pooling mechanisms because that is one way in which you can manage that.

1:06:51 Uh,

1:06:51 the initiative that we see in the Caribbean,

1:06:53 in Africa,

1:06:54 in Asia,

1:06:54 and the Pacific are really aimed at bringing countries

1:06:57 together to pool their risk into a single portfolio

1:07:00 so that they're able to access the market.

1:07:02 At a much better rate.

1:07:04 The second is that we are also seeing innovation

1:07:06 in terms of the products that are being developed,

1:07:08 for example,

1:07:08 in terms of parametric insurance products,

1:07:11 and these are quite different from the traditional indemnity

1:07:13 products where you usually have to have a loss,

1:07:15 you go out into the field,

1:07:17 you do the assessments,

1:07:18 then you pay out a couple of months after the loss adjusters

1:07:21 have determined what that impact is,

1:07:23 right?

1:07:23 And that drives up the cost.

1:07:25 But at the same time,

1:07:26 Parametric insurance also is data intensive and so

1:07:29 there is a need for investment in that data

1:07:31 to actually make these products available and viable.

1:07:34 But then there's also a conversation in

1:07:36 terms of fundamental investments in risk reduction.

1:07:40 In many of the countries that we are engaged in,

1:07:42 there is very weak

1:07:44 social protection systems,

1:07:46 very limited investments in resilience and adaptation.

1:07:50 And so insurance can be valuable,

1:07:51 but it has its limitations,

1:07:53 and that's also part of what we need to figure out.

1:07:55 And its value comes in terms of the extremes,

1:07:57 but also through leveraging risk pooling,

1:07:59 um,

1:08:00 and risk sharing mechanisms.

1:08:01 So I hope I've addressed that

1:08:03 question that was raised very nicely done.

1:08:05 And

1:08:06 I,

1:08:06 I

1:08:07 I it's over to you,

1:08:08 Matt.

1:08:08 I know,

1:08:09 I know that you won't answer the question

1:08:10 and you'd like to talk about something else,

1:08:12 but that's fine.

1:08:13 You can.

1:08:15 So.

1:08:17 So on,

1:08:18 on resilience,

1:08:20 uh,

1:08:20 the world is urbanizing and I think that urbanization

1:08:23 and within nations the competition between systems of cities

1:08:27 is gonna play a key role

1:08:29 to allow us to discover there's so much that we know that we don't know of how

1:08:34 we're going to adapt and this competition.

1:08:36 Between cities

1:08:37 within nations to attract migrants

1:08:40 and within a system of cities this competition is going to teach us so much.

1:08:44 Uh,

1:08:44 Claudia asked an excellent question of what are the carbon footprint implications

1:08:49 as all of us adapt by cranking up the air conditioning.

1:08:52 I think we're nicely cooled here today.

1:08:55 And,

1:08:55 uh,

1:08:56 Paul Gertler,

1:08:57 who I think had a great career at the World Bank for a while,

1:08:59 and Lucas Davis had a great 2015 Proceedings of National Academy Sciences paper

1:09:04 exploring this topic in Mexico,

1:09:07 studying the Grilllius adoption curve as people go from being poor to

1:09:10 middle class of how many more people in Mexico own an air conditioner

1:09:15 and,

1:09:15 and what are the resulting greenhouse gas emissions.

1:09:18 So an unintended consequence of adapting is to exacerbate the externality,

1:09:23 especially as you've scale this up all over the world.

1:09:24 World,

1:09:26 I'm optimistic

1:09:27 that President Biden's

1:09:29 inflation Reduction Act is gonna give us a set

1:09:31 of green blueprints that will diffuse around the world.

1:09:35 Uh,

1:09:35 it's gonna be slow.

1:09:36 Sham McLal and I have written about this,

1:09:39 but I do think,

1:09:40 and I'm a,

1:09:40 I'm a fan of the president's subsidy program

1:09:43 because somebody had to be the guinea pig here

1:09:45 to accelerate our decarbonization.

1:09:48 And of course that's the sweet spot of having the win-win

1:09:51 of cranking up the air conditioning without angering Greta Thunberg.

1:09:55 Well,

1:09:55 it should have been called the Temperature reduction Act,

1:09:57 yep.

1:09:59 Michael,

1:10:01 OK,

1:10:01 um,

1:10:02 just a couple of quick,

1:10:03 uh,

1:10:03 responses to very interesting questions.

1:10:06 First,

1:10:06 Rodrigo,

1:10:06 I just wanna,

1:10:07 as someone who lives in the world of parametric insurance

1:10:11 and something I'm actually talking about tomorrow

1:10:13 morning early in California here in DC

1:10:16 for a World Bank seminar,

1:10:18 uh,

1:10:18 I think one of the big problems is defining quality.

1:10:21 For those kinds of contracts,

1:10:23 so we've been working on the definition of quality standards

1:10:26 and,

1:10:27 uh,

1:10:27 Matt and I looked at each other

1:10:29 when when the underwriter lab was mentioned

1:10:31 because that's actually been our model for what's missing

1:10:34 in the parametric insurance market and I think that issue

1:10:37 has to be taken really seriously more generally,

1:10:40 uh,

1:10:40 if in fact we're gonna tap into the potential

1:10:43 of parametric insurance.

1:10:44 OK,

1:10:44 very quickly.

1:10:46 Uh,

1:10:46 Tala,

1:10:47 you asked a little bit about the other

1:10:49 resilience literature.

1:10:51 Um,

1:10:52 I think most of that literature,

1:10:54 and,

1:10:54 and I am quite familiar with Chris's

1:10:56 damning critiques,

1:10:58 uh,

1:10:58 on it.

1:10:59 Um,

1:11:00 a lot of it is measurement of resi what's called resilience capacities,

1:11:03 so people haven't actually looked at shocks

1:11:06 in the way Townsend did or think of some of the classic.

1:11:09 They've actually said,

1:11:10 well,

1:11:10 we think we know what makes people resilient.

1:11:12 So let's look at the distribution of those things and then they try to use that

1:11:17 predictively

1:11:18 to look at future changes in welfare but not as a mitigating factor for shocks.

1:11:22 So the paper that Mo and I have actually written,

1:11:26 um,

1:11:26 you know,

1:11:27 tries to say let's just kind of start over again from basics.

1:11:30 And,

1:11:30 and resilience means your ability to recover from a shock.

1:11:34 So you're not gonna know that unless you observe people

1:11:36 with a shock,

1:11:37 and that leads me to,

1:11:38 to lead to your

1:11:39 second,

1:11:40 uh,

1:11:40 question,

1:11:41 which is about the LSMS data.

1:11:43 So I think that is absolutely gonna be a vital source

1:11:47 uh for for looking at this resilience and I think one of the things

1:11:51 that we need to might wanna think about

1:11:53 is when large shocks do happen

1:11:56 in in between LSMS rounds,

1:11:59 you know,

1:11:59 what's the frequency of observation that you need after it?

1:12:02 The dynamic programming fake data that I was using,

1:12:05 you know,

1:12:06 we could observe things as frequently as we wanted.

1:12:09 You know,

1:12:10 interestingly,

1:12:10 with the much with the annual frequency data from that Mozambique,

1:12:13 Tanzania,

1:12:14 we actually see we can get some stuff and

1:12:16 so I think there's for me this is a great idea

1:12:19 is to harness,

1:12:22 uh,

1:12:22 to harness the LSMS data to actually

1:12:24 do this and,

1:12:25 and,

1:12:25 and really start to build up a catalog

1:12:28 uh of information on that,

1:12:30 uh.

1:12:30 Uh,

1:12:31 Chave asked a couple of really,

1:12:33 uh,

1:12:34 uh,

1:12:34 good questions.

1:12:35 I think we were maybe a little confused on,

1:12:37 on,

1:12:38 on what the

1:12:39 treatment group that wasn't shocked

1:12:41 was doing and sort of how to use the behavior of that group.

1:12:44 So

1:12:45 it's a little bit messy to think about because literally what we see in the data,

1:12:49 there is a small,

1:12:51 smallish ex ante response

1:12:54 to being provided these things that we do see.

1:12:57 In both in all people in the treatment group and then some of them got zapped

1:13:01 and some of them didn't

1:13:03 so there's a little bit of an ex ante response

1:13:06 which is in part is the is part of the benefit

1:13:09 of the resilience technology so that's why we compared.

1:13:13 To the control group,

1:13:14 uh,

1:13:14 but then as I,

1:13:15 as I tried to say in the talk,

1:13:17 eventually

1:13:18 the non-shocked

1:13:20 people who received the res they,

1:13:22 they really dra drastically reduced

1:13:25 walked away from the technology and,

1:13:26 and I think that's an important thing to sort of,

1:13:29 uh,

1:13:29 think about.

1:13:30 I think you,

1:13:30 you also,

1:13:31 um.

1:13:33 Uh,

1:13:34 you raised a really important point.

1:13:36 Uh,

1:13:37 which is,

1:13:38 you know,

1:13:38 it's one thing to help someone keep growing maize

1:13:41 in an arid area of Mozambique,

1:13:42 but is that actually what somebody,

1:13:44 is that actually the best thing to be done?

1:13:46 So,

1:13:46 again,

1:13:47 I didn't really emphasize it in the talk,

1:13:48 but we were bundling together.

1:13:51 A

1:13:52 genetic technology which it makes it more possible for some people to continue

1:13:56 to profitably

1:13:57 grow maize in some places,

1:13:59 but clearly there are gonna be other instances

1:14:01 and probably in those parts of Mozambique in the near future

1:14:05 where that's actually no longer the right decision

1:14:08 and here is where I think

1:14:09 there's kind of a chicken and egg problem that goes on we,

1:14:12 we.

1:14:12 Uh,

1:14:13 we tried to do something like this in the Dominican Republic

1:14:16 and it never really got off the ground,

1:14:18 so the idea

1:14:19 was to create an insurance contract

1:14:22 that could be used

1:14:23 to certify loans for lenders

1:14:26 that lenders would make to small scale

1:14:28 livestock dairy farmers

1:14:30 so that they could invest then in in irrigation

1:14:33 and water control facilities.

1:14:36 So the problem was

1:14:37 without insurance,

1:14:38 the banks didn't want to touch these guys.

1:14:41 Uh,

1:14:41 and then what we tried to do is combine the insurance

1:14:45 to unlock credit,

1:14:46 but then the credit

1:14:48 was being provided in,

1:14:49 uh,

1:14:50 again,

1:14:50 it didn't ever work,

1:14:51 but the idea was that the credit.

1:14:52 Would then be linked

1:14:54 to some of these more transformative

1:14:56 investments like if you're a small scale dairy farmer you don't just

1:15:00 depend on natural pasture

1:15:01 but you build barrages and you build small scale irrigation

1:15:04 schemes or you could think about that being tied even to

1:15:07 crop protection but we sort of need to get from where people are,

1:15:11 which often risk prone farmers have no capital access or very

1:15:14 little capital access

1:15:16 and,

1:15:16 and,

1:15:16 and,

1:15:16 and get them to where they can move ahead.

1:15:18 So

1:15:19 I think your point is extremely.

1:15:20 Well taken,

1:15:21 we

1:15:21 this should not be seen as a way to lock people

1:15:24 into something that becomes increasingly nonprofitable,

1:15:27 but,

1:15:28 uh,

1:15:28 I think we need to think then about ways to blend together

1:15:31 financial tools so that people

1:15:33 can actually get the loans they need to make the adaptive kind of investments that

1:15:37 I think we would all agree would make sense.

1:15:39 So again,

1:15:39 thank you everyone.

1:15:41 Do you wanna add something,

1:15:42 please,

1:15:42 please,

1:15:43 uh,

1:15:43 I wanted to add to that I think that that's

1:15:44 a very important point because even the work that we did

1:15:47 with the African Risk Capacity.

1:15:49 Um,

1:15:49 it made very clear what the risks were in

1:15:52 terms of droughts and the fact that in some context

1:15:55 there should be a shift in terms of some of the agricultural practices,

1:15:59 uh,

1:15:59 but that's very difficult because it also converges

1:16:01 with some of the political and cultural,

1:16:03 uh.

1:16:04 Issues within a particular country,

1:16:06 but I think an important contribution is also

1:16:09 from the conversation around risk is bringing transparency

1:16:12 to what exists,

1:16:13 right?

1:16:14 And using that transparency to drive further

1:16:17 conversations around how do you mobilize financing

1:16:20 for such transitions that need to,

1:16:21 to take place.

1:16:22 So I think this,

1:16:23 the World Bank's work on the CCDRs

1:16:25 is quite,

1:16:26 I think,

1:16:26 supportive and helpful in some of that

1:16:28 thinking that we're seeing evolving in countries.

1:16:30 So the work that you're doing is also very

1:16:33 helpful for the CCDRs because Matt will know this

1:16:36 and others will know this that there's a lot of confused thinking about

1:16:39 what's adaptation,

1:16:40 what is resilience,

1:16:41 what is development,

1:16:42 what is adaptability,

1:16:43 and so on.

1:16:44 So I think it will really help us a lot and I know that

1:16:47 Farhat is working on this to actually distill all of your ideas into a form

1:16:51 that even world bankers can understand.

1:16:53 So,

1:16:54 um,

1:16:55 uh,

1:16:55 so I'm going to ask you all to do two rounds of applause.

1:16:59 The first round,

1:17:00 I would like

1:17:01 to give an applause

1:17:02 to this panel,

1:17:03 to Michael,

1:17:04 to Matt,

1:17:05 to Echo Swe,

1:17:06 and for Had for actually,

1:17:08 uh,

1:17:09 for,

1:17:10 uh,

1:17:11 for,

1:17:11 uh,

1:17:12 for,

1:17:12 uh,

1:17:13 thinking through these things and organizing a great session.

1:17:16 So first applause.

1:17:17 Thank you.

1:17:23 The second round I wanted to,

1:17:25 uh,

1:17:27 uh,

1:17:27 I wanted to thank very much the colleagues,

1:17:30 uh,

1:17:31 who actually organized the ABCDE

1:17:33 and I'm sure you all,

1:17:35 I'm sure you all recognize

1:17:37 and appreciate that it's actually much easier for us to attend a hybrid conference,

1:17:42 but if you actually try to organize a hybrid conference,

1:17:44 you know that it's actually much harder to organize one.

1:17:47 Than to organize,

1:17:48 uh,

1:17:49 you know,

1:17:50 uh,

1:17:51 to organize a purely virtual one or a.

1:17:55 A purely virtual one or a purely in-person one,

1:17:58 right?

1:17:59 So I really thank very,

1:18:01 very much all of those who think,

1:18:03 especially 10 people,

1:18:04 and those are

1:18:06 Nona

1:18:07 and her last name is Karaashvili.

1:18:10 The next one is Tatiana Kleinberg.

1:18:12 Then we have Tale Kili,

1:18:15 uh,

1:18:15 we have Paul Christian,

1:18:16 we have Gabby Calderon

1:18:18 Morta,

1:18:19 we have Rula Yazigi,

1:18:21 and we have Anna Bonfield,

1:18:24 Jonathan Litwin.

1:18:25 Maria Saffa,

1:18:27 and of course Art Crey,

1:18:29 OK,

1:18:29 so big,

1:18:30 big applause to all of us.

1:18:40 And thank you all very,

1:18:41 very much for staying till the end.

1:18:43 Thank you so much.

1:18:44 Bye-bye.

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For coming for the session, uh, so I, I must thank Farhahlpi for asking me to moderate the session. Uh, she asked me because I think she wants me to learn about, about climate resilience. Um, so, uh, the, the, the, the, the way that I would introduce the session is that natural disasters that are due to climate change and other things, they cost the world about a quarter of a trillion dollars each year, OK. And they also cause a lot of debts, uh, but most of those debts, about 80% of them are in low and lower middle income economies, uh, so we think that the severity and the frequency of these shocks has been increasing, and the main question, and that's a question for the session today, is how can governments and markets make people and enterprises, uh, more, uh. Uh, much better at handling these shocks in the sense of actually both not being affected them nearly as much and to the extent that they are affected to actually rebound quicker, right? So to discuss this question we have uh 3 experts and I'm going to introduce them very, very quickly and I introduce them all at once. Uh, so the first one is Michael Carter. He'll go first and he will discuss whether insurance markets can build resilience of households, OK. So I should say a few words about Michael. Uh, he is distinguished professor for agricultural and Resource Economics at the University of California Davis. He's done a lot of work in this area and he's going to, uh, uh, he's going to share some of that with us. The second speaker is Matt Kahn, and he'll talk about the interactions between private investment and government protection against climate risk. Matt is the Provost professor of economics at the University of Southern California. And the third person is Eko Swehi. Uh, uh, she will go 3rd, and she will discuss how the private sector, uh, can increase the financial protection for people in vulnerable countries. Uh, so Ekoswehi is actually, uh, very well qualified to do this. Uh, she's been involved in two innovative, uh, 2 innovative institutions and initiatives. The first one is the African Risk Capacity Agency. And the other one is the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility. She's the general secretary of the Insurance Development Forum, which is supported by the UN and the World Bank. So with those introductions, I'm going to ask Michael to start us off. Uh, he'll speak for between 15 and 20 minutes. Sorry. There you go, Mickey. Thank you very much. So, good afternoon. It's a great honor to be here. I'm glad to be, uh, speaking, uh, with all of you and, uh, and, and on this very important topic. So. Uh, the slide you see in front of you, those are women in, uh, northern Kenya, specifically Samburu County, who have been involved in a graduation program study we did that also combined asset building with asset protection. Um, so we'll talk uh perhaps a little bit about that. I'm really gonna, I'm doing something slightly unwise. Uh, I was told by a Jesuit priest many years ago, never try to give more than 3 messages in a single talk. I'm actually gonna try to mash together 2 papers, each of which has about 12 messages. So I'm, I'm going against, uh, use, I'm going against my training, uh, by trying to do this, but hopefully you'll see why I'm, uh, mashing together, uh, these things. Let me give a small, uh, amount of credit. One paper, uh, is with Sarah Jansen and Nobu Ik Kagami, and it, it asked the question, if insurance can change, uh, poverty dynamics and reduce the cost of social protection. I'm gonna draw on just a few ideas on that. And then the second piece of work is with, uh, Moa Lus and it's on, on measuring resilience with well-defined counterfactuals. And so I'm gonna try to make a, a transition between, uh, these two things in a way that, uh, hopefully will prove to be, uh, sensible. Uh, so real quickly, let me just summarize a little bit of theory of insurance markets and the cost of, of social protection. So in this paper I mentioned with. Uh, with Sarah and, and Nobu, it's a, it's a calibrated, fairly complicated dynamic stochastic programming model. Model assumes households are very smart, very forward looking, understand probability distributions, understand how insurance works, um, and they, they do the best they can in a, in a rather difficult environment. That model is actually calibrated on the area of northern Kenya where we just saw those women, uh, a moment ago. Um, so what happens in, in this model is, as, as we'll see in a moment, but the provisioning of insurance or inducing an insurance market and specifically an index insurance market, uh, for people like those women actually has substantial impacts on, on poverty dynamics, and it, the, uh, the, it has effects through three mechanisms. The first is what I call a vulnerability reduction or resilience effect, so it, it keeps people from falling as far. And so if you don't follow as far, it doesn't take you as long obviously to get back. Uh, the second, it changes investment incentives for people, so it actually has what I call a, uh, a resilience dividend effect. So we actually alter the long term level of poverty because, uh, providing insurance for people's assets actually enhances their incentives to accumulate and wisely invest. And the third, which is sort of a strange one, and when I first introduced this a few years back to Alain de Genvri at Berkeley, he said. You're making people pay for their own social protection, which is true, uh, so in this model we're gonna look at the wisdom of a partial government subsidy program for insurance, um, and that actually allows the existing government budget, uh, to stretch further. So we'll get, I'll, I'll just summarize those results, uh, really, uh, really quickly, and they can be summarized. I think I've been seeing everyone say that this pointer doesn't work. So what we can see in these two diagrams, I don't need to go them in, in great detail. But the diagram on the left is a poverty headcount that comes out of this, uh, this, this long-term model over a period of 50 years. The one on the right is the poverty gap. The solid, I guess it looks black line, the uppermost line in the latter part of the period. That's if the government, uh, if there's no insurance market active. The sort of bluish line, which is in the, in the middle in most of them, is when there's an insurance market, but the government leaves it up to people's own devices, whether or not they wish to purchase insurance, and the red line is sort of a sloppily targeted. Subsidy program which the government offers to to bring subsidies and so what you can see from this is it, it really does in the in the context of this model, it really does alter long term poverty dynamics so you can see the headcount measures of poverty end up being much lower uh when you have an insurance market presence uh and also the poverty gap eventually uh becomes smaller. There's some interesting intertemporal trade-offs there which I, we can talk about if, if there's time. Uh, or interest, the, the main impacts, the largest growth there are is actually coming from what I call the vulnerability reduction effect, OK, uh, and, and then the red line, which is when the subsidy comes in, uh, is the additional investment incentive effect. So one of the things that comes out of this work is if you are in a dynamic system that has a tipping point or a poverty trap, if you are vulnerable in the sense that you're close to that dynamic tipping point, essentially the shaft. The price of money is extremely high for you, and it turns out it's not optimal for people right at the tipping point to buy any insurance. It's not that it wouldn't be valuable, but the money is, it's actually more valuable for them to get as far away from the tipping point as quickly as they can. When you've subsidize insurance, it takes those vulnerable, those most vulnerable people, and then they, then they're, they're willing to pay sort of half price on it. And so that's where you get some additional poverty reduction effects. Uh, the, the, the final kind of exercise we do in the paper is we, we provide the following thought experiment. Suppose the government comes along with a social compact and says, let's guarantee everyone in this economy that we're gonna raise them up to the poverty line, OK? And the, the black solid line now is the budgetary implication of the government holding on to that social compact when there is no insurance market. You can see over time the black line uh sort of creeps up as government expenditures begin to increase. And then we ask ourselves, is there really a public finance case for inducing insurance markets, and secondly for subsidizing those insurance markets, given the particular behavior of the the particular behavior of people who are in this system with a dynamic tipping point. Uh, when we do the comparisons here, let me just focus on the subsidized case, that's the red line again, um. When we do that, we, we, we, we measure total government expenditures as closing the poverty gap for everybody and also paying for the insurance subsidies. So you can see initially, the cost of that program is rather high, but by the time you get to the end of the fifty-year. Uh, simulation because you've had these investment incentive effects, you've reduced vulnerability for everybody. Government expenditures are actually less, and the paper goes into much greater detail, but there on the slide you can see that if we take the discounted present value of the. Different kind of public expenditure streams, the government actually saves money even by subsidizing insurance because you're basically, you're keeping more of the population in a, in a circumstance where they can maintain their economic viability. So as I often, I think as as the paper actually puts it, um, we can, we can, uh, we, we can imagine a world in which. Uh, you know, we might say insurance subsidies are expensive, but this is also saying not subsidizing insurance is also expensive in, in terms of the poverty that, that emerges without sort of good social protection mechanisms, um. Something I'll just very briefly flag here, we're looking at insurance mechanisms here to achieve this goal. It works because people understand and trust the insurance. It's reliable. It's delivered quickly. In principle, you can have governments do shock responsive social protection programs. Uh, government of Kenya is experimenting with it with something called HSMP 2, which is a scalable social protection program. What I've heard about how that works, doing a lot of field work in the area, we get a lot of, uh, rural myths about how that works. So I, I would say there's not a lot yet that tells us that that works, uh, necessarily very well. Um, there's another side thing since we have someone who worked for ARC before, um. You know, there's a side issue if the government is in fact gonna carry that risk of stochastic social protection obligation, should they in fact engage with the Africa risk capacity, for example. Uh, we've been doing some work on when that is good public finance, uh, or not, and that's a, that's again a side issue, but I think it's actually a really, uh, important question to consider. OK, so theory is very suggestive, right? We, we've just seen a couple of ways through, through which, uh, insurance could actually or insurance markets, perhaps subsidized insurance markets could increase resilience, but if I stop to think about it, I realize I don't actually know what resilience is. I don't think there's any good measures. Uh, in fact, uh, excuse me, yesterday, in Dermit, in your introductory remarks, you gave, you gave a definition of resilience, which is pretty close to that first bullet point on there, right? I think you said, well, resilience is kind of when you get back to where you were pretty quickly, OK. Um, so I wanna suggest that we take that definition of resilience seriously and figure out how to do it because, uh, I was sort of doing a resilience like analysis in that prior paper, but I wanna be a little more formal and I wanna I wanna sort of think about it. So again. If, if we really wanna measure resilience as, as, as I think we all really mean it when we talk about economic resilience, then obviously we're gonna need to observe whatever unit of analysis like households that we're interested in, we're gonna need to observe them. After a shock, right? And more importantly, we're gonna need a counterfactual estimate of where they would have been without the shock, right? Because if we wanna measure the cost of the shock, if we say being resilient means we have very small loss of current and future well-being, then we need a counterfactual if we wanna measure what that would have been. So what I'm gonna share with you quickly then is, is, is taking a look. At, at first, how we can define a measure, I'm gonna do it with fake data because it's always, it's a lot easier to shock people inside your computer CPU than it is to do it in the real world, thank God, uh, and, and then I'm actually gonna use some real data and show you how you can use it and, and bring it around, uh, bring both examples if time permits to, uh, uh, to this, uh, to, uh, to, to insurance and, and its impacts on resilience more formally, uh, defined. So I'm just gonna jump ahead here a little bit. Um. So the upper, the upper curve there is the expected value of income for a control group that does not receive a shock. The lower line, so these are people who are behaving dynamically optimally. So you can see the control group is, is on an upward trajectory converging to sort of their solo steady state if you want to think about it, uh, that way, and that's more or less the right way to think about it. We take a random sample of the people in our study, and we give them a horrific shock, OK? So they immediately have a very large collapse. And then the red line, as it slowly recovers, right, that's actual optimal rate of recovery when people are considering in the absence of ability to borrow, that's how fast they will try to return to their counterfactual state. OK? So this is made up with fake data. I skipped over the slides that say how we estimate it, but it's, it's pretty obvious. Uh, and there's a very good literature, as I think we all know in this, uh, in this room that looks at the, the impact of shocks on, on coping, on investment, and all, all sorts of things. So this work really draws on that, on that tradition. Moe and I in this paper suggest we define resilience this way just graphically. Uh, resilience is defined there in the middle. L is the gap between, it's the loss gap between the actual income level of people who were shocked and their counterfactual measure of where they would have been. OK, so that's the core part of the measure. And then just to normalize it. Then we basically normalize that loss gap by an imaginary standard if they didn't recover at all. So if they didn't recover at all, they would, they would go along the bottom of that gray box at what we call the zero resilience line. So defining it with this normalization is, is kind of nice, um, because it makes the resilience measure go between 0 and 1. So if you don't recover at all, you have zero resilience, and if you were to recover instantaneously, you would have a resilience of 1. OK? In this particular instance that comes from our dynamic programming model, uh, the resilience measure is actually 43%, and you will note that's cutting off the measure, uh, uh, six years after the shock occurred, OK? Uh, so that's just an example that you can take. Imagine having panel data like this. You could actually measure a shock, you know, subject to some identification concerns. I'll just mention quickly, you can actually also measure it at the individual level and so I won't explain the, the mathematical expression there, but that's just a matching estimator for individual resilience. It's the same concept of comparing how. Household eye with their counterfactual estimate of where they were and we can, we can add up their individual resilience. I think that's really important if we measure resilience because then we can start to look at the determinants of resilience, which I think is something that, that, that we need to, uh, kind of get to. Another reason for doing this, it, it, it allows us to think about the, the cost-benefit analysis or more generally the economic value of resilience promoting interventions. So first, let me real quickly take an example from the computer. So, uh, we imagine, uh, uh, uh, a catastrophic insurance policy is introduced. It only pays off if the shock is really bad, OK? And we and and and it's calibrated to cover 1 in 10 year events. So to make the analysis kind of balanced, we assume that someone's buying this insurance for 10 years before the shock occurs. And then when the shock after the shock occurs, the green line there shows the much more rapid recovery of households that had their assets kind of rebuilt or partially rebuilt subject to a deductible, OK, and. And once you do that, the, the resilience measure goes up quite substantially. Um. In the paper we, we look at two cases. I'm actually sharing with you the non-poverty trap, uh, paper. Uh, we can see when we, when we provide this catastrophic insurance, resilience actually rises to about 70%, so this resilience measure goes up substantially. If we do a benefit cost analysis and we basically take the present value of that area in the middle that's marked Delta. OK, and we compare that to the the present value of that to the present value of, of having made insurance payments for 10 years, you can see the benefit cost ratio is about 1, just under 2, OK. This kind of approach actually accommodates poverty traps. I was talking to Hebram today wherever he, I saw him a moment ago, um, who's thinking about vulnerability, which in a sense these upper measures are actually perfect measures of vulnerability as, as well. Um, OK, let's go real quickly to the, to the real world to sort of wrap up. Um, There's a, there's, if you look at the slides, there's a, it tells you where to get the different papers here. Um, and if, if God smiles on us, this boucher at all will be published before my next birthday. Now, probably not. My birthday is in 2 weeks, so there's no, there's no hope because of referee 4 is doing it to us again. Uh, this was a 4 year RCT in Tanzania, Mozambique. Uh, we were looking at bundling stress tolerance, specifically drought tolerant seeds, with an insurance contract which was intended to cover the risks that drought tolerant seeds don't. I was talking to Chave, uh, earlier today because he said, why do you need insurance if you have drought tolerant seeds and the reality is drought tolerant seeds or even flood tolerant rice only cover a subset of the events that happened. So we came up with an index insurance contract which I could talk about for hours, but I will not. Um, and, and then we end up having a treatment. We have a control group. This was a spatially diversified RCT, so we had two countries, Mozambique, Tanzania. We spent a lot of time looking at weather maps, so we tried to maximize the probability that somebody somewhere in our study would get, would get zapped, uh, which is an unfortunate way to design a study, but that's what we did. Uh, nature, fortunately for us, unfortunately for the people in the study, the nature was pretty generous in terms of providing different kinds of shocks, both the kind of shock that is managed, um, that is managed by the drought tolerant seeds, as well as the kind of shock that's covered by the insurance. Uh, I can skip, this is junkie, we'll get over it. I mean, that's just saying we regress. We're just regressing, uh, various kinds of outcome measures. I'm gonna look at May's income here, regressing it on the shocks and the interaction between the shocks in the different, in the different treatments and controlling. For the usual stuff you would expect to see controlled for in an RCT. OK, so now this is real data, OK? So now the counterfactual line, the upper blue line that we're looking at, this is what happens to our control group, who does not receive a shock. OK? And you can see the importance of the counterfactual here. So, uh, what's labeled there is year 3 was actually not a great year. So even the people that weren't shocked were sort of not doing great in year 3. And then the red line is actually the group of people who were hit by severe shock in year 2. OK? And what we see is there's extremely low resilience, OK. By the following year, these families have barely recovered. If the paper breaks it down into drops in investment at the intensive and extensive margins, kids don't eat, all sorts of terrible stuff is going on there. OK, but it's sort of summarized here as a lack of resilience. And then we, we sort of ran out of money, so the study came to an end, but we sort of imagined they would slowly start to recover. Uh, but the way I've written it here, the measured resilience is only about 18%. OK, so there's a lot that could happen. Now, what happens to our experimental treatment group? OK, so again, we have an experimental randomly selected treatment group that receives a package of risk mitigation technologies, OK? And so a couple of things are going on here. So that's the green line. OK, and again this is all based on the econometric, uh, estimates. And at year two, we give the identical shock. To the people in the treatment group, OK. The first thing you notice is they don't fall nearly as far. That's because it turns out that drought tolerant seeds actually work. I actually did not believe they would. I thought they only worked on fancy farms with, with, uh, fancy agronomy. Turns out they work for like farmers that have pathetic soils, use no inputs other than seeds. So that's a really interesting finding. So first of all, they don't fall very far, and more importantly, they're not, they're not capitalized for the next year. OK, so for the control group farmers that were shocked, their input intensity drops tremendously, and they actually reduced the area planted by about 25% the year following a severe shock. So the, the household is really hunkered down as best they can, and they're not at all resilient. Um, so if we ignore the part for a moment that's labeled resilience dividend above the blue line, what we find is this this treatment group has almost perfect resilience, and it's a combination of the action of, of a genetic technology as well as index insurance, uh, kind of financial, uh, technology. The final thing, and, and I'll kind of end here since the, the, the buzzer just is going off. The final thing, are we OK? Absolutely fine. It's an excellent. Oh, OK. Well, thank you. Um, So just, just real quickly, the really interesting thing is the year after the shock, we see the so-called resilience dividend. So those of you who have looked at the literature on insurance, at least when it works, right, there's this ex ante or resilience dividend effect. So when people become convinced that they have a financial or in this case a financial slash agronomic technology that will help them, they actually intensify. Investment. So what's going on there with that big post-shock jump is not only did these mechanisms keep them from falling very far, not only did it help the insurance help them preserve their capital, but it seemed to have given them confidence, and they actually expanded the year after a shock when everybody else is shrinking their production. They actually expanded their production from 2 to like 2.6 hectares. So it's a huge jump, and they also intensify the amount of inputs that they use. OK. Now the flip side of this in the paper is being tortured by referee 4 who wants us to prove for sure that this was a learning effect, and we think we've satisfied my favorite referee 4. but what we think, you know, if you look at the treatment group people who did not receive shocks. In this year 3, they actually run away from the technology, and their behavior and productivity becomes indistinguishable from the control group. OK. So to me this is an example of farmers, if a bunch of people come up in, in, in trucks from cement or wherever our trucks came from, you know, and they say, oh try these magic seeds, and they think Jack and the Beanstalk, my mother warned me about this, right? But most people seem pretty accommodating. And they, they sort of dabbled in it, right? And after the first year, people that didn't see the benefits, uh, uh, you know, walked away from it. People that did see the benefits says, wow, this is amazing, and they intensify. I think there are huge policy lessons there. I've written a little bit actually with Alanda Jadri and Jing Kai, who's at Maryland on how do you subsidize an input which delivers its benefits only occasionally. Right, because people, you know, the expression I learned as a kid, uh, was, you know, fool me once, shame on you, fool me twice, shame on me. And I think people in our, in our treatment groups, you tell them all this fancy stuff about insurance and, you know, how to, how to make complaints and how to do this and that, the magic bean seeds or maize seeds in this case, and they'll go, well, maybe. But if they don't see it working, and it's a pretty large jump in their expenditures, which it was for these farmers, uh, even when they were dabbling in it, they say, well, that's enough. So, the, the question is, for me, smart subsidies are subsidies that allow people to learn, which is a real public good, and it spills over really rapidly. Um, but here, in fact, what we see, it's actually really hard to learn about these kinds of technologies in the short term, and I think that's something we still need as kind of a community need to, to grapple with. So I think I've pretty much said, uh, most of this. So, um, um, thank you very much for your attention. Excellent. Thank you very much, Michael. Over to you, Matt. That was a brilliant presentation, Michael. It was very, really well done. So I understood most of it. I, I don't use this fancy PowerPoint stuff, so, uh, tough room. So to, uh, to prepare for my talk, I typed into chat GPT, uh, give me 1000 words on adapting to climate change, and I'd like to read you what the computer said. Folks, in economics, in climate economics today, as you know, there's two major issues. How are we gonna reduce, uh, the world's carbon footprint at a time when the world economy has to grow? We need economic growth to, to help all of us. How will we decarbonize? And at the same time there's a second question of as Mother Nature punches us harder, how do we configure the rules of the game and incentives such that we can take a punch, and I don't mean evolution, uh, we're not gonna talk about that in my remaining 9 minutes. What I wanna talk about is how do we. Set up our markets and the interplay between government and the private sector such that we build up resilience. I love Michael's presentation. How do we build up human capital? How do we unleash entrepreneurship and innovation such that we get better and better at adapting to the scary challenges we face, folks, for better or worse, I'm an eternal optimist. My mother says, Matthew, no magical thinking, but I am trained at Chicago. Tough room. And while I am a believer in free markets in helping us to adapt, I recognize the central role that government can and often does play in unleashing the free market. But I will also be talking today about cases, Sam Peltzman cases where government intervention has muffled the free market. And want to discuss a research agenda that I'm part of and where I have many open questions, uh, since I'm gonna do no theory, since I'm gonna show you no empirics and since you're checking your cell phones, uh, I want you to know that what I do on a day to day basis is, uh, as an empiricist and as a soft theorist I am always looking for empirical benchmarks of are we doing better. At adapting to climate change, for example, we released an NPR paper. Sean McLal was one of our co-authors and great to work with him with repeated floods that have taken place over the last decade, our lights at night dimming less in the aftermath of a flood and recovering faster. That's an example of the types of benchmarking I do and I'm always interested in for different measures for people. For places for farms when the same punch occurs, a flood, a heat wave, how much economic damage occurs coming back to Michael's talk, how much would we be willing to pay to not face the shock and evidence of adaptation is if we're actually willing to pay less over time because we're getting better at adapting to the shock and so that's sort of the structural benchmark I'm looking for. Folks, when I was a Gary Becker student and I was not the star of the class, I was in Ed Glazer's shadow, um, what we often were talking about was the household production theory. People want to be safe. They want to raise happy, comfortable children and, and, and productive children. Let's not forget that, uh, in a world where we face increased risks. How do we achieve these goals? How, I'm gonna read from my script. How do we remain safe and comfortable in an increasingly risky world, folks, I wanna start with the boring air conditioner, and, and can I get a boo? I'm looking at intermitt. The, the, the beauty of the air conditioner for to start a discussion about adaptation is there's a 1 to 1 function. If it's extremely hot. Side, people who can afford an air conditioner can buy it and operate it, folks. There was a paper, oh, my teleprompter just went out. Uh, there was a paper in the Journal of Political Economy six years ago by Michael Greenstone, Karen Clay, Joe Shapiro, and a few more co-authors called The Remarkable, it had the word remarkable in the title, and here's what it documented. In Iowa in the 1930s when it was over 95 degrees for a few days in the summer, many people died. We didn't have air conditioning and Americans suffered circa 1930. So these guys ran regressions at the state level of how many people died per capita as a function of how many hot days, and they ran this regression every decade and showed that over the 20th century, fewer and fewer. Americans are dying in heat waves, and we're not evolving. They attribute the success to air conditioners becoming cheaper, of higher quality, and Americans growing richer to afford these. We anticipated a challenge. We demanded the product and we installed it. Even my mother-in-law in Berkeley is now considering air conditioning. And let's be careful, air conditioning is not free. There's a I have an alternative hypothesis. So I think a lot of Indians are moving to Iowa and for us 95 degree days are fantastic. So this, that was not part of their model. This was a closed economy and that, but, but this is why intermitt's the chief and I have 6 more minutes. The, um, it folks, but the air conditioner is a convenient example for a free market optimist because we have it. We recognize that heat causes this challenge, and we have this offsetting product. Um, uh, here, let me say something productive. In my city of Los Angeles, there is the recognition that there's many poor people, and I have a paper in the Journal of Public Economics of the challenges that poor people face in the tougher neighborhoods in Los Angeles where they live in older housing without air conditioning. Karen Bass and Eric Garcetti. Have introduced cooling centers and have worked with Uber and other ride sharing companies to bring disadvantaged people to cooling centers on the hottest days. So while LeBron James and Kim Kardashian can crank up their air conditioning, tough room, uh, at the same time as they privately adapt to the climate change challenge, um, I. Support my being taxed to provide these services for the poor to bring them into these cooling centers. So that's a case where the government's efforts to provide adaptive services to the disadvantaged do not crowd out the efforts by private citizens. But folks, I'm gonna argue that that's rare. There is often, uh, uh, there are often Peltzman effects involved, and let me give a classic one. Carolyn Kowski, who would be a great panel member today but could not join us, she wrote a tremendous paper 20 years ago where she said, uh, a crowding out hypothesis, and here's the Peltzman part. If there's a city like Miami that floods, if that city builds a seawall. That can actually be an attractive nuisance as more people move to the area because they perceive it to be safe. So folks, does everyone see that crowding out hypothesis? And so a fundamental idea that I'm eager to work with World Bank scholars about is unintended consequences. If you build infrastructure at a desirable place that helps the incumbents, but does it make the place even more desirable to move there? And if this infrastructure is unreliable, if it depreciates over time and isn't. Maintained you could actually run into an engineering disaster of luring people if they overestimate the safety uh there can be unintended consequences of crowding out private self-protection. So one theme I want to stress today is to think about when are government efforts a complement of private efforts to improve your safety in the face of climate change versus when do government efforts unintentionally crowd out private adaptation efforts. And so that is one big theme I want to convey today. I think I want to convey two more points. I want to take a look at my notes. Two more segues. There's a very interesting literature out of Stanford University on government officials' incentives, and I think the following merits much more research. So again, what this, uh, non-lucid talk it was supposed to be about is about how do we configure public and private incentives such that they're dovetailed to help us to increase our resilience as we face greater risk. Neil Mahorda of Stanford has written several papers that in democracies elected officials are rewarded after a disaster occurs for bringing back the federal bacon and international bacon to help an area rebuild. So after Hurricane Katrina, after Hurricane Sandy, that the FEMA leader, the president shows up and shakes the hands with the mayor of the injured place. To me this is a very important issue if this holds in the developing world. I want us to live in an economy of Gary Becker's economy where rational agents invest in self protection before a shock to reduce the risk versus taking the gamble. Of course it depends on the specifics, but, but we currently in democracy elected. Officials do not appear to be rewarded for prudent investments that reduce low probability events to be even less lower probability, if that's proper English. Instead, elected officials are more rewarded for when a disaster occurs for bringing back more pork to their region, and that strikes me as very bad incentives. The takeaway message that I want you to think about is I want government to provide public goods, to adapt to climate change. We need to know where is higher ground. We need to know what parts of each nation face less objective flood risk, face lower fire risk, face lower PM 2. 5 spike risk we need to up zone and change our land use regulations to build up in those areas so that poor people and middle class people can live there to avoid the climate gentrification hypothesis that posits that only Elon Musk will live on higher ground and I. Will try to grab his toe, uh, as the seas rise. I wanna live in a world where we, uh, climate science identifies where is higher ground, and we have again land use regulation such that we substitute capital for land and build up in relatively safer areas. In my California we face greater fire risk, and we, uh, the officials are not allowing insurance prices to rise in risky areas. That sends bad signals. Uh, ensure regulatory agencies are not passing on insurance costs to those in the fire zone. I understand that there's incumbents in these fire zones, and we could talk about that, but I want government officials. I encourage them, we'll be better able to adapt to climate change if price signals, uh, send that we not muffle the adaptation signals. For insurance, for electricity, in places where there is drought, water prices should rise. Economists are smart enough to think about nonlinear prices such that we protect the poor while simultaneously having other interest groups face market the correct price signal for these resources. So the point of this wacky talk is that we need PowerPoint, but we also need market price signals to unleash capitalism. I jumped in my organization of my slides. There's tremendous optimism right now that capitalism is going to fuel the green economy. We keep hearing about Tesla. We keep hearing about green power. There isn't equal optimism out there about adaptation progress. If water prices rise in places where water is scarce, if. Electricity prices rise in in places where we have trouble generating power. This unleashes entrepreneurship, and these ideas are public goods. So Paul Romer's ideas about ideas as public goods, uh, will play a key role going forward in helping the developing world as the US and other. Research nations do the basic research to give us the adaptation innovations we need and intermitt, I'm gonna stop there. That. That was a completely different presentation from the first one. It was fantastic too. Excellent, excellent. So now you have the 3rd presentation by Eko Swehe. Uh, please go ahead. I don't know how you're gonna top those two. I don't know either. Uh, no, it's really, it's really fascinating to be here and to listen to the presentations, um, because they touch on so many points I think impact the work that I do. I'm not a researcher, but I'm very much involved in the messy world of implementation and precisely, as was reflected, looking at insurance in the context of resilience and adaptation, which is, uh, uh, not a conversation that is often top of mind. Uh, so I've been asked to speak. On mobilizing the private sector to reduce the financial protection gap um of vulnerable countries and uh that's really my domain. It's really a focus on, on developing countries, emerging markets, um, and the protection gap being the difference between total losses, um, and insured losses. Um, so maybe it's useful to give a little bit of context given, you know, what we're, uh, where we work as the insurance development forum. Uh, the fact that, um, the estimated figure lost to extreme natural disaster events globally over the past 40 years, uh, was 4 is approximately 4 trillion, and that's a really conservative estimate, um, and only 2.9 trillion of which, uh, and US 2.9 trillion of which was uninsured. Uh, this also sits against a background where only 1% of those natural. Disaster losses between 1980 and 2004 were insured um in developing countries. So that's quite significant when you think about the impact of these events on these countries given the absence of insurance markets. At the same time, there's also extensive research that demonstrates a 1% increase in insurance penetration results in a 22% reduction in taxpayer disaster recovery burden. So that's quite, I think, um, a lot of figures that we can, we can kind of, uh, think about. Uh, when we look at some of the figures coming out from 2022, and this is taken from Aeon, um, economic losses from natural disasters were estimated at 313 billion in 2022. Approximately 42% of losses were covered by insurance. Again, some significant figures. I think that should startle us. An important point to note is also that those who actually need protection are often uninsured, right? When you look at this map, uh, there's a lot of work that insurance companies do in terms of tracking, uh, what this looks like, and I think that this is an important point to note. And it's also similar when you look at developed markets. Poor, vulnerable communities often, often also don't have access to insurance coverage. Again, stepping back and thinking about developing countries, they also exist in a landscape where the humanitarian funding gap is very real. In 2022, we saw funding requirements spike up to 51.5 billion. And the system only received 28.7 billion. So that's a significant gap in terms of an absence of protection in terms of insurance markets, but also an absence in terms of financing from the humanitarian community that would often step in to support low-income households. And that means there's a real mismatch between the commitment to protect and the funding model and the funding architecture that we have as a global community in terms of disaster protection. That speaks to poor preparedness, planning, underinvestment in data and systems for for response, underinvestments in adaptation and risk reduction, which, which you had spoken about, slow politicized tactical decision-making processes that are, that are not rooted in the science or the existence of systems, fragmented, poorly coordinated response and just limited learning over the decades that we've been, been going through this. Um, an important fact. That we should also note is that when we look at COVID-19, when it hits, only 2% of global funding was planned and pre-arranged in advance. That's quite startling when you think about if we just spent a little bit of time to think about putting some resources, making resources available before shocks occur, um, we could save significantly, but the system is currently simply does not do that. So what is the work of the IDF? Um, we're constructed as a public-private partnership, um, and it's really about how do we bring insurance and related risk management capabilities, and I emphasize this point, related risk management capabilities to address this financial protection gap. Uh, it's an industry-led initiative, but it's also co-chaired with the World Bank as well as the United Nations and for us this is very much. Focused on the reality that we are seeing, which is that all over the world, both developed and developing countries, we are seeing a widening protection gap. There are skills, tools, practices, disciplines that we can employ to do better, but we simply are not doing it. And so our mandate is to really try to explore what are the barriers that we see as an institution, but also what are the opportunities to break some of those barriers through both public and private. Uh, collaboration. Obviously, the protection gap is a, is a threat to the sustainable development goals. That's obvious. But for us as an institution, we've essentially decided to focus on five areas where we believe there are critical contributions that can be made and where I think there's also a tremendous amount of opportunity for learning, research in this space. The first is really on risk modeling and we often hear in developing, developing countries. Data, there's data available, etc. Sometimes, yes, the data might be available, but what's the quality of the data? What's the accessibility of the data? How is it being used to frame discussions with ministries of finance around the critical decisions and trade-offs that they have to make? Very little of that actually takes place. So for us within the IDF, there are two components to this when we assess the situation, which is there is a structural question. That we have to ask in terms of making risk analytic data more prevalent or more available for those communities that need it the most. And then there is an information gap which we have to close when we talk about driving resilience based on an understanding of risk. So in terms of the architecture of risk information. One of the things that we are really focused on is how do we support open risk modeling frameworks and interoperability standards. And this is really to facilitate facilitate better sharing and cross-sharing of data, not only between insurance companies, but also with the public sector. And one of the, I think, really positive developments, um, was work that we've been doing. With the World Bank on converting the World Bank's risk library into a format which could also be used by um some of the platforms that we are investing in or the industry is investing in, in this space. The second component is, OK, if we tackle the architecture element, there still remains the substantive gap that exists in terms of risk information. And so one of the things that we've done is to partner with the V20 group of countries, which are 58 of the most vulnerable countries in the world, to really establish a system where we can work with them to try to tackle some of these questions. And again, part of this, and I won't go into it because of the time, is really trying to. Find institutional structures that can allow for the private sector as well as the public sector to put in resources towards, towards tackling what I think is a, is an important challenge and also basically the development of a global public good if you can consider it in that way. Again, I've spoken to the, the elements in terms of architecture but also in terms of substantive. But beyond that, I think one of the issues that is really important is that insurers for a very long time, we often hear them talk about the protection gap and we hear this talked about all the time, right? But at the end of the day, there's a real need for investment in what solutions need to look like, given what we are seeing with climate change. The industry, I mean, for the past 300 years, they are very standard products, right? But given what we are seeing with the kinds of risks, there's a need to rethink what are some of the new types of insurance, risk sharing, risk pooling mechanisms that are required to take us into the next 300 years. So a critical part of that work is how can we create again the necessary architecture that will allow for an exchange between both the public and private sector in designing solutions. They be at the sovereign sub-sovereign level or also importantly with humanitarian actors who are especially relevant in, uh, developing countries. So a critical part of our work is really focused on working with sovereigns and sub-sovereigns on this, but this is a complex task, and at the center of this is public-private partnerships. And again, I would say the messy reality that is involved, and I see you in the mids nodding your head, uh, of of implementing PPPs, uh, right, um. If we talk about this case in in Ghana where government is interested in flood risk, there are different types of risk. You have large riverline risks, um, floods, but you also have urban floods, right? And those can also be induced by man-made behavior. How do you translate that into a risk that's insurable, right? That's a complex task in terms of, do you actually have information on historical loss data, right? How do, how does that contend if we are thinking about climate change and future. Risks, right? Are we effectively mapping what that is? Um, many governments have outdated public asset registries, right? There are issues in terms of challenges with waste management, blocked drains, etc. So where does the insurance fit in into this discussion around risk, resilience, and adaptation? What are the boundaries between investments in risk reduction and what that risk transfer needs to look like? Those are some of the challenges that we have to counter when we get to a phase around implementation. But again, what's the role of public-private partnerships? One of the things that we have seen is that we need or the industry needs to work with the public sector hand in hand to really address some of these challenges, and in 2019 we launched a program with UNDP with the support of the German government to look at how we can support or work with about 20 countries towards addressing some of their risk financing, uh, challenges. And as part of that, it also involved again thinking through how do you align incentives between private sector and public sector, who pays for what, right? What are the outcomes. Outcomes that we expect. How do you even get what are traditional insurance companies that compete against each other to collaborate, um, in such a context and so this is, I think, represents quite an interesting model and I can go into a little bit more depth around its structure, um, and what we have, we have delivered with that program in a short space of time. But essentially what we are seeing is that there is a possibility to work faster and better, right, through public-private partnerships that are designed appropriately. They are difficult, they are messy. There are lots of lessons that we are learning, but there is an opportunity, I think, to really sharpen that, that convergence between these communities, and we are seeing quite a lot of work going on globally with governments and sub-sovereign entities really looking to, um, harness, uh, different types of risk uh financing solutions. They range from, as was mentioned earlier in the Caribbean with the catastrophe risk pool. Which was supported by the World Bank or in Africa with the African risk capacity supported by the World Food Program and the African Union, or even sovereigns themselves who are making these investments. If you look at China and, uh, uh, and some of the work that they're doing with agricultural insurance, and it takes different forms in different countries depending on what the objective is that the government or the counterpart of or the partner, uh, might have. But beyond looking at sovereign and humanitarian. We also need to look at how are we developing markets because you also have a tremendous middle class in many of these countries and a significant portion are people who have just emerged out of poverty and with one shock go right down into that into the, into a, a, a real, you know, difficult circumstances. And so one of the things that we are doing as the IDF because we've seen and the research shows countries where you have robust insurance markets, capital markets, as well as banking, uh, sectors. are able to recover faster, right, from disasters. Where one is missing insurance markets, you see the consequence of that. So, a critical part of this effort is how do we work in the development of these markets from the bottom up as opposed from the top down. And that involves working with regulators. How are regulators viewing their role in terms of market development versus consumer protection, right? How are regulators in emerging markets dealing with the rapid evolution that we are seeing in market develop in development and product development in Western developed markets compared to what exists in developing countries. The gap is huge, right? So, there's a tremendous amount of work that needs to go into development of um these markets. But importantly, as I alluded to, there's also the fact that we are talking about insurance markets that have to be regulated, right? So there is work to be done in terms of engagement with regulators and we saw recently the International Association of Insurance Supervisors issue a statement which was quite unusual, really encouraging regulators to see the protection gap as an issue, right? And to be more proactive in terms of their policies around, uh, uh, um, tackling, tackling this. And I just referenced some papers which you can, you can look up on the IDF website that speak to not only regulatory dimension, maybe opportunities in terms of leveraging technology to address some of these gaps. And then finally, one of the things that I think that we are also exploring as the, as the IDF is looking at insurers not simply as underwriters but also as institutional investors. Um. It's challenging. Most insurers don't invest in developing markets. Uh, there are a variety of reasons, capital standards, um, also constraints around project pipeline, etc. but we see this as an important space in terms of if we are interested in adaptation, resilience, growth, resilience, and all these issues, we hear the conversations that are happening. Around the need to mobilize financing, then what is the opportunity for insurers to lean into this space? There have been some, I think, innovative work, uh, done with the IFC on the MCCP program, uh, through some innovative vehicles that allow for that, um, but clearly there is a need for more and I think an appetite for more also when you think about the long term interests of, of insurers. So just to conclude. I, I think, you know, this raises some, some interesting points for us when we think about growth and resilience because for the work that we do, it's about how do we build effective risk management and protection systems. With climate change, we're seeing new risks, complex interconnected risks. We're also seeing a demand in terms of risk management tools and services. We're also seeing the need to deepen our engagement with governments on improving public financial management, and that's challenging because a lot of what we do doesn't necessarily reconcile with political cycles, as was mentioned earlier, right? So how do you contend with some of the initiatives that require a long-term investment. There's also the issue of transition risks and opportunity that and the limit the challenges, but also opportunities that come with that if we step away from the resilience and adaptation, uh, discussion. But it's also about keeping pace with innovation. How do we drive and use, um, uh, risk information when we see the rapid evolution that is taking place with technology firms, how is that filtering into developing countries, right? And how that information is being absorbed into in um into informing. Action, right? How are we ensuring appropriate regulation, as I mentioned earlier? What is the investment in new product development, right? We can talk about the protection gap and all these different things, but are we willing to be innovative and invest and think creatively, uh, about what these products and feel and learn. Right, um, from what we are doing, how are we leveraging technology. But central to that is also about fostering collaboration and coalitions, driving greater scale through knowledge sharing, improving systems, new structures. And focusing on solutions, right? Learning, implementing, yes, there is some failure, but how do we improve a constant process of improvement, but also as part of that, providing public value. It's not just simply about insurance, it's about the ecosystem that is created. The discipline of it, putting resources aside to deal with the potential shock, but it's also about, you know, the investment through information that we should be making in fundamental risk risk reduction efforts that is also part when we think about growth and resilience of what we need to be doing. And I will just close with a little bit of, uh, maybe a little bit of an anecdote which is we're currently having a conversation internally within the IDF and amongst many of our members, right, insurance actors, because we are seeing the impacts of these risks. We talk about California and State Farm, right, and the recent withdrawal. There's a role in terms of Sending a signal in terms of price. But when you leave vulnerable communities exposed, that's a huge reputational risk on every party involved. So what is the opportunity for public-private partnerships to figure out a way in which we can send those signals but also don't leave people stranded. So, one of the things that we've also been, we've been discussing is when we think about the 1890s when there was, we saw the increasing uh electrification, engineers, industry, insurance industry sent out engineers to consider, should we support this, right? Or is this a major issue that we, we need to, you know, really pull back in terms of our, our investments and the engineers, I can't remember his name, but he was at MIT, came back and said electrification is inevitable. It is the future, right? What you need to do as insurers is find a way to make it safe to occur, right? And that was what led to the creation of Underwriters Laboratory, which is basically an an entity that certifies all electrical equipment that you see, most electrical equipment that you see around the world. So there is a conversation that we are pushing with our members, with the industry members, but also with the public sector. We are faced with a world of increasing uncertainty. Huge shocks we have to reimagine what those solutions need to be for the future and it cannot simply be yes with withdrawal in some instances that's appropriate, but also trying to think about what does growth and resilience look like in the future when we think about climate change and what are the opportunities as. An institution to unlock that and make that happen. So I'll end there and say that's the work of the IDF and hopefully, hopefully we can um collaborate with others on that. Excellent, excellent. IDF has an excellent general secretary. So I attended some of the earlier sessions I, I saw a Fast and Furious session. This one was fast, furious, and fantastic. This, this was brilliant. This was really, really good. Uh, so now we have, we have some time for you to ask questions, and I, uh, uh, so I would encourage you to do that. Can you, uh, who wants to go first? Or do you want to go home? Anybody? Yes, sir. Come on, please. Just introduce yourself and ask the question. Sure. Hi, uh, Rodrigo Garcia from, uh, Sua Climate Insurance, and I, I find like the discussion fascinating and it's been mostly about, um, uh, risks transferring, right? And probably to professors can point, uh, risk mitigation is something that probably we need the most, it could be the most efficient in terms of incentives, but these two, pieces are. Uh, are filled with market and government failures. So, uh, I, I, I agree like it's necessary to think through like uh economic efficiency, but, uh, I don't see clearly how to think, uh, like what is a framework to think through these problems to begin with. Do we have any other questions we can ask all at once. And then we can, and then I also want to thank the organizers at the end. So I don't want you, I don't want you to leave before then. Please continue. OK, uh, thanks inermit. Uh, I'm Tali Kulli. I'm with the, uh, World Bank. Uh, I have a question for Michael. Uh, Michael, so on resilience measurement, there's, uh, obviously there has been an active literature, uh, particularly over the last 1015 years. Um, I'm not sure if you've seen Chris Barrett's last paper, a recent paper on this comparative assessment of various resilience approaches where he basically casts doubt on existing measures, uh, and their utility and encourages further research. So I wanted you to contextualize a little bit your measure vis a vis existing measures and in particular. Uh, what you see the methodological frontier, uh, for the development of that particular measure and how longitudinal survey platforms such as the LSMS could actually help propel that particular agenda. Thank you so much. Thank you, Taleb. Next one. Next question, please. We'll take them all at all at once. Hi, I'm Chavi Gine from Deck DCRG uh here at the bank. So this is also a question for Michael, uh, and then for Ecasue, um, so. So, so I, I think I missed that, but, but basically when you compare the control to the treated or the controls that had experienced a shock, so did you say what happened to the treated that did not experience a shock, uh, and so how does that, so is that the more natural comparison group to the, to the treated that did experience a shock and then, so I think you, I think you mentioned that actually they. Those that did not experience the shock but were, you know, had the seeds and, and, and insurance basically did not, you know, behaved as controls, I believe, um, but then, you know, this is only after one year so even, even if I, you know, even if, if I'm a farmer and experience a shock, um. You know, and I'm more likely to buy, to buy the bundle, you know, what happens in subsequent years, right? I mean this is not, you know, or, or, you know, do I learn in one period and then, and then I'm, you know, even though I may not benefit later on, I still keep on buying this, right? And so, so how, how should we, how should we think, how should we think about this? and then, you know, a related question and so, so this is again, these are folks using the same technology, presumably growing the same kind of crop. But, but, but there's another counterfactual which is, you know, are these, should be, should be these guys be, you know, given the conditions, given climate change, should be these guys be growing whatever it is that they're growing, or should they just, you know, uh, should, should incentives to be provided to. Either migration, move away from the farm, or, you know, and, and, and, and you know what, what would the what would the resilience gap be if, if you know with these with these alternative uh kind of policies and then sorry with with your, uh, so you know fascinating uh uh presentation, um, but I think you know what what I was after is is what you said at the very end which is. So I think we're in an environment where there are places, you know, coastal Florida, California, where actually private insurance companies are pulling out now I don't know what's happening in, in Africa in terms of, you know, uh, uh, index insurance or so on and so forth where again the prevalence of, of payouts is increasing and so, so how, how is the industry responding, uh, uh, and what are you guys doing about that, uh, uh, um, yeah sorry, thank you. Good, good, good, good, good question please, please ask. Um, yeah, hi, uh, I'm Claudia from the research department, and I wanted to pick up on Matt's point about, uh, unintended consequences of some of these, uh, measures, for instance, uh, the, uh, air conditioning which made it, uh, more habitable to live in super high countries. They also, uh, um, contributed to the hole in the ozone layer back. When I was a kid, which the Globe was successful in. Getting together to ban those chemicals and uh so I like that as both the unintended consequence for the ozone layer as well as the world getting organized to address the problem, but as far as I, as far as Google tells me they continue to contribute to greenhouse gasses. So, uh, I just wanted to pick up further on that point. Thank you. Good question. Hi, uh, I'm Alessandro Barratiri from the World Bank, and a short question for Xuedi. I'm not an expert of this. It was, uh, very fascinating, and I was wondering if you could tell us a little bit more about the history of the institution, so the, the, the, the incentives, and, uh, that have led the industry to, to, to provide this, uh, uh, proposal of PPP, and so the scalability also, now you mentioned 5 billion clearly is, is a small drop in the, in the need, and so how we go forward with that. Excellent set of questions. So why don't we go first Ecowe, then Matt, then, and then Michael. Yeah, yeah, great. Uh, so I'll start with the history, um, of institutions of the institution. Actually it came from quite a lot of conversation that was happening within the UN system for many years around shocks that were happening in developing countries and just the concern in. In terms of how do they work, can they work with the private sector to improve the financing for response. So it was actually through that that there was a concerted effort to see how can we create an institution where the industry could work as a collective with the public sector, uh, because I mean there were so many institutions, if I can put it that way, from UNWFP to UNDRR to World Bank. Institutions that the feeling was let's create a single entity where there could be a collective approach to this. So that was the history and it was formally launched at COP 21 in Paris, um, not because we are only focused on climate change, but because that was when, you know, it was the opportune time for that. So again, I hope that clarifies in terms of, of, of the history of the institution. It's hugely important because I think that's the first good thing that's come out of the UN. I, I did not say that. Uh, I think, I think it's, uh, it's, it's a good thing that has come out in terms of collective action, um, and I think, you know, there are lots of opportunities to learn from that. Um, so, in terms of the second question, which was, um, the industry's response when you took, when you think about climate change, I will say, OK, we tackle this on two fronts. With a focus on emerging markets. We've focused a lot in terms of improving the engagement at a global policy level around putting this issue on the map. You would be surprised that this conversation that we're having here in terms of the protection gap is not one that is prevalent or often understood or even seen in many contexts. So that for us is a critical contribution that we have made or we are making to this space because without that acknowledgement, there's very little investment that will actually go into tackling the problem. The second component is what do you do in terms of the practicalities around this, and I, and as I said earlier, we are talking about developing countries where you have between 1 to 3% in terms of insurance penetration rates. So part basically non-existent, right? And so there is some fundamental work that needs to be done in terms of thinking about how do we actually develop those markets in the first place. But there's an added layer of complexity indeed, as you alluded to in terms of climate change and what this introduces. So a lot of what we do is really looking at different types of risk pooling mechanisms because that is one way in which you can manage that. Uh, the initiative that we see in the Caribbean, in Africa, in Asia, and the Pacific are really aimed at bringing countries together to pool their risk into a single portfolio so that they're able to access the market. At a much better rate. The second is that we are also seeing innovation in terms of the products that are being developed, for example, in terms of parametric insurance products, and these are quite different from the traditional indemnity products where you usually have to have a loss, you go out into the field, you do the assessments, then you pay out a couple of months after the loss adjusters have determined what that impact is, right? And that drives up the cost. But at the same time, Parametric insurance also is data intensive and so there is a need for investment in that data to actually make these products available and viable. But then there's also a conversation in terms of fundamental investments in risk reduction. In many of the countries that we are engaged in, there is very weak social protection systems, very limited investments in resilience and adaptation. And so insurance can be valuable, but it has its limitations, and that's also part of what we need to figure out. And its value comes in terms of the extremes, but also through leveraging risk pooling, um, and risk sharing mechanisms. So I hope I've addressed that question that was raised very nicely done. And I, I I it's over to you, Matt. I know, I know that you won't answer the question and you'd like to talk about something else, but that's fine. You can. So. So on, on resilience, uh, the world is urbanizing and I think that urbanization and within nations the competition between systems of cities is gonna play a key role to allow us to discover there's so much that we know that we don't know of how we're going to adapt and this competition. Between cities within nations to attract migrants and within a system of cities this competition is going to teach us so much. Uh, Claudia asked an excellent question of what are the carbon footprint implications as all of us adapt by cranking up the air conditioning. I think we're nicely cooled here today. And, uh, Paul Gertler, who I think had a great career at the World Bank for a while, and Lucas Davis had a great 2015 Proceedings of National Academy Sciences paper exploring this topic in Mexico, studying the Grilllius adoption curve as people go from being poor to middle class of how many more people in Mexico own an air conditioner and, and what are the resulting greenhouse gas emissions. So an unintended consequence of adapting is to exacerbate the externality, especially as you've scale this up all over the world. World, I'm optimistic that President Biden's inflation Reduction Act is gonna give us a set of green blueprints that will diffuse around the world. Uh, it's gonna be slow. Sham McLal and I have written about this, but I do think, and I'm a, I'm a fan of the president's subsidy program because somebody had to be the guinea pig here to accelerate our decarbonization. And of course that's the sweet spot of having the win-win of cranking up the air conditioning without angering Greta Thunberg. Well, it should have been called the Temperature reduction Act, yep. Michael, OK, um, just a couple of quick, uh, responses to very interesting questions. First, Rodrigo, I just wanna, as someone who lives in the world of parametric insurance and something I'm actually talking about tomorrow morning early in California here in DC for a World Bank seminar, uh, I think one of the big problems is defining quality. For those kinds of contracts, so we've been working on the definition of quality standards and, uh, Matt and I looked at each other when when the underwriter lab was mentioned because that's actually been our model for what's missing in the parametric insurance market and I think that issue has to be taken really seriously more generally, uh, if in fact we're gonna tap into the potential of parametric insurance. OK, very quickly. Uh, Tala, you asked a little bit about the other resilience literature. Um, I think most of that literature, and, and I am quite familiar with Chris's damning critiques, uh, on it. Um, a lot of it is measurement of resi what's called resilience capacities, so people haven't actually looked at shocks in the way Townsend did or think of some of the classic. They've actually said, well, we think we know what makes people resilient. So let's look at the distribution of those things and then they try to use that predictively to look at future changes in welfare but not as a mitigating factor for shocks. So the paper that Mo and I have actually written, um, you know, tries to say let's just kind of start over again from basics. And, and resilience means your ability to recover from a shock. So you're not gonna know that unless you observe people with a shock, and that leads me to, to lead to your second, uh, question, which is about the LSMS data. So I think that is absolutely gonna be a vital source uh for for looking at this resilience and I think one of the things that we need to might wanna think about is when large shocks do happen in in between LSMS rounds, you know, what's the frequency of observation that you need after it? The dynamic programming fake data that I was using, you know, we could observe things as frequently as we wanted. You know, interestingly, with the much with the annual frequency data from that Mozambique, Tanzania, we actually see we can get some stuff and so I think there's for me this is a great idea is to harness, uh, to harness the LSMS data to actually do this and, and, and really start to build up a catalog uh of information on that, uh. Uh, Chave asked a couple of really, uh, uh, good questions. I think we were maybe a little confused on, on, on what the treatment group that wasn't shocked was doing and sort of how to use the behavior of that group. So it's a little bit messy to think about because literally what we see in the data, there is a small, smallish ex ante response to being provided these things that we do see. In both in all people in the treatment group and then some of them got zapped and some of them didn't so there's a little bit of an ex ante response which is in part is the is part of the benefit of the resilience technology so that's why we compared. To the control group, uh, but then as I, as I tried to say in the talk, eventually the non-shocked people who received the res they, they really dra drastically reduced walked away from the technology and, and I think that's an important thing to sort of, uh, think about. I think you, you also, um. Uh, you raised a really important point. Uh, which is, you know, it's one thing to help someone keep growing maize in an arid area of Mozambique, but is that actually what somebody, is that actually the best thing to be done? So, again, I didn't really emphasize it in the talk, but we were bundling together. A genetic technology which it makes it more possible for some people to continue to profitably grow maize in some places, but clearly there are gonna be other instances and probably in those parts of Mozambique in the near future where that's actually no longer the right decision and here is where I think there's kind of a chicken and egg problem that goes on we, we. Uh, we tried to do something like this in the Dominican Republic and it never really got off the ground, so the idea was to create an insurance contract that could be used to certify loans for lenders that lenders would make to small scale livestock dairy farmers so that they could invest then in in irrigation and water control facilities. So the problem was without insurance, the banks didn't want to touch these guys. Uh, and then what we tried to do is combine the insurance to unlock credit, but then the credit was being provided in, uh, again, it didn't ever work, but the idea was that the credit. Would then be linked to some of these more transformative investments like if you're a small scale dairy farmer you don't just depend on natural pasture but you build barrages and you build small scale irrigation schemes or you could think about that being tied even to crop protection but we sort of need to get from where people are, which often risk prone farmers have no capital access or very little capital access and, and, and, and get them to where they can move ahead. So I think your point is extremely. Well taken, we this should not be seen as a way to lock people into something that becomes increasingly nonprofitable, but, uh, I think we need to think then about ways to blend together financial tools so that people can actually get the loans they need to make the adaptive kind of investments that I think we would all agree would make sense. So again, thank you everyone. Do you wanna add something, please, please, uh, I wanted to add to that I think that that's a very important point because even the work that we did with the African Risk Capacity. Um, it made very clear what the risks were in terms of droughts and the fact that in some context there should be a shift in terms of some of the agricultural practices, uh, but that's very difficult because it also converges with some of the political and cultural, uh. Issues within a particular country, but I think an important contribution is also from the conversation around risk is bringing transparency to what exists, right? And using that transparency to drive further conversations around how do you mobilize financing for such transitions that need to, to take place. So I think this, the World Bank's work on the CCDRs is quite, I think, supportive and helpful in some of that thinking that we're seeing evolving in countries. So the work that you're doing is also very helpful for the CCDRs because Matt will know this and others will know this that there's a lot of confused thinking about what's adaptation, what is resilience, what is development, what is adaptability, and so on. So I think it will really help us a lot and I know that Farhat is working on this to actually distill all of your ideas into a form that even world bankers can understand. So, um, uh, so I'm going to ask you all to do two rounds of applause. The first round, I would like to give an applause to this panel, to Michael, to Matt, to Echo Swe, and for Had for actually, uh, for, uh, for, uh, for, uh, thinking through these things and organizing a great session. So first applause. Thank you. The second round I wanted to, uh, uh, I wanted to thank very much the colleagues, uh, who actually organized the ABCDE and I'm sure you all, I'm sure you all recognize and appreciate that it's actually much easier for us to attend a hybrid conference, but if you actually try to organize a hybrid conference, you know that it's actually much harder to organize one. Than to organize, uh, you know, uh, to organize a purely virtual one or a. A purely virtual one or a purely in-person one, right? So I really thank very, very much all of those who think, especially 10 people, and those are Nona and her last name is Karaashvili. The next one is Tatiana Kleinberg. Then we have Tale Kili, uh, we have Paul Christian, we have Gabby Calderon Morta, we have Rula Yazigi, and we have Anna Bonfield, Jonathan Litwin. Maria Saffa, and of course Art Crey, OK, so big, big applause to all of us. And thank you all very, very much for staying till the end. Thank you so much. Bye-bye.
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ABCDE2023 Session 6
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ABCDE2023 Session 6
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This video features the following papers presented at the ABCDE 2023 Conference: Can Insurance Markets Build Household Resilience and Reduce the Cost of Social Protection? Theoretical Hypotheses and Empirical Methods for Moving Forward; Private Investment and Government Protection Against Rising Climate Risks; and Mobilizing the Private Sector to Reduce the Financial Protection Gap of Vulnerable Countries.
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