 Complete Report [3.7 mb] English | Español |
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| Executive Summary |
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| Chapter 1: The Strategy for Pension Reform |
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The Bank has been a leader in pension system reform. |
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The Bank strategy supports a flexible, multi-pillar framework,
under the appropriate macroeconomic, social, and financial
conditions. |
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The multi-pillar framework consists of a public unfunded pillar,
a private funded pillar, and a voluntary pillar. |
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| Chapter 2: The Bank's Support for Pension Reform |
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Bank economic and sector work provides an extensive technical
background on pension policy. |
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Analysis of fiscal issues and private pension regulation has
been thorough, but inadequate attention has been paid to income
of the aged and ways to expand coverage. |
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Both pay-as-you-go and multi-pillar pension systems supported
by the Bank varied widely. |
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Bank lending operations and nonlending work focused mainly
on countries that implemented multi-pillar reforms. |
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The majority of ratings for pension components and the projects
overall were satisfactory. |
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| Chapter 3: Quality at Entry for Pension Reforms |
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The Bank supported PAYG reforms in many countries where
initial conditions were inappropriate for multi-pillar reform. |
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The Bank also supported multi-pillar reforms in a number of
countries lacking macroeconomic stability, banking sector
readiness, moderate indebtedness, and a low risk for corruption,
which are necessary for a successful multi-pillar pension
system. |
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In some countries, the Bank did not fully consider all noncontributory
options to expand the safety net to those outside
the formal pension system. |
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| Chapter 4: The Impact of Pension Reforms |
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In many countries with multi-pillar systems, funded pillars
were not well-diversified and remained open to political influence,
contrary to theoretical precepts for a good multipillar
system. |
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Both multi-pillar and parametric reforms have helped improve
fiscal sustainability, but the improvements are not sufficient
for the long term. |
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The secondary objectives of funded plans—to increase
savings, develop capital markets, and improve labor market
flexibility—have remained largely unrealized. |
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| Chapter 5: Building Institutional Capacity |
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The problems in Bank assistance in supporting pay-as-you go
administration appear to be related to inadequate Bank and
client supervision. |
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Despite the success of the Bank’s pension simulation model
(PROST), technical assistance has not been sufficient in
developing local expertise. |
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The Bank has made few loans to strengthen the regulatory
environment. |
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| Chapter 6: World Bank Coordination |
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The Bank’s internal and external collaboration with other international
agencies and with its client countries has affected
the success of Bank-assisted reforms. |
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Inconsistency in Bank policy often results from a lack of
coordination among Bank sectors involved in pension reform. |
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Relations with other donors have also weakened some
outcomes. |
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In its country relations, the Bank has not always effectively incorporated
the concerns of all stakeholders involved in the
process. |
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| Chapter 7: Findings and Recommendations |
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Appendices: |
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Appendix A: View on Pension Reform - A Brief Literature Survey |
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Appendix B: Pension Systems in the World Bank-Assisted Countries |
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Appendix C: Performance Ratings for Pension Projects |
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Appendix D: Multi-Pillar Pension Systems, Transition Costs, and Savings |
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Appendix E: Indicator Tables |
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Appendix F: Reference Tables |
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Appendix G: Selected World Bank Economic and Sector Work, by Region (Country-Specific) |
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Appendix H: Management Response |
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Appendix I: Chairman's Summary: Committee on Development Effectiveness (CODE) |
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Endnotes |
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References |
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