The disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic started in Egypt in March 2020, and has since interrupted a period of macroeconomic stability, characterized by relatively high growth, improved fiscal accounts, and a comfortable level of foreign reserves. The pandemic hit as longstanding challenges continued to persist, notably the government’s elevated debt-to-GDP ratio (despite its significant reduction in recent years), sluggish revenue-mobilization, and a budget structure unfavorable to the nature of the crisis, with limited allocation scheduled for key sectors such as health and education, limited job-creation in the formal sector, and the below-potential performance of non-oil merchandise exports and non-oil FDI.
Economic activity slowed with social distancing measures and the temporary suspension of air traffic. The Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) declined to 38.3 during the period April to June 2020, its lowest level on record, indicating a large contraction in non-oil private sector activity. The number of employed individuals declined by 2.7 million during the same period, pushing unemployment to 9.6% from 7.7% the previous quarter, with job losses, especially among informal workers, reported mainly in retail and wholesale trade, manufacturing, tourism, transport and construction.
The government allocated an emergency response package worth LE100 billion (1.7% of GDP) to augment health expenditure, scale-up social protection, and provide financial relief for individuals and businesses. Key measures included a one-off monetary grant to irregular workers and the expansion of existing cash transfer programs. Forbearance measures were introduced in the form of delayed tax filing and loan repayments, in addition to subsidized credit for targeted sectors. The Central Bank of Egypt slashed policy rates by a cumulative 350 basis-points since March 2020 to ease liquidity. Inflation has been declining since end-2019 and has remained rather contained, registering an average of 5.7% in the fiscal year 2020 (from an average 19.6% in the previous three), reflecting subdued demand and the general decline of global commodity prices, including oil.
Foreign reserves dropped sharply due to large-scale capital outflows at the outset of the COVID-19 crisis, in addition to the drop in tourism, Suez Canal revenues, and merchandise exports. Egypt has mobilized external financing, including a US$2.8 billion stopgap loan, issued under the IMF’s Rapid Financing Instrument; a US$5.2 billion Stand-by Arrangement (of which the first US$2 billion tranche was disbursed); and a US$5 billion sovereign Eurobond, a US$0.75 billion sovereign Green-bond, and US$2 billion loan from a UAE-led commercial bank consortium. Reserves remain ample, at US$38.4 billion by the end of August 2020 (7 months of merchandise imports), albeit below its pre-crisis peak of US$45.5 billion at end-February 2020. The exchange rate depreciated marginally from LE15.7/US$1 in February 2020 to just below LE16/US$ as of August 2020, with the authorities tolerating a drain on reserves in the intervening months to absorb some of the pressure experienced by many emerging markets.
Growth, expected to have remained positive, declined from 5.6% in fiscal year 2019 to 3.5% in fiscal year 2020. Under a scenario that the pandemic will persist through early-2021, growth is projected to decline further to 2.3% in fiscal year 2021 before rebounding in fiscal year 2022. Private consumption in the near-term is expected to remain constrained; household incomes are affected by a combination of the economic downturn, increased joblessness, and salary cuts. Subsequently, poverty is forecast to increase, particularly in urban areas. And, since high-skilled, formal sector jobs were relatively shielded (whereas informal ones were adversely impacted by the crisis), inequality is also expected to rise.
While remittances may initially react countercyclically (as expats increase one-off transfers), they are expected to eventually decline, notably with the economic downturn in Gulf countries. The current account deficit is thus projected to widen before starting to improve by fiscal year 2022, especially if the expected decline in remittances outweighs the projected narrowing of the net exports deficit. On the other hand, the capital and financial account is projected to remain buoyed by foreign borrowing, although FDI may decline, exacerbating a long-standing weakness in the amount of FDI going into traded goods’ sectors.
The recent trend in fiscal consolidation is also expected to be temporarily disrupted. The budget deficit is estimated to have widened to LE476.8 billion, equivalent to 8.2% of the projected GDP in fiscal year 2020, up from 8.1% of GDP in fiscal year 2019. This was mainly driven by the decline in the tax-to-GDP ratio and exacerbated by economic contraction and postponed tax payments. Subsequently, government debt is projected to increase (from the already elevated 90.2% of GDP at end-fiscal year 2019), before starting to moderate once again as fiscal consolidation is resumed by fiscal year 2022. The multi-dimensional health and economic crisis caused by the pandemic underscores the importance of advancing both the human capital agenda and the country’s crucial need to strengthen social protection. A second wave of pending reforms, designed to unleash private sector activity and address Egypt’s long-standing structural challenges, is crucial to create better employment opportunities and improve livelihoods.
Last Updated: Oct 01, 2020


