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00:00 Good morning,

00:00 everybody.

00:01 Welcome to this seminar organized by the Development Economics Research Group

00:06 on uh

00:09 Global value chains and trade in the age of COVID-19.

00:17 As you all know,

00:18 since the early 1990s,

00:21 we have

00:22 seen remarkable improvements in

00:25 transport,

00:26 information and communication technology

00:29 which,

00:30 together with

00:31 greater openness to trade and investment,

00:34 have led to the progressive deepening of integration in the global economy.

00:40 As production has fragmented across national boundaries,

00:46 we have seen

00:48 also deepening input-output relationships between countries,

00:53 and that has meant that the destinies of nations are increasingly intertwined,

01:01 uh,

01:01 which is a grand way of saying that GDP is increasingly correlated.

01:09 But this period of hyperglobalization.

01:13 Received the first big shock

01:16 with the

01:17 Great Recession

01:18 in 2008 and 2009,

01:21 and then we entered this period of what has been referred to as a great flattening

01:27 where trade as a share of GDP stopped growing.

01:32 And

01:34 Where global value chains stopped

01:37 their expansion.

01:40 Even as we were struggling to recover from that great recession,

01:44 a period of trade tensions and increasing

01:48 mutual protection between the United States and China

01:52 generated

01:54 further

01:54 uncertainty,

01:55 which also had a chilling effect on

01:59 trade

01:59 and global value chains.

02:02 Now we see

02:03 a third shock,

02:05 perhaps the most serious shock,

02:07 an unusual shock.

02:09 It's a shock to both demand.

02:12 Because people cannot spend.

02:14 And to supply because it's hard for people to work.

02:18 And it's affecting not one country,

02:20 like for example,

02:22 the

02:23 Japanese tsunami or the American mortgage crisis,

02:26 but it's almost at the same time affecting many countries,

02:31 as Daria Tagleoni has shown

02:33 that some of the

02:34 most important nodes in the global economy,

02:37 as

02:38 she calculated some time ago that 17 countries which had seen the

02:42 largest number of cases accounted for more than 70% of global trade.

02:49 And finally,

02:50 because it's an unusually

02:52 uncertain

02:53 shock both in depth and duration.

02:57 Therefore,

02:57 it's also turning into a financial shock.

03:01 So how these developments

03:05 interact

03:07 in the age of

03:09 flattening global value chains

03:11 will be discussed today by 3 luminaries in the field.

03:17 First,

03:18 we begin

03:19 with

03:21 Richard.

03:23 Baldwin,

03:24 who has really shaped our thinking in this whole area,

03:28 Richard is professor of international economics at the Graduate Institute.

03:33 He's been the editor in chief of VoxEU since June 2007.

03:39 I could say many things about his

03:42 multiple accomplishments,

03:43 but let me focus on

03:45 his 2016 book The Great Convergence

03:48 Information Technology and the New Globalization.

03:52 Lawrence Summers called it one of the 5 most important books on globalization ever.

03:59 And his more recent book,

04:02 The Globotics Upheaval,

04:04 is

04:06 been published in 2019

04:08 and has been almost as influential in helping us think about what's happening,

04:13 so

04:13 I was tempted to use Richard's original title of his Vox EU column,

04:18 which has many medical metaphors.

04:21 It was called

04:22 Supply Chain Contagion Waves.

04:25 Manufacturing contagion

04:28 and reinfection

04:29 from the COVID concussion,

04:31 but he has chosen today

04:34 a less dramatic title which is Thinking Ahead on COVID-19 and GVCs.

04:39 So Richard,

04:39 why don't we begin with you,

04:41 and I'll introduce the other speakers after you finish.

04:51 Richard,

04:51 you're muted.

04:57 It's a pleasure to be here with all of you.

04:58 What I want to do in the next 15 minutes is

05:02 run through a few points,

05:04 um,

05:05 not so much to inform you as to sort of inspire thinking and discussion

05:09 about what's going on.

05:11 I think there are big implications of COVID for global value chains,

05:15 but I think a lot of people are,

05:16 are misthinking them and,

05:18 uh,

05:19 missing a few points.

05:20 So,

05:20 let me just get started with

05:23 What I'm hoping to do today.

05:25 So,

05:25 the,

05:26 if I can get this.

05:29 There we go.

05:30 The outline of the talk is I'm gonna have 3 parts.

05:32 The first is the nature and the duration of the shock.

05:35 Now,

05:35 this is gonna involve talking a little bit about medical things,

05:39 but one of the first aspects of misthinking,

05:42 which I think is systemic is

05:44 People not realizing how long and how deep and how

05:48 how

05:49 uncoordinated this shock is going to be.

05:52 And

05:52 the second part is

05:54 why this shock is so different from the 2008,

05:57 2009 1.

05:58 And then the last,

05:59 I'm going to talk about the supply contagion

06:02 and re-contagion.

06:04 And if I have time,

06:05 I'll say a few words about

06:06 whether there's going to be long-term damage to global value chains or not.

06:10 So,

06:11 let me just start getting into the medical imperative.

06:14 So,

06:14 we've all heard

06:15 that we have to flatten the epi curve or the epidemiological curve.

06:20 Um,

06:20 and let me just go through that because I think it's

06:23 important to understanding the length and the nature of this thing.

06:26 So,

06:27 what this blue curve here is the number of new cases,

06:31 uh,

06:31 and when it,

06:32 and this is uh on the horizontal axis week,

06:35 so the,

06:35 the vertical axis is the number of people.

06:38 And in the beginning,

06:39 it doesn't look like very much.

06:40 That's the discovery and initiation phase,

06:43 but then we go into the acceleration phase

06:45 where people are

06:47 getting other people sick who are getting other people sick,

06:50 and the number of new cases can

06:52 double

06:53 every 2 or 3 days.

06:54 So it tends to overwhelm government's ability

06:57 to think ahead or plan

06:59 because by the time they form the committee,

07:01 it's already doubled or tripled or quadrupled what it was before.

07:05 But um,

07:06 as the number of people getting

07:09 the new infection ramps up,

07:11 with about a 2-week lag,

07:14 the number of people who are recovering is also ramping up.

07:17 And I'll,

07:17 we'll,

07:17 we'll follow that for a second.

07:18 We'll,

07:19 we'll show that,

07:19 that that actually has a,

07:21 a big implication.

07:22 But the point about this is,

07:24 these are the new infections,

07:25 and one of the interesting things,

07:27 one of the important things about this disease

07:29 is that although it's

07:31 explosively contagious,

07:33 it's not very deadly.

07:34 So the number of hospitalizations

07:37 coming from these new cases is about 11/10 or 15% of what they are.

07:41 But each one of these new hospital admissions stays

07:44 in there for 2 weeks or 3 weeks sometimes.

07:46 So the cumulative number of people in the hospital

07:49 climbs

07:51 much higher than the than the number of hospitalizations,

07:55 and it peaks a little bit later.

07:57 So if the number of hospitalizations overwhelms the hospital capacity,

08:01 we get this overload and excess deaths.

08:03 In fact,

08:04 it can be quite traumatic,

08:05 the things you've seen going on in Italy

08:07 and in New York and in Spain.

08:10 What went on in Wuhan,

08:12 these are things that really

08:13 make

08:15 people very,

08:15 very upset,

08:16 and governments

08:17 take extreme measures to avoid this kind of overwhelming things.

08:21 So that's essentially where the imperative comes,

08:24 because more people will die than is necessary,

08:27 and the way they die

08:28 is very

08:30 traumatic,

08:30 and people

08:31 are,

08:31 are view it as absolute imperative not

08:34 to,

08:35 not to do that.

08:36 So,

08:36 avoiding this yellow is not a balancing between GDP and jobs or

08:41 dollars and debts,

08:42 it's an imperative.

08:45 Now,

08:45 what I want to talk about

08:46 is,

08:48 uh,

08:49 next,

08:50 how this is connected with the economic shock,

08:53 the recession,

08:53 which then hits GDPs.

08:55 So,

08:56 if you take this yellow,

08:57 this red curve as what the epidemiological

09:00 curve would look like without containment policies,

09:02 in order to avoid that overloading,

09:05 we have containment policies,

09:06 lockdowns and things like that,

09:08 that flatten and spread out the the epi curve.

09:12 Now,

09:12 those containment policies

09:14 also make the recession,

09:16 which would be rather

09:17 short and not too,

09:19 not too deep if it,

09:19 if there were no containment policies.

09:22 It makes the recession much deeper.

09:24 And in rich countries,

09:26 at least,

09:26 governments use economic policy to flatten the recession curve

09:30 by spending truly

09:31 historic sums of money to try and protect the economy and also

09:36 to

09:38 share income and redistribute the cost a little bit.

09:41 So that's how we have these containment policies are a medical imperative,

09:45 and at least in rich countries,

09:47 they're using the economic policy

09:49 to counter them.

09:50 But it's worthwhile saying that

09:53 the

09:54 Economic

09:55 recession

09:56 is really a health,

09:59 a health measure.

10:00 Now,

10:00 the containment policies

10:02 are inducing a rather unusual recession.

10:05 Most recessions are just a lack of spending,

10:07 and central banks or governments can

10:10 undo the recession by stimulating spending,

10:13 but this containment policy is hitting the supply side and hitting the

10:17 The supply chains and the financial sector,

10:21 all of this all at the same time,

10:23 and it's done on purpose,

10:24 so it's difficult to just fix one bit or another bit.

10:27 It's shutting it down quite systematically.

10:30 So as a consequence,

10:31 this recession

10:32 is Complex supply shock

10:35 and a demand shock all at the same time.

10:37 Moreover,

10:38 it's happening

10:39 at different times in different countries around the world.

10:42 And because they're linked by global value chains and also just regular trade,

10:46 the shock is being transmitted

10:49 internationally.

10:51 So the next thing I want to talk about is how long will the shock last?

10:55 Are we talking about a couple of quarters,

10:57 as it seems like many of the

10:59 investment banks and some of the international organizations

11:02 are

11:03 projecting that,

11:04 that the second half of this year

11:06 will all be positive and will start to come back,

11:08 or are we talking about a couple of years?

11:11 And my opinion is I think people are way underestimating how long

11:14 this shock is going to last.

11:16 And I want to convince you that

11:18 by looking at a little bit of epidemiology.

11:21 And we've all had to become a little bit uh epidemiologists,

11:24 uh,

11:25 in,

11:25 in,

11:25 in the,

11:26 uh,

11:26 the last couple of months.

11:28 The good thing is epidemiologists have had to

11:30 learn a little bit of economics as well,

11:31 so.

11:33 So,

11:34 the model that,

11:35 that,

11:35 this is a,

11:36 this is like the supply and demand model of epidemiology.

11:39 It's called the

11:40 SIR model.

11:42 So,

11:43 I for infectious,

11:45 S for susceptible.

11:46 I,

11:46 I made a mistake,

11:47 that should be an S,

11:48 and R for recovered,

11:49 that's where the model name comes from,

11:51 SIR.

11:52 Now,

11:52 here's how it works.

11:53 You divide the population into three bins,

11:56 infectious people,

11:57 susceptible people,

11:58 and recovered.

11:59 People who are infected can give it.

12:01 People who

12:02 are susceptible can get it,

12:04 and people who are recovered

12:05 are immune.

12:06 Now,

12:06 the new cases is what we were talking about before,

12:09 that's the epidemiological.

12:10 This is the explosive contagion in the first place,

12:13 and then there's a deceleration,

12:15 and there's a steady stream of people who are recovering,

12:18 going from infectious

12:19 to recovered.

12:21 Now,

12:22 uh,

12:22 when you want to look at the dynamics of that whole thing,

12:25 It's useful to first of all point out that this is exactly what China,

12:30 China did.

12:30 They went through the,

12:31 this is the daily cases.

12:33 This is the epi curve.

12:34 They went through the accelerating phase,

12:36 the decelerating phase,

12:37 and now they seem to have at least

12:39 put it to bed,

12:40 although they're getting a second wave.

12:42 We'll talk about that.

12:44 But to think about how long this is gonna last,

12:46 I,

12:47 I did some illus illustrative dynamics,

12:49 so don't take any of this serious.

12:51 I'm not an epidemiologist,

12:53 and lots of people are doing real simulations.

12:55 I just want to illustrate the dynamics

12:57 so we can get our mind around how like,

13:00 likely,

13:00 how long this thing is likely to happen.

13:02 So this is when there is no

13:04 reduction in the,

13:06 um,

13:06 in the containment policies or anything.

13:08 So this orange thing,

13:10 the num,

13:10 the stock of infected people rises very quickly at peak,

13:14 and then it comes down.

13:15 And what that's consisting of is this red curve,

13:18 which is the new cases.

13:19 So that's the epi curve over here,

13:21 it looks like that.

13:22 And the green is the recovered cases,

13:24 which looks a lot like the new cases,

13:26 but just delayed because of the recovery.

13:29 Now,

13:29 when the recover number of

13:31 new cases equal the number of recovered,

13:33 that's when we're at the peak,

13:34 and once we get past the peak,

13:36 we can start to get better.

13:37 And what the black curve is showing is the number of people who've had it,

13:41 and that starts rising and then it sort of levels off

13:44 as the stock comes down.

13:46 OK.

13:47 So,

13:48 what I'd like to do is put some orders of magnitude

13:50 on this to argue this is way far from over.

13:54 So I'm just gonna do some simple math with this model.

13:57 Beta is the number of infectious contacts per period

14:01 per infected person.

14:03 So that's a,

14:03 a,

14:04 a medical kind of parameter,

14:05 but it's also connected

14:07 with,

14:07 or can be influenced by social distancing.

14:10 So the number of new cases is this beta parameter

14:13 times the number of people who are infected

14:16 times

14:17 the fraction of the people they meet

14:20 that are

14:21 susceptible.

14:22 So if,

14:23 if half the population has it,

14:25 so n is not the size of the population,

14:28 s is the number of people susceptible,

14:30 so if this ratio is 15,

14:32 then only half of those contacts by infectious people will actually lead

14:36 to new infections.

14:38 The new recover,

14:39 recoveries is even easier.

14:41 It's just gamma,

14:42 which is a recovery rate,

14:43 which is medically given,

14:45 times

14:46 i.

14:47 So the top of the infection is when the new cases equal the new recoveries,

14:51 and if you just cancel out the i,

14:52 you get this extremely simple formula

14:55 that the fraction of the population who has not had it,

14:59 that,

14:59 that are still susceptible

15:00 is gamma over beta.

15:02 Now,

15:02 gamma over beta

15:04 is equal to 1 over R0,

15:06 and R0 is this very famous statistic that gets estimated all over the time.

15:10 And the estimates for COVID is that R0 is between 2 and 3.

15:14 So that means

15:16 when R0 is not modified by containment policies,

15:20 something like

15:21 between half

15:22 and

15:23 a third of the people will not get it,

15:25 and everybody else will get it.

15:27 Now,

15:27 in,

15:28 we don't know exactly how many people have got it,

15:30 but it's at least an order of magnitude less than would need to be

15:35 before this thing goes into

15:37 herd immunity and getting rid of it.

15:39 Now,

15:39 the point of that is

15:41 it,

15:41 a couple of points.

15:42 One,

15:42 if you reduce

15:44 beta

15:45 by

15:45 50%,

15:46 let's say through containment policies or mask or whatever you do,

15:50 then you're going to double the number of people who do not get it,

15:52 so you save a huge number of lives.

15:55 But as soon as you let beta go back up to where it was before

15:59 by relaxing containment policies,

16:01 this dynamic will come again.

16:03 So there almost surely will be 2nd and 3rd waves.

16:06 As we start to relax the restraints,

16:08 we will get more and more waves,

16:10 and they're also,

16:11 importantly for global value chains,

16:13 they're not synchronized across the world.

16:16 OK.

16:18 So,

16:18 now what I want to do is argue that this is different.

16:21 So that

16:22 in 2008,

16:23 2009,

16:24 it was sudden,

16:25 severe,

16:25 and synchronized,

16:26 but it was basically all coming from the demand side.

16:29 So,

16:30 apart from the United States,

16:31 the UK and a few other very,

16:33 very clever countries

16:34 who

16:35 got into this financial engineering,

16:37 most countries in the world had nothing to do with the subprime crisis.

16:41 So their financial sector was not directly hit by this.

16:45 For most of the world,

16:45 it was a great big demand shock which led to a great big trade collapse,

16:49 and all the global value chains shut down at the same time.

16:53 So the global value chain contagion

16:55 wasn't really that important.

16:57 During the 2009,

16:58 because everybody shut down at the same time and people started coming back up

17:02 more or less at the same time.

17:04 And in any case,

17:05 the supply chains weren't damaged.

17:07 What happened was there was just a lack of aggregate demand.

17:09 And once the demand was restored,

17:11 we were good to go.

17:13 This time,

17:14 as

17:14 Addita mentioned that Daria has calculated,

17:17 it hit all the biggest traders and manufacturers within 2 months,

17:20 more or less simultaneously,

17:22 but on the supply side and the demand side,

17:25 so there was,

17:26 uh,

17:27 there has been some damage in terms of bankruptcy,

17:30 but in any case,

17:31 the supply chain was directly shut down either by transportation limitations

17:36 or by lockdowns of factories.

17:39 The 2nd,

17:39 the 3rd point

17:40 is that global value chain integration is

17:43 much bigger than it was back then.

17:45 And here you can see

17:46 a slide that I put together.

17:48 This is from a,

17:49 a Vox column that I posted a few weeks ago and was calculation by Rebecca Friedman.

17:56 So the exposure,

17:57 what this shows is a higher exposure to inputs.

18:00 Now,

18:00 what this table does,

18:01 it shows the total exposure

18:03 of the row nation's manufacturing

18:06 to the column nation's manufacturing inputs in 2015.

18:10 So you can see the

18:12 inputs from the US,

18:14 from Germany,

18:15 and for China are are important for basically everybody,

18:19 and Japan and Korea are also basically important for everybody.

18:22 And countries,

18:24 their sus susceptibility to the inputs from other countries

18:28 um

18:28 are shown here and you can see there's a regionalization of these.

18:31 This is factory North America,

18:33 this is factory Europe,

18:35 and this is factory Asia,

18:36 but Asia is important for everybody and so is Germany.

18:40 So the idea here is

18:41 if

18:42 factory China shuts down,

18:43 for example,

18:44 Mexico

18:46 is

18:46 Mexico's value of manufacturing is heavily dependent upon China.

18:50 So when China's shut down,

18:52 that's going to affect Mexico.

18:54 And when Mexico shuts down,

18:56 that's going to affect the United States because

18:58 the United States is,

19:00 is

19:01 reliant on

19:02 Mexico for the,

19:03 this is 1.6.

19:05 So,

19:05 you get these echoes going through,

19:07 and these numbers are larger

19:09 than they were before.

19:10 So,

19:10 it,

19:10 it's,

19:11 it's a,

19:11 it's um a different crisis and it's uh gonna affect through global value chains,

19:16 uh,

19:17 more importantly.

19:19 So the,

19:19 the

19:20 last point I want to talk about is this contagion.

19:23 So,

19:23 I'm just going to take the example of the United States

19:26 and uh the US

19:28 and

19:28 those two countries,

19:29 uh,

19:30 manufacturing sectors are,

19:31 are pretty integrated.

19:33 So,

19:33 when,

19:34 when China shut down,

19:36 that

19:38 impacted manufacturing in the United States and China also

19:42 um

19:42 was a source of the contagion to the United States.

19:45 And

19:46 now,

19:47 China's getting better,

19:48 so their manufacturing sector is back on its feet,

19:52 but the US is experiencing a huge outbreak of COVID and therefore,

19:56 its manufacturing is shutting down

19:58 either because of plant closures or difficult of transportation.

20:02 Turns out there's a lot of air transportation and sea transportation problems.

20:06 So the supply chain problems

20:08 that

20:10 China is now facing is in part because

20:12 of their supply chain dependence on the United States

20:15 and the US and other people are reinfecting China.

20:18 So the idea is that this contagion and reinfection

20:21 could continue

20:23 for quite a while as long as

20:26 we don't have a vaccine or we don't acquire

20:29 herd immunity.

20:31 So,

20:31 um,

20:32 I don't know how am I doing on time,

20:34 Adita?

20:34 Do,

20:34 should I,

20:35 I have a couple more slides I don't want to talk about the future,

20:38 or should I just stop here?

20:39 I think,

20:40 I think I started,

20:41 uh,

20:42 Richard,

20:42 I don't you take another minute because that's gonna be interesting to hear

20:45 about how you see things evolving.

20:48 OK.

20:49 So,

20:49 um,

20:51 my argument is that

20:53 the,

20:53 the value chains are not gonna be affected,

20:55 and I think there's a great deal of wooly and wishful thinking.

20:59 And instead,

20:59 we should think about sources of hysteresis.

21:02 So there's all sorts of people who said,

21:03 oh my goodness,

21:04 we can't rely again

21:06 on X,

21:06 Y,

21:06 and Z country.

21:07 We should have it all at home.

21:09 First of all,

21:09 that's just wrong because you should be diversifying risk,

21:12 not concentrating it.

21:13 But the second

21:15 is,

21:15 did anything really change?

21:17 When the European people and the European Commission or the European Council

21:21 say we should think about not being so reliant on China,

21:25 well,

21:25 unless they actually changed anything,

21:27 it's going to go back.

21:28 Because

21:29 you need a permanent change in global

21:30 value chain that will require government subsidies,

21:33 government-mandated stockpiles,

21:35 diversification,

21:36 or massive tariffs on inputs and final goods to move anything.

21:40 So,

21:40 I'm quite willing to accept that when it comes to medical equipment,

21:43 we'll see some changes.

21:45 But are people really going to be willing to pay

21:48 10,

21:49 20% more for their cars,

21:50 50% or 100% more for their electronics,

21:53 for all sorts of gadgets that are made around the world?

21:56 Are they going to do that on the abstract

21:59 possibility

22:00 that something's going to happen in the future?

22:02 Because after all,

22:03 the

22:04 Global value chain allocation,

22:06 what we actually have now is really balancing reward cost savings against risk.

22:11 It's just a portfolio problem.

22:13 And unless something moves this indifference curve,

22:15 which is set by private firms interested in a profit

22:18 this quarter

22:20 or something moves the risk reward frontier.

22:23 We're gonna go back as soon as the shock passes to the way it was before.

22:27 So,

22:27 I think a lot of the discussion about this is

22:29 finally the time we're gonna unwind global value chains,

22:32 I think that's wishful and wooly thinking.

22:34 So I'll stop right there.

22:36 Thank you very much.

22:39 Thank you,

22:39 Richard,

22:39 for that excellent introduction.

22:42 Um,

22:43 after Richard,

22:44 we have,

22:45 uh,

22:46 Vasco Carvalho.

22:48 He's a professor of economics at the University of Cambridge,

22:53 professor of macroeconomics,

22:54 and also the senior Keynes Fellow

22:57 in Cambridge.

22:59 Again,

22:59 he has done a lot to shape our

23:02 understanding of how production networks affect macroeconomic propagation.

23:08 He was awarded the 2014 Wiley Prize in Economics by the British

23:12 Academy for achievement in research by an outstanding early career economist.

23:19 He's the principal investigator of the European Research

23:22 Council grant Macronets Production Networks in Macroeconomics.

23:27 And also a recipient of the Lehoon Prize Fellowship.

23:32 Um,

23:34 Vasko did not share with me,

23:36 as far as I know,

23:37 his presentation,

23:38 but he

23:40 did

23:40 remarkable work

23:42 helping us to understand

23:44 how the Great East Japan earthquake.

23:48 Propagated through

23:51 Japan.

23:52 And how input output linkages were a mechanism for the propagation

23:58 and amplification of that shock,

24:00 but I see

24:02 Vasco is going to make a more general

24:05 presentation which will nicely complement Richard's introduction.

24:10 And international shock propagation.

24:13 Vasco's past work that I'm familiar with

24:15 looked at shock propagation within countries.

24:18 So I'm going to assume that this will continue

24:20 in the same way unless Vasco has internationalized his

24:26 analysis.

24:27 Vasco,

24:27 over to you.

24:29 Thank you very much,

24:30 Richard.

24:30 Thank you for the invitation.

24:31 This certainly beats uh teaching fractions to my kids,

24:35 which is what I'm otherwise doing.

24:37 Um.

24:39 So,

24:40 yes,

24:40 that's what the first thing I was going to say is that

24:43 you will not see international trade or global in my slides.

24:48 Um,

24:48 I do think

25:11 The thing I would like to do

25:13 is to

25:15 just take a step back and and notice that

25:19 Um,

25:20 in economics,

25:21 the role of supply chain linkages as a

25:24 source of risk and as a source of synchronization

25:27 is almost as old a dis discipline.

25:29 I'm not even gonna go back to Quesna and the Tau Economique,

25:33 um,

25:34 but it's been there.

25:35 The first general equilibrium model by von Neumann is a multi-sector model by,

25:40 by,

25:40 by the liberation of the author.

25:42 The beginning of growth theory is a multi-sector models.

25:46 The beginning of modern business cycle theory with real business cycles

25:50 is multi-sector.

25:51 And of course there's Leon TF writing much more beautifully than

25:55 anyone writes now.

25:57 reminding us back in the 30s and 40s how

26:01 laymen and professional economists and practical planners

26:04 are all equally aware of the existence

26:05 of some kind of interconnection between even

26:08 the remotest parts of the national economy.

26:11 And he goes on to say that the presence of

26:13 this invisible but nevertheless very real ties can be observed

26:17 in the synchronization of say,

26:19 demand in New York City

26:21 and how that translates

26:23 into

26:24 groceries in Detroit or mines in Pennsylvania to

26:28 textile mills in New England.

26:30 And then reassert itself over the business cycle,

26:33 right?

26:33 And so this is a very

26:36 There's nothing new here.

26:39 There is an increasing policy awareness.

26:42 So

26:43 my understanding is that a national strategy for the

26:46 US is a step just below a national agency.

26:49 The US has a national strategy.

26:51 Uh,

26:51 for global supply chain security,

26:53 acknowledging again

26:55 the disruption to supply chains as a source of global economic risk,

27:03 right,

27:04 be it by natural disasters,

27:05 be it by

27:07 criminals targeting

27:08 the

27:09 system.

27:11 Um,

27:12 and of course,

27:13 as Leontiev told us,

27:16 uh,

27:17 these supply chain risk aspects

27:21 tend to reassert themselves with relentless regularity.

27:25 So this is just a cut from the Financial Times a month ago or so.

27:30 Uh,

27:30 which was exactly what Richard was saying about the,

27:34 the

27:35 The first

27:38 from economic contagion from China early on in this process.

27:42 So having set the stage,

27:43 I was kind of asked to do two things.

27:45 I want,

27:46 I was asked to review a little bit evidence on

27:49 that the supply chain,

27:51 uh,

27:51 linkages do propagate risk across uh otherwise largely independent units.

27:57 Uh,

27:58 and then I was asked to do some kind of,

28:00 um,

28:01 material for discussion.

28:02 So let's try to do both.

28:05 Uh,

28:05 uh,

28:05 I'll start with,

28:06 um,

28:08 The review of paper on

28:10 the Great East Japan earthquake.

28:12 I want to name my co-authors here,

28:14 which is Makoto Niere,

28:15 Yukiko Saito in Japan,

28:16 and then Alireza Taba Sale in northwestern.

28:20 Um,

28:21 and kind of

28:23 There's the

28:24 the starting point for this paper was there was lots

28:26 and lots of evidence out there about how supply chains

28:30 may be a source of macro risk,

28:32 and they're assumed so by policymakers,

28:34 but there's very little systematic evidence.

28:37 From the point of view of kind of causal strictures that we impose ourselves,

28:42 we're talking about two fundamental challenges.

28:44 The first would be,

28:45 can you identify

28:48 a supply chain shock,

28:50 an individual localized shock.

28:54 Uh,

28:54 that's number 1.

28:55 And can you then,

28:57 number 2,

28:59 having had such shock or plausibly exogenous shock,

29:02 can you trace the shock as it,

29:04 as it spreads to the network?

29:05 So we're going to look at data from Japan in 2011 and try to get some basic magnitude.

29:10 And then depending on time,

29:12 I'll I'll go for for a more general discussion of what we learned a little

29:15 bit in Japan or the discussions within Japan

29:17 at the time that are relevant more globally

29:20 now.

29:21 So if I can take you back

29:23 uh nine years now,

29:25 uh,

29:25 in March 11,

29:26 2000,

29:27 so,

29:27 so basically 99 and 9 years and 10 days now.

29:31 It was a triple disaster.

29:32 There was a

29:34 a very large earthquake off the Pacific

29:38 northeast coast of Japan

29:40 that started a

29:42 tsunami

29:43 which

29:43 then ended up

29:45 hitting a nuclear power plant in Fukusushima.

29:48 Uh,

29:49 what you have there is a graph of fatalities and essentially human loss in red and

29:55 physical capital loss in green,

29:58 and what you see is that,

30:00 you know,

30:00 despite being a horrible

30:02 shock,

30:03 it is relatively localized in Japan.

30:05 It affected.

30:07 It's northeast prefectures

30:09 and

30:11 in particular the seaside prefectures because of the

30:15 The tsunami.

30:17 So that we're going to exploit that as our

30:20 first uh dictum that we needed,

30:22 the exogenous large localized disruption.

30:26 Um,

30:26 just to remind you,

30:27 you know,

30:28 I'm gonna very briefly go over this.

30:30 This is not the data that we'll be using,

30:32 but just as a reminder of what happened in Japan then,

30:35 there's very little high frequency data.

30:37 This is one snippet of high frequency data that we can show to you,

30:41 which is a year on year monthly production industry

30:45 index by prefecture.

30:47 And what you see in the red line is a 40%

30:49 year on year decline of industrial production in the affected prefectures.

30:53 And uh

30:55 a relatively strong recovery throughout

30:57 the months of the year that follows.

31:00 And in a way,

31:01 the question of this paper of this research is,

31:05 uh,

31:05 if we take a look at the blue line,

31:07 that's the entire Japan industrial production and

31:10 how it evolves throughout the year.

31:12 And what we know is that the disaster area by simple

31:16 national accounting by adding up is too small to account for

31:20 a 50% decline of

31:23 industrial production in Japan on impact

31:26 and it,

31:27 you know,

31:27 recovered throughout the year.

31:28 So we are

31:29 going to try to source firm level data

31:32 to see if this can come about,

31:34 if the translating the red line to the blue line is an aggregate outcome.

31:39 This can come about by supply chain propagation of this disruptions.

31:45 How are we going to do this?

31:46 We're going to access a very large firm level database.

31:49 So

31:50 essentially we're going to look at which firms are behind this red line.

31:54 What are the firms that are producing,

31:57 not only in services,

31:58 the database is very broad and covers

32:01 the entire

32:03 landscape of the economy very thoroughly.

32:05 And then we're going to overlay this with

32:08 3 governmental decrees essentially establishing a disaster area,

32:12 an emergency area following the earthquake,

32:16 and we're going to take advantage of the fact that we know

32:19 the address of the firms to geolocate them inside these disaster municipalities,

32:27 which is a subunit of these prefectures that we use.

32:31 Now,

32:32 having said this,

32:33 and you can see them again plotted against the northeast coast of Japan,

32:36 these like little reddish dots are the ferns and their location.

32:41 Having said that,

32:42 we don't care about the disaster area in this paper or the fate of these firms.

32:48 What we care about is the supply chain

32:52 link through to these firms,

32:54 and what you're seeing there is the same database as,

32:59 which is something very valuable and still somewhat unusual

33:02 for about a million firms in Japan.

33:04 That's about 2/3 of all the firms in Japan.

33:08 It has information of suppliers and customers of each firm on the identity,

33:12 not the quantity of trade.

33:15 So in the topmost graph,

33:16 I am plotting again the disaster firms that

33:19 we just identified previously in the graph.

33:22 And then I have 4 degrees of separation over

33:26 the production network or over the supply chain.

33:29 So what are the reds,

33:30 the second

33:32 up,

33:32 the 2nd graph.

33:35 Uh

33:37 coming from top to bottom.

33:40 Those are all direct suppliers or direct customers of affected area firms.

33:47 These are firms who are headquartered in

33:50 away from the disaster prefectures,

33:52 right?

33:54 But to have direct input-output linkages either by being suppliers

33:58 or customers to disaster area firms that we just.

34:03 And then I can go on.

34:04 I can ask,

34:05 OK,

34:06 who are the suppliers

34:08 and customers of the red firms?

34:10 So orange firms

34:12 are firms that

34:14 um

34:16 are what we call network distance to or supply chain distance

34:20 to from the disaster areas that they are not directly linked.

34:23 They are not direct customers or suppliers,

34:26 but they're either suppliers of the suppliers or

34:28 customers of the customers of disaster areas.

34:32 And then we go,

34:33 uh,

34:34 and,

34:34 and we continue going,

34:35 uh,

34:36 for the network buffs out there,

34:38 the diameter is 7,

34:39 which means we'd run out of firms at distance 7.

34:42 Uh,

34:42 for the popular culture buffs,

34:45 this is very much like the Kevin Bacon

34:48 degrees of separation.

34:49 The average distance is small.

34:51 That is economically relevant because it means that

34:54 within

34:56 In between,

34:57 somewhere in between the orange and the green ferns,

34:59 you cover 50% of the firms in Japan.

35:04 Which means modern supply chains are small worlds in their technical definition,

35:08 meaning

35:09 Uh,

35:11 they are sparse in that most people,

35:13 most firms are not trading directly with each other.

35:17 But they are nevertheless indirectly very close.

35:20 They are 2 or 3 links away from the disaster area.

35:24 And this is nothing in particular that is special to this disaster area.

35:28 This is a general feature of modern production networks in the data

35:32 that we are that is coming online and we can see.

35:35 Now,

35:36 having that,

35:36 what I want to do,

35:37 the outcome of interest now is to understand what was the impact

35:41 of being

35:43 Uh,

35:44 say,

35:45 Of the earthquake on non-disaster firms,

35:49 right,

35:49 firms that were linked

35:51 to disaster area only by their supply chain linkages,

35:55 either directly,

35:57 and then I would call that

35:59 distance one,

36:00 either upstream or downstream,

36:02 or indirectly,

36:03 which would be distance 23,

36:05 and 4.

36:06 So,

36:07 what we're trying to do here is basically saying,

36:11 Relative to our control group,

36:13 and our control group here to be clear,

36:16 is firms that are distance 5 and above from disaster area firms,

36:20 firms that are very remote in a supply chain sense

36:24 from the disaster area.

36:26 The firms that were closer in the supply chain distance,

36:30 um,

36:30 either downstream or upstream,

36:33 uh,

36:33 uh,

36:35 uh,

36:35 can we see an impact on their,

36:37 the level of their sales in the following year,

36:40 and this is the yearly frequency.

36:43 I'm just gonna now show you the main headline

36:45 result at this kind of the micro reduced form.

36:48 The,

36:48 in the paper,

36:49 you will find lots of robustness checks and and more discussion.

36:53 But this would be the key outcome.

36:55 So to read this graph,

36:56 let's just focus on the blue

36:59 bars,

37:00 and the circles are the point estimates.

37:03 And so this is saying that in the year following the earthquake,

37:08 a firm that was a direct customer,

37:10 Downstream One.

37:12 Of,

37:12 of,

37:13 of disaster area firms,

37:15 um,

37:18 Declined its sales by 3.6%

37:22 relative to firms that were distance 5 or above.

37:27 What we can see is that then you can go for

37:30 only indirect customers,

37:32 so downstream 2 or customers of customers of customers,

37:35 downstream 3,

37:36 etc.

37:38 and we see that this,

37:40 um,

37:40 there was significant propagation,

37:42 indirect propagation going downstream

37:45 all the way to firms

37:47 being with 4 degrees away.

37:50 Going downstream from Disaster River.

37:53 On the right side of the graph,

37:54 we also see that there was significant upstream propagation.

37:57 So from disaster area firms to their suppliers,

38:00 upstream one,

38:02 they lost 3% following the earthquake.

38:04 The supplier suppliers upstream too,

38:07 they lost 2%.

38:09 And so on and so forth.

38:11 OK.

38:12 What we're seeing here is a large,

38:15 uh,

38:16 spread,

38:16 large contagion or cascading behavior of this localized supply chain disruption,

38:22 with effects decaying with network distance as models imply.

38:26 Uh,

38:26 and very briefly,

38:27 I'll note what,

38:28 what the red dots tell you is that there is no evidence of pre-trend.

38:32 So these firms did not differ

38:35 already,

38:35 uh,

38:36 in their performance

38:37 already,

38:38 uh,

38:38 previous to the earthquake.

38:39 Again,

38:40 the,

38:40 the paper has a bunch of uh

38:43 Of um

38:44 robustness checks,

38:45 I found interesting.

38:47 But now I just want to take a step back from this very micro level impact,

38:50 and the first thing I want to notice is

38:53 for any of you that has looked at firm level data and firm

38:56 level growth rates and the standard deviation of the firm level growth rate,

39:00 even the largest of these numbers,

39:02 3.6% negative,

39:04 is not very large.

39:06 So it's not that the effects for individual firms are large.

39:11 Rather,

39:11 the effects may matter in the aggregate because it affects many firms.

39:17 So,

39:17 if you recall,

39:18 I told you that about 50% of the firms in Japan are within two steps

39:22 of the,

39:23 of disaster area firms.

39:25 And what we can see from the previous thing

39:27 is that though there are again relatively small effects,

39:30 right,

39:31 you lost 2%,

39:32 3% at most.

39:35 Um,

39:35 the fact there are,

39:36 you are shaving off 2% for 50% of the first.

39:41 And that's what generates an aggregate shock,

39:43 an aggregate movement,

39:45 right.

39:46 It's the fact

39:48 that there is some propagation

39:50 and the fact that the production network or the supply chain is wired in such a way.

39:55 That everyone,

39:57 if you hit a note at random,

39:59 a production site at random,

40:01 A lot of people are within a neighborhood of two

40:05 supply chain linkages of the way,

40:07 right?

40:07 This small world aspect of supply chain.

40:11 You could also do formal aggregation in GE rather than back

40:14 of the envelope aggregation of the effects I told you,

40:16 and what we're getting now,

40:18 and we're just computing these as we speak,

40:20 is that Japan lost about 0.5% of GDP that year due to the Earth.

40:25 And that's not very large,

40:27 but it's in line with empirical studies on the effects of disasters.

40:32 It's a threefold magnification from the simple adding up,

40:35 you know,

40:36 traditional accounting adding up of,

40:38 of,

40:38 uh,

40:39 say,

40:39 the real value-added weight of this.

40:42 And it's significant for Japan because you need to keep in mind that

40:45 Japan's growth rate average growth rate for the last 20 years is 1%.

40:50 OK

40:52 Now having,

40:53 so this kind of gives you

40:55 that these effects are real,

40:57 they matter,

40:58 and they show up in aggregate.

41:00 And

41:01 they are arguably causal

41:03 at a large scale of looking at a million firms,

41:07 um,

41:07 firms that are apparently very distant,

41:10 both geographically in a sector manner,

41:13 and even in supply chain distance still get affected.

41:18 Now I want to just take you a little

41:20 bit over the discussion that happened in Japan and,

41:22 and,

41:23 and mostly around business schools,

41:25 much less in economics,

41:27 after the Japan earthquake,

41:29 and thinking about what our strategies to deal with.

41:33 Uh,

41:33 this kind of supply chain risk.

41:36 Um,

41:36 and,

41:37 and this is my own summary.

41:38 Um.

41:40 But the way I see this,

41:42 there,

41:42 you know,

41:42 at the firm level,

41:44 I'm thinking first about private sector

41:46 responses on recognizing supply chain risk,

41:49 there was the obvious,

41:50 the obvious first thing that came about was the lack of information.

41:54 Even very large firms claim

41:57 that they lost weeks understanding what to

41:59 do with production because they didn't even know

42:02 why their input supply stopped.

42:07 Uh,

42:08 their direct supplier was up and running.

42:11 So they did not even know indirectly who are,

42:14 who they linked,

42:15 and this led to a number of programs led in particular by big firms in Japan

42:20 of recursively imposing on suppliers.

42:23 So if you want to be my supplier,

42:25 you need to tell me who your suppliers are

42:27 and the suppliers of the suppliers and the suppliers of the suppliers.

42:31 Large automakers in Japan try to,

42:35 try to get

42:35 gather information on supply chain.

42:39 The second

42:41 that I think Richard already kind of

42:42 briefly touched upon is diversification strategy.

42:45 This is both of suppliers

42:47 and about production sites,

42:49 my own production sites,

42:50 or demanding,

42:51 for example,

42:52 that my supplier,

42:53 if I have one,

42:54 has two distinct productions.

42:57 This is to ensure short term substitution possibilities.

43:00 And the other,

43:02 um,

43:02 which

43:03 I think we have very little evidence whether it's gone on in practice or not,

43:07 but there was a discussion certainly about this,

43:09 is the standardization of components,

43:11 in particular,

43:12 you know,

43:12 one reason why the supply chains are fragile is the myriad of

43:17 um

43:18 You know,

43:19 customer demand

43:21 spec of I want my

43:23 headlights to have a shade of blue or a shade of pink,

43:27 and I want the color of the car to be this and not that.

43:31 And that

43:32 um

43:33 variety

43:34 that is,

43:35 we think is welfare enhancing,

43:37 um,

43:37 is,

43:38 brings about complexity and generates over ring type

43:41 problems where everything is ready to go,

43:43 but

43:44 the controller of the headlights is not available.

43:47 And that that that leads to a little bit of less choice,

43:50 less variety and standardization of components.

43:53 And one reason why these lessons may have

43:56 not been learned more globally and even without

44:00 outside of Japan is that these are very costly,

44:02 as I think Richard was already

44:04 Pointing out information is costly and introduces a gap between

44:08 large firms that can gather information and small firms that do not.

44:13 Diversification is costly,

44:14 in particular when you think about relation-specific investment.

44:18 If I now have two suppliers

44:20 for the same goods,

44:22 there is much less investment in a particular relation,

44:24 and it's costly to maintain all these relationships.

44:29 And,

44:29 and,

44:30 and the last point is standardization or less variety.

44:34 And either by direct higher cost or lower variety,

44:38 what this means is if you want to build robustness.

44:42 This comes at a cost.

44:43 How large is this cost?

44:44 It's not clear.

44:46 The way I think about it in the first instance is

44:49 firms who participation in the supply chain or

44:52 in this case in the global supply chain.

44:54 Um,

44:55 the marginal firms are affected,

44:57 firms that are basically,

44:59 uh,

45:00 You know,

45:02 Close to breaking even

45:03 if they face a larger cost,

45:05 they will either not implement these changes or remove themselves from.

45:18 Large firms it seems to be is uh what this presents for research,

45:23 so this area of production networks has expanded enormously over the last 10 years,

45:28 um.

45:30 And has definitely put on the table the notion that there are systemic

45:35 production firms or sectors.

45:38 Narrowly defined production.

45:40 Or actors

45:41 Roscoe and systemic risk.

45:44 Roscoe,

45:44 another couple of minutes please.

45:45 Thank you.

45:46 Yes,

45:46 I will,

45:47 I'll finish in one slide.

45:48 Um

45:51 And,

45:51 and

45:53 And while it considers that it makes it very clear,

45:55 it also considers that the supply chains are efficiently,

45:58 efficient,

45:59 and that there is no room for policy intervention.

46:01 So

46:02 friction on the environment is something that

46:03 is just now being looked at seriously.

46:06 The other thing that is not that there is not a lot of work on,

46:09 although there is some great work on supply chain formation.

46:13 But we understand

46:14 how firms rewire after firms exit.

46:18 Or how firms make these linkages to begin with,

46:21 and microdata being a large bug.

46:26 I'll finish

46:27 Uh,

46:28 for policymakers,

46:29 right,

46:29 in the situation where we are now,

46:31 where

46:32 we've identified clearly some key goods that we need to have them operational.

46:37 We need ventilators,

46:38 we need masks,

46:39 we need tests,

46:40 or here in the UK you also need flour.

46:42 Apparently flour has disappeared.

46:46 Now,

46:46 this presents incredible challenges to policymakers,

46:49 which is

46:50 Uh,

46:51 typically it's not because the ventilators cannot be done at the final producer.

46:56 This is because somewhere in the supply chain there's a

46:58 bottleneck that cannot be overcome in a very short run.

47:02 This requires the policymakers to know in real time

47:04 what are bottlenecks to the production of individual goods.

47:09 And then we would require them to act,

47:10 and it's not obvious again we've seen that we

47:12 don't have great theoretical justification for how to ring fence

47:17 what are deemed to be key supply chains or mandate diversification and capacity.

47:24 So this presents lots of challenges for policymakers in

47:26 the sense that information being one of them,

47:29 most countries in the world do not have this supply chain data

47:33 that allow them to trace

47:35 which are the key firms to ensure the production of certain goods.

47:40 Uh,

47:41 we do not know,

47:43 and when I talk to people exactly what we mean by ringfencing.

47:48 Uh,

47:48 and what we,

47:48 we don't know the,

47:49 the pernicious effect of though.

47:51 And we don't have a great justification to

47:54 enact

47:55 policy measures that ring fence or ensure

47:58 diversification or national champions as Richard.

48:03 So,

48:03 I'm happy to take further discussion in the Q&A.

48:07 Thank you very much.

48:09 Thank you very much,

48:10 uh,

48:11 Vasco.

48:11 That was

48:12 an excellent,

48:14 careful,

48:14 thoughtful presentation.

48:16 Um,

48:17 after Richard and Vasco,

48:20 uh,

48:20 who have talked about

48:23 God-made shocks

48:25 like disease and natural disasters,

48:28 we will now turn

48:29 to how

48:30 these

48:32 shocks are amplified by man-made shocks.

48:35 In the form of trade restrictions.

48:38 And for that we have Simon Enet,

48:40 who's a professor of international trade and economic development.

48:44 And MBA director at the University of St.

48:47 Gallen.

48:48 Simon

48:49 has specialized in

48:53 Understanding,

48:54 monitoring,

48:56 highlighting,

48:57 protection.

48:59 At the start of the global financial crisis,

49:01 Simon created the Global Trade Alert Initiative,

49:05 and this has become the leading independent

49:09 conscience.

49:11 of the world,

49:12 and he has highlighted

49:15 some of the most egregious

49:17 measures taken by governments and perhaps

49:21 Through shining his light on them

49:24 has disciplined them.

49:26 Simon,

49:26 apart from his many other accomplishments,

49:29 has been a staff member

49:32 of the World Bank not once but twice,

49:36 and he has been

49:38 a friend for many of us for a long,

49:41 long time.

49:42 So Simon,

49:43 over to you.

49:49 Thank you.

50:05 Uh,

50:06 in light of,

50:06 uh,

50:07 what we've known about

50:08 response to previous global economic shocks

50:11 and of course the academic literature and the research literature

50:15 which is

50:15 being prepared

50:17 now if I know how to

50:19 use this

50:20 technology,

50:21 I'll try and move through the slides.

50:23 Great.

50:23 I'm gonna start by discussing.

50:27 The uh

50:28 uh changes that we have seen this year compared to previous years,

50:32 uh,

50:32 in the overall global stance

50:34 now

50:35 monitoring trade policies is at some level quite an unsatisfactory,

50:39 um,

50:39 uh,

50:40 endeavor

50:41 because there are.

50:42 There are lots of ways that theory would tell us we would like to be able to

50:45 assess policy stance,

50:47 ideally in terms of some ad valorum equivalent or the

50:50 amount of trade which is covered and the like,

50:52 but much of the information we need to be

50:54 able to make those types of meaningful calculations.

50:59 Isn't available at the time when we,

51:01 when we need to be able to assess what governments are doing.

51:04 So

51:05 what has tended to happen is

51:06 that there have been

51:09 essentially

51:10 statistics based on counts of measures

51:12 that governments have undertaken.

51:14 Now

51:14 we can all think of

51:16 many reasons why those counts are potentially misleading.

51:19 Wrong,

51:20 and I will show you some export coverage data later,

51:24 but this is the metric which is typically

51:27 used by the international organizations

51:29 and one which my team at Stallen has been using

51:34 for 10 years now.

51:36 So I should say in our

51:37 work and reports we do try and report other measures too,

51:41 but if you want to know what's happening

51:43 right now,

51:44 then I'm afraid you're stuck with counts.

51:46 That's pretty much the only game in town.

51:49 Well,

51:49 this first slide that I have here

51:51 on

51:52 developments this year shows just how different this

51:55 year has been compared to previous years.

51:57 If you look back over

51:59 the years 2009 to 2019

52:01 and you look at the measures which were put in place from 1 January

52:05 to 17 April,

52:07 you'll see

52:08 that your traditional anti-dumping,

52:10 anti-subsidy

52:11 and other measures

52:12 are

52:14 are the

52:16 largest share.

52:17 They're typically half of shares,

52:19 half of the measures which are

52:21 found in the first few months of the year,

52:23 and then

52:24 subsidy trade distorting subsidies are the second largest grouping

52:28 and then tariff increases.

52:29 Now of course,

52:30 there's variation across the years and

52:32 you can imagine

52:33 that this pie chart looked a little bit different during the trade war years.

52:37 If you're looking at some type of average to benchmark this year against,

52:42 then this is the starting point on the right hand side.

52:45 On the left hand side,

52:46 we have information on what governments have actually been doing this year,

52:50 and you can see that the most prevalent form

52:52 of

52:53 trade policy intervention,

52:54 which is harmful to foreign commercial interests

52:57 are measures which relate to exports,

52:59 in

53:00 particular,

53:01 measures which are restricting exports,

53:03 about which I'll say more later.

53:05 So we have a shift in the

53:08 mix of

53:09 trade distortions that we've observed.

53:11 We can see also that there's a far greater number,

53:14 proportionally

53:15 of

53:16 subsidies which have been introduced.

53:18 These are subsidies to

53:19 import competing firms,

53:21 and we can see that contingent protection measures,

53:23 which were the largest category in previous years,

53:26 is now the 3rd largest category this year.

53:28 So there does appear to be a trade policy shift

53:32 which has occurred,

53:33 and of course,

53:33 one question we will want to

53:35 look into over time

53:36 and in research is whether that

53:39 had meaningful effects.

53:41 Now these summary statistics here

53:44 are drawn from

53:45 an initiative where we essentially monitor

53:48 very carefully what is published on government websites

53:51 around the world and systematically collect that information.

53:55 If you're talking about the overall quantum of the number of

53:58 Harmful measures introduced this year.

54:00 It is below what it was last year.

54:02 This year we've had 173

54:04 harmful measures which have been documented,

54:06 which is below the 315 found last year,

54:10 but still

54:10 this year's numbers are relatively high compared to the 10 year average.

54:15 So this is the first finding.

54:18 Now if we can go to the next slide.

54:27 Actually,

54:28 if I could have some help getting to the next slide,

54:29 I'm find

54:30 finding this rather difficult,

54:32 um.

54:35 Ryan or

54:37 Ale?

54:40 Um,

54:41 Ryan?

54:44 Hi Simon,

54:45 if you just,

54:45 have you tried

54:46 pressing a

54:48 The director,

54:49 the arrow key,

54:50 did that

54:51 do it?

54:52 Uh,

54:52 no.

54:54 Or pressing down

54:55 might also.

54:58 Hold on.

55:00 Neither of those.

55:03 Neither of those works,

55:04 so can I just ask you to?

55:05 Sure,

55:05 sure,

55:06 I'm happy to.

55:07 That's great.

55:07 So if we can go to the next slide,

55:08 I can

55:09 try and catch up a little bit.

55:10 Um,

55:10 the next slide slips,

55:13 looks at

55:14 not the trade harm,

55:15 the harmful measures which have been put in place,

55:17 but the liberalizing measures,

55:19 and hopefully Ryan will bring this up in a second.

55:21 And

55:22 here we have

55:23 a different pattern which is

55:26 worth

55:27 noting.

55:28 Normally between 2009 and 2019,

55:31 by now we have seen about

55:34 half of the measures which are introduced,

55:35 liberalizing measures are

55:37 tariff measures.

55:39 About 45% of them,

55:40 and this proportion has increased a lot,

55:44 or at least somewhat I should say,

55:45 and then

55:46 we also tend to see

55:48 another breakdown in terms of

55:50 export related measures,

55:51 normally the removal of export restraints,

55:54 but the other big change if you compare.

55:56 In 2020

55:56 with earlier years,

55:58 is

55:59 that we see far fewer FDI liberalizing measures this year,

56:03 and this is actually consistent with the

56:05 work that we've seen on the ground,

56:07 where more governments,

56:08 if anything,

56:08 will be moving in

56:09 a more restrictive way in terms of how

56:11 they're treating foreign direct investment this year.

56:13 So overall,

56:14 then,

56:14 what we have seen

56:16 is

56:17 on the harmful side we see

56:19 more export

56:20 related measures,

56:21 and on the liberalizing side we see more tariff cuts and fewer FDI reforms.

56:26 So this is the overall picture

56:28 for this

56:30 the particular year,

56:31 looking globally across.

56:32 All of the

56:34 countries of the world.

56:35 Now what I'd like to do,

56:36 since the purpose is to focus a little bit on COVID-19,

56:39 is to look

56:40 at

56:41 the developments inside the sector,

56:44 which covers

56:45 medical equipment,

56:46 medical supplies

56:47 and medicines,

56:49 and if we could go to the next slide please,

56:50 that would be great.

56:52 Oh,

56:53 I should have added him.

56:55 Actually,

56:55 uh,

56:56 there's,

56:56 uh,

56:56 one other point I,

56:57 I'm,

56:58 now I can see I've

57:00 missed the order here.

57:01 Um,

57:02 before we get to the,

57:03 uh,

57:03 export incentives and the export restrictions in medicines and the like,

57:07 let me,

57:07 um,

57:08 Uh,

57:08 just quickly say one other thing,

57:10 um,

57:10 although,

57:11 uh,

57:12 we earlier mentioned the export restrictions being prominent,

57:15 if you're actually looking at trade affected,

57:17 the biggest issues this year to date

57:19 have actually been export incentives which have been offered by countries

57:23 to their exporters,

57:24 and so,

57:25 uh,

57:26 we have seen three such measures.

57:27 Perhaps the largest such measure

57:29 was one introduced by China on the 20th of March,

57:32 which,

57:33 where they offered higher export incentives through their.

57:36 The tax system

57:37 for

57:38 products which were

57:40 exported

57:41 from that country

57:42 and we can see that worldwide,

57:44 the total estimate so far

57:47 of the amount of trade affected by this

57:49 year's trade distortions is just under $0.5 trillion

57:52 and of that $3 trillion

57:54 comes from the export incentives

57:57 which the Chinese and others have offered.

58:00 And so you can see that a large share of the trade distortions in terms of.

58:03 Coverage

58:04 are actually

58:05 unrelated to the export restrictions,

58:07 which I'll spend a bit more time looking on.

58:09 Please be aware that

58:10 the vertical axis on this chart

58:12 is in log form.

58:14 I've also put in place the

58:16 share of trade which is affected by import tariffs,

58:18 and

58:20 these are the most salient forms of

58:22 import restrictions,

58:24 and you can see they pale

58:25 in significance to

58:27 the impact or sorry,

58:29 the scale of export incentives.

58:33 So then just to summarize the

58:34 what the the the changes so far this year,

58:37 we've seen lots of export restrictions

58:39 but

58:39 the uh policy which um which is probably affecting the most trade

58:43 are actually export incentives.

58:47 These export incentives,

58:48 by the way,

58:48 are typically very poorly documented by either the international organizations

58:54 or in economic research.

58:57 We now have more research on the VAT

58:59 rebates done by China.

59:01 There is a growing literature on this.

59:03 But

59:04 I should say

59:05 that these are

59:06 the principal form

59:08 of trade distortion that we saw

59:10 at the

59:11 turn of the last global economic crisis

59:14 and also it seems to be today as well.

59:17 If we can move on to the next slide,

59:19 please,

59:20 then I'll turn now to the export curbs with respect to

59:23 medical products,

59:25 medical products and medicines.

59:27 What

59:28 we have found this year,

59:29 and this has received,

59:30 of course,

59:30 a lot of attention,

59:31 given the salience of the pandemic,

59:34 is

59:34 that over time more and more countries have imposed

59:38 different types of Export curbs on medical products and medicines.

59:42 At the moment we are counting that 76 nations

59:45 have limited

59:47 the

59:48 exportation of different types of medical supply.

59:51 Not all countries have done it the same way and they have not all

59:54 covered the same degree of products,

59:56 but we do see

59:58 a spread over time

59:59 in the measures which have been taken.

1:00:02 And uh

1:00:03 this uh spread has occurred from

1:00:05 uh the source of the virus

1:00:08 uh westward over time as we have seen,

1:00:10 um,

1:00:10 as,

1:00:11 as the virus has spreads to the export

1:00:14 constraints have spread.

1:00:15 I should say that if you're thinking of a product like medical ventilators,

1:00:19 then

1:00:20 countries like Australia,

1:00:23 Mexico,

1:00:24 Canada and Japan are now pretty much the only suppliers which are available to send

1:00:30 these important pieces of medical equipment

1:00:32 to the rest of the world.

1:00:33 All of the other suppliers have some type of

1:00:36 export ban in place.

1:00:38 So this is,

1:00:39 I think,

1:00:39 a highly salient topic.

1:00:41 The literature,

1:00:41 as we know,

1:00:42 on export curbs

1:00:43 is uniformly damning.

1:00:45 A lot of the great work done on this

1:00:47 was done on the export curbs associated with the

1:00:49 agricultural

1:00:51 sector

1:00:52 and in particular with respect to the 2008 to 2010 commodity price spike.

1:00:58 Much of it was done actually at the World Bank and by World Bank affiliates,

1:01:02 and of course,

1:01:02 what makes that research so much easier is that we have

1:01:05 World prices

1:01:06 or national market prices

1:01:07 for these commodities.

1:01:09 Most medical products,

1:01:10 on the other hand,

1:01:11 are so differentiated

1:01:12 that I suspect we will not have the same,

1:01:15 we will not have the same rich data sets to be able to do

1:01:18 that type of research.

1:01:19 We'll probably have

1:01:20 more narrower focused research,

1:01:22 but still,

1:01:23 the work that has been done by Michele Rutte and colleagues

1:01:26 has shown that

1:01:27 the estimated impact on prices

1:01:29 of these export curves can be significant.

1:01:32 If we could move on to the next slide,

1:01:34 please,

1:01:35 I'd like to

1:01:36 talk about something which has received a lot of attention as well,

1:01:39 which are export curbs on food.

1:01:42 These have begun to receive a lot of attention from policymakers

1:01:46 and the press.

1:01:47 I think it's important to point out,

1:01:48 clearly this is a

1:01:50 potentially important matter which needs to be tracked over time,

1:01:53 but we are nowhere near the same

1:01:55 degree of

1:01:57 prevalence of export curbs in food that we have seen

1:01:59 in medical products,

1:02:01 really in terms of the major producers.

1:02:03 There's only one which has curbed

1:02:05 exports in a serious way,

1:02:07 and that's Russia

1:02:08 so far.

1:02:08 This may change,

1:02:09 of course,

1:02:10 and we'll have to watch it carefully,

1:02:12 but we do see

1:02:14 a much more limited exportation curbs

1:02:17 in this particular sector,

1:02:19 and we have also seen tracking countries here

1:02:22 that the political economy of these curbs are quite interesting.

1:02:24 Interesting.

1:02:25 A number of countries put in place curbs

1:02:27 which are extremely aggressive,

1:02:28 often bans,

1:02:31 and then they face pressure from farmers and from internal

1:02:35 forces within a government

1:02:37 which end up

1:02:39 causing the export measure to be relaxed.

1:02:42 We've seen a bit of that

1:02:43 going on in countries like Vietnam and Romania.

1:02:46 So there's a very interesting political economy story unfolding there as well.

1:02:50 So this is with respect to food.

1:02:53 Yep,

1:02:53 and let me just,

1:02:54 uh,

1:02:54 quickly,

1:02:55 uh,

1:02:55 move on to the next slide,

1:02:56 and I think that's,

1:02:57 uh,

1:02:58 my takeaway slide,

1:02:59 so I can wrap up.

1:03:01 So what are the main takeaways?

1:03:02 The first is we do see

1:03:05 some differences between this year and previous years.

1:03:10 The previous decade

1:03:11 saw a much more

1:03:13 traditional pattern of trade policy intervention

1:03:15 with resort to subsidies and to contingent protectionism.

1:03:19 This year we see

1:03:21 a lot of subsidies,

1:03:22 but we also see

1:03:23 many more export restraints.

1:03:26 It's unclear

1:03:29 what will happen next,

1:03:30 but if we do have a

1:03:31 collapse in world trade,

1:03:32 which has been forecast,

1:03:34 then there will be concerns that this may lead to

1:03:37 an unleashing of lots of protectionism,

1:03:39 and we'll have to track that

1:03:41 very carefully and see what format protectionism will take.

1:03:45 When it comes to the impact on development sensitive areas,

1:03:48 clearly

1:03:49 the impact on medical supplies and food are a concern,

1:03:52 but we see many more

1:03:54 impacts and many more effects in the

1:03:57 more

1:03:58 interventions in the area of medical supplies and food

1:04:01 at the moment.

1:04:02 And the last point I would make is that

1:04:04 whilst export restrictions get a lot of attention,

1:04:07 Uh,

1:04:07 from the media and the like,

1:04:09 and they are very,

1:04:10 very salient for good reasons,

1:04:12 uh,

1:04:12 often the most pervasive,

1:04:14 uh,

1:04:15 forms of protectionism or trade distortion are actually

1:04:19 measures to increase exports,

1:04:21 uh,

1:04:21 which governments take,

1:04:22 which amount to

1:04:24 market share stealing or market share reallocation

1:04:27 away from trading partners towards subsidized firms,

1:04:31 and this is what we should be watching as well

1:04:33 as this

1:04:34 COVID pandemic unfolds.

1:04:36 Thank you very much.

1:04:39 Thank you,

1:04:40 Simon,

1:04:40 for that important and um

1:04:43 careful presentation.

1:04:45 Um,

1:04:48 Before we open up for questions,

1:04:49 I,

1:04:50 uh,

1:04:51 have been asked to take stock and make

1:04:54 some,

1:04:54 um,

1:04:55 uh,

1:04:56 observations.

1:04:58 The 3 questions we could ask at this juncture.

1:05:02 The first is how

1:05:04 production interdependence

1:05:07 leads to a transmission of shocks.

1:05:11 And that's a question that Richard and Vasco

1:05:14 addressed.

1:05:16 The second question is how the shock

1:05:20 that we are witnessing today is leading to

1:05:22 a disruption of global value chains today.

1:05:26 And the third question is

1:05:28 how

1:05:29 does the shock

1:05:30 and

1:05:32 the

1:05:33 Policy response to the shock

1:05:35 lead to a longer term reorganization of global value chains.

1:05:43 I think in the discussion now it would be great

1:05:45 to hear from all of you and from the speakers

1:05:48 is how is this shock different,

1:05:50 you know,

1:05:50 as I said at the beginning,

1:05:51 this is not like the Japanese tsunami,

1:05:53 it's not like the American mortgage crisis.

1:05:56 It is a shock that's virtually simultaneously affecting

1:06:00 many different parts of the world.

1:06:02 It's also unusual

1:06:03 that it's not so much

1:06:05 a shock that is disrupting manufacturing capacity.

1:06:10 Some of the biggest changes we are seeing are in the Services sectors.

1:06:15 So what does that mean when a large part of the economy,

1:06:19 which is relatively less dependent on backward value chains,

1:06:23 but perhaps more important in forward value chains?

1:06:26 How should we think in terms of the nature of this shock as different

1:06:31 and how do we expect it to be transmitted differently

1:06:35 when we think of the disruption,

1:06:38 how is it the types of stages of production that are being affected?

1:06:42 Uh,

1:06:44 you know,

1:06:44 high density collective consumption,

1:06:47 high density collective production,

1:06:50 face to face interaction,

1:06:52 how do we expect those

1:06:54 also to lead to a disruption in global value chains?

1:06:58 And then when we think about the longer term,

1:07:00 I think Vasco very nicely set out

1:07:02 the kind of issues,

1:07:04 but there are,

1:07:04 as he said,

1:07:05 a tension between acquiring more information and the big benefits of delegation.

1:07:11 The

1:07:13 Tension between diversifying

1:07:17 versus efficiency precisely because of relationship specific

1:07:22 investments that these global value chains require

1:07:25 and also a tension between the standardization

1:07:28 which would make it easy for you to switch

1:07:31 and the customization,

1:07:33 which is increasingly a feature of these international production relations

1:07:37 and I do think that even though Simon said it's not just export restrictions.

1:07:41 The fact that we are seeing export restrictions,

1:07:44 I think,

1:07:45 could have a particularly pernicious effect,

1:07:47 not just on global value chains,

1:07:49 but on trade.

1:07:50 Because

1:07:51 they

1:07:52 suggest

1:07:53 that trade is not

1:07:55 a reliable way of dealing with difficult circumstances.

1:08:00 The whole idea

1:08:02 that

1:08:02 if in bad states of the world countries

1:08:05 import export restrictions on food and medical supplies,

1:08:08 then it does legitimize

1:08:12 greater

1:08:13 self-sufficiency even in good states of the world.

1:08:17 So how should we think about that and especially

1:08:20 When all our existing multilateral institutions,

1:08:24 even in their

1:08:25 prime,

1:08:26 they were not able to discipline

1:08:28 these export restrictions.

1:08:30 How is it

1:08:31 that we can think of new international cooperative

1:08:34 arrangements which preserve the huge gains from this

1:08:39 fragmentation of production,

1:08:41 both

1:08:42 in terms of productivity and diffusion of technology?

1:08:45 So I think these are the questions that are important,

1:08:49 you know,

1:08:49 we We are doing some work here with Caroline Freund,

1:08:52 Daria Taglioni,

1:08:53 Michele Ruta

1:08:55 to try and understand

1:08:56 both the short run and the long run implications of these changes,

1:09:00 but it'd be great to hear now from all of you.

1:09:02 But let me open up

1:09:04 for questions.

1:09:06 Uh,

1:09:07 one,

1:09:09 you can use YouTube,

1:09:11 you can use Webex,

1:09:13 and let me begin with one question

1:09:16 which has come from Sabrina Holman.

1:09:19 Who's asking

1:09:21 Any thoughts,

1:09:22 views on the impact of these disruptions on

1:09:26 current

1:09:27 and potential trade agreements,

1:09:29 regional agreements.

1:09:31 So perhaps Richard,

1:09:32 you can begin and then the others can step in if they wish.

1:09:36 And after that I'll try and keep track of questions and bundle them together.

1:09:49 Richard,

1:09:49 are you there?

1:09:50 Let me,

1:09:51 oh,

1:09:51 sorry,

1:09:51 yeah,

1:09:51 I,

1:09:52 I hadn't thought about it,

1:09:53 but let,

1:09:53 let me,

1:09:54 um,

1:09:55 talk about,

1:09:56 uh,

1:09:57 what I think happened,

1:09:58 for example,

1:09:58 in NAFTA.

1:09:59 I think there's been less disruption

1:10:01 and less export restrictions within NAFTA,

1:10:04 and I think within Europe also there was an initial push

1:10:08 that blocked a lot of stuff within Europe,

1:10:10 but then

1:10:11 it was

1:10:12 allowed inside Europe but not outside Europe.

1:10:15 So I think to my,

1:10:16 my,

1:10:16 my instinct would be that what we're going to,

1:10:19 especially in things like medical,

1:10:20 is uh

1:10:21 part of the regional

1:10:23 agreements would be not to block each other's exports

1:10:26 in this,

1:10:27 in this time of need.

1:10:28 So I think it may,

1:10:29 may come to have clubs of people who

1:10:32 promise not to block food or

1:10:34 medical equipment or something like that.

1:10:37 But I have to say that I,

1:10:39 I think a lot of,

1:10:40 of this will,

1:10:41 apart from the medi medical equipment,

1:10:42 I think a lot of it

1:10:44 will pass and

1:10:45 the vast majority of trade in

1:10:47 chemicals and vehicles and electrical equipment and

1:10:51 electronics,

1:10:52 that stuff is not going to be changed because the,

1:10:54 the basic political economy which led to the

1:10:57 diverse,

1:10:58 led to the global value chains isn't gonna change.

1:11:01 And uh so I,

1:11:01 I think a lot of this discussion,

1:11:03 oh my goodness,

1:11:04 now we have to change everything,

1:11:05 it's not gonna go through.

1:11:07 But anyways,

1:11:07 uh,

1:11:08 with respect to regional,

1:11:09 um,

1:11:10 regional trade agreements,

1:11:11 I think that's where

1:11:12 the restrictions have sort of been not,

1:11:14 not extended.

1:11:15 So,

1:11:15 NAFTA is trading with each other.

1:11:18 Europe is trading with each other.

1:11:19 I don't know the situation in Asia.

1:11:25 Simon,

1:11:25 do you want to come in on that?

1:11:29 Yes,

1:11:30 if I may,

1:11:33 I think there's a very interesting question which is raised by

1:11:35 your question and Sabine's question about

1:11:37 reciprocity,

1:11:39 because we typically think that if a country

1:11:41 liberalizes

1:11:42 its import regime in the context of a trade agreement,

1:11:45 the payoff

1:11:46 comes not only to the benefits from importing

1:11:49 but also for the benefit of.

1:11:50 Benefits from uh

1:11:51 being able to export to other countries,

1:11:53 but that calculus gets disturbed

1:11:56 in if uh

1:11:57 uh it turns out that if you liberalize your import tariffs let in

1:12:01 um imports,

1:12:02 but if there are no imports to buy because the other party is using export curbs,

1:12:06 especially on essential

1:12:08 items when you need them,

1:12:09 then a lot of the benefits.

1:12:10 From liberalizing your trade your trade regime

1:12:13 has been um

1:12:14 has been lost and so

1:12:16 what we

1:12:16 learned then is that the benefits from reciprocal

1:12:20 trade reform I think are conditional

1:12:22 on being able to somehow qualify or limit the use of these

1:12:26 um export restrictions and here I just build a bridge to what Richard said.

1:12:30 There are a number of

1:12:31 Trade agreements which have tried

1:12:33 to qualify the use of export restrictions.

1:12:36 Interestingly,

1:12:37 some are in North America

1:12:38 and some involve North American countries with Latin American countries,

1:12:43 and it would be interesting to see

1:12:45 if the disruption to supply chains there or the threat of such disruption

1:12:49 was perceived as being much lower as a result.

1:12:53 Thank you,

1:12:54 Simon.

1:12:55 Uh,

1:12:56 Vasco,

1:12:57 2 questions for you.

1:12:59 Uh,

1:13:00 one from Tristan Reed.

1:13:04 and I think from key,

1:13:05 uh,

1:13:06 is what are the most promising proposals to enhance the resilience of

1:13:13 supply chains and especially medical supply chains?

1:13:17 And here,

1:13:18 if I can paraphrase the question,

1:13:20 that would it be a good idea if firms don't do it themselves

1:13:25 to mandate greater holding of inventories or essential inputs.

1:13:38 Rasco,

1:13:39 you have to unmute yourself.

1:13:40 Here we go.

1:13:41 Sorry.

1:13:42 Um,

1:13:43 thanks a lot for the question.

1:13:44 I think that they're good questions.

1:13:45 Um,

1:13:50 I think what I am seeing from many conversations and from,

1:13:55 uh,

1:13:56 I think Richard was discussing this ahead of the,

1:13:58 you know,

1:13:59 you know,

1:13:59 we had a small pre-discussion to the conference.

1:14:03 I think the most promising thing or the most

1:14:06 positive thing that I'm seeing around the world.

1:14:09 Is the deployment of massive data.

1:14:14 That is on the information side if you want,

1:14:16 what we were discussing before.

1:14:19 So

1:14:19 even countries where an understanding of

1:14:23 what is your supply chain,

1:14:25 what are your supply chain risks,

1:14:26 can you map out the supply chain with some detail?

1:14:30 Can you tell me

1:14:31 what you require to produce ventilators?

1:14:34 Which was a kind of a pipe dream,

1:14:37 I would say 20 years ago.

1:14:39 Um,

1:14:39 if you asked me 2 years ago to do that on a systematic level,

1:14:44 uh,

1:14:44 at least nation by nation,

1:14:46 it was still a pipe dream.

1:14:48 And what I am seeing in this crisis is governments and policymakers and advisors.

1:14:55 Um,

1:14:55 actually implementing very interesting solutions with payment system data,

1:15:00 with transaction data,

1:15:02 with banking data.

1:15:04 Which

1:15:04 is a first step in understanding

1:15:08 what can be done

1:15:09 in understanding what are bottlenecks in your supply chains.

1:15:14 Where do you stand as a macro risk if

1:15:17 plant X goes down?

1:15:19 A couple of years ago,

1:15:20 we had this,

1:15:21 we found,

1:15:22 or I found out that half of the world's

1:15:25 hard disk drives were

1:15:26 were produced in a valley in Thailand,

1:15:28 I believe.

1:15:29 And then the valley flooded and the hard disk drives

1:15:32 price doubled overnight.

1:15:35 Um,

1:15:36 I think we,

1:15:36 we are now living in a world where

1:15:40 we actually are,

1:15:41 are,

1:15:42 are much more aware and can map out these risks,

1:15:44 and that's the first step for policy.

1:15:47 Um,

1:15:48 so I think that's been an exciting development.

1:15:50 Now,

1:15:50 to go from there to what can actually governments do in terms of shoring up

1:15:56 our,

1:15:56 in terms of,

1:15:58 um,

1:15:59 ring-fencing,

1:16:03 what national interest,

1:16:04 entire supply chains around national interest,

1:16:07 uh,

1:16:08 is something that I think we are far from.

1:16:12 I,

1:16:12 I,

1:16:12 I,

1:16:12 I suspect that the most we will be able to deliver the capacity

1:16:16 to start thinking about these things.

1:16:18 Um,

1:16:19 I can tell you that,

1:16:20 you know,

1:16:20 the UK and Spain and

1:16:22 different governments that I've been in touch are

1:16:25 thinking very,

1:16:26 thinking ambitiously about these things,

1:16:28 trying to figure out.

1:16:30 Exactly what do I need to

1:16:33 ensure

1:16:35 production at the current level of demand of good X?

1:16:40 And I think we are very close to having,

1:16:42 you know,

1:16:42 relatively scientific answers to those questions,

1:16:46 but I think politically,

1:16:47 in terms of the political economy of that

1:16:49 and all that can go wrong

1:16:51 along that path,

1:16:53 something that we haven't thought,

1:16:54 and that I would like to think a little bit more,

1:16:57 um.

1:16:59 I,

1:16:59 I know that this is,

1:17:00 is,

1:17:00 is for sure happened with,

1:17:01 with medical supplies to go back to you.

1:17:06 Uh,

1:17:07 Bhaskar,

1:17:07 thank you.

1:17:08 There's another question,

1:17:09 if again I can paraphrase from Hatem

1:17:12 Jabani.

1:17:14 And

1:17:15 he is or she is asking about,

1:17:19 you know,

1:17:19 are you taking into account

1:17:22 How,

1:17:23 how are you thinking about switching costs on both the consumer

1:17:27 and the supply side when you think of disasters,

1:17:30 number one?

1:17:31 And secondly,

1:17:33 uh,

1:17:34 is it not possible that

1:17:37 the disasters or value chains transmit shocks,

1:17:41 they're also able to diffuse shocks.

1:17:43 Isn't

1:17:44 a global value chain itself.

1:17:47 An exercise in diversification,

1:17:50 even though,

1:17:51 you know,

1:17:51 the Leonti,

1:17:52 the interdependence makes you vulnerable to these oing kind of

1:17:57 problems,

1:17:59 should we not see that as a positive side of global value chains?

1:18:05 Um,

1:18:11 Right.

1:18:12 So,

1:18:14 Let me give you an experience of.

1:18:17 Of an automaker in Japan.

1:18:20 Uh,

1:18:21 so they turned out that after a few days,

1:18:23 they realized

1:18:25 they didn't have a pigment to paint the car,

1:18:27 to,

1:18:27 to form the paint to paint the car.

1:18:30 And that's a relation to specific investment because the automaker makes

1:18:34 um

1:18:37 Guarantees to the final consumer

1:18:39 on,

1:18:40 you know,

1:18:41 10 years,

1:18:42 or we'll paint the car for free for you,

1:18:44 that there will be no rust.

1:18:45 And

1:18:47 again,

1:18:47 it goes according to spec of what is the color,

1:18:50 exact color that the consumer asked for.

1:18:53 Um,

1:18:56 That,

1:18:57 so switching was so costly in that sense,

1:18:59 and it was not that,

1:19:00 it was not their car point in the world,

1:19:02 is that,

1:19:02 that's a relation specific investment for the automaker.

1:19:05 That the automaker shut down his plant and send

1:19:08 his workers to rebuild the plant of the supplier.

1:19:13 Um

1:19:15 Now,

1:19:15 what that tells you is that switching costs are high,

1:19:18 and even if you

1:19:20 plan for them ex ante,

1:19:22 um,

1:19:22 you can have,

1:19:24 uh,

1:19:25 you,

1:19:25 you can destroy the value of relation-specific investment.

1:19:29 Remember,

1:19:29 what we think by relation-specific investment

1:19:32 is,

1:19:32 uh,

1:19:33 that I share,

1:19:35 there is some kind of private good.

1:19:37 That is that I cannot go just to the market on

1:19:39 eBay and find another supplier is I create value with you,

1:19:43 my supplier,

1:19:45 and we share the rent of that.

1:19:47 This uh the notion of bilateral monopoly over that.

1:19:51 When you destroy that bilateral monopoly,

1:19:53 say,

1:19:53 by diversifying,

1:19:54 say by maintaining multiple suppliers at the same time.

1:19:59 You destroy the incentives

1:20:00 that underlie these

1:20:02 relations and therefore you destroy value.

1:20:06 That's number.

1:20:07 So the other thing that you've talked about,

1:20:09 and this will follow all the way to

1:20:12 final consumers and costs.

1:20:14 That are probably passed through to the final.

1:20:18 Um,

1:20:20 The other thing you said is,

1:20:21 can they be um

1:20:23 Are we speaking too negatively as supply chains as

1:20:27 just a conductor of shocks rather than dissipator of shocks?

1:20:30 And of course you're right.

1:20:33 There is just kind of

1:20:34 the clean thinking there is

1:20:36 what is the counterfactual.

1:20:37 The counterfactual is

1:20:39 uh to have everything,

1:20:41 all my eggs in one basket and have all my production

1:20:45 in,

1:20:45 in my country.

1:20:47 Well,

1:20:47 that is,

1:20:48 first,

1:20:49 you're gonna lose

1:20:50 large efficiency gains

1:20:52 from comparative advantage reasons.

1:20:54 You're also gonna be

1:20:56 subjecting yourself to much more risk.

1:20:58 So it depends on what your counterfactual is.

1:21:00 Yes,

1:21:01 supply chain,

1:21:02 global supply chains pose transmission of risk,

1:21:05 but your counterfactual,

1:21:07 I would venture to say,

1:21:09 is more risk and more concentrated precisely for the reasons you.

1:21:13 Bye.

1:21:15 I,

1:21:15 I do think this dissipation is there and that's

1:21:18 one of the reasons apart from efficiency reasons,

1:21:20 the dissipation of of risk relative to

1:21:24 having all the production concentrated domestically and all your supply chains

1:21:28 that

1:21:28 that leads us where we are now.

1:21:32 Thank you,

1:21:32 Vasco.

1:21:33 Richard,

1:21:34 uh,

1:21:34 you were

1:21:36 relatively sanguine about what might happen to global value chains,

1:21:40 but here's a question from

1:21:42 Roberto E Chandi.

1:21:43 Who says

1:21:44 that discussions on vulnerability of GVCs may suggest that,

1:21:50 you know,

1:21:51 the

1:21:51 private sector is not sufficiently sensitive

1:21:54 and it may justify protectionist policies

1:21:58 and at a time when developing countries had finally embraced trade

1:22:02 and benefited from GVCs,

1:22:04 what could we now be entering a slippery slope of

1:22:10 protectionism.

1:22:11 And a related question from

1:22:16 Someone else

1:22:17 is that

1:22:18 given that

1:22:20 countries are simplifying

1:22:23 their,

1:22:23 I think it's key,

1:22:27 their documentation and various things to help their traders,

1:22:31 could this be a time where we can actually,

1:22:34 you know,

1:22:36 aim for greater harmonization or simplification

1:22:39 and trade facilitation.

1:22:43 Good.

1:22:43 So,

1:22:43 let,

1:22:44 let me address those one at a time.

1:22:46 So,

1:22:46 I don't think we're heading towards an increase in protectionism here.

1:22:50 And I think uh Simon's chart showed that actually,

1:22:54 even the Trump administration is liberalizing tariffs because they realize

1:22:58 there are pluses to uh imports,

1:23:00 not just minuses to imports.

1:23:03 And what it is,

1:23:04 is we're worried about uh the slippery slope to

1:23:07 export protectionism.

1:23:09 So let,

1:23:09 let me just take that in,

1:23:11 in,

1:23:11 um,

1:23:11 in,

1:23:12 in two bits.

1:23:13 So one,

1:23:14 when the GAATT was set up and when the

1:23:18 European Union was set up.

1:23:20 Wartime

1:23:21 embargoes and shortages were front of mind of the people who wrote these documents.

1:23:25 So all this kind of export restrictions are legal

1:23:29 on purpose,

1:23:30 but it was never really an issue

1:23:32 in the in the post-war world because supply was never a constraint.

1:23:36 All you needed was demand,

1:23:38 so it was all about restraining people from protectionism,

1:23:42 not from export restraints.

1:23:44 So I suspect we may see a greater realization.

1:23:46 That we also need to coordinate on restraining export restraints as well,

1:23:51 especially in food,

1:23:52 and we've seen this movie when it comes to food before.

1:23:54 There's,

1:23:55 there's nothing new about export restrictions

1:23:57 tumbling out of control on food.

1:23:58 It happened in

1:23:59 2006,

1:24:00 2007,

1:24:01 or

1:24:02 2007,

1:24:02 2008,

1:24:03 I think was the last time it happened.

1:24:05 So maybe we'll have more um

1:24:08 liberalization on that.

1:24:09 In terms of the second question about the harmonization,

1:24:12 we have seen some incredible things where it's,

1:24:15 it's difficult for countries to import

1:24:17 masks that are made to a Chinese standard,

1:24:19 even though they're basically the same as an American standard,

1:24:22 but the American standard was put in there more or less as a protectionist device.

1:24:26 So,

1:24:26 this may again be one of these realizations that,

1:24:29 that it is a moment where we can reflect.

1:24:32 But I,

1:24:32 I would again say,

1:24:33 I think most of this reflection

1:24:35 is being spun out too generally.

1:24:36 So this is in

1:24:38 medical equipment and a few things which are

1:24:40 actually,

1:24:41 uh,

1:24:42 I think the total is 7% of world trade is in these things.

1:24:45 And the vast majority of all these lessons we're learning.

1:24:47 are not going to go on

1:24:49 to the big volume trade things

1:24:50 because there hasn't been a change.

1:24:52 But let me come back to something you asked before about stockholding.

1:24:56 And so in Switzerland,

1:24:57 we're very vulnerable to imported food,

1:25:00 imported medical,

1:25:01 imported all sorts of things.

1:25:03 And so the Swiss government mandates stockholding

1:25:06 that's done in cooperation

1:25:08 with the private sector and subsidized,

1:25:10 and that's the way we deal with the supply shocks.

1:25:13 And I think many countries in terms of food,

1:25:16 where this is realized,

1:25:17 have food stocks.

1:25:18 So I think one of the solutions instead of trying to bring all the production home,

1:25:22 you just have a buffer stock

1:25:24 and you cooperate with that and may have to subsidize that,

1:25:27 but I think that's a better solution.

1:25:28 And I think in the end,

1:25:29 when we're done with this,

1:25:31 people will say that these global value chains were actually a savior,

1:25:35 because,

1:25:35 for example,

1:25:36 China can now make masks when they couldn't before

1:25:38 and uh when the US industry is getting shut down,

1:25:41 they can import masks and tests and things like that.

1:25:44 So,

1:25:45 at the end of this whole story,

1:25:46 which is going to go on for another couple of years,

1:25:48 I think trade will be viewed as a massive insurance policy,

1:25:51 not as a source of,

1:25:52 of uh contagion.

1:25:56 Thank you,

1:25:57 Richard.

1:25:58 Simon,

1:25:59 a question for you.

1:26:01 Have you seen any evidence on how these different measures that you described,

1:26:06 both the export

1:26:09 promotion measures or import restriction measures,

1:26:12 are having an effect on actual trade patterns

1:26:15 or on global value chains?

1:26:19 Right,

1:26:19 so,

1:26:20 the,

1:26:20 the developments this year are just simply too,

1:26:22 um,

1:26:23 too fresh for us to have any

1:26:24 serious empirical work,

1:26:25 but as I said to you

1:26:27 earlier,

1:26:28 with respect to export restraints,

1:26:30 and we have a,

1:26:30 you know,

1:26:30 fantastic research which has been done on,

1:26:33 mainly on the agri-food sector.

1:26:35 which I think has a clear set of conclusions

1:26:38 about the counterproductive nature of these export restraints.

1:26:42 Whether that carries over to

1:26:44 medical goods we will see,

1:26:46 but I think the benchmark,

1:26:47 the starting point is

1:26:49 quite well established in the literature.

1:26:51 With respect to export promotion measures,

1:26:54 there is a growing literature

1:26:56 which uses quite sophisticated gravity equation work.

1:27:00 Which looks to see if export growth into

1:27:04 third markets is faster for countries

1:27:07 where the products have been

1:27:08 subsidized compared to other

1:27:10 non-subsidized

1:27:12 exports from other countries,

1:27:13 of course,

1:27:14 controlling for all other factors.

1:27:16 And we do find

1:27:17 indeed quite strong effects for

1:27:20 market share reallocation.

1:27:22 So I think

1:27:22 the finding is

1:27:24 that trade actually gets increased by

1:27:28 these export promotion measures,

1:27:29 but also gets redistributed

1:27:32 as well and reshuffled between

1:27:34 trading partners,

1:27:34 and of course this is where it becomes

1:27:36 both a trade policy and a resource misallocation

1:27:39 problem.

1:27:41 Let me just quickly summarize the last few questions that have come in.

1:27:45 One,

1:27:47 Could it be that the worst is behind us,

1:27:50 and now it's only a question of stimulating demand?

1:27:55 How does the oil price

1:27:57 decline figure in all your

1:28:00 um

1:28:00 assessments

1:28:02 and

1:28:04 Is there a chance

1:28:05 that China's early recovery

1:28:09 Is going to lead also to a

1:28:12 reassessment and a reconfiguration of value chains.

1:28:16 Now,

1:28:16 I'll leave it to each of you

1:28:18 to decide whether or which question to respond to,

1:28:22 uh,

1:28:23 but also please.

1:28:24 Take a minute to sum up and conclude

1:28:27 and what has been the most illuminating discussion.

1:28:32 So why don't we go

1:28:34 in the order of Simon,

1:28:35 you go first and then Bhaskar stays second and Richard concludes.

1:28:40 Thank you and thanks for organizing

1:28:43 this particular session.

1:28:44 Let me just address the question,

1:28:46 is the worst over?

1:28:47 I strongly doubt it.

1:28:49 I think

1:28:49 even if one does not believe that there will be

1:28:52 substantial across the board tariff increases,

1:28:54 I do think

1:28:55 we will have to watch very carefully

1:28:58 whether the

1:28:59 measures which governments are using to subsidize firms

1:29:02 go beyond just traditional liquidity support

1:29:05 into.

1:29:06 Something a little bit more

1:29:07 sinister in terms of

1:29:09 either bailing out failing firms

1:29:11 or

1:29:12 firms which were failing before the pandemic that way,

1:29:15 or

1:29:17 attempts to try and

1:29:18 foster new industries or indeed to repatriate

1:29:21 supply chains.

1:29:22 We're already seeing some of that.

1:29:25 Perhaps the most prominent example is

1:29:27 the Japanese government putting a lot of money on the table

1:29:29 for Japanese firms to repatriate.

1:29:31 Our supply chains out of China,

1:29:34 uh,

1:29:34 and so we'll have to watch that carefully to see

1:29:36 if,

1:29:37 uh,

1:29:37 the trade distortions of the future

1:29:40 are going to be anything like the ones we've seen in the past.

1:29:43 Thank you.

1:29:48 Thank you,

1:29:49 Simon Bosco.

1:29:52 So

1:29:54 To,

1:29:55 to try to wrap up,

1:29:56 um,

1:29:59 I think there was a question there regarding is the

1:30:02 worst over and are we gonna go out of this.

1:30:05 I think it's a little bit,

1:30:06 uh,

1:30:07 related to the,

1:30:08 your your own initial question of what is the nature of this shock and uh.

1:30:13 Mm

1:30:14 What is awaiting us both now versus the future,

1:30:17 right?

1:30:18 Um,

1:30:19 so I,

1:30:20 it's just a set of,

1:30:21 of,

1:30:22 of factors.

1:30:23 One is

1:30:24 related to the length of the shock and,

1:30:26 and how do we expect,

1:30:27 and I think that will play a role in the sense

1:30:30 that as Richard said early on,

1:30:32 there was not a productive capacity was not affected.

1:30:36 There was no fundamental reason why we should

1:30:39 uh rewire global value chains or domestic chains.

1:30:43 Um,

1:30:44 As

1:30:46 the

1:30:47 The recession lengthened in time,

1:30:50 when you start factoring in um inefficient exit.

1:30:54 We,

1:30:55 you know,

1:30:55 and and have this piles up over time,

1:30:57 there may be larger effects in the sense of

1:31:00 um

1:31:02 You know,

1:31:03 the macro effects

1:31:04 done by inefficient liquidation of large parts of the productive,

1:31:08 productive,

1:31:08 uh,

1:31:09 side of the economy.

1:31:10 And if we go along that scenario,

1:31:13 um,

1:31:14 and there may be very large effects on,

1:31:16 on,

1:31:16 on,

1:31:16 on trade and,

1:31:17 and,

1:31:17 and longer lasting.

1:31:19 Um,

1:31:21 so I think that,

1:31:21 that's kind of,

1:31:22 it shines a light on the,

1:31:23 the,

1:31:23 the,

1:31:24 the need for,

1:31:25 uh,

1:31:25 you know,

1:31:25 all of these national power uh

1:31:27 policies of liquidity and some,

1:31:30 some sort of,

1:31:30 of buy.

1:31:32 Um,

1:31:33 reassurance of of kind of reassurance of the production side maintained.

1:31:37 Um

1:31:39 There's really a trade-off between what is,

1:31:42 uh,

1:31:42 protectionism versus what is

1:31:45 protecting inefficient liquidation on a massive scale if this continues going on.

1:31:49 Second point is,

1:31:50 you know,

1:31:51 what is the effect generally on,

1:31:53 if,

1:31:54 if there is,

1:31:55 what I try to say is

1:31:57 there may be

1:31:59 uh

1:31:59 costly manners of robustifying a little bit,

1:32:03 be it

1:32:04 Uh,

1:32:04 and,

1:32:04 and I've kind of covered a few ways.

1:32:06 Richard has just said,

1:32:07 stockpiling in key areas would be another one.

1:32:09 I believe all of these are costly,

1:32:11 but I believe all of these are costly at the margin.

1:32:14 So they are,

1:32:15 they,

1:32:15 they will,

1:32:16 you know,

1:32:17 at worst,

1:32:18 diversity a variety will go down a little bit or costs will go up a bit.

1:32:24 Given

1:32:25 large benefits of global trade,

1:32:27 what you,

1:32:28 what economics,

1:32:29 what,

1:32:29 uh,

1:32:29 you know,

1:32:29 the last 20 years looking at Virginia firms would say is

1:32:34 it is

1:32:35 the,

1:32:35 the firms at the threshold of participating that we will see disappearing.

1:32:39 But as we know,

1:32:40 these firms,

1:32:41 the bulk of global trade is accounted by very large firms.

1:32:46 To the extent that the,

1:32:47 the surplus that those are generating

1:32:50 is only,

1:32:51 only somewhat affected by any robust,

1:32:55 there,

1:32:55 there is a path that is feasible in the sense of robustifying the system

1:33:00 without

1:33:01 large,

1:33:02 uh,

1:33:03 large costs and large disruption in global value chain.

1:33:06 And the final point that is a little bit too far away from here is,

1:33:10 of course,

1:33:10 this all depends on political economy.

1:33:13 So,

1:33:15 The way we manage this as societies and as citizens and,

1:33:18 uh,

1:33:18 and politicians,

1:33:20 um,

1:33:22 you know,

1:33:22 turns to protectionism,

1:33:23 turns to disintegration,

1:33:25 uh,

1:33:26 may,

1:33:26 may be on the cards,

1:33:28 but that is less,

1:33:29 and it's,

1:33:29 um,

1:33:30 so I think there's a lot about how,

1:33:32 uh,

1:33:34 Rather than just thinking about it as strict demand or supply side policies,

1:33:38 but as policies that

1:33:40 try to uh keep

1:33:42 Negative political economy developments from,

1:33:45 from,

1:33:46 from,

1:33:47 from gaining foothold,

1:33:49 which would indeed send the system into very nonlinear

1:33:52 dynamics where crisis can happen and disintegration can happen.

1:33:58 Thank you,

1:33:59 Vaskar Richard,

1:34:00 final minute.

1:34:02 OK,

1:34:02 let,

1:34:03 let me just uh talk a little bit about the oil,

1:34:05 uh,

1:34:06 and this wraps back also into your question about trade and services.

1:34:10 So the oil price normally would be a stimulus to

1:34:13 having bigger

1:34:15 global value chains and,

1:34:16 and,

1:34:16 uh,

1:34:17 and getting things getting cheaper.

1:34:18 But as um uh an e-book that Simon Evannett and I are editing on,

1:34:23 on export restrictions that'll come out on Monday or Tuesday next week.

1:34:27 We have a couple

1:34:29 chapters on

1:34:30 sea transportation and air cargo,

1:34:33 and it turns out that both of those have been heavily disrupted by

1:34:37 the COVID restrictions directly.

1:34:39 So the price of oil isn't what's holding up

1:34:42 or hindering global value chains from moving.

1:34:44 It's actually direct

1:34:46 disruptions to sea transportation

1:34:48 and air cargo.

1:34:50 So let me go

1:34:51 to my,

1:34:52 the wrap up point.

1:34:53 The,

1:34:53 the thing I would say is this movie is not even near the end.

1:34:56 We don't even know what this movie is really about yet,

1:34:59 and the lessons that people are trying to draw from the early,

1:35:02 early stages

1:35:03 of this,

1:35:03 I think,

1:35:04 are slippery,

1:35:06 and not very

1:35:07 useful.

1:35:08 So

1:35:09 at the end,

1:35:09 I think people will be very happy that they had access

1:35:13 to the manufacturing sectors of other countries and the food producing countries,

1:35:17 sectors of other countries.

1:35:19 And,

1:35:19 and really at the end of this,

1:35:20 what we may come out of it is that we may want to all agree.

1:35:24 Not to restrict things

1:35:25 except in disciplined ways.

1:35:27 So we may end up with rounds of limiting export restriction,

1:35:31 and that's sort of

1:35:32 a longer thing,

1:35:33 the longer takeaway is that

1:35:35 cascading

1:35:36 or spirals of export restrictions are as

1:35:39 dangerous as cascading or spiraling protectionism,

1:35:42 and therefore we need international negotiations to do that.

1:35:46 Now,

1:35:46 of course,

1:35:46 all that requires the administration in the United States to change,

1:35:49 so.

1:35:50 Um,

1:35:51 it,

1:35:51 it,

1:35:51 it will depend for what happens in November,

1:35:54 but if

1:35:55 the administration changes,

1:35:57 I think there is a real chance

1:35:59 that

1:35:59 we will have a moment of cooperation to reshape

1:36:02 things,

1:36:03 to remove some of the tariffs that were put up and remove some of the restrictions

1:36:07 in a kind of a big talk.

1:36:08 Maybe you could call it the Biden round or something,

1:36:11 in which case,

1:36:12 discussing export restrictions could be part of it.

1:36:14 So I'll,

1:36:15 I'll just stop there.

1:36:18 Thank you very much,

1:36:19 Richard,

1:36:20 Simon,

1:36:20 Vasco for a

1:36:22 deeply insightful and richly stimulating discussion.

1:36:26 Thank you.

1:36:26 Bye-bye.

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transcript
Good morning, everybody. Welcome to this seminar organized by the Development Economics Research Group on uh Global value chains and trade in the age of COVID-19. As you all know, since the early 1990s, we have seen remarkable improvements in transport, information and communication technology which, together with greater openness to trade and investment, have led to the progressive deepening of integration in the global economy. As production has fragmented across national boundaries, we have seen also deepening input-output relationships between countries, and that has meant that the destinies of nations are increasingly intertwined, uh, which is a grand way of saying that GDP is increasingly correlated. But this period of hyperglobalization. Received the first big shock with the Great Recession in 2008 and 2009, and then we entered this period of what has been referred to as a great flattening where trade as a share of GDP stopped growing. And Where global value chains stopped their expansion. Even as we were struggling to recover from that great recession, a period of trade tensions and increasing mutual protection between the United States and China generated further uncertainty, which also had a chilling effect on trade and global value chains. Now we see a third shock, perhaps the most serious shock, an unusual shock. It's a shock to both demand. Because people cannot spend. And to supply because it's hard for people to work. And it's affecting not one country, like for example, the Japanese tsunami or the American mortgage crisis, but it's almost at the same time affecting many countries, as Daria Tagleoni has shown that some of the most important nodes in the global economy, as she calculated some time ago that 17 countries which had seen the largest number of cases accounted for more than 70% of global trade. And finally, because it's an unusually uncertain shock both in depth and duration. Therefore, it's also turning into a financial shock. So how these developments interact in the age of flattening global value chains will be discussed today by 3 luminaries in the field. First, we begin with Richard. Baldwin, who has really shaped our thinking in this whole area, Richard is professor of international economics at the Graduate Institute. He's been the editor in chief of VoxEU since June 2007. I could say many things about his multiple accomplishments, but let me focus on his 2016 book The Great Convergence Information Technology and the New Globalization. Lawrence Summers called it one of the 5 most important books on globalization ever. And his more recent book, The Globotics Upheaval, is been published in 2019 and has been almost as influential in helping us think about what's happening, so I was tempted to use Richard's original title of his Vox EU column, which has many medical metaphors. It was called Supply Chain Contagion Waves. Manufacturing contagion and reinfection from the COVID concussion, but he has chosen today a less dramatic title which is Thinking Ahead on COVID-19 and GVCs. So Richard, why don't we begin with you, and I'll introduce the other speakers after you finish. Richard, you're muted. It's a pleasure to be here with all of you. What I want to do in the next 15 minutes is run through a few points, um, not so much to inform you as to sort of inspire thinking and discussion about what's going on. I think there are big implications of COVID for global value chains, but I think a lot of people are, are misthinking them and, uh, missing a few points. So, let me just get started with What I'm hoping to do today. So, the, if I can get this. There we go. The outline of the talk is I'm gonna have 3 parts. The first is the nature and the duration of the shock. Now, this is gonna involve talking a little bit about medical things, but one of the first aspects of misthinking, which I think is systemic is People not realizing how long and how deep and how how uncoordinated this shock is going to be. And the second part is why this shock is so different from the 2008, 2009 1. And then the last, I'm going to talk about the supply contagion and re-contagion. And if I have time, I'll say a few words about whether there's going to be long-term damage to global value chains or not. So, let me just start getting into the medical imperative. So, we've all heard that we have to flatten the epi curve or the epidemiological curve. Um, and let me just go through that because I think it's important to understanding the length and the nature of this thing. So, what this blue curve here is the number of new cases, uh, and when it, and this is uh on the horizontal axis week, so the, the vertical axis is the number of people. And in the beginning, it doesn't look like very much. That's the discovery and initiation phase, but then we go into the acceleration phase where people are getting other people sick who are getting other people sick, and the number of new cases can double every 2 or 3 days. So it tends to overwhelm government's ability to think ahead or plan because by the time they form the committee, it's already doubled or tripled or quadrupled what it was before. But um, as the number of people getting the new infection ramps up, with about a 2-week lag, the number of people who are recovering is also ramping up. And I'll, we'll, we'll follow that for a second. We'll, we'll show that, that that actually has a, a big implication. But the point about this is, these are the new infections, and one of the interesting things, one of the important things about this disease is that although it's explosively contagious, it's not very deadly. So the number of hospitalizations coming from these new cases is about 11/10 or 15% of what they are. But each one of these new hospital admissions stays in there for 2 weeks or 3 weeks sometimes. So the cumulative number of people in the hospital climbs much higher than the than the number of hospitalizations, and it peaks a little bit later. So if the number of hospitalizations overwhelms the hospital capacity, we get this overload and excess deaths. In fact, it can be quite traumatic, the things you've seen going on in Italy and in New York and in Spain. What went on in Wuhan, these are things that really make people very, very upset, and governments take extreme measures to avoid this kind of overwhelming things. So that's essentially where the imperative comes, because more people will die than is necessary, and the way they die is very traumatic, and people are, are view it as absolute imperative not to, not to do that. So, avoiding this yellow is not a balancing between GDP and jobs or dollars and debts, it's an imperative. Now, what I want to talk about is, uh, next, how this is connected with the economic shock, the recession, which then hits GDPs. So, if you take this yellow, this red curve as what the epidemiological curve would look like without containment policies, in order to avoid that overloading, we have containment policies, lockdowns and things like that, that flatten and spread out the the epi curve. Now, those containment policies also make the recession, which would be rather short and not too, not too deep if it, if there were no containment policies. It makes the recession much deeper. And in rich countries, at least, governments use economic policy to flatten the recession curve by spending truly historic sums of money to try and protect the economy and also to share income and redistribute the cost a little bit. So that's how we have these containment policies are a medical imperative, and at least in rich countries, they're using the economic policy to counter them. But it's worthwhile saying that the Economic recession is really a health, a health measure. Now, the containment policies are inducing a rather unusual recession. Most recessions are just a lack of spending, and central banks or governments can undo the recession by stimulating spending, but this containment policy is hitting the supply side and hitting the The supply chains and the financial sector, all of this all at the same time, and it's done on purpose, so it's difficult to just fix one bit or another bit. It's shutting it down quite systematically. So as a consequence, this recession is Complex supply shock and a demand shock all at the same time. Moreover, it's happening at different times in different countries around the world. And because they're linked by global value chains and also just regular trade, the shock is being transmitted internationally. So the next thing I want to talk about is how long will the shock last? Are we talking about a couple of quarters, as it seems like many of the investment banks and some of the international organizations are projecting that, that the second half of this year will all be positive and will start to come back, or are we talking about a couple of years? And my opinion is I think people are way underestimating how long this shock is going to last. And I want to convince you that by looking at a little bit of epidemiology. And we've all had to become a little bit uh epidemiologists, uh, in, in, in the, uh, the last couple of months. The good thing is epidemiologists have had to learn a little bit of economics as well, so. So, the model that, that, this is a, this is like the supply and demand model of epidemiology. It's called the SIR model. So, I for infectious, S for susceptible. I, I made a mistake, that should be an S, and R for recovered, that's where the model name comes from, SIR. Now, here's how it works. You divide the population into three bins, infectious people, susceptible people, and recovered. People who are infected can give it. People who are susceptible can get it, and people who are recovered are immune. Now, the new cases is what we were talking about before, that's the epidemiological. This is the explosive contagion in the first place, and then there's a deceleration, and there's a steady stream of people who are recovering, going from infectious to recovered. Now, uh, when you want to look at the dynamics of that whole thing, It's useful to first of all point out that this is exactly what China, China did. They went through the, this is the daily cases. This is the epi curve. They went through the accelerating phase, the decelerating phase, and now they seem to have at least put it to bed, although they're getting a second wave. We'll talk about that. But to think about how long this is gonna last, I, I did some illus illustrative dynamics, so don't take any of this serious. I'm not an epidemiologist, and lots of people are doing real simulations. I just want to illustrate the dynamics so we can get our mind around how like, likely, how long this thing is likely to happen. So this is when there is no reduction in the, um, in the containment policies or anything. So this orange thing, the num, the stock of infected people rises very quickly at peak, and then it comes down. And what that's consisting of is this red curve, which is the new cases. So that's the epi curve over here, it looks like that. And the green is the recovered cases, which looks a lot like the new cases, but just delayed because of the recovery. Now, when the recover number of new cases equal the number of recovered, that's when we're at the peak, and once we get past the peak, we can start to get better. And what the black curve is showing is the number of people who've had it, and that starts rising and then it sort of levels off as the stock comes down. OK. So, what I'd like to do is put some orders of magnitude on this to argue this is way far from over. So I'm just gonna do some simple math with this model. Beta is the number of infectious contacts per period per infected person. So that's a, a, a medical kind of parameter, but it's also connected with, or can be influenced by social distancing. So the number of new cases is this beta parameter times the number of people who are infected times the fraction of the people they meet that are susceptible. So if, if half the population has it, so n is not the size of the population, s is the number of people susceptible, so if this ratio is 15, then only half of those contacts by infectious people will actually lead to new infections. The new recover, recoveries is even easier. It's just gamma, which is a recovery rate, which is medically given, times i. So the top of the infection is when the new cases equal the new recoveries, and if you just cancel out the i, you get this extremely simple formula that the fraction of the population who has not had it, that, that are still susceptible is gamma over beta. Now, gamma over beta is equal to 1 over R0, and R0 is this very famous statistic that gets estimated all over the time. And the estimates for COVID is that R0 is between 2 and 3. So that means when R0 is not modified by containment policies, something like between half and a third of the people will not get it, and everybody else will get it. Now, in, we don't know exactly how many people have got it, but it's at least an order of magnitude less than would need to be before this thing goes into herd immunity and getting rid of it. Now, the point of that is it, a couple of points. One, if you reduce beta by 50%, let's say through containment policies or mask or whatever you do, then you're going to double the number of people who do not get it, so you save a huge number of lives. But as soon as you let beta go back up to where it was before by relaxing containment policies, this dynamic will come again. So there almost surely will be 2nd and 3rd waves. As we start to relax the restraints, we will get more and more waves, and they're also, importantly for global value chains, they're not synchronized across the world. OK. So, now what I want to do is argue that this is different. So that in 2008, 2009, it was sudden, severe, and synchronized, but it was basically all coming from the demand side. So, apart from the United States, the UK and a few other very, very clever countries who got into this financial engineering, most countries in the world had nothing to do with the subprime crisis. So their financial sector was not directly hit by this. For most of the world, it was a great big demand shock which led to a great big trade collapse, and all the global value chains shut down at the same time. So the global value chain contagion wasn't really that important. During the 2009, because everybody shut down at the same time and people started coming back up more or less at the same time. And in any case, the supply chains weren't damaged. What happened was there was just a lack of aggregate demand. And once the demand was restored, we were good to go. This time, as Addita mentioned that Daria has calculated, it hit all the biggest traders and manufacturers within 2 months, more or less simultaneously, but on the supply side and the demand side, so there was, uh, there has been some damage in terms of bankruptcy, but in any case, the supply chain was directly shut down either by transportation limitations or by lockdowns of factories. The 2nd, the 3rd point is that global value chain integration is much bigger than it was back then. And here you can see a slide that I put together. This is from a, a Vox column that I posted a few weeks ago and was calculation by Rebecca Friedman. So the exposure, what this shows is a higher exposure to inputs. Now, what this table does, it shows the total exposure of the row nation's manufacturing to the column nation's manufacturing inputs in 2015. So you can see the inputs from the US, from Germany, and for China are are important for basically everybody, and Japan and Korea are also basically important for everybody. And countries, their sus susceptibility to the inputs from other countries um are shown here and you can see there's a regionalization of these. This is factory North America, this is factory Europe, and this is factory Asia, but Asia is important for everybody and so is Germany. So the idea here is if factory China shuts down, for example, Mexico is Mexico's value of manufacturing is heavily dependent upon China. So when China's shut down, that's going to affect Mexico. And when Mexico shuts down, that's going to affect the United States because the United States is, is reliant on Mexico for the, this is 1.6. So, you get these echoes going through, and these numbers are larger than they were before. So, it, it's, it's a, it's um a different crisis and it's uh gonna affect through global value chains, uh, more importantly. So the, the last point I want to talk about is this contagion. So, I'm just going to take the example of the United States and uh the US and those two countries, uh, manufacturing sectors are, are pretty integrated. So, when, when China shut down, that impacted manufacturing in the United States and China also um was a source of the contagion to the United States. And now, China's getting better, so their manufacturing sector is back on its feet, but the US is experiencing a huge outbreak of COVID and therefore, its manufacturing is shutting down either because of plant closures or difficult of transportation. Turns out there's a lot of air transportation and sea transportation problems. So the supply chain problems that China is now facing is in part because of their supply chain dependence on the United States and the US and other people are reinfecting China. So the idea is that this contagion and reinfection could continue for quite a while as long as we don't have a vaccine or we don't acquire herd immunity. So, um, I don't know how am I doing on time, Adita? Do, should I, I have a couple more slides I don't want to talk about the future, or should I just stop here? I think, I think I started, uh, Richard, I don't you take another minute because that's gonna be interesting to hear about how you see things evolving. OK. So, um, my argument is that the, the value chains are not gonna be affected, and I think there's a great deal of wooly and wishful thinking. And instead, we should think about sources of hysteresis. So there's all sorts of people who said, oh my goodness, we can't rely again on X, Y, and Z country. We should have it all at home. First of all, that's just wrong because you should be diversifying risk, not concentrating it. But the second is, did anything really change? When the European people and the European Commission or the European Council say we should think about not being so reliant on China, well, unless they actually changed anything, it's going to go back. Because you need a permanent change in global value chain that will require government subsidies, government-mandated stockpiles, diversification, or massive tariffs on inputs and final goods to move anything. So, I'm quite willing to accept that when it comes to medical equipment, we'll see some changes. But are people really going to be willing to pay 10, 20% more for their cars, 50% or 100% more for their electronics, for all sorts of gadgets that are made around the world? Are they going to do that on the abstract possibility that something's going to happen in the future? Because after all, the Global value chain allocation, what we actually have now is really balancing reward cost savings against risk. It's just a portfolio problem. And unless something moves this indifference curve, which is set by private firms interested in a profit this quarter or something moves the risk reward frontier. We're gonna go back as soon as the shock passes to the way it was before. So, I think a lot of the discussion about this is finally the time we're gonna unwind global value chains, I think that's wishful and wooly thinking. So I'll stop right there. Thank you very much. Thank you, Richard, for that excellent introduction. Um, after Richard, we have, uh, Vasco Carvalho. He's a professor of economics at the University of Cambridge, professor of macroeconomics, and also the senior Keynes Fellow in Cambridge. Again, he has done a lot to shape our understanding of how production networks affect macroeconomic propagation. He was awarded the 2014 Wiley Prize in Economics by the British Academy for achievement in research by an outstanding early career economist. He's the principal investigator of the European Research Council grant Macronets Production Networks in Macroeconomics. And also a recipient of the Lehoon Prize Fellowship. Um, Vasko did not share with me, as far as I know, his presentation, but he did remarkable work helping us to understand how the Great East Japan earthquake. Propagated through Japan. And how input output linkages were a mechanism for the propagation and amplification of that shock, but I see Vasco is going to make a more general presentation which will nicely complement Richard's introduction. And international shock propagation. Vasco's past work that I'm familiar with looked at shock propagation within countries. So I'm going to assume that this will continue in the same way unless Vasco has internationalized his analysis. Vasco, over to you. Thank you very much, Richard. Thank you for the invitation. This certainly beats uh teaching fractions to my kids, which is what I'm otherwise doing. Um. So, yes, that's what the first thing I was going to say is that you will not see international trade or global in my slides. Um, I do think The thing I would like to do is to just take a step back and and notice that Um, in economics, the role of supply chain linkages as a source of risk and as a source of synchronization is almost as old a dis discipline. I'm not even gonna go back to Quesna and the Tau Economique, um, but it's been there. The first general equilibrium model by von Neumann is a multi-sector model by, by, by the liberation of the author. The beginning of growth theory is a multi-sector models. The beginning of modern business cycle theory with real business cycles is multi-sector. And of course there's Leon TF writing much more beautifully than anyone writes now. reminding us back in the 30s and 40s how laymen and professional economists and practical planners are all equally aware of the existence of some kind of interconnection between even the remotest parts of the national economy. And he goes on to say that the presence of this invisible but nevertheless very real ties can be observed in the synchronization of say, demand in New York City and how that translates into groceries in Detroit or mines in Pennsylvania to textile mills in New England. And then reassert itself over the business cycle, right? And so this is a very There's nothing new here. There is an increasing policy awareness. So my understanding is that a national strategy for the US is a step just below a national agency. The US has a national strategy. Uh, for global supply chain security, acknowledging again the disruption to supply chains as a source of global economic risk, right, be it by natural disasters, be it by criminals targeting the system. Um, and of course, as Leontiev told us, uh, these supply chain risk aspects tend to reassert themselves with relentless regularity. So this is just a cut from the Financial Times a month ago or so. Uh, which was exactly what Richard was saying about the, the The first from economic contagion from China early on in this process. So having set the stage, I was kind of asked to do two things. I want, I was asked to review a little bit evidence on that the supply chain, uh, linkages do propagate risk across uh otherwise largely independent units. Uh, and then I was asked to do some kind of, um, material for discussion. So let's try to do both. Uh, uh, I'll start with, um, The review of paper on the Great East Japan earthquake. I want to name my co-authors here, which is Makoto Niere, Yukiko Saito in Japan, and then Alireza Taba Sale in northwestern. Um, and kind of There's the the starting point for this paper was there was lots and lots of evidence out there about how supply chains may be a source of macro risk, and they're assumed so by policymakers, but there's very little systematic evidence. From the point of view of kind of causal strictures that we impose ourselves, we're talking about two fundamental challenges. The first would be, can you identify a supply chain shock, an individual localized shock. Uh, that's number 1. And can you then, number 2, having had such shock or plausibly exogenous shock, can you trace the shock as it, as it spreads to the network? So we're going to look at data from Japan in 2011 and try to get some basic magnitude. And then depending on time, I'll I'll go for for a more general discussion of what we learned a little bit in Japan or the discussions within Japan at the time that are relevant more globally now. So if I can take you back uh nine years now, uh, in March 11, 2000, so, so basically 99 and 9 years and 10 days now. It was a triple disaster. There was a a very large earthquake off the Pacific northeast coast of Japan that started a tsunami which then ended up hitting a nuclear power plant in Fukusushima. Uh, what you have there is a graph of fatalities and essentially human loss in red and physical capital loss in green, and what you see is that, you know, despite being a horrible shock, it is relatively localized in Japan. It affected. It's northeast prefectures and in particular the seaside prefectures because of the The tsunami. So that we're going to exploit that as our first uh dictum that we needed, the exogenous large localized disruption. Um, just to remind you, you know, I'm gonna very briefly go over this. This is not the data that we'll be using, but just as a reminder of what happened in Japan then, there's very little high frequency data. This is one snippet of high frequency data that we can show to you, which is a year on year monthly production industry index by prefecture. And what you see in the red line is a 40% year on year decline of industrial production in the affected prefectures. And uh a relatively strong recovery throughout the months of the year that follows. And in a way, the question of this paper of this research is, uh, if we take a look at the blue line, that's the entire Japan industrial production and how it evolves throughout the year. And what we know is that the disaster area by simple national accounting by adding up is too small to account for a 50% decline of industrial production in Japan on impact and it, you know, recovered throughout the year. So we are going to try to source firm level data to see if this can come about, if the translating the red line to the blue line is an aggregate outcome. This can come about by supply chain propagation of this disruptions. How are we going to do this? We're going to access a very large firm level database. So essentially we're going to look at which firms are behind this red line. What are the firms that are producing, not only in services, the database is very broad and covers the entire landscape of the economy very thoroughly. And then we're going to overlay this with 3 governmental decrees essentially establishing a disaster area, an emergency area following the earthquake, and we're going to take advantage of the fact that we know the address of the firms to geolocate them inside these disaster municipalities, which is a subunit of these prefectures that we use. Now, having said this, and you can see them again plotted against the northeast coast of Japan, these like little reddish dots are the ferns and their location. Having said that, we don't care about the disaster area in this paper or the fate of these firms. What we care about is the supply chain link through to these firms, and what you're seeing there is the same database as, which is something very valuable and still somewhat unusual for about a million firms in Japan. That's about 2/3 of all the firms in Japan. It has information of suppliers and customers of each firm on the identity, not the quantity of trade. So in the topmost graph, I am plotting again the disaster firms that we just identified previously in the graph. And then I have 4 degrees of separation over the production network or over the supply chain. So what are the reds, the second up, the 2nd graph. Uh coming from top to bottom. Those are all direct suppliers or direct customers of affected area firms. These are firms who are headquartered in away from the disaster prefectures, right? But to have direct input-output linkages either by being suppliers or customers to disaster area firms that we just. And then I can go on. I can ask, OK, who are the suppliers and customers of the red firms? So orange firms are firms that um are what we call network distance to or supply chain distance to from the disaster areas that they are not directly linked. They are not direct customers or suppliers, but they're either suppliers of the suppliers or customers of the customers of disaster areas. And then we go, uh, and, and we continue going, uh, for the network buffs out there, the diameter is 7, which means we'd run out of firms at distance 7. Uh, for the popular culture buffs, this is very much like the Kevin Bacon degrees of separation. The average distance is small. That is economically relevant because it means that within In between, somewhere in between the orange and the green ferns, you cover 50% of the firms in Japan. Which means modern supply chains are small worlds in their technical definition, meaning Uh, they are sparse in that most people, most firms are not trading directly with each other. But they are nevertheless indirectly very close. They are 2 or 3 links away from the disaster area. And this is nothing in particular that is special to this disaster area. This is a general feature of modern production networks in the data that we are that is coming online and we can see. Now, having that, what I want to do, the outcome of interest now is to understand what was the impact of being Uh, say, Of the earthquake on non-disaster firms, right, firms that were linked to disaster area only by their supply chain linkages, either directly, and then I would call that distance one, either upstream or downstream, or indirectly, which would be distance 23, and 4. So, what we're trying to do here is basically saying, Relative to our control group, and our control group here to be clear, is firms that are distance 5 and above from disaster area firms, firms that are very remote in a supply chain sense from the disaster area. The firms that were closer in the supply chain distance, um, either downstream or upstream, uh, uh, uh, can we see an impact on their, the level of their sales in the following year, and this is the yearly frequency. I'm just gonna now show you the main headline result at this kind of the micro reduced form. The, in the paper, you will find lots of robustness checks and and more discussion. But this would be the key outcome. So to read this graph, let's just focus on the blue bars, and the circles are the point estimates. And so this is saying that in the year following the earthquake, a firm that was a direct customer, Downstream One. Of, of, of disaster area firms, um, Declined its sales by 3.6% relative to firms that were distance 5 or above. What we can see is that then you can go for only indirect customers, so downstream 2 or customers of customers of customers, downstream 3, etc. and we see that this, um, there was significant propagation, indirect propagation going downstream all the way to firms being with 4 degrees away. Going downstream from Disaster River. On the right side of the graph, we also see that there was significant upstream propagation. So from disaster area firms to their suppliers, upstream one, they lost 3% following the earthquake. The supplier suppliers upstream too, they lost 2%. And so on and so forth. OK. What we're seeing here is a large, uh, spread, large contagion or cascading behavior of this localized supply chain disruption, with effects decaying with network distance as models imply. Uh, and very briefly, I'll note what, what the red dots tell you is that there is no evidence of pre-trend. So these firms did not differ already, uh, in their performance already, uh, previous to the earthquake. Again, the, the paper has a bunch of uh Of um robustness checks, I found interesting. But now I just want to take a step back from this very micro level impact, and the first thing I want to notice is for any of you that has looked at firm level data and firm level growth rates and the standard deviation of the firm level growth rate, even the largest of these numbers, 3.6% negative, is not very large. So it's not that the effects for individual firms are large. Rather, the effects may matter in the aggregate because it affects many firms. So, if you recall, I told you that about 50% of the firms in Japan are within two steps of the, of disaster area firms. And what we can see from the previous thing is that though there are again relatively small effects, right, you lost 2%, 3% at most. Um, the fact there are, you are shaving off 2% for 50% of the first. And that's what generates an aggregate shock, an aggregate movement, right. It's the fact that there is some propagation and the fact that the production network or the supply chain is wired in such a way. That everyone, if you hit a note at random, a production site at random, A lot of people are within a neighborhood of two supply chain linkages of the way, right? This small world aspect of supply chain. You could also do formal aggregation in GE rather than back of the envelope aggregation of the effects I told you, and what we're getting now, and we're just computing these as we speak, is that Japan lost about 0.5% of GDP that year due to the Earth. And that's not very large, but it's in line with empirical studies on the effects of disasters. It's a threefold magnification from the simple adding up, you know, traditional accounting adding up of, of, uh, say, the real value-added weight of this. And it's significant for Japan because you need to keep in mind that Japan's growth rate average growth rate for the last 20 years is 1%. OK Now having, so this kind of gives you that these effects are real, they matter, and they show up in aggregate. And they are arguably causal at a large scale of looking at a million firms, um, firms that are apparently very distant, both geographically in a sector manner, and even in supply chain distance still get affected. Now I want to just take you a little bit over the discussion that happened in Japan and, and, and mostly around business schools, much less in economics, after the Japan earthquake, and thinking about what our strategies to deal with. Uh, this kind of supply chain risk. Um, and, and this is my own summary. Um. But the way I see this, there, you know, at the firm level, I'm thinking first about private sector responses on recognizing supply chain risk, there was the obvious, the obvious first thing that came about was the lack of information. Even very large firms claim that they lost weeks understanding what to do with production because they didn't even know why their input supply stopped. Uh, their direct supplier was up and running. So they did not even know indirectly who are, who they linked, and this led to a number of programs led in particular by big firms in Japan of recursively imposing on suppliers. So if you want to be my supplier, you need to tell me who your suppliers are and the suppliers of the suppliers and the suppliers of the suppliers. Large automakers in Japan try to, try to get gather information on supply chain. The second that I think Richard already kind of briefly touched upon is diversification strategy. This is both of suppliers and about production sites, my own production sites, or demanding, for example, that my supplier, if I have one, has two distinct productions. This is to ensure short term substitution possibilities. And the other, um, which I think we have very little evidence whether it's gone on in practice or not, but there was a discussion certainly about this, is the standardization of components, in particular, you know, one reason why the supply chains are fragile is the myriad of um You know, customer demand spec of I want my headlights to have a shade of blue or a shade of pink, and I want the color of the car to be this and not that. And that um variety that is, we think is welfare enhancing, um, is, brings about complexity and generates over ring type problems where everything is ready to go, but the controller of the headlights is not available. And that that that leads to a little bit of less choice, less variety and standardization of components. And one reason why these lessons may have not been learned more globally and even without outside of Japan is that these are very costly, as I think Richard was already Pointing out information is costly and introduces a gap between large firms that can gather information and small firms that do not. Diversification is costly, in particular when you think about relation-specific investment. If I now have two suppliers for the same goods, there is much less investment in a particular relation, and it's costly to maintain all these relationships. And, and, and the last point is standardization or less variety. And either by direct higher cost or lower variety, what this means is if you want to build robustness. This comes at a cost. How large is this cost? It's not clear. The way I think about it in the first instance is firms who participation in the supply chain or in this case in the global supply chain. Um, the marginal firms are affected, firms that are basically, uh, You know, Close to breaking even if they face a larger cost, they will either not implement these changes or remove themselves from. Large firms it seems to be is uh what this presents for research, so this area of production networks has expanded enormously over the last 10 years, um. And has definitely put on the table the notion that there are systemic production firms or sectors. Narrowly defined production. Or actors Roscoe and systemic risk. Roscoe, another couple of minutes please. Thank you. Yes, I will, I'll finish in one slide. Um And, and And while it considers that it makes it very clear, it also considers that the supply chains are efficiently, efficient, and that there is no room for policy intervention. So friction on the environment is something that is just now being looked at seriously. The other thing that is not that there is not a lot of work on, although there is some great work on supply chain formation. But we understand how firms rewire after firms exit. Or how firms make these linkages to begin with, and microdata being a large bug. I'll finish Uh, for policymakers, right, in the situation where we are now, where we've identified clearly some key goods that we need to have them operational. We need ventilators, we need masks, we need tests, or here in the UK you also need flour. Apparently flour has disappeared. Now, this presents incredible challenges to policymakers, which is Uh, typically it's not because the ventilators cannot be done at the final producer. This is because somewhere in the supply chain there's a bottleneck that cannot be overcome in a very short run. This requires the policymakers to know in real time what are bottlenecks to the production of individual goods. And then we would require them to act, and it's not obvious again we've seen that we don't have great theoretical justification for how to ring fence what are deemed to be key supply chains or mandate diversification and capacity. So this presents lots of challenges for policymakers in the sense that information being one of them, most countries in the world do not have this supply chain data that allow them to trace which are the key firms to ensure the production of certain goods. Uh, we do not know, and when I talk to people exactly what we mean by ringfencing. Uh, and what we, we don't know the, the pernicious effect of though. And we don't have a great justification to enact policy measures that ring fence or ensure diversification or national champions as Richard. So, I'm happy to take further discussion in the Q&A. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, uh, Vasco. That was an excellent, careful, thoughtful presentation. Um, after Richard and Vasco, uh, who have talked about God-made shocks like disease and natural disasters, we will now turn to how these shocks are amplified by man-made shocks. In the form of trade restrictions. And for that we have Simon Enet, who's a professor of international trade and economic development. And MBA director at the University of St. Gallen. Simon has specialized in Understanding, monitoring, highlighting, protection. At the start of the global financial crisis, Simon created the Global Trade Alert Initiative, and this has become the leading independent conscience. of the world, and he has highlighted some of the most egregious measures taken by governments and perhaps Through shining his light on them has disciplined them. Simon, apart from his many other accomplishments, has been a staff member of the World Bank not once but twice, and he has been a friend for many of us for a long, long time. So Simon, over to you. Thank you. Uh, in light of, uh, what we've known about response to previous global economic shocks and of course the academic literature and the research literature which is being prepared now if I know how to use this technology, I'll try and move through the slides. Great. I'm gonna start by discussing. The uh uh changes that we have seen this year compared to previous years, uh, in the overall global stance now monitoring trade policies is at some level quite an unsatisfactory, um, uh, endeavor because there are. There are lots of ways that theory would tell us we would like to be able to assess policy stance, ideally in terms of some ad valorum equivalent or the amount of trade which is covered and the like, but much of the information we need to be able to make those types of meaningful calculations. Isn't available at the time when we, when we need to be able to assess what governments are doing. So what has tended to happen is that there have been essentially statistics based on counts of measures that governments have undertaken. Now we can all think of many reasons why those counts are potentially misleading. Wrong, and I will show you some export coverage data later, but this is the metric which is typically used by the international organizations and one which my team at Stallen has been using for 10 years now. So I should say in our work and reports we do try and report other measures too, but if you want to know what's happening right now, then I'm afraid you're stuck with counts. That's pretty much the only game in town. Well, this first slide that I have here on developments this year shows just how different this year has been compared to previous years. If you look back over the years 2009 to 2019 and you look at the measures which were put in place from 1 January to 17 April, you'll see that your traditional anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and other measures are are the largest share. They're typically half of shares, half of the measures which are found in the first few months of the year, and then subsidy trade distorting subsidies are the second largest grouping and then tariff increases. Now of course, there's variation across the years and you can imagine that this pie chart looked a little bit different during the trade war years. If you're looking at some type of average to benchmark this year against, then this is the starting point on the right hand side. On the left hand side, we have information on what governments have actually been doing this year, and you can see that the most prevalent form of trade policy intervention, which is harmful to foreign commercial interests are measures which relate to exports, in particular, measures which are restricting exports, about which I'll say more later. So we have a shift in the mix of trade distortions that we've observed. We can see also that there's a far greater number, proportionally of subsidies which have been introduced. These are subsidies to import competing firms, and we can see that contingent protection measures, which were the largest category in previous years, is now the 3rd largest category this year. So there does appear to be a trade policy shift which has occurred, and of course, one question we will want to look into over time and in research is whether that had meaningful effects. Now these summary statistics here are drawn from an initiative where we essentially monitor very carefully what is published on government websites around the world and systematically collect that information. If you're talking about the overall quantum of the number of Harmful measures introduced this year. It is below what it was last year. This year we've had 173 harmful measures which have been documented, which is below the 315 found last year, but still this year's numbers are relatively high compared to the 10 year average. So this is the first finding. Now if we can go to the next slide. Actually, if I could have some help getting to the next slide, I'm find finding this rather difficult, um. Ryan or Ale? Um, Ryan? Hi Simon, if you just, have you tried pressing a The director, the arrow key, did that do it? Uh, no. Or pressing down might also. Hold on. Neither of those. Neither of those works, so can I just ask you to? Sure, sure, I'm happy to. That's great. So if we can go to the next slide, I can try and catch up a little bit. Um, the next slide slips, looks at not the trade harm, the harmful measures which have been put in place, but the liberalizing measures, and hopefully Ryan will bring this up in a second. And here we have a different pattern which is worth noting. Normally between 2009 and 2019, by now we have seen about half of the measures which are introduced, liberalizing measures are tariff measures. About 45% of them, and this proportion has increased a lot, or at least somewhat I should say, and then we also tend to see another breakdown in terms of export related measures, normally the removal of export restraints, but the other big change if you compare. In 2020 with earlier years, is that we see far fewer FDI liberalizing measures this year, and this is actually consistent with the work that we've seen on the ground, where more governments, if anything, will be moving in a more restrictive way in terms of how they're treating foreign direct investment this year. So overall, then, what we have seen is on the harmful side we see more export related measures, and on the liberalizing side we see more tariff cuts and fewer FDI reforms. So this is the overall picture for this the particular year, looking globally across. All of the countries of the world. Now what I'd like to do, since the purpose is to focus a little bit on COVID-19, is to look at the developments inside the sector, which covers medical equipment, medical supplies and medicines, and if we could go to the next slide please, that would be great. Oh, I should have added him. Actually, uh, there's, uh, one other point I, I'm, now I can see I've missed the order here. Um, before we get to the, uh, export incentives and the export restrictions in medicines and the like, let me, um, Uh, just quickly say one other thing, um, although, uh, we earlier mentioned the export restrictions being prominent, if you're actually looking at trade affected, the biggest issues this year to date have actually been export incentives which have been offered by countries to their exporters, and so, uh, we have seen three such measures. Perhaps the largest such measure was one introduced by China on the 20th of March, which, where they offered higher export incentives through their. The tax system for products which were exported from that country and we can see that worldwide, the total estimate so far of the amount of trade affected by this year's trade distortions is just under $0.5 trillion and of that $3 trillion comes from the export incentives which the Chinese and others have offered. And so you can see that a large share of the trade distortions in terms of. Coverage are actually unrelated to the export restrictions, which I'll spend a bit more time looking on. Please be aware that the vertical axis on this chart is in log form. I've also put in place the share of trade which is affected by import tariffs, and these are the most salient forms of import restrictions, and you can see they pale in significance to the impact or sorry, the scale of export incentives. So then just to summarize the what the the the changes so far this year, we've seen lots of export restrictions but the uh policy which um which is probably affecting the most trade are actually export incentives. These export incentives, by the way, are typically very poorly documented by either the international organizations or in economic research. We now have more research on the VAT rebates done by China. There is a growing literature on this. But I should say that these are the principal form of trade distortion that we saw at the turn of the last global economic crisis and also it seems to be today as well. If we can move on to the next slide, please, then I'll turn now to the export curbs with respect to medical products, medical products and medicines. What we have found this year, and this has received, of course, a lot of attention, given the salience of the pandemic, is that over time more and more countries have imposed different types of Export curbs on medical products and medicines. At the moment we are counting that 76 nations have limited the exportation of different types of medical supply. Not all countries have done it the same way and they have not all covered the same degree of products, but we do see a spread over time in the measures which have been taken. And uh this uh spread has occurred from uh the source of the virus uh westward over time as we have seen, um, as, as the virus has spreads to the export constraints have spread. I should say that if you're thinking of a product like medical ventilators, then countries like Australia, Mexico, Canada and Japan are now pretty much the only suppliers which are available to send these important pieces of medical equipment to the rest of the world. All of the other suppliers have some type of export ban in place. So this is, I think, a highly salient topic. The literature, as we know, on export curbs is uniformly damning. A lot of the great work done on this was done on the export curbs associated with the agricultural sector and in particular with respect to the 2008 to 2010 commodity price spike. Much of it was done actually at the World Bank and by World Bank affiliates, and of course, what makes that research so much easier is that we have World prices or national market prices for these commodities. Most medical products, on the other hand, are so differentiated that I suspect we will not have the same, we will not have the same rich data sets to be able to do that type of research. We'll probably have more narrower focused research, but still, the work that has been done by Michele Rutte and colleagues has shown that the estimated impact on prices of these export curves can be significant. If we could move on to the next slide, please, I'd like to talk about something which has received a lot of attention as well, which are export curbs on food. These have begun to receive a lot of attention from policymakers and the press. I think it's important to point out, clearly this is a potentially important matter which needs to be tracked over time, but we are nowhere near the same degree of prevalence of export curbs in food that we have seen in medical products, really in terms of the major producers. There's only one which has curbed exports in a serious way, and that's Russia so far. This may change, of course, and we'll have to watch it carefully, but we do see a much more limited exportation curbs in this particular sector, and we have also seen tracking countries here that the political economy of these curbs are quite interesting. Interesting. A number of countries put in place curbs which are extremely aggressive, often bans, and then they face pressure from farmers and from internal forces within a government which end up causing the export measure to be relaxed. We've seen a bit of that going on in countries like Vietnam and Romania. So there's a very interesting political economy story unfolding there as well. So this is with respect to food. Yep, and let me just, uh, quickly, uh, move on to the next slide, and I think that's, uh, my takeaway slide, so I can wrap up. So what are the main takeaways? The first is we do see some differences between this year and previous years. The previous decade saw a much more traditional pattern of trade policy intervention with resort to subsidies and to contingent protectionism. This year we see a lot of subsidies, but we also see many more export restraints. It's unclear what will happen next, but if we do have a collapse in world trade, which has been forecast, then there will be concerns that this may lead to an unleashing of lots of protectionism, and we'll have to track that very carefully and see what format protectionism will take. When it comes to the impact on development sensitive areas, clearly the impact on medical supplies and food are a concern, but we see many more impacts and many more effects in the more interventions in the area of medical supplies and food at the moment. And the last point I would make is that whilst export restrictions get a lot of attention, Uh, from the media and the like, and they are very, very salient for good reasons, uh, often the most pervasive, uh, forms of protectionism or trade distortion are actually measures to increase exports, uh, which governments take, which amount to market share stealing or market share reallocation away from trading partners towards subsidized firms, and this is what we should be watching as well as this COVID pandemic unfolds. Thank you very much. Thank you, Simon, for that important and um careful presentation. Um, Before we open up for questions, I, uh, have been asked to take stock and make some, um, uh, observations. The 3 questions we could ask at this juncture. The first is how production interdependence leads to a transmission of shocks. And that's a question that Richard and Vasco addressed. The second question is how the shock that we are witnessing today is leading to a disruption of global value chains today. And the third question is how does the shock and the Policy response to the shock lead to a longer term reorganization of global value chains. I think in the discussion now it would be great to hear from all of you and from the speakers is how is this shock different, you know, as I said at the beginning, this is not like the Japanese tsunami, it's not like the American mortgage crisis. It is a shock that's virtually simultaneously affecting many different parts of the world. It's also unusual that it's not so much a shock that is disrupting manufacturing capacity. Some of the biggest changes we are seeing are in the Services sectors. So what does that mean when a large part of the economy, which is relatively less dependent on backward value chains, but perhaps more important in forward value chains? How should we think in terms of the nature of this shock as different and how do we expect it to be transmitted differently when we think of the disruption, how is it the types of stages of production that are being affected? Uh, you know, high density collective consumption, high density collective production, face to face interaction, how do we expect those also to lead to a disruption in global value chains? And then when we think about the longer term, I think Vasco very nicely set out the kind of issues, but there are, as he said, a tension between acquiring more information and the big benefits of delegation. The Tension between diversifying versus efficiency precisely because of relationship specific investments that these global value chains require and also a tension between the standardization which would make it easy for you to switch and the customization, which is increasingly a feature of these international production relations and I do think that even though Simon said it's not just export restrictions. The fact that we are seeing export restrictions, I think, could have a particularly pernicious effect, not just on global value chains, but on trade. Because they suggest that trade is not a reliable way of dealing with difficult circumstances. The whole idea that if in bad states of the world countries import export restrictions on food and medical supplies, then it does legitimize greater self-sufficiency even in good states of the world. So how should we think about that and especially When all our existing multilateral institutions, even in their prime, they were not able to discipline these export restrictions. How is it that we can think of new international cooperative arrangements which preserve the huge gains from this fragmentation of production, both in terms of productivity and diffusion of technology? So I think these are the questions that are important, you know, we We are doing some work here with Caroline Freund, Daria Taglioni, Michele Ruta to try and understand both the short run and the long run implications of these changes, but it'd be great to hear now from all of you. But let me open up for questions. Uh, one, you can use YouTube, you can use Webex, and let me begin with one question which has come from Sabrina Holman. Who's asking Any thoughts, views on the impact of these disruptions on current and potential trade agreements, regional agreements. So perhaps Richard, you can begin and then the others can step in if they wish. And after that I'll try and keep track of questions and bundle them together. Richard, are you there? Let me, oh, sorry, yeah, I, I hadn't thought about it, but let, let me, um, talk about, uh, what I think happened, for example, in NAFTA. I think there's been less disruption and less export restrictions within NAFTA, and I think within Europe also there was an initial push that blocked a lot of stuff within Europe, but then it was allowed inside Europe but not outside Europe. So I think to my, my, my instinct would be that what we're going to, especially in things like medical, is uh part of the regional agreements would be not to block each other's exports in this, in this time of need. So I think it may, may come to have clubs of people who promise not to block food or medical equipment or something like that. But I have to say that I, I think a lot of, of this will, apart from the medi medical equipment, I think a lot of it will pass and the vast majority of trade in chemicals and vehicles and electrical equipment and electronics, that stuff is not going to be changed because the, the basic political economy which led to the diverse, led to the global value chains isn't gonna change. And uh so I, I think a lot of this discussion, oh my goodness, now we have to change everything, it's not gonna go through. But anyways, uh, with respect to regional, um, regional trade agreements, I think that's where the restrictions have sort of been not, not extended. So, NAFTA is trading with each other. Europe is trading with each other. I don't know the situation in Asia. Simon, do you want to come in on that? Yes, if I may, I think there's a very interesting question which is raised by your question and Sabine's question about reciprocity, because we typically think that if a country liberalizes its import regime in the context of a trade agreement, the payoff comes not only to the benefits from importing but also for the benefit of. Benefits from uh being able to export to other countries, but that calculus gets disturbed in if uh uh it turns out that if you liberalize your import tariffs let in um imports, but if there are no imports to buy because the other party is using export curbs, especially on essential items when you need them, then a lot of the benefits. From liberalizing your trade your trade regime has been um has been lost and so what we learned then is that the benefits from reciprocal trade reform I think are conditional on being able to somehow qualify or limit the use of these um export restrictions and here I just build a bridge to what Richard said. There are a number of Trade agreements which have tried to qualify the use of export restrictions. Interestingly, some are in North America and some involve North American countries with Latin American countries, and it would be interesting to see if the disruption to supply chains there or the threat of such disruption was perceived as being much lower as a result. Thank you, Simon. Uh, Vasco, 2 questions for you. Uh, one from Tristan Reed. and I think from key, uh, is what are the most promising proposals to enhance the resilience of supply chains and especially medical supply chains? And here, if I can paraphrase the question, that would it be a good idea if firms don't do it themselves to mandate greater holding of inventories or essential inputs. Rasco, you have to unmute yourself. Here we go. Sorry. Um, thanks a lot for the question. I think that they're good questions. Um, I think what I am seeing from many conversations and from, uh, I think Richard was discussing this ahead of the, you know, you know, we had a small pre-discussion to the conference. I think the most promising thing or the most positive thing that I'm seeing around the world. Is the deployment of massive data. That is on the information side if you want, what we were discussing before. So even countries where an understanding of what is your supply chain, what are your supply chain risks, can you map out the supply chain with some detail? Can you tell me what you require to produce ventilators? Which was a kind of a pipe dream, I would say 20 years ago. Um, if you asked me 2 years ago to do that on a systematic level, uh, at least nation by nation, it was still a pipe dream. And what I am seeing in this crisis is governments and policymakers and advisors. Um, actually implementing very interesting solutions with payment system data, with transaction data, with banking data. Which is a first step in understanding what can be done in understanding what are bottlenecks in your supply chains. Where do you stand as a macro risk if plant X goes down? A couple of years ago, we had this, we found, or I found out that half of the world's hard disk drives were were produced in a valley in Thailand, I believe. And then the valley flooded and the hard disk drives price doubled overnight. Um, I think we, we are now living in a world where we actually are, are, are much more aware and can map out these risks, and that's the first step for policy. Um, so I think that's been an exciting development. Now, to go from there to what can actually governments do in terms of shoring up our, in terms of, um, ring-fencing, what national interest, entire supply chains around national interest, uh, is something that I think we are far from. I, I, I, I suspect that the most we will be able to deliver the capacity to start thinking about these things. Um, I can tell you that, you know, the UK and Spain and different governments that I've been in touch are thinking very, thinking ambitiously about these things, trying to figure out. Exactly what do I need to ensure production at the current level of demand of good X? And I think we are very close to having, you know, relatively scientific answers to those questions, but I think politically, in terms of the political economy of that and all that can go wrong along that path, something that we haven't thought, and that I would like to think a little bit more, um. I, I know that this is, is, is for sure happened with, with medical supplies to go back to you. Uh, Bhaskar, thank you. There's another question, if again I can paraphrase from Hatem Jabani. And he is or she is asking about, you know, are you taking into account How, how are you thinking about switching costs on both the consumer and the supply side when you think of disasters, number one? And secondly, uh, is it not possible that the disasters or value chains transmit shocks, they're also able to diffuse shocks. Isn't a global value chain itself. An exercise in diversification, even though, you know, the Leonti, the interdependence makes you vulnerable to these oing kind of problems, should we not see that as a positive side of global value chains? Um, Right. So, Let me give you an experience of. Of an automaker in Japan. Uh, so they turned out that after a few days, they realized they didn't have a pigment to paint the car, to, to form the paint to paint the car. And that's a relation to specific investment because the automaker makes um Guarantees to the final consumer on, you know, 10 years, or we'll paint the car for free for you, that there will be no rust. And again, it goes according to spec of what is the color, exact color that the consumer asked for. Um, That, so switching was so costly in that sense, and it was not that, it was not their car point in the world, is that, that's a relation specific investment for the automaker. That the automaker shut down his plant and send his workers to rebuild the plant of the supplier. Um Now, what that tells you is that switching costs are high, and even if you plan for them ex ante, um, you can have, uh, you, you can destroy the value of relation-specific investment. Remember, what we think by relation-specific investment is, uh, that I share, there is some kind of private good. That is that I cannot go just to the market on eBay and find another supplier is I create value with you, my supplier, and we share the rent of that. This uh the notion of bilateral monopoly over that. When you destroy that bilateral monopoly, say, by diversifying, say by maintaining multiple suppliers at the same time. You destroy the incentives that underlie these relations and therefore you destroy value. That's number. So the other thing that you've talked about, and this will follow all the way to final consumers and costs. That are probably passed through to the final. Um, The other thing you said is, can they be um Are we speaking too negatively as supply chains as just a conductor of shocks rather than dissipator of shocks? And of course you're right. There is just kind of the clean thinking there is what is the counterfactual. The counterfactual is uh to have everything, all my eggs in one basket and have all my production in, in my country. Well, that is, first, you're gonna lose large efficiency gains from comparative advantage reasons. You're also gonna be subjecting yourself to much more risk. So it depends on what your counterfactual is. Yes, supply chain, global supply chains pose transmission of risk, but your counterfactual, I would venture to say, is more risk and more concentrated precisely for the reasons you. Bye. I, I do think this dissipation is there and that's one of the reasons apart from efficiency reasons, the dissipation of of risk relative to having all the production concentrated domestically and all your supply chains that that leads us where we are now. Thank you, Vasco. Richard, uh, you were relatively sanguine about what might happen to global value chains, but here's a question from Roberto E Chandi. Who says that discussions on vulnerability of GVCs may suggest that, you know, the private sector is not sufficiently sensitive and it may justify protectionist policies and at a time when developing countries had finally embraced trade and benefited from GVCs, what could we now be entering a slippery slope of protectionism. And a related question from Someone else is that given that countries are simplifying their, I think it's key, their documentation and various things to help their traders, could this be a time where we can actually, you know, aim for greater harmonization or simplification and trade facilitation. Good. So, let, let me address those one at a time. So, I don't think we're heading towards an increase in protectionism here. And I think uh Simon's chart showed that actually, even the Trump administration is liberalizing tariffs because they realize there are pluses to uh imports, not just minuses to imports. And what it is, is we're worried about uh the slippery slope to export protectionism. So let, let me just take that in, in, um, in, in two bits. So one, when the GAATT was set up and when the European Union was set up. Wartime embargoes and shortages were front of mind of the people who wrote these documents. So all this kind of export restrictions are legal on purpose, but it was never really an issue in the in the post-war world because supply was never a constraint. All you needed was demand, so it was all about restraining people from protectionism, not from export restraints. So I suspect we may see a greater realization. That we also need to coordinate on restraining export restraints as well, especially in food, and we've seen this movie when it comes to food before. There's, there's nothing new about export restrictions tumbling out of control on food. It happened in 2006, 2007, or 2007, 2008, I think was the last time it happened. So maybe we'll have more um liberalization on that. In terms of the second question about the harmonization, we have seen some incredible things where it's, it's difficult for countries to import masks that are made to a Chinese standard, even though they're basically the same as an American standard, but the American standard was put in there more or less as a protectionist device. So, this may again be one of these realizations that, that it is a moment where we can reflect. But I, I would again say, I think most of this reflection is being spun out too generally. So this is in medical equipment and a few things which are actually, uh, I think the total is 7% of world trade is in these things. And the vast majority of all these lessons we're learning. are not going to go on to the big volume trade things because there hasn't been a change. But let me come back to something you asked before about stockholding. And so in Switzerland, we're very vulnerable to imported food, imported medical, imported all sorts of things. And so the Swiss government mandates stockholding that's done in cooperation with the private sector and subsidized, and that's the way we deal with the supply shocks. And I think many countries in terms of food, where this is realized, have food stocks. So I think one of the solutions instead of trying to bring all the production home, you just have a buffer stock and you cooperate with that and may have to subsidize that, but I think that's a better solution. And I think in the end, when we're done with this, people will say that these global value chains were actually a savior, because, for example, China can now make masks when they couldn't before and uh when the US industry is getting shut down, they can import masks and tests and things like that. So, at the end of this whole story, which is going to go on for another couple of years, I think trade will be viewed as a massive insurance policy, not as a source of, of uh contagion. Thank you, Richard. Simon, a question for you. Have you seen any evidence on how these different measures that you described, both the export promotion measures or import restriction measures, are having an effect on actual trade patterns or on global value chains? Right, so, the, the developments this year are just simply too, um, too fresh for us to have any serious empirical work, but as I said to you earlier, with respect to export restraints, and we have a, you know, fantastic research which has been done on, mainly on the agri-food sector. which I think has a clear set of conclusions about the counterproductive nature of these export restraints. Whether that carries over to medical goods we will see, but I think the benchmark, the starting point is quite well established in the literature. With respect to export promotion measures, there is a growing literature which uses quite sophisticated gravity equation work. Which looks to see if export growth into third markets is faster for countries where the products have been subsidized compared to other non-subsidized exports from other countries, of course, controlling for all other factors. And we do find indeed quite strong effects for market share reallocation. So I think the finding is that trade actually gets increased by these export promotion measures, but also gets redistributed as well and reshuffled between trading partners, and of course this is where it becomes both a trade policy and a resource misallocation problem. Let me just quickly summarize the last few questions that have come in. One, Could it be that the worst is behind us, and now it's only a question of stimulating demand? How does the oil price decline figure in all your um assessments and Is there a chance that China's early recovery Is going to lead also to a reassessment and a reconfiguration of value chains. Now, I'll leave it to each of you to decide whether or which question to respond to, uh, but also please. Take a minute to sum up and conclude and what has been the most illuminating discussion. So why don't we go in the order of Simon, you go first and then Bhaskar stays second and Richard concludes. Thank you and thanks for organizing this particular session. Let me just address the question, is the worst over? I strongly doubt it. I think even if one does not believe that there will be substantial across the board tariff increases, I do think we will have to watch very carefully whether the measures which governments are using to subsidize firms go beyond just traditional liquidity support into. Something a little bit more sinister in terms of either bailing out failing firms or firms which were failing before the pandemic that way, or attempts to try and foster new industries or indeed to repatriate supply chains. We're already seeing some of that. Perhaps the most prominent example is the Japanese government putting a lot of money on the table for Japanese firms to repatriate. Our supply chains out of China, uh, and so we'll have to watch that carefully to see if, uh, the trade distortions of the future are going to be anything like the ones we've seen in the past. Thank you. Thank you, Simon Bosco. So To, to try to wrap up, um, I think there was a question there regarding is the worst over and are we gonna go out of this. I think it's a little bit, uh, related to the, your your own initial question of what is the nature of this shock and uh. Mm What is awaiting us both now versus the future, right? Um, so I, it's just a set of, of, of factors. One is related to the length of the shock and, and how do we expect, and I think that will play a role in the sense that as Richard said early on, there was not a productive capacity was not affected. There was no fundamental reason why we should uh rewire global value chains or domestic chains. Um, As the The recession lengthened in time, when you start factoring in um inefficient exit. We, you know, and and have this piles up over time, there may be larger effects in the sense of um You know, the macro effects done by inefficient liquidation of large parts of the productive, productive, uh, side of the economy. And if we go along that scenario, um, and there may be very large effects on, on, on, on trade and, and, and longer lasting. Um, so I think that, that's kind of, it shines a light on the, the, the, the need for, uh, you know, all of these national power uh policies of liquidity and some, some sort of, of buy. Um, reassurance of of kind of reassurance of the production side maintained. Um There's really a trade-off between what is, uh, protectionism versus what is protecting inefficient liquidation on a massive scale if this continues going on. Second point is, you know, what is the effect generally on, if, if there is, what I try to say is there may be uh costly manners of robustifying a little bit, be it Uh, and, and I've kind of covered a few ways. Richard has just said, stockpiling in key areas would be another one. I believe all of these are costly, but I believe all of these are costly at the margin. So they are, they, they will, you know, at worst, diversity a variety will go down a little bit or costs will go up a bit. Given large benefits of global trade, what you, what economics, what, uh, you know, the last 20 years looking at Virginia firms would say is it is the, the firms at the threshold of participating that we will see disappearing. But as we know, these firms, the bulk of global trade is accounted by very large firms. To the extent that the, the surplus that those are generating is only, only somewhat affected by any robust, there, there is a path that is feasible in the sense of robustifying the system without large, uh, large costs and large disruption in global value chain. And the final point that is a little bit too far away from here is, of course, this all depends on political economy. So, The way we manage this as societies and as citizens and, uh, and politicians, um, you know, turns to protectionism, turns to disintegration, uh, may, may be on the cards, but that is less, and it's, um, so I think there's a lot about how, uh, Rather than just thinking about it as strict demand or supply side policies, but as policies that try to uh keep Negative political economy developments from, from, from, from gaining foothold, which would indeed send the system into very nonlinear dynamics where crisis can happen and disintegration can happen. Thank you, Vaskar Richard, final minute. OK, let, let me just uh talk a little bit about the oil, uh, and this wraps back also into your question about trade and services. So the oil price normally would be a stimulus to having bigger global value chains and, and, uh, and getting things getting cheaper. But as um uh an e-book that Simon Evannett and I are editing on, on export restrictions that'll come out on Monday or Tuesday next week. We have a couple chapters on sea transportation and air cargo, and it turns out that both of those have been heavily disrupted by the COVID restrictions directly. So the price of oil isn't what's holding up or hindering global value chains from moving. It's actually direct disruptions to sea transportation and air cargo. So let me go to my, the wrap up point. The, the thing I would say is this movie is not even near the end. We don't even know what this movie is really about yet, and the lessons that people are trying to draw from the early, early stages of this, I think, are slippery, and not very useful. So at the end, I think people will be very happy that they had access to the manufacturing sectors of other countries and the food producing countries, sectors of other countries. And, and really at the end of this, what we may come out of it is that we may want to all agree. Not to restrict things except in disciplined ways. So we may end up with rounds of limiting export restriction, and that's sort of a longer thing, the longer takeaway is that cascading or spirals of export restrictions are as dangerous as cascading or spiraling protectionism, and therefore we need international negotiations to do that. Now, of course, all that requires the administration in the United States to change, so. Um, it, it, it will depend for what happens in November, but if the administration changes, I think there is a real chance that we will have a moment of cooperation to reshape things, to remove some of the tariffs that were put up and remove some of the restrictions in a kind of a big talk. Maybe you could call it the Biden round or something, in which case, discussing export restrictions could be part of it. So I'll, I'll just stop there. Thank you very much, Richard, Simon, Vasco for a deeply insightful and richly stimulating discussion. Thank you. Bye-bye.
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Trade and Global Value Chains in the Age of COVID-19 eSeminar
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Trade and Global Value Chains in the Age of COVID-19 eSeminar
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How is COVID-19 disrupting global value chains? How will impaired global trade affect countries' ability to save lives and livelihoods? Richard Baldwin (Professor, Graduate Institute Geneva), Vasco Carvalho (Professor, Cambridge University), and Simon Evenett (Professor, University of St Gallen) addressed these questions in an e-seminar on April 22, 2020.
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