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00:00 OK,

00:00 great.

00:01 So we're going to get started on our last panel,

00:04 um,

00:04 of ABCD 2025,

00:06 which is on migration.

00:08 Uh,

00:08 this will be moderated by my colleague Danny Bahar,

00:11 who is a senior fellow and the director of the Migration Displacement

00:14 and Humanitarian Policy,

00:15 um,

00:16 Program at the Center for Global Development.

00:18 Um,

00:18 right after that,

00:19 we'll go to a fireside chat,

00:20 but I'll be back to,

00:21 um,

00:22 introduce that.

00:31 Thank you,

00:32 everyone.

00:32 Good morning.

00:33 er

00:34 Friday weekend is coming.

00:37 Um,

00:38 but not before we talk about this very interesting and exciting panel that we have,

00:43 um,

00:44 and I'll just,

00:45 uh,

00:45 as a moderator,

00:46 I'm gonna also take advantage of,

00:47 uh,

00:47 sharing framing a little bit the conversation because we're

00:50 gonna try to have more of a conversation,

00:53 um,

00:53 on a topic that,

00:54 um,

00:55 that,

00:55 you know,

00:55 it's,

00:56 it's,

00:56 uh.

00:57 Uh,

00:58 a lot of people has a lot of opinions on,

01:00 um,

01:01 and,

01:02 and the idea is to really bring this bound to evidence and try to think forward

01:07 about the importance of this topic for,

01:09 for,

01:09 for development at large,

01:10 so,

01:11 um.

01:13 Uh,

01:14 I,

01:14 I,

01:14 I call a little bit,

01:15 uh,

01:16 the frame of this uh uh the next big shift

01:19 in the world.

01:21 Um,

01:22 and,

01:23 uh,

01:23 I wanna start by claiming

01:25 that

01:26 the demographic imbalance,

01:28 the demographic imbalance,

01:29 the global demographic imbalance is probably the most

01:32 pressing and neglected issue

01:35 in the world that we have today.

01:37 There's many other pressing issues,

01:38 um,

01:39 I think many of them people are aware of,

01:41 have opinions on,

01:42 but I think the demographic imbalance is somebody is,

01:44 is one that is kind of under the radar.

01:47 Um,

01:48 and

01:50 there's two,

01:51 the metaphor I like to use is that there's two

01:54 things happening at the same time under,

01:56 underneath that we're not even appreciating much,

01:59 and one of them

02:00 is an earthquake.

02:01 It's like the tectonic plates are moving in the world.

02:05 Um,

02:06 and a slow earthquake is happening because in many,

02:09 mostly developed countries,

02:11 also middle income countries,

02:13 um,

02:14 populations are aging

02:16 really fast.

02:16 Fertility rates have dropped

02:18 below replacement rates,

02:20 um,

02:21 and we are beginning to experience,

02:24 uh,

02:24 labor shortages

02:26 that,

02:27 um,

02:27 are gonna keep these countries from just fulfilling the natural economic

02:32 growth that they've been seeing if these shortages are not.

02:35 Fulfilled somehow.

02:37 So in those countries we have a situation of jobs without people.

02:43 Um,

02:44 but in developing countries,

02:46 um,

02:47 South Asia,

02:49 Africa,

02:49 of course

02:50 we have a little bit of a volcano that is about to erupt.

02:55 where there's abundance of young

02:58 people

03:00 ready to work without enough jobs.

03:02 Um,

03:02 so there we have people without jobs and of course

03:05 part of the framing here is that that seems to be a very obvious problem to solve.

03:11 On paper,

03:12 but maybe not on practice.

03:14 A and

03:17 I don't think this is moving.

03:18 OK.

03:20 This is an example of,

03:21 of what I'm saying that comes from actually the WDR

03:23 of 2023 with Jaer was one of the lead authors.

03:27 He's also accompanying on the panel,

03:28 and here you see very clearly

03:30 an example of a developed country.

03:33 Um,

03:34 uh,

03:34 Italy,

03:35 uh,

03:36 and a developing country,

03:37 Nigeria,

03:37 and how their pyramids of population are completely almost the opposite yin yangs,

03:43 um,

03:44 and the projections are,

03:46 you know,

03:46 you also have their projections until 2050,

03:49 so,

03:50 um,

03:50 it's kind of obvious,

03:52 uh,

03:52 this,

03:54 this is kind of a proof of,

03:55 of a little bit of what I was saying of the earthquakes and the volcanoes.

03:58 Um,

03:59 and

04:00 one of the things that are that I,

04:02 I,

04:02 I,

04:02 I claim that this is the most pressing,

04:04 pressing issue because these labor shortages are challenges that are

04:07 transversal across a number of other critical issues are transversal

04:10 in terms of

04:12 the energy transition

04:13 because there's just not enough electricians

04:16 to install solar panels if that's what,

04:18 uh,

04:18 countries wanna do.

04:20 Um,

04:20 there's just not enough nurses.

04:22 To,

04:23 uh,

04:25 deal,

04:25 uh,

04:25 you know,

04:26 for,

04:26 for public health challenges that we have

04:28 in developed countries,

04:30 and we're talking about AI.

04:31 There's just not enough talent,

04:34 or,

04:35 or,

04:35 or skills to be able to

04:37 supplement the infrastructure that developed countries need

04:41 in their race for AI.

04:42 So this is a,

04:43 it's not just one issue,

04:44 it's a transversal issue across all other

04:47 elements that are critical for the global economy.

04:50 and a little bit the framing of this panel is going to be,

04:53 well,

04:53 it's labor migration.

04:55 A feasible solution,

04:56 a possible solution,

04:57 maybe one of many or

05:00 in these times,

05:01 particularly these times of populism.

05:03 Um,

05:04 the last thought here is that I also want to claim that the clock is ticking

05:10 because

05:11 some of the irregular migration that we have seen in many places in the world

05:17 could be part of this imbalance actually,

05:19 so we talk a lot about

05:21 a lot of determinants,

05:22 but I

05:24 just sharing with you a couple of graphs from a paper that I

05:28 Uh completed last year in which

05:31 I was looking particularly at some of the determinants of the labor,

05:34 the border crossings here in the US

05:37 over the past 25 years.

05:39 So this graph is showing

05:41 um in a year over year difference,

05:42 so it's taking out the seasonality of the series

05:45 of all the border crossings in the southwest

05:48 border of the US

05:50 since 2000 until

05:52 mid last year.

05:54 Um,

05:55 and I'm going to

05:56 put on this graph

05:59 another variable which is the,

06:00 the,

06:01 the,

06:01 the labor tightness of the US during that period,

06:04 which is how many vacancies there are

06:06 for each unemployed person in the US,

06:08 and this is how it looks.

06:11 That correlation is strong,

06:14 uh,

06:14 in the,

06:15 of course you see here in the last 5 years where those numbers went up significantly,

06:20 the border crossings

06:21 also labor market tightness was reached about 2 in according to this data,

06:26 so there were essentially at some 0.2 vacancies

06:29 per each unemployed person in the US.

06:32 And as many of you remember walking around any city in the US,

06:36 there were help wanted signs everywhere

06:39 in hotels there were not enough workers in construction,

06:42 there weren't enough workers.

06:42 So,

06:43 so,

06:43 so what I'm going to claim is that this

06:46 is the beginning of this.

06:48 What we're seeing is part of the beginning of this earthquake that is happening.

06:52 So therefore it needs to be addressed.

06:54 So we're going to try to explore in this panel some of these questions.

06:56 Is migration one of the solutions to this imbalance?

06:59 Maybe there's other solutions.

07:02 What are they?

07:03 What policy instruments are available to make this a win win win situation?

07:06 We're going to talk about skill building,

07:08 credentials,

07:08 financing,

07:09 pathways,

07:10 um,

07:11 and we're also going to revisit the long

07:13 old question about the brain gain versus the brain

07:15 gain gain because we also want to make

07:18 sure this is a win-win for developing countries.

07:20 So we have really the most fantastic panel that we could

07:24 have had.

07:27 So we

07:28 have Caroline Theoharides,

07:30 who is an associate professor at Amherst College.

07:32 She's the global scholar expert on brain gain

07:36 with many publications,

07:37 in particular one I would recommend in Science magazine very recently

07:41 summarizing the literature,

07:42 so we're really pleased pleased pleased to have you.

07:45 Um,

07:45 Andrewilley,

07:46 a good friend and also the president of the Migration Policy Institute who has

07:50 been at the frontier of both academia and policy

07:54 work on this matter,

07:55 and of course the World Bank's very own,

07:58 uh,

07:59 Jalar Oz and also a good friend who's now the deputy chief economist of,

08:02 of MENA here at the World Bank who's a

08:04 leading scholar on everything that has to do with migration.

08:06 So

08:07 Jalar,

08:08 why don't you come and then we'll,

08:09 we'll have a discussion.

08:10 Thank you.

08:16 OK.

08:17 Uh,

08:18 thank you,

08:18 Danny.

08:18 It's great to be here and I'll echo Danny,

08:21 thank you for being here on a Friday.

08:23 Uh,

08:25 on,

08:26 on an interesting topic,

08:27 uh,

08:27 at least two of us,

08:28 OK,

08:29 I cannot see half of my

08:31 PowerPoints,

08:32 so I apologize,

08:33 but oh,

08:33 I,

08:33 I'll look there.

08:34 All right,

08:34 so what I'm gonna talk about,

08:36 uh,

08:36 Danny kind of built the pathway,

08:38 so I'll

08:39 start there,

08:39 but I want to start with,

08:40 um,

08:41 the following.

08:42 Last night during dinner,

08:43 uh,

08:43 Dion mentioned the 1984,

08:45 uh,

08:46 World Development report that Nancy Bursall did on demography.

08:49 And

08:50 which embarrassingly so,

08:52 I didn't know about it.

08:54 Uh,

08:55 I said,

08:56 well,

08:56 I was in

08:57 elementary school at the time,

08:59 but nevertheless I should have known about it,

09:01 but

09:02 it really,

09:02 so last night I sat down and read through it and it was remarkable

09:06 how much the world has changed.

09:08 I mean,

09:08 other than the

09:09 art cover of the WDRs,

09:11 I think that's one of the few dimensions we have improved.

09:14 And

09:16 anyway,

09:17 so

09:17 the 1984 WEDR basically was about two things.

09:21 It was,

09:22 you know,

09:22 the fertility population growth rate is way too high in developing countries,

09:27 and that's a problem.

09:28 It impacts growth.

09:29 We really have to

09:31 worry about it,

09:32 and we are so proud of South Korea because they lowered the fertility rate to 2.1.

09:37 Right,

09:39 uh,

09:39 the

09:40 shocking thing there in the WDR there was the implicit

09:43 assumption that fertility rate can never fall below 2.

09:47 There are all these long term projections

09:49 and as if there's a

09:50 line that fertility rate cannot go down.

09:53 I'm going to get back to that point quickly.

09:55 And how much the world has changed in in 40 years since 1984

10:00 and this is

10:01 the,

10:01 the whole thing has almost shifted

10:03 and at the time also in 1984,

10:06 the fertility rate in high income countries also around 2%

10:09 and they're saying,

10:09 see,

10:10 this is fantastic that's why they're wealthy and

10:12 that's why they're gonna stay wealthy right so

10:15 Danny put this,

10:16 the,

10:17 the,

10:18 the this is from the WDR.

10:21 But I'm going to say

10:22 the shocking and important thing is not Nigeria or Western Europe,

10:26 it's actually Mexico here.

10:28 The biggest shock is what happened to Mexico,

10:31 because the vast majority of the world's

10:32 population lives in middle income countries,

10:34 and the rapid decline in fertility and the rapid aging

10:38 is the middle income countries,

10:40 it's the biggest

10:41 actually threat I'm going to argue here.

10:43 We knew what was going to happen in high income countries even in 1984.

10:48 We kind of knew what was happening,

10:49 although the fertility decline in low income countries has been faster,

10:54 but still

10:55 we kind of kept the shape.

10:57 But

10:58 the big shock happened in the middle income countries.

11:00 So if you look at it,

11:01 this is the US fertility decline.

11:04 So

11:05 the bump during the war years,

11:07 you know,

11:08 people have a way of smoothing out

11:11 everything including income and number of children.

11:13 But

11:14 it took

11:16 almost 200 years for the US fertility rate to decline from

11:19 6 and 7 to replacement.

11:22 Now look at

11:23 what happened in a range of middle income countries.

11:26 Even India today is below replacement.

11:29 I'm Turkish.

11:31 In Turkey it is 1.4.

11:33 Nobody has expected it to decline that far,

11:36 that

11:37 fast.

11:37 Now there's a phrase

11:39 associated with China becoming old before becoming wealthy.

11:42 It is not about China.

11:43 It is about pretty much every middle income country we know

11:46 that decline

11:47 and in At the same time,

11:48 the US income,

11:50 depending on how you calculate it our endowment left,

11:53 uh,

11:53 the,

11:54 the growth rate,

11:54 like 30-40 times income growth in the US in the same time period,

11:58 it is significantly less in all these countries,

12:01 right?

12:01 You,

12:01 you're seeing the rapid decline

12:03 now

12:04 and you also,

12:05 when we put the this is the

12:08 inverse dependency ratio working age to elderly and you're seeing even the

12:12 low income countries

12:14 like this year today is the where we are falling off the cliff.

12:18 Right,

12:18 you're seeing how rapidly it's gonna start falling

12:21 even in low income countries,

12:22 and the most important one,

12:24 the upper middle income countries are basically

12:26 rapidly converging to high income countries,

12:28 right?

12:29 Now

12:29 why is this important?

12:31 So if you look at the dependency ratios in high income countries,

12:34 middle income countries,

12:35 and low income countries,

12:36 you're seeing this pattern,

12:38 and the middle income countries are basically starting to pick up.

12:42 high income countries already did,

12:44 but the remarkable thing,

12:45 the remarkable thing is the following.

12:48 If you look at the world today,

12:49 the whole world,

12:50 we are in this remarkable era of stability.

12:53 It has never,

12:54 never happened in human history since we started collecting data

12:57 that we have a

12:59 fixed,

12:59 stable,

13:00 almost 40 years of basically.

13:04 The

13:05 stable dependence ratio.

13:06 The problem

13:07 is this is going on its own.

13:08 I'm not clicking.

13:10 Is one of you guys doing it?

13:12 I mean,

13:12 I understand I have 20 minutes,

13:14 15 minutes,

13:15 but

13:15 don't,

13:16 don't,

13:16 don't rush me.

13:17 All right,

13:18 so this era of stability,

13:20 we are smack in the middle of it,

13:22 right?

13:22 2025 is right there,

13:25 and

13:25 this is a great opportunity of demographic arbitrage.

13:28 We've been saying this.

13:29 OK,

13:30 10 minutes.

13:31 Saying this for a long time.

13:32 The issue obviously

13:34 the,

13:34 the,

13:35 the young people are in one place

13:37 where the jobs,

13:38 what this is what Danny said,

13:40 where the jobs are needed in another place and migration is optional,

13:43 you know,

13:43 optimal choice,

13:44 but it doesn't end there,

13:45 and that's because of fine.

13:47 So side point,

13:49 all this stuff where we are today,

13:51 I'm going to put part of the blame

13:53 on the UN population divisions overestimation of fertility rates.

13:57 This is their errors.

13:59 Which was this is the data they used in the

14:03 1984

14:06 WDR.

14:08 Do you see how much off they are,

14:09 for example,

14:10 in the case of Thailand for young people.

14:14 They're almost overestimated by 80%.

14:17 They underestimated the rapid fertility decline,

14:20 and all of our projections and,

14:22 you know,

14:22 our planning is based on this,

14:25 these fertility declines and completely overestimated the world population.

14:30 So

14:31 if anything,

14:32 Manta,

14:32 this is one thing I think the World Bank has to go back and

14:36 looking at the demographic transition as an economic issue,

14:39 not just some sort of mechanical issue which automatically declines,

14:42 but at a

14:43 relatively low rate.

14:44 All right

14:44 now.

14:45 This is what the world is going to happen.

14:47 We all know sub-Saharan Africa is going to increase.

14:49 South Asia is increasing,

14:51 although fertility has gone down because

14:53 people are living longer

14:54 right

14:55 everywhere else,

14:57 actually

14:58 we're seeing a shrinkage of labor force.

15:01 So this is a back of the envelope exercise we have done.

15:04 If you want to maintain 2.5 working age people

15:08 per each elderly retiree,

15:10 this is how many people you're going to need by education.

15:13 Right

15:13 now,

15:14 the second problem is the following.

15:16 Historically,

15:16 if you look at the post-war

15:18 migration patterns,

15:19 it's a middle income country guy like me going to a high income country person,

15:24 right?

15:24 This applies to pretty much half of us in this room.

15:27 That has stopped

15:28 because the middle income countries have run out of people.

15:31 This is Mexico.

15:32 This is Turkey.

15:33 This is Morocco.

15:33 This is Philippines.

15:35 It is not there.

15:36 These middle income countries for a

15:37 variety of really successful development initiatives,

15:40 not at the level we have,

15:41 but we want,

15:42 but still there,

15:43 they have decent education systems,

15:46 right?

15:46 There's mandatory

15:48 12 year education in Mexico and Turkey,

15:50 and the periphery countries,

15:52 these migrants,

15:53 they are the ones who supply the migrants to the high income countries.

15:55 That has stopped.

15:57 Where you have the excess people

15:59 and where you need them,

16:01 including the middle income countries,

16:02 there's a huge education gap.

16:04 So

16:05 the whole

16:06 what we're talking about this whole labor market thing

16:08 is not just about the number of people missing,

16:10 it's the education,

16:11 the human capital that's missing.

16:13 So you cannot have a

16:15 migration policy or labor market policy without an appropriate

16:19 education intervention.

16:20 In the rapidly growing countries,

16:22 that's the,

16:22 that was one of the messages of the WDR.

16:25 So in a sense I always say the 2023 WDR was as much about education

16:30 as it was about labor mobility,

16:32 right

16:33 now if you look at it,

16:34 this is the,

16:35 the high income countries,

16:36 how many people you're gonna need

16:38 and possible policy interventions.

16:40 Right,

16:41 so suppose we increase the labor force participation of women,

16:44 we go a little bit,

16:46 we increase the elderly labor force participation,

16:49 push the retirement age,

16:50 and we increase migration

16:52 way more than what is currently.

16:54 But you see,

16:54 migration actually,

16:55 sadly,

16:56 sadly enough,

16:57 does not really solve the problem in high income countries,

17:00 and also in China.

17:01 But in the Chinese case it's for a low base,

17:03 so.

17:04 Take it with a grain of salt.

17:05 So we still have a huge remaining labor force gap

17:10 in

17:11 upper middle income and high-income countries.

17:13 Now,

17:14 if you look at the low-income countries.

17:17 There's a shortage of the high,

17:18 uh,

17:19 highly educated,

17:19 tertiary educated people.

17:21 There's a slight surplus.

17:22 India again,

17:23 like China bucks the trend,

17:24 so it's good to take out India from the analysis because

17:27 they're so big and the trends are different.

17:29 But this is what you are seeing,

17:30 right?

17:31 There's a

17:32 surplus of labor,

17:34 but they are not educated.

17:35 All right,

17:36 now

17:36 when we

17:37 actually put the whole thing together,

17:39 you're seeing the numbers are actually pretty good.

17:41 This is why we have that stability.

17:43 Uh,

17:44 the demographic,

17:45 uh,

17:45 window of arbitrage,

17:47 uh,

17:47 yeah,

17:47 alright,

17:48 now

17:49 let's come to the education.

17:50 I'm gonna wrap it up very quickly.

17:52 This is where we are.

17:54 Upper middle income countries have done remarkably well.

17:56 The whole world has done remarkably well with primary education.

17:59 We are at almost 100% everywhere around the world.

18:02 Uh,

18:03 part of the credit goes to my education colleagues in the

18:06 bank because we have done a very decent job there.

18:08 But look at secondary and especially tertiary enrollment,

18:11 you're seeing upper middle income countries

18:13 are converging to high income countries,

18:15 but

18:15 that is not the case for lower middle income and especially low income countries.

18:19 They're actually stabilizing,

18:21 uh,

18:22 if you look at the,

18:23 the transit data at really

18:25 suboptimal levels.

18:26 So we need more,

18:27 uh,

18:28 more funding and not necessarily for tertiary education.

18:31 Remember,

18:31 the shortage actually in high-income countries are the,

18:34 the middle educated people,

18:36 especially in vocational training.

18:38 US and Europe have no problem actually

18:40 educating the tertiary.

18:42 That's,

18:42 that's,

18:42 we are

18:43 doing much better.

18:44 It's the vocational and

18:46 secondary education that we need,

18:48 uh,

18:48 especially

18:49 in low income and low middle income.

18:51 Now,

18:52 a potential solution,

18:53 this was a follow-up report we did with

18:55 the SBJ colleagues on global skills partnerships.

18:58 Now

18:58 there's this whole debate about migration.

19:00 There are tons of different types of migration,

19:02 whether it's forced migration

19:03 or whether,

19:04 um.

19:06 You name it,

19:06 right,

19:07 it's a continuum that was the framework of the WDI.

19:09 So I'm going to talk about a small portion where we can address this,

19:13 these issues,

19:14 the demographic and the education

19:17 mismatches,

19:17 gaps between where the people are and where the jobs are.

19:21 Uh,

19:22 so

19:22 here it is.

19:23 GSP,

19:24 for those of you who don't know,

19:25 is a very simple idea.

19:26 It says basically,

19:27 uh,

19:28 Germany needs nurses.

19:31 Uh,

19:32 and the German standards of education and professional whatever

19:35 licensing are such that it's not easy to,

19:38 you know,

19:39 convince the German authorities to grant licenses to people

19:43 even if they're coming from Italy,

19:44 say.

19:45 So we convinced the Germans,

19:47 uh,

19:48 to basically open a nursing school in,

19:51 in Senegal.

19:52 They train 1000 people.

19:54 Half of them,

19:55 whatever portion you agree,

19:56 stay in Senegal and the rest come to Germany with the

20:00 proper German licensing,

20:01 with proper

20:02 legal pathways and with the proper human capital.

20:06 Senegal gains

20:07 because they have 500 extra nurses.

20:11 Properly trained by the Germans

20:13 and the Germans gained because they have now more nurses

20:15 that they have trained according to the criteria of their

20:20 labor market needs and licensing requirements.

20:22 Now

20:23 the devil is of course in the details.

20:25 I have 3 minutes.

20:26 The details are that.

20:28 You need

20:29 whatever 22 ministries in both countries to agree on this,

20:32 from the foreign ministry to the finance to the education to the labor,

20:35 and it becomes a nightmare.

20:37 This is where the World Bank actually enters the picture.

20:39 This is our value added smoothing out the bureaucratic mess.

20:45 The SBJ unit has actually active

20:48 between 8 and 14,

20:49 depending on how you

20:51 counted GSP programs,

20:54 but that's where you can address all the concerns from brain drain.

20:58 To,

20:58 uh,

20:59 legality of,

21:00 of migration,

21:01 right?

21:02 Now,

21:02 the,

21:03 the

21:04 important thing,

21:04 I'm gonna start from the,

21:05 the other side,

21:06 the legality because they're coming under,

21:09 um,

21:09 legal pathways with the proper licensing.

21:12 So,

21:13 uh,

21:13 presumably all the burdens on Germany is taken care of in that process because it's a

21:18 bilateral agreement.

21:20 The second one,

21:20 it's,

21:21 uh,

21:22 the,

21:22 the firms,

21:23 the employers have a stake in this.

21:26 Right,

21:27 so it becomes sustainable and scalable,

21:29 and the most important thing is,

21:32 uh,

21:32 it's,

21:32 it's a bilateral agreement and it doesn't

21:35 impose necessarily a big financial burden on Senegal

21:38 and

21:39 kind of the markets take care of it.

21:41 And

21:43 for example,

21:43 the Australians,

21:44 Australians started this program.

21:46 In Pacific islands,

21:49 it was just a vocational training program.

21:51 They did not think of it as a migration actually.

21:53 But then they realized

21:54 all these people now that they had Australian

21:56 training back at home,

21:58 the employers in Australia were easily hiring them,

22:00 and then the

22:02 officials in Tonga and Papua New Guinea got really upset.

22:04 I thought,

22:05 we thought you were going to educate our people

22:07 to work here and now you're stealing them,

22:09 and Australians said that wasn't our intention.

22:12 But the market somehow way of fixing things,

22:14 so Australians actually doubled down and expanded it rapidly,

22:18 and it has been very successful.

22:20 Unfortunately,

22:20 a lot of the other GSP programs pilots have not been as successful.

22:25 They stayed as pilots partly,

22:27 partly because

22:29 of the 22 ministries getting involved

22:31 and partly because COVID intervened in a lot of the cases.

22:34 But I want to end

22:36 with this.

22:37 A lot of my presentations,

22:38 I have

22:38 slides from football.

22:41 And actually

22:42 after the Bosman rule in the European leagues

22:45 where you had free mobility of football players,

22:49 A lot of the European soccer football clubs opened up academies in West Africa.

22:55 These are boarding schools.

22:56 They take 23,

22:58 400 young boys,

22:59 give them proper

23:01 uh high school education,

23:02 and at the same time train them

23:05 for football.

23:06 Around 10% go to leagues in Europe

23:10 that finances the whole operation.

23:12 Around another 20% play football at home,

23:16 and 70% don't even play football,

23:18 but they end up with

23:20 high school education which they would not have.

23:22 There's no government involvement,

23:23 completely private sector.

23:24 This is what you see

23:26 when the skills are transferable.

23:28 And when there is legal pathway opportunity,

23:32 then everybody benefits from it except

23:35 a couple of the European football players now who are placed out

23:39 by by the Africans who are coming there.

23:41 All right,

23:42 thank you so much,

23:43 and

23:44 I think I did OK in terms of.

23:59 Good morning,

24:00 everybody.

24:01 Oh,

24:02 good.

24:02 OK,

24:02 great.

24:03 I know it's hard on a Friday morning here.

24:05 Thank you all for being here.

24:06 Thank you to Danny for the invitation.

24:08 Um,

24:08 I'm gonna repeat a little bit of what,

24:10 uh,

24:11 both Danny and Shagler have already said,

24:13 um,

24:13 but I will then go into a bit of,

24:15 of some of the policy considerations here.

24:18 Going forward,

24:19 um,

24:19 you know,

24:20 demography is going to necessitate movement.

24:22 It's going to drive movement,

24:23 and you saw two different examples.

24:24 You saw one way of doing this

24:26 in a healthy way,

24:27 right?

24:27 Thinking about how we could actually plan for mobility

24:30 in ways that help the,

24:32 the source countries

24:33 as well as the destination countries.

24:35 Right now you'll hear more about this,

24:36 uh,

24:36 shortly as well from the next speaker.

24:38 And you also saw,

24:40 even though Danny didn't dwell on it,

24:41 but you saw in his

24:43 slide there,

24:44 the number of people who move through irregular channels across the US border

24:48 when the economy is there.

24:50 I mean,

24:50 the bottom line,

24:51 if you take those two,

24:52 is people are going to move,

24:53 right?

24:53 We actually have

24:55 a,

24:56 we're living in a time where there will be labor market openings.

24:59 There will be opportunities,

25:00 there will be a pull factor for people to come,

25:02 not just to the United States,

25:04 but to other countries,

25:05 to a lot of middle-income countries as well.

25:07 And unless we think about how we build the legal channels,

25:10 which Tyler finished here,

25:12 uh,

25:12 uh,

25:13 to move through which people can move,

25:15 people are gonna move through irregular routes,

25:17 right?

25:17 But we should assume that the future has a lot of mobility

25:20 and,

25:20 and much more than we've seen in the recent past.

25:23 And it's not.

25:23 Just

25:24 the United States and Canada and Western Europe and

25:26 Australia and East Asia and sort of the obvious ones

25:29 that got there first with low birth rates.

25:31 We actually just literally have a book that's about to come out as an advance copy

25:35 on migration policies in Latin America and the Caribbean.

25:38 This was with three colleagues of mine.

25:39 And much of the last

25:41 15 years

25:43 in Latin America and the Caribbean has

25:44 been movement because of displacement crises Venezuela,

25:47 Haiti,

25:47 Nicaragua.

25:48 But where we end the book actually is saying this is not likely to be the future,

25:52 right?

25:52 This has been the past.

25:54 The future conversation's going to be about labor mobility,

25:56 and there'll be a handful of countries Honduras,

25:58 Guatemala,

25:59 Haiti that people will be leaving still where there'll still be surplus labor,

26:02 but there's going to be lots of countries like Mexico,

26:04 like Brazil.

26:06 Like Colombia,

26:06 already Uruguay and Barbados,

26:08 the Bahamas,

26:09 um,

26:10 where there are real labor needs,

26:11 Guyana,

26:12 oddly enough,

26:12 which was one of the countries that had lots and lots of people left,

26:15 which suddenly will be looking for workers abroad,

26:17 right?

26:17 And no one's noticed it yet for the most part except for Uruguay's talking Barbados,

26:21 but most are not talking about it yet

26:22 because displacement crises have actually

26:25 taken up the conversation.

26:27 Same thing in Turkey,

26:28 right?

26:28 But,

26:28 but in the end this is the future conversation that's coming.

26:31 Um,

26:32 of course,

26:32 you could say technology will make a difference.

26:35 Some jobs will disappear.

26:36 That's almost certainly true.

26:38 Um,

26:38 you know,

26:38 the,

26:39 the workforce of the future is not the workforce of the past.

26:42 Um,

26:42 but what we know for those that lived through the 1990s and we heard that all the jobs

26:47 would disappear and that everything was gonna be replaced

26:49 by robots and the internet and all that,

26:51 what we also know is productivity increases also generate new kinds of employment.

26:56 Uh,

26:56 it is certainly possible that there will be fewer workers,

26:58 also be fewer workers on the planet eventually.

27:01 Um,

27:01 but it's also very likely that in many countries what you're going to see is,

27:05 is perhaps,

27:06 you know,

27:06 you're seeing this in Japan,

27:07 for example,

27:08 getting by with fewer workers,

27:10 but you will also see lots of other jobs that are created also by aging populations,

27:14 for example,

27:15 care work.

27:15 So.

27:16 Um

27:18 In

27:19 many countries what we see is what we see in the United States,

27:22 um,

27:22 and I'm going to make a,

27:24 a political but nonpartisan comment on this,

27:26 which is in the US we tend to zigzag between

27:29 allowing people in through irregular channels to meet our workforce needs and

27:32 then shutting down and then going back to figuring it out.

27:36 Um,

27:36 there are a few countries that have more or less gotten this right.

27:39 And by getting it right,

27:40 what they have done is both figure out legal pathways to meet workforce needs.

27:44 They've thought about immigration policy as part of their economic

27:48 and labor force policy,

27:50 but they've also made sure that there's not

27:52 a lot of irregular migration because irregular migration,

27:54 what it does

27:55 is undermine the credibility of immigration systems.

27:58 And I'm not surprised that a lot of people

28:01 were actually turned off by the number of people that came across the border,

28:04 not because they're bad folks,

28:05 because they actually,

28:05 as I always point out to people,

28:06 the folks that came across the border

28:08 are likely to be

28:10 contributing members of American society.

28:12 Their kids will be great Americans,

28:14 but because when people see that there isn't a selection system.

28:17 For people coming,

28:18 it undermines the public's willingness to support legal pathways.

28:22 So we need to see a future where we can do both of those.

28:25 In some countries like Canada and Australia and New Zealand,

28:27 granted,

28:27 they're all de facto islands,

28:29 real islands are de facto island Canada.

28:31 Everyone's Canadian,

28:31 no offense,

28:32 but de facto island.

28:33 Um,

28:34 the,

28:34 uh,

28:35 you know,

28:36 the,

28:36 the,

28:36 to,

28:36 to have been good both about making sure there's limited irregular

28:40 migration.

28:41 A little easier when you're an island or you got the US as a buffer,

28:43 but still.

28:44 And at the same time been proactive on building legal pathways

28:47 and we're starting to see this happening in some other countries.

28:50 Italy,

28:51 you wouldn't think of Italy with a government that is often

28:54 seen to be on the populist right would be doing this,

28:56 but actually has,

28:58 you know,

28:58 been very intolerant of boat arrivals

29:00 but has actually passed one of the most ambitious labor migration.

29:04 Reforms in the past two years.

29:06 Spain,

29:07 which actually has a lot of migration control,

29:09 they're the opposite.

29:09 They don't talk about that part,

29:11 but they do,

29:12 also has a new labor reform.

29:13 Germany is leaning into

29:15 trying to reduce arrivals,

29:18 um,

29:18 and asylum

29:19 applications,

29:19 but also has a fairly ambitious,

29:21 not totally successful,

29:22 but fairly ambitious immigration reform.

29:24 So we are seeing in Korea and Japan,

29:25 which have always been and again have the advantage

29:28 of distance and an island in one case,

29:30 peninsula and an island.

29:31 They have the advantage of being a little

29:33 bit distant but have also been cautious about arrivals

29:36 but as a result have actually been able to lean into

29:38 now thinking about legal pathways at a time when demography.

29:42 Uh,

29:42 warrants it.

29:43 So let,

29:43 let me lay out three sets of principles

29:46 here of what I think we need to think about for the future.

29:49 And then we can,

29:50 I'm timing myself here because I want,

29:52 don't want to go over

29:53 time.

29:54 Um,

29:54 but three principles I think we need to think about.

29:56 So the first is we will need to build,

29:58 we need to be intentional about building legal channels for people to come in.

30:01 If we want this to work.

30:03 If we want to be able to figure out how countries that have

30:06 surplus labor

30:08 can contribute them

30:09 to people that do not have it and make

30:11 this work in ways that are regular and predictable

30:14 for advantages for both sides,

30:16 right,

30:16 we have to actually figure out these channels and we have to

30:18 be proactive about it and the way Canadians and Australians have been.

30:22 Japan is now doing.

30:24 Uh,

30:24 Italy is doing and others.

30:26 Um,

30:26 that means,

30:28 uh,

30:29 thinking about a mix of permanent pathways because some jobs are permanent.

30:33 Um,

30:34 seasonal.

30:34 Some jobs are seasonal.

30:35 It's OK to have seasonal work.

30:36 And by the way,

30:37 lots of people,

30:38 lots of potential migrants would love to do seasonal work and

30:40 live in their home country and come back.

30:42 There's always challenges with anything that's temporary

30:44 in terms of imbalance of power,

30:46 but

30:47 with,

30:47 with employers,

30:48 but it works very well

30:50 in places where it is policed well.

30:52 And then there's temporary work because.

30:54 Also in the mobile society,

30:55 this is particularly true of knowledge workers.

30:57 I mean,

30:57 we've always thought that we want people co-located,

30:59 right?

30:59 We want everyone to be together increasingly in a mobile world.

31:03 In fact,

31:03 I'm surprised there's lots of us here in one room.

31:05 This is kind of a rare experience for most of us,

31:07 right?

31:07 Don't we spend our days,

31:09 you know,

31:09 sitting on the screens?

31:10 You know,

31:10 we do lots of work across screens.

31:12 You still need to bring people together.

31:14 Periodically,

31:15 however,

31:15 right,

31:16 and so we may want to think,

31:17 particularly for some kinds of work,

31:19 and this is probably more high-end,

31:20 that we don't actually need permanent immigration,

31:22 but we do need the ability for people to come and go,

31:25 right?

31:25 We do need a team,

31:27 an innovation team to get together,

31:28 a management team

31:30 to be able to get together on a regular basis for a period of time,

31:33 and then we're gonna have to think agilely about this.

31:35 Um,

31:36 one ways of approaches are skills partnerships.

31:38 I'll let you know the others focus on that because they have much more expertise,

31:43 but I would say access matters.

31:44 We've done some looking at skills partnerships

31:46 between countries in Europe and several countries

31:49 in Africa,

31:50 the Middle East,

31:50 and Asia,

31:52 and there are lots of unseen barriers to access,

31:55 and that will actually matter as these things scale up.

31:58 I mean,

31:58 scaling up labor partnerships.

32:01 Really matters.

32:02 And at the same time it really matters who has access and how people get access.

32:06 We can talk more about that later if people want to.

32:09 And finally,

32:10 actually thinking about transitions between education and work matter.

32:14 There are some countries like Korea and Japan that are doing a lot of work on this.

32:17 In the US historically we've actually done a lot of work on this,

32:20 particularly for,

32:20 for high skilled work.

32:22 But actually thinking that for many countries

32:24 people who come into the education system

32:27 are often prime candidates to stay and move into the working into the workforce.

32:31 So something that we should focus on.

32:34 Two second principle is that we need to

32:35 invest in the credibility of legal immigration systems

32:38 or legal migration systems.

32:40 This is not something you tend to hear from people

32:43 who say the first principle that we need legal channels.

32:46 We often leave off the second part,

32:48 which is

32:48 we need to make sure people use those channels.

32:51 Um,

32:52 I think many of us who are immigrants,

32:54 children of immigrants,

32:55 married to immigrants,

32:57 live in immigrant communities,

32:58 we're very comfortable with people whether they come legally or not,

33:02 right?

33:02 It doesn't matter to us a whole lot,

33:03 but I think we should assume that in most societies,

33:06 publics lose confidence with immigration systems

33:09 if most people don't come through legal channels,

33:12 right?

33:12 And we do have to be sensitive to that.

33:13 We have to be conscious of that.

33:15 Um,

33:16 as a real need.

33:17 And so this makes the,

33:19 it makes it important to,

33:20 to figure out how you reduce irregular migration.

33:23 By the way,

33:23 I think it's hard to,

33:24 unless you're draconian,

33:25 it's hard to reduce irregular migration

33:27 when the economy is good.

33:28 Going back to Danny's slide

33:30 and his,

33:30 his previous paper on this,

33:32 unless you have legal channels,

33:33 there's a reinforcing effect.

33:34 But the opposite is true.

33:36 Legal channels don't work unless you also enforce them,

33:39 right,

33:39 and make sure they work.

33:41 Pacing matters,

33:42 and I think we need to be sensitive to pacing,

33:44 to timing.

33:45 Um,

33:46 how the effects on schools,

33:47 the effects on healthcare systems,

33:48 the effects on housing.

33:50 This is an issue that's being debated in Canada right now,

33:51 right,

33:52 as the number of migrants shot up,

33:54 the actual pressures on housing,

33:56 not all of which was driven by immigration,

33:57 but it's an easy target and certainly was a contributing factor.

34:01 Um,

34:02 and we need to think about redesigning humanitarian protection,

34:05 and I know this is controversial probably in this group and most groups that I'm in,

34:09 but the reality of sort of open-ended asylum processes will probably not survive.

34:13 I mean,

34:14 de facto,

34:14 we do not have an asylum system on the US border right now,

34:17 and I'm not sure it's coming back,

34:18 and I'm,

34:19 I'm afraid we may see Europe go that way,

34:21 but there is a midpoint where you can make asylum

34:24 of non-neighboring countries or non-narby countries.

34:27 Much higher standard,

34:29 preserve it at a much higher standard and invest much more in regional,

34:32 um,

34:33 in regional protection,

34:34 much more in legal pathways

34:37 for resettlement,

34:37 and much more in making

34:39 employment-based pathways accessible to refugees and displaced populations.

34:43 So happy to talk more about that,

34:44 but I think we do have to have that

34:46 displacement is not going to go away.

34:48 In fact,

34:48 it's probably going to increase over time in a post-liberal order,

34:52 global liberal order world.

34:54 And so we do have to think about this as part of the equation.

34:57 The final thing I would say is we need to think the third

34:59 principle be how we incorporate people

35:01 who migrate into the destination societies.

35:04 Integration really matters,

35:06 right?

35:06 And it's actually one of the toughest pieces of this,

35:08 and it's not just about entry,

35:10 it's about remaining,

35:12 um.

35:13 You know,

35:13 there is an increasing body of economic research,

35:16 and I would recommend a paper that is

35:18 Leah Bustan and others at Al.

35:20 It's a group of researchers

35:22 that published both through the National Bureau of

35:24 Economic Research and through the Institute for Labor Economics

35:29 that looks at 15 countries,

35:30 and one of the things they find is that countries that have a history of immigration.

35:34 The UK,

35:36 Australia,

35:36 Canada,

35:36 US,

35:37 the second

35:38 generation

35:39 born in the country

35:40 has much more upward mobility

35:42 than in countries where there's less history of immigration.

35:45 Now there's a lot of things you need to dig down in this,

35:46 right,

35:47 which they have not had a chance to do yet,

35:48 which is how did people arrive?

35:50 Were they refugees?

35:51 Were they labor immigrants?

35:52 I mean,

35:53 you ask questions what income level,

35:54 so on and so forth.

35:55 So I don't think this is definitive,

35:57 but I think it tells us something we intuitively know already,

35:59 which is you need to have templates for immigrants to come,

36:02 those who are going to stay permanently.

36:04 To become part of their country,

36:05 for their kids to be part of the country,

36:08 and to have mechanisms to succeed over time,

36:10 and this leads us to a set of things that we're

36:12 ill prepared to deal with and frankly have to be dealt with

36:15 in national contexts,

36:17 right?

36:17 The World Bank can be helpful on this,

36:19 but ultimately these are national decisions.

36:21 I mean,

36:21 and,

36:22 and some of these are about mediating institutions at the local level,

36:24 schools,

36:25 community organizations,

36:27 um.

36:28 You know,

36:28 migrant-led organizations that can help their own coming in,

36:32 you know,

36:33 how,

36:33 what is the institutional con

36:34 context?

36:35 Some of this is about debates around national identity,

36:39 right?

36:40 I mean,

36:40 and these are tough conversations,

36:42 right?

36:42 Some countries have very fluid national identities,

36:45 you know,

36:46 Australia,

36:46 right?

36:47 Australia,

36:47 you know,

36:47 that's not always been fluid.

36:48 It's actually,

36:49 and it's not that there aren't debates and that

36:51 there isn't pushback and there isn't inequality in it,

36:53 but there's some ability in.

36:55 Some notion in Australia you can come from India

36:57 and you could end up,

36:58 by the way,

36:59 UK,

36:59 you could,

36:59 you know,

37:00 you could be of Indian descent with your parents

37:01 born in Uganda and end up as prime minister

37:03 right now may be a harder road,

37:05 maybe there's a lot of inequality certainly,

37:07 but,

37:08 but not a crazy idea all of a sudden,

37:09 right?

37:10 Um,

37:11 that's not equally true everywhere,

37:13 right?

37:13 And so these are gonna get into questions that are

37:15 really tough that have to be answered in national contexts

37:18 about who gets to belong and I,

37:19 and I think we just need to be.

37:21 To be aware that's there.

37:23 So let me just conclude by saying one way or

37:25 another we're going to see a world of increased mobility

37:27 in a pessimistic scenario.

37:30 Um,

37:30 this is going to lead to enormous tensions,

37:32 reassertions of narrow ideas of national identity,

37:36 and lots of conflict between nations.

37:38 Like why are you letting your people come over here?

37:40 That would never happen in this country,

37:41 right?

37:42 Um.

37:43 In an optimistic scenario,

37:44 we will see,

37:45 we will build the right channels for people to move.

37:48 Those channels will

37:49 also,

37:50 as Shagler said,

37:52 you know,

37:52 also involve upskilling people for people both to

37:55 move and to stay with greater skills.

37:58 They will,

37:59 these channels will be enforceable.

38:01 We'll actually make sure that they're respected and

38:03 we'll be sensitive to the fact that,

38:04 that we don't want people moving outside those channels for the most part,

38:08 and we will invest in integration.

38:10 Right?

38:10 And this will be a win-win

38:13 for both sending countries and for receiving countries.

38:16 In reality,

38:17 I suspect we're going to end up with a little bit of both in different places,

38:20 and we're gonna have to figure out how to navigate this going forward.

38:23 Thank you.

38:42 Great.

38:42 Thanks so much to Ashanti and Danny for inviting me to be here today.

38:46 I'm what I'm going to talk about is I'm going to think

38:48 a little bit about the development impacts on migrant origin countries.

38:51 Um,

38:52 I'm going to focus this particularly thinking about human capital

38:54 and the way that this responses to international migration.

38:58 So

38:59 I don't think I have to convince you that international

39:01 migration rates are high and they've been increasing globally,

39:04 and this is particularly true for skilled workers.

39:07 For example,

39:07 18% of workers from low income countries with a

39:10 bachelor's degree are currently living in the OECD.

39:13 And so as a result of this,

39:16 researchers,

39:16 policymakers,

39:17 government officials,

39:18 um,

39:19 often

39:20 argue that this sort of international migration is going to lead

39:23 to a loss of human capital in countries of origin,

39:26 something we colloquially colloquially referred to as brain drain.

39:29 OK.

39:30 This is particularly pervasive and arguments about healthcare workers.

39:34 OK,

39:34 we've seen this ramp up during the

39:36 COVID-19 pandemic as it became particularly apparent,

39:39 um,

39:39 the global shortages that we had for medical workers.

39:42 OK,

39:43 but

39:44 I think well it may be intuitive to think about that when people leave,

39:48 they take their human capital with them and this depletes the origin country.

39:51 What I want to think a little bit about today is how migration

39:54 opportunities may also be able to lead to increases in human capital,

39:58 what we can refer to as brain gain.

40:00 OK.

40:00 And so there are a number of mechanisms through which this process could happen.

40:03 And I would say historically,

40:05 we haven't had a lot of evidence on this.

40:06 Economists have talked about this as a potential,

40:08 um,

40:09 a potential channel,

40:11 but they haven't really empirically been able to estimate this.

40:14 And in the past,

40:14 um,

40:15 several years,

40:15 there's been a lot of progress made on this as an empirical channel.

40:19 OK.

40:20 Um,

40:21 so what I want to talk about first is I want to kind of put forth some of the

40:25 theoretical underpinnings of what we're thinking here

40:28 in terms of the way these mechanisms might work.

40:30 OK,

40:30 so this is a figure from the paper that Danny

40:33 mentioned that we just had come out in Science,

40:35 um,

40:35 and I think it does a nice job of hopefully

40:37 helping illustrate the different channels that I'm thinking about here.

40:40 OK,

40:40 so I want to start with the most obvious,

40:42 um,

40:43 The most obvious path.

40:44 And what I want to think about is

40:45 how migration opportunities

40:47 can lead to impacts on human capital.

40:49 So let's start on the left.

40:52 And go toward this brain drain channel where I talk about immigration.

40:55 This is sort of the intuitive case.

40:57 People leave,

40:57 they take their human capital with them.

40:59 OK.

41:00 Now,

41:00 alternatively,

41:01 if you look above this,

41:03 OK,

41:03 toward educational investments,

41:05 there's another story.

41:06 OK.

41:07 So

41:08 perhaps the prospect of future migration actually incentivizes people

41:12 to invest in education that they wouldn't have bothered

41:14 to if the only labor market opportunities available to

41:17 them were those available in their origin country.

41:19 OK?

41:20 If not all of those individuals choose to migrate,

41:23 which is typically the case,

41:24 given restrictions on labor mobility,

41:26 this can actually lead to an increase in

41:28 human capital in migrants' countries of origin.

41:30 OK,

41:30 so that's sort of the other direct pathway that I'm thinking about here.

41:34 Now,

41:35 I want to leave that one aside for a minute.

41:37 I'm going to come back to it.

41:38 And I want to come back to this brain drain channel where

41:40 we have people leaving and taking their human capital with them,

41:43 OK?

41:44 What I want to argue is that there are still a number of other

41:47 theoretical mechanisms through which international migration can

41:50 actually lead to increases in human capital.

41:52 OK,

41:53 so let's start with probably the most obvious.

41:55 That's the one on the bottom,

41:56 where we think about that.

41:58 People leave and they send financial remittances back home.

42:01 OK.

42:02 Um,

42:02 they send these financial remittances back home.

42:04 This can have direct impacts on investment in human capital.

42:08 OK.

42:08 More people go to school,

42:09 can also have direct impacts on income,

42:11 on consumption,

42:12 on investment,

42:13 as well as on investments in health.

42:15 OK.

42:16 Similarly,

42:17 we can think about return migration.

42:19 OK,

42:19 we have lots of circular migration,

42:20 temporary migration happening around the globe right now.

42:23 And so many of these workers are going to come back home again.

42:25 OK.

42:26 And when they come back home,

42:27 there's been some evidence that shows that this leads to more innovation at home.

42:31 It leads to more entrepreneurship,

42:32 it leads to better trade linkages between origin and destination countries in a

42:36 way that has real development impacts and real impacts on human capital.

42:41 OK?

42:42 You don't need the workers to return

42:44 home though to necessarily reap these benefits,

42:46 OK?

42:47 We're living in a world where technology is expanding,

42:49 people are communicating on WhatsApp and social media and Zoom,

42:52 and so these knowledge transfers can happen even in

42:55 the absence of this sort of return migration.

42:58 OK,

42:58 and so these knowledge transfers can lead to some

43:00 of these channels about innovation and business development.

43:04 But they can also lead to what,

43:06 um,

43:06 many in the field have started calling social remittances.

43:08 OK.

43:09 So there can be these transfers of norms from

43:12 the destination country back to the origin country.

43:15 There's some really nice evidence that thinks

43:16 about this in terms of sociopolitical outcomes.

43:19 So thinking about particularly when migrants

43:21 go to more democratic destination countries,

43:23 these democratic norms often gets transmitted back

43:26 to the country of origin and can have

43:28 real meaningful change in terms of the political systems in the country of origin.

43:33 I have some relatively new work with Susan Godlinton where

43:35 we look at this in terms of fertility norms,

43:37 OK,

43:37 and so we look at migrants going abroad,

43:40 they get exposed to,

43:41 say,

43:42 new reproductive health policy,

43:43 maybe the pill is legalized in their destination country.

43:47 When they're exposed to this,

43:48 um,

43:49 this transmits back to their country of origin,

43:51 and fertility actually reduces beyond just the migrants themselves

43:55 through the mechanism of increased adoption of modern contraceptives.

43:58 OK?

43:59 So these sorts of channels can really matter

44:01 in terms of shaping things socially beyond the

44:04 story that we've kind of all been telling

44:05 about financial remittances for a really long time.

44:07 Still super important,

44:08 but I just want to push you to think beyond that financial remittance story.

44:13 OK?

44:13 These things can matter in the long run.

44:15 Um,

44:15 I have some other new work,

44:17 um,

44:17 with a few co-authors

44:18 where we're thinking about positive income shocks to migration,

44:21 um,

44:21 for Filipino migrants,

44:22 and we can show that 20 years after these income shocks,

44:26 there are real increases,

44:27 not only in global income,

44:29 but in domestic income coming through

44:30 entrepreneurship and increased investment in education.

44:33 So,

44:34 Thinking of these,

44:35 these mechanisms,

44:36 I think

44:37 what I want to argue is at least theoretically,

44:39 and there's a lot of empirical evidence to

44:41 this human capital,

44:42 um,

44:43 there can be real human capital effects kind of diffusing through migration.

44:48 OK,

44:49 so for what,

44:49 what I want to do for the rest of my time today is focus on

44:53 a case study where migration leads to increases

44:55 in human capital in the origin country.

44:57 OK,

44:58 I'm gonna focus specifically

45:00 on this top channel about educational investments,

45:03 um,

45:03 and I'm gonna think about a case in the Philippines,

45:06 uh,

45:06 where incentives to invest in human capital due to

45:08 migration opportunities led to gains in human capital.

45:12 And you know,

45:13 this behind this figure,

45:14 there are a lot of really great empirical work that

45:16 I'm not going to have time to talk about today.

45:18 Um,

45:18 so I just point you toward this review piece that we have in science,

45:21 uh,

45:21 to dig into some of that.

45:22 I'm happy to chat more at lunch as well.

45:26 OK,

45:26 so when we think,

45:28 um,

45:28 about many wealthy countries,

45:30 many of them have shortages of medical workers and they're relying

45:33 on workers from developing countries to fill in as nurses,

45:36 as doctors,

45:37 and,

45:38 um,

45:38 other medical professionals,

45:39 care workers,

45:40 um,

45:40 broadly.

45:41 By the same token,

45:42 many origin countries,

45:44 many lower income countries

45:46 are actually developing migration policy to actually encourage the migration

45:49 of healthcare professionals as part of their development strategy.

45:52 The Philippines,

45:53 I think,

45:53 is the example of a country that's done this for the longest,

45:56 um,

45:56 largely because of the colonial ties between the US and the Philippines,

45:59 um,

46:00 and the US setting up nursing schools back in the 1940s.

46:03 But I think

46:05 thinking about this,

46:05 we're kind of left in this situation where we think about,

46:08 you know,

46:08 how is this working?

46:09 Is this leading to brain drain?

46:11 OK.

46:11 So Filipinos broadly come as nurses to the United States.

46:15 About 74% of Filipino nurses who migrate come to the United States,

46:19 and their opportunities to come to the United

46:21 States are largely dictated by US visa policy.

46:24 OK?

46:25 And so

46:25 what I'm gonna show you in this figure,

46:27 what I've done here is I've plotted

46:29 Filipino migrants to the United States and to other countries,

46:33 um,

46:33 along here.

46:34 And so you can see

46:35 that between 1990 and 2000,

46:37 this was relatively stable,

46:39 OK?

46:39 That was about,

46:40 you know,

46:41 Say 1500,

46:43 um,

46:43 workers coming each year on visas to the United States.

46:46 In 2000,

46:47 we start to see this increase.

46:48 OK,

46:48 so what happened in 2000?

46:50 Well,

46:50 in 2000,

46:51 the United States lifted the 7% cap on countries of origin

46:54 in terms of like diversification of where people could come from.

46:57 So they lifted that.

46:59 They also authorize the use of some employment-based visas,

47:02 EB-3 visas that hadn't been used before.

47:05 Um,

47:05 and they,

47:06 they profit,

47:07 they,

47:07 uh,

47:07 they prioritize Schedule A occupations,

47:09 which are occupations where there's a shortage,

47:11 which is what nursing falls under.

47:13 OK.

47:13 So what do we see here?

47:15 We see a really dramatic increase in the number of Filipinos that

47:18 are coming to the US as nurses between 2000 and 2006.

47:22 OK.

47:22 By 2006,

47:23 this is about 7000 individuals coming on nursing visas each year.

47:27 2007,

47:29 policy changes,

47:30 7% caps back in place.

47:32 The EB3 visas that were unused have now been used up,

47:35 and we,

47:35 and we see this dramatic drop in 2007.

47:38 OK.

47:39 It increased a little bit.

47:40 It didn't go quite back to the original levels,

47:42 but it never increases back to these levels that we see

47:45 during this kind of period where visas are relatively available.

47:49 OK,

47:49 so what Paulo and I do in our paper is we use these shocks to immigration policy,

47:53 um,

47:54 from US visa policy.

47:55 And we combine it with geographic migrant networks in the Philippines.

47:59 So,

47:59 like most places,

48:00 migrant networks really matter in terms of where people go

48:03 abroad and the occupations that they do in destination countries.

48:07 And so we're able to combine these two things to have places

48:10 where they have historically sent lots of nurse migrants to the US.

48:13 Those are sort of our treated places.

48:15 And then we have places that haven't had a lot of nurse migration to the US.

48:17 And so we combine these two sources of variation.

48:20 To investigate this using an event study and look at the

48:23 implications that this has on human capital back in the Philippines.

48:27 Now,

48:28 I'm actually just going to show you this in the aggregate today.

48:30 I think,

48:31 um,

48:32 one of the reasons I like this paper is because I can just

48:34 show you a time series and it tells you the whole story.

48:36 If you want to see the event studies,

48:37 they're all in the paper,

48:37 but I think the time series actually makes this in a really compelling way.

48:41 OK,

48:41 so what I've done here is this is plotting

48:44 for your enrollment,

48:45 um,

48:45 in tertiary education in the Philippines over time.

48:48 OK.

48:49 And so you can see nursing in black,

48:51 and you can see that this follows

48:53 that liberalization of visas,

48:54 kind of the expansion of visas,

48:56 um,

48:57 for,

48:57 uh,

48:57 for Filipinos to the US,

48:59 and then the subsequent contraction.

49:01 OK,

49:01 so in 2000,

49:02 we start to see enrollment increase pretty dramatically.

49:04 We're going from around 150,000 individuals enrolling in nursing school

49:08 over,

49:09 so this is,

49:10 you know,

49:10 in the Philippines,

49:11 you have to have a 4-year degree to become a nurse.

49:13 So this is all 4 years of enrollment,

49:15 um,

49:16 And so you see this go from about 150,000 in the year 2000.

49:21 To about 550,000.

49:24 OK,

49:24 by the peak of this.

49:25 Now,

49:25 I just want to draw your attention back to this.

49:27 We were going from 1500 to 7000 visas.

49:31 What we see here is going

49:33 to almost 550,000 people enrolled in school.

49:36 And we see,

49:36 if you look at graduation,

49:37 you can see the same picture.

49:39 It's just lagged 4 years,

49:40 um,

49:40 because it takes 4 years to finish your degree.

49:42 So

49:44 what this resulted in is this visa expansion led to

49:46 about a 247% increase in the number of nursing graduates.

49:51 Now,

49:52 in the Philippines,

49:52 you also have to pass a nursing licensure exam.

49:54 They come to the US,

49:55 they also have to pass the NCLEX.

49:57 But what we find is that for each additional nurse who migrated to the US on a visa,

50:01 9 more passed the licensure exam.

50:04 OK,

50:04 it's important that we think about licensure because we want to make sure

50:06 that they actually meet the standards to actually practice in a Filipino hospital.

50:10 Um,

50:11 and so,

50:11 so we find these 9 more licensed nurses.

50:14 Now the enrollment effects,

50:15 you can see this here are really driven by switches from other fields.

50:19 OK?

50:19 So you see these dips in business and education and STEM

50:22 that are kind of trading off with the increases in nursing.

50:26 However,

50:27 people appear to persist to degree at higher rates in nursing.

50:31 And so we actually find an overall increase

50:34 in the amount of people that have a tertiary education.

50:37 So we see an overall increase in regardless of degree type

50:40 in the number of people that got a tertiary education.

50:43 OK,

50:44 so what made this possible?

50:45 So I think economists for a while that you can look at some writings,

50:48 you know,

50:48 from 20 or 30 years ago that say,

50:50 yeah,

50:50 theoretically brain drain seems like it could be possible,

50:54 but

50:54 the supply is not going to respond.

50:56 So it's not going to be able to happen empirically.

50:58 OK?

50:59 So what we're able to do with the Philippines data,

51:01 which is pretty amazing,

51:02 is we can look at the supply of nursing programs.

51:04 OK,

51:04 so I've just again plotted this for you,

51:06 just the time series across the country as a whole.

51:08 And you can see that there was a dramatic increase in nursing schools,

51:12 um,

51:12 in response to demand for people to get nursing degrees.

51:16 This was driven mostly by private institutions.

51:18 OK.

51:18 And I want to emphasize the Philippines has

51:20 a very well developed tertiary education system,

51:22 and I'll talk about that a little bit more in just a minute.

51:25 This increase was driven almost entirely by existing

51:28 institutions adding programs rather than entirely new schools.

51:31 And the enrollment effects that we find are coming from provinces

51:35 that had

51:36 A lot of tertiary education institutions,

51:39 but didn't have nursing programs.

51:40 So Amherst College adds a nursing degree,

51:43 OK?

51:43 Not the new nursing school of Amherst,

51:45 Massachusetts opens.

51:46 It's coming through the the former.

51:48 OK.

51:52 OK,

51:52 so where does this leave us?

51:54 OK,

51:54 so brain drain and brain circulation

51:56 are more than just theoretical possibilities.

51:58 I think what this paper shows is that you can

52:00 experience these real gains in human capital as a result.

52:03 But I want to emphasize a number of other things,

52:05 OK,

52:05 because I think for me,

52:06 this,

52:06 this,

52:07 uh,

52:07 project on Filipino nurses has led to even more questions that I think we need,

52:11 um,

52:11 we need input on.

52:12 So the outcomes may differ in poorer countries,

52:14 OK.

52:15 They may differ in more fragile economies,

52:16 they may differ in conflict,

52:18 um,

52:18 prone regions.

52:19 OK.

52:20 There may be fewer opportunities in those places for skill acquisition.

52:23 And so that supply side and response may differ.

52:25 And I think what our work shows

52:27 is the supply being flexible and agile,

52:29 and this speaks to some of what was mentioned before.

52:31 It's going to be really important for,

52:33 for low-income countries to get the benefits of this.

52:36 The other thing I want to mention is that a lot of the literature focuses on

52:39 low,

52:39 low middle income and middle income countries that are quite large.

52:42 OK.

52:43 So Philippines,

52:43 India,

52:44 and Mexico,

52:45 we need to take this literature

52:46 to other places that may be vulnerable to try to push this forward.

52:50 OK?

52:51 Um,

52:51 and so I think the other place that I really think we

52:54 need to push on is what are effective policies for origin regions,

52:57 OK?

52:58 Really,

52:59 we need to consider the general equilibrium effects

53:02 for all of the relevant labor markets.

53:04 OK?

53:04 So if people are switching to nursing,

53:06 does that mean they're not engineers and infrastructure is not happening

53:09 at home in the ways that it would have before?

53:11 OK,

53:11 what are these switches happening?

53:13 I think perhaps obviously,

53:14 what are the externalities in terms of health

53:15 and well-being for the population countries of origin?

53:19 And then I think thinking about our countries investing in the wrong type of skill,

53:22 and you can think of this at a pretty micro level.

53:24 There are a lot of anecdotes in the Philippines that

53:26 nurses that want to go abroad,

53:28 they're investing in geriatric skills.

53:30 They want to go to Japan,

53:31 they want to go to Israel and work in those places.

53:33 And so as a result,

53:35 that's not what the Philippines needs.

53:36 The Philippines still needs pediatric care,

53:38 still needs OBGYNs,

53:39 right?

53:40 And so this,

53:41 this heterogeneity may have implications at home as well.

53:44 And one last point that I want to make on this before I'll conclude is like,

53:48 two countries

53:50 actually capitalize on this brain game?

53:52 OK,

53:52 so,

53:52 you know,

53:53 I think I can show you in the time series

53:55 is pretty compelling in terms of the number of nurses,

53:57 but if I talk to say the Department of

53:59 Labor in the Philippines or the Department of Health,

54:01 they're still reporting shortages of nurses in hospitals.

54:04 OK.

54:05 Now,

54:05 why is that?

54:05 OK,

54:06 when I talk to nurses about this,

54:07 they'll say,

54:08 yeah,

54:08 well,

54:08 or people who got a nursing degree,

54:09 they'll say,

54:10 well,

54:10 the conditions are terrible,

54:11 the wages are terrible.

54:12 I'd,

54:12 I'd prefer to work in a call center or,

54:15 or,

54:15 or BPO

54:16 and use my nursing skills,

54:18 um,

54:18 you know,

54:18 for an insurance company or something like that.

54:21 And so thinking about how we can help

54:24 the labor markets in origin countries actually make

54:26 use of these gains and human capital,

54:28 I think is really important.

54:31 OK.

54:31 So,

54:33 the last things that I'll say are just that.

54:36 International migration shapes the labor force.

54:39 It shapes the human capital that happens in the labor force.

54:42 And so on the previous slide,

54:43 hopefully I,

54:44 I,

54:44 uh,

54:44 outlined some areas where I think we need future work.

54:47 But the last point that I want to leave you with is that,

54:50 you know,

54:50 there's been a lot of good empirical work that

54:54 has looked at origin country responses to migration shocks.

54:57 OK,

54:57 and this has been really important for being

54:59 able to document these human capital responses.

55:01 And I hate to knock this because that's what most of my

55:03 work has done is looking at migration shocks and seeing what happens.

55:06 But I think where we need to go next is not there,

55:08 OK?

55:09 That work is great.

55:10 um,

55:10 but what future work needs to do

55:12 is really think about partnerships with policymakers to

55:15 actively identify the types of policies that

55:18 will enhance the benefits for origin countries,

55:21 for the migrants themselves,

55:22 and for the destination countries.

55:23 And I think things like diaspora engagement,

55:26 as well as the global skills partnerships we've talked

55:28 about are things that have a lot of potential,

55:29 and these partnerships are going to be really important.

55:31 So thank you so much.

55:49 Um,

55:49 all right.

55:50 Well,

55:50 this was

55:54 Um,

55:55 this was fantastic and um

55:58 I don't know if I'm going to disappoint you going back to the microphone myself,

56:01 but

56:02 Um,

56:03 I want to,

56:03 we have a bit of about 20 minutes,

56:06 15 minutes,

56:07 so,

56:08 um,

56:08 I'm going to do,

56:10 I just have to do a round of questions myself and then we're going to open it.

56:13 Can you,

56:13 can you tell me when you have like

56:15 7 minutes,

56:16 8 minutes ish or something,

56:18 um.

56:20 I,

56:21 uh,

56:23 help me,

56:24 this is gonna be very hard because I'm

56:26 throwing you questions that are hard to answer,

56:27 but just let's try to be concise.

56:29 Um,

56:30 I loved your football example and I appreciate you calling it football.

56:35 Very much,

56:36 um.

56:38 What,

56:39 uh,

56:39 it,

56:40 it,

56:40 because a big part of this which we probably

56:42 won't be able to go too much in detail is about the financing of these models,

56:46 and it's a completely private

56:48 sector,

56:49 um,

56:50 endeavor,

56:52 and,

56:52 and I,

56:53 I wonder if you have thought,

56:54 and you probably have,

56:54 like how much of this is actually replicable to

56:57 other industries because I guess in the football example

57:00 there's a bit of a portfolio approach like one

57:01 of these people is gonna be the next Messi.

57:04 And that's gonna bring millions and millions of dollars.

57:05 It's not the same you cannot say that about manufacturing or nurses,

57:08 I guess,

57:09 uh,

57:10 so

57:11 tell us,

57:11 you know,

57:12 how much,

57:12 what are the lessons

57:14 or one lesson,

57:15 or how,

57:15 how would you think this about for other industries perhaps?

57:17 Is this actually doable,

57:18 or you,

57:19 you foresee that this will always need some sort of

57:21 public sector involvement?

57:24 Uh,

57:25 I can speak for hours about football,

57:27 but the short answer,

57:29 I don't think I agree with you,

57:31 Danny,

57:31 because I don't think

57:32 when Barcelona or Ajax sets up a football academy,

57:35 they think they're gonna find the next Messi,

57:38 because if they find the next Messi,

57:39 which happened with Messi,

57:40 they bring him to Spain

57:42 at age 10,

57:43 right?

57:44 The,

57:44 the whole thing there is actually

57:46 partially,

57:47 I,

57:47 I honestly believe some sort of social service.

57:51 And provide education

57:53 and most of these players go to

57:55 2nd or 3rd tier countries.

57:57 They go play in,

57:58 in Poland and they play in Latvia and stuff.

58:01 The,

58:01 the really,

58:02 really,

58:02 really talented ones,

58:03 they identify at a young age and they bring them to the Netherlands and Spain

58:07 right away.

58:09 Uh,

58:09 but

58:10 now,

58:10 football is a very small market.

58:12 It,

58:12 but it,

58:13 it works really well as an example because it's minimal government intervention

58:17 and it is so

58:18 close to the hearts of the consumer.

58:21 If the government said in in Italy or Spain or

58:24 England we're not going to allow more foreign players,

58:27 you know,

58:27 you would have riots.

58:28 I mean there are British English teams which don't have a single English player,

58:33 and I think 49 of the top 50 players in the world are.

58:37 Playing in a country in which they are not citizens,

58:39 so

58:40 it's an anomaly in a way.

58:41 But the unique thing about football,

58:43 what I'm going to tell you compared to the doctors

58:47 from Africa,

58:48 if you look at the data,

58:49 the growth of the doctors' migration in the football players is almost identical.

58:53 So I had those slides in other presentations.

58:56 You cannot tell them apart.

58:58 The difference is is what Carolyn said is the supply response.

59:01 The training,

59:02 the medical school facilities in Africa did not

59:05 expand with increased demand from high income,

59:08 but the football markets did,

59:10 right?

59:11 I think that's where the private sector

59:13 plays a key role.

59:14 If it can be

59:16 addressed through private sector,

59:17 it's nursing

59:18 or actually

59:20 shipping crews in the Philippines,

59:21 it's the same thing.

59:22 Private training facilities address that or football players.

59:25 You know,

59:27 and we kind of keep the governments and even sometimes the World Bank out of it.

59:31 The markets actually do pretty well,

59:33 right?

59:33 I think that's what

59:35 we should be

59:36 focusing on how to.

59:39 Set up the legal framework

59:41 as as as we talked about that the legal

59:44 pathways are there where the rights are protected and the

59:46 the the.

59:48 The locals,

59:49 the natives in the migrant destination country are also protected,

59:53 but also the full rights of the migrants and their credentials are recognized.

59:58 Finding those systems,

59:59 and I think

59:59 the market kind of takes care of it.

1:00:01 I mean,

1:00:02 I come from a left wing family.

1:00:03 My father would be

1:00:04 devastated in seeing,

1:00:05 but

1:00:06 the private markets,

1:00:08 I think,

1:00:08 take care of it.

1:00:09 I think that's what the football markets are teaching us.

1:00:13 Let me take that and go to Carolyn because um

1:00:16 er I was very struck by what you said at the end uh on how

1:00:20 to capitalize the rate gain and and

1:00:23 and there were shortages of nurses in the Philippines but the wages weren't

1:00:27 maybe adjusting as fast or that the market maybe wasn't uh getting that cue so

1:00:32 um bigger question for you but also maybe if if you can brief about be brief about

1:00:38 because you thought about this,

1:00:39 what,

1:00:39 what would you say are like important.

1:00:42 Policies or key ideas to keep in place to actually capitalize on

1:00:46 that boring game because I think that's kind of the core,

1:00:48 one of the cores of the issue on how to really make this a win-win.

1:00:52 Yeah,

1:00:53 OK,

1:00:53 it's on.

1:00:54 Um,

1:00:55 yeah,

1:00:55 I think it's a great question,

1:00:56 Danny,

1:00:57 and I think

1:00:58 Frustratingly,

1:00:59 I think that that question

1:01:01 gets more or less attention as

1:01:05 political administrations change in the origin country.

1:01:08 So there was a lot of interest in the Philippines and thinking about this,

1:01:12 um,

1:01:13 maybe 5 years ago

1:01:14 and then priorities changed and there's sort of

1:01:16 been less interest in thinking about it,

1:01:17 but some of the ideas that we were talking about.

1:01:19 Um,

1:01:20 were twofold.

1:01:21 So first,

1:01:21 you know,

1:01:21 I told you that for each licensed nurse that goes abroad

1:01:24 or each nurse that goes abroad,

1:01:25 there are 9 newly licensed nurses.

1:01:28 Well,

1:01:28 there are also a bunch of people who never passed the licensure exam.

1:01:30 OK.

1:01:31 These schools that increased weren't all

1:01:33 great schools,

1:01:34 and so

1:01:35 there's a lot of concern about

1:01:38 people that invested in a costly degree and

1:01:40 couldn't actually work in the profession that.

1:01:42 That they were trained to do.

1:01:43 And so one of the things that we were talking about

1:01:45 was trying to develop some retraining programs because

1:01:48 they actually have a lot of skill.

1:01:49 Maybe they could migrate as caregivers,

1:01:51 um,

1:01:51 not as a nurse,

1:01:52 but as a caregiver.

1:01:53 Maybe they could,

1:01:55 um,

1:01:55 work as the Philippines has a lot of these like rural healthcare workers.

1:01:59 They don't need to be a nurse,

1:02:00 but they could do some sort of,

1:02:01 um,

1:02:02 training along those lines.

1:02:03 So thinking about ways that we can capitalize on that,

1:02:05 um.

1:02:06 And then I think that there,

1:02:08 there's been some discussion about like,

1:02:10 how can we improve the conditions in the the local

1:02:13 hospitals in such a way that it's a more appealing,

1:02:15 um,

1:02:15 place to work.

1:02:16 And I think the Department of Labor was really keen to kind of

1:02:18 push some ideas forward on that front.

1:02:21 So maybe a little bit stalled now in terms of thinking about it,

1:02:24 um,

1:02:25 so

1:02:25 yeah,

1:02:25 I don't know,

1:02:26 I don't know if I have more to say than that,

1:02:27 um,

1:02:28 no,

1:02:28 that's,

1:02:29 that's,

1:02:29 that's,

1:02:29 that's a great insight,

1:02:31 Andrew,

1:02:32 um,

1:02:34 going back to

1:02:37 the,

1:02:37 the difficult part of the policy making which Jalar kind of also,

1:02:41 uh,

1:02:41 explained about all the,

1:02:43 you know,

1:02:44 different departments and ministries that need to be involved with you,

1:02:46 you've spent a lot of time with,

1:02:48 with decision makers.

1:02:49 Um,

1:02:50 talking about this,

1:02:51 so what are,

1:02:52 uh,

1:02:52 another very easy question,

1:02:54 what are the kind of the low hanging fruits in terms of the,

1:02:57 I don't know if you want to go through the narrative or the actual,

1:03:01 um,

1:03:01 policy making in to,

1:03:03 to,

1:03:03 to,

1:03:04 to actually,

1:03:05 you know,

1:03:05 make this again a win-win with with the decision makers that are.

1:03:09 Uh,

1:03:09 maybe,

1:03:10 um,

1:03:11 uh,

1:03:12 you know,

1:03:12 worried about

1:03:13 all the things you said,

1:03:14 the,

1:03:14 the social narrative or

1:03:16 the social cohesion,

1:03:17 all,

1:03:17 all these aspects of what,

1:03:18 what,

1:03:19 what would be kind of at this stage in,

1:03:20 in where the world is

1:03:22 kind of a good way to,

1:03:24 to,

1:03:24 to get this

1:03:25 past the political process in a way that it's being,

1:03:28 uh,

1:03:29 appreciated as a win,

1:03:29 win,

1:03:29 win.

1:03:32 Let me start by saying something that is not in my self-interest

1:03:35 since I work at a place called the Migration Policy Institute,

1:03:39 but it is better not to talk about it as migration.

1:03:41 Um,

1:03:43 and I'm actually serious about that.

1:03:44 I mean,

1:03:45 I think the,

1:03:45 the conversation about labor markets,

1:03:47 about skills,

1:03:49 about,

1:03:49 you know,

1:03:50 I,

1:03:50 I think you gets you broader buy-in.

1:03:52 You can find very few countries.

1:03:54 I mean,

1:03:54 again,

1:03:55 you go back to Canada,

1:03:56 Australia,

1:03:57 New Zealand,

1:03:58 where immigration has always been part of economic policy.

1:04:00 You say immigration

1:04:02 and most people go,

1:04:03 yeah,

1:04:03 that's about skills,

1:04:04 about population growth,

1:04:05 we got that,

1:04:06 you know,

1:04:06 but most other countries,

1:04:08 immigration is still a controversial.

1:04:11 World word

1:04:12 and it's slightly isolated and people who run the immigration policy

1:04:16 tend not to be

1:04:18 strong actors within the interagency system,

1:04:21 right?

1:04:22 So vis a vis labor ministries,

1:04:24 vis a vis treasury,

1:04:25 vis a vis,

1:04:26 you know,

1:04:27 or finance ministries,

1:04:28 vis a vis commerce,

1:04:29 vis a vis other ministry education

1:04:31 that you need to get engaged,

1:04:34 that's,

1:04:34 I think Tyler's point I think was really important actually in Germany

1:04:37 where I mean the fact that the World Bank comes in.

1:04:40 Is really useful.

1:04:41 Outside actors matter a lot.

1:04:43 The fact that actually your counterparts are

1:04:45 often finance ministries is really helpful.

1:04:47 Actually something we found,

1:04:49 we,

1:04:49 we keep

1:04:50 bemoaning the fact that we don't spend enough time with finance ministries

1:04:53 and then we still don't spend enough time with finance ministries.

1:04:55 But,

1:04:56 um,

1:04:56 but it,

1:04:57 but in fact,

1:04:57 a lot of things

1:04:59 we keep recurrently discovering a lot of immigration policy,

1:05:03 and this is particularly true in developing countries more perhaps than.

1:05:07 Than say in in highly industrialized countries,

1:05:09 but

1:05:10 finance ministries drive a lot of policy decisions

1:05:13 because they actually get the labor market questions

1:05:16 and the innovation question.

1:05:17 There's a whole question around innovation which we haven't

1:05:19 talked about in high skilled immigration as well,

1:05:21 but they're actually really looking at this as an

1:05:23 economic issue and finance ministries are really important,

1:05:25 right?

1:05:26 They do tend to have

1:05:27 A lot because they do budgets,

1:05:29 right?

1:05:29 They tend to have a lot of weight with other ministries and so I think

1:05:32 figuring out who the actors are,

1:05:34 it's very easy to get the immigration people excited about things,

1:05:38 um,

1:05:39 but they may not always be and look,

1:05:40 those are often our counterparts,

1:05:42 right,

1:05:42 who we're talking to,

1:05:43 but,

1:05:43 but I do think it is important thinking about

1:05:45 who the other stakeholders are that may.

1:05:48 Actually be able to to weigh in

1:05:50 and then the other thing we found we did some work with with Colombia for example,

1:05:53 the Colombian government on putting together an interagency process

1:05:56 and

1:05:57 you know the other thing is on immigration you tend

1:05:58 not to have interagency processes even in the US,

1:06:01 by the way.

1:06:02 I mean they're sort of a vague there

1:06:03 there was eventually sort of a senior adviser on immigration

1:06:06 at the White House but it was actually a fragmented.

1:06:08 Way of,

1:06:09 uh,

1:06:10 we,

1:06:10 we have a fairly fragmented way of dealing with,

1:06:12 with immigration policy in this country,

1:06:14 but it's true

1:06:15 most places,

1:06:16 right?

1:06:17 And so when you get into things in the case in Colombia where there were,

1:06:19 you know,

1:06:20 2.8 million Venezuelans

1:06:22 who have come over the past few years,

1:06:25 this next generation of issues are not the province of the immigration agency

1:06:30 or the foreign.

1:06:31 Ministry

1:06:31 right who are who are interested in the question of who could come and whether people

1:06:35 got legal status and all that but the next set of questions really are about,

1:06:38 you know,

1:06:38 what are the barriers to access to education for a kid to sign in who doesn't have,

1:06:42 you know,

1:06:43 the birth certificate family left the

1:06:44 other country without the birth certificate.

1:06:46 They don't have any

1:06:48 history of their studies.

1:06:49 We're we're discovering a lot of people actually leave

1:06:51 school for reasons we don't know in Latin America.

1:06:53 Um,

1:06:54 among particularly Venezuelans and so figuring that out,

1:06:57 you need the education ministry of that and so figuring out who the stakeholders,

1:07:00 so creating the interagency,

1:07:03 um,

1:07:03 and it's something the Colombian government did,

1:07:04 but we were fortunate to be able to accompany them in this.

1:07:06 What you know,

1:07:07 figuring out how you create an interagency that's got everyone at the table

1:07:10 is really helpful because most of the time they're not thinking about

1:07:13 immigrants as a separate group even though they may actually have some specific

1:07:17 needs that they need to address.

1:07:19 OK,

1:07:20 thank you.

1:07:20 We are gonna take a couple,

1:07:22 and this is my fault that I took much time,

1:07:24 but a couple of questions from the public and then uh wrap up and,

1:07:28 and I'm not gonna be able to take all those,

1:07:30 but we are gonna stick around here for more questions kind of on the coffee break,

1:07:33 so the lady here and the gentleman over there,

1:07:36 and I don't know.

1:07:45 I'm Fiona Stewart.

1:07:46 I'm the global lead here at the Bank on aging and pensions.

1:07:49 Um,

1:07:50 just wanted to ask about the,

1:07:51 the,

1:07:51 totally agree,

1:07:52 underappreciated mega trend,

1:07:54 but the speed,

1:07:55 the speed of the aging,

1:07:57 I think is also really underappreciated.

1:07:59 How do we make sure in these programs

1:08:01 that we're not targeting countries where the window of this demographic

1:08:05 change is happening so fast

1:08:08 that by the time the programs,

1:08:09 etc.

1:08:09 in place,

1:08:10 the windows actually shut.

1:08:12 So do we need to think about the speed of the

1:08:14 demographic window as well when we're building these sort of programs?

1:08:19 Alright,

1:08:19 let's take that one and then we'll answer

1:08:21 yes,

1:08:22 great,

1:08:23 thank you.

1:08:23 Good morning,

1:08:24 everyone.

1:08:24 Uh,

1:08:24 my name is Alejandro Lara,

1:08:25 and

1:08:26 the line of my research is about lifelong learning,

1:08:30 aging,

1:08:31 and productive aging,

1:08:33 um,

1:08:33 and I encounter a gap in the

1:08:37 migration

1:08:38 system,

1:08:39 doing,

1:08:40 you know,

1:08:40 doing my research

1:08:41 and my question is threefolded all related,

1:08:44 um.

1:08:46 I would like to know if there is any

1:08:48 database

1:08:50 that assess people,

1:08:52 migrants

1:08:53 at the point of entry.

1:08:56 Because

1:08:56 in that way,

1:08:57 you know,

1:08:57 the country will

1:08:59 reduce the burden

1:09:01 on,

1:09:01 you know,

1:09:02 those individuals,

1:09:03 right,

1:09:03 that there will be a better place

1:09:05 if they said that,

1:09:05 for example,

1:09:06 Andrew.

1:09:07 Has 20 years of experience as a plumber in in your own country.

1:09:12 So,

1:09:13 you know,

1:09:13 therefore

1:09:14 X country will be able to place you.

1:09:18 At a specific organization or company,

1:09:23 um,

1:09:23 and,

1:09:23 and I say very quickly

1:09:24 and,

1:09:24 and,

1:09:25 uh,

1:09:25 uh,

1:09:26 I understand that it's a handful of countries doing that,

1:09:29 but very few.

1:09:31 So

1:09:33 In that way,

1:09:34 if we know that,

1:09:36 then

1:09:36 one will reduce the burden,

1:09:38 and 2

1:09:40 will be better allocate

1:09:42 those training resources,

1:09:44 you know,

1:09:44 if we,

1:09:45 if we,

1:09:45 if we know what are the the the

1:09:48 the skill,

1:09:49 the knowledge,

1:09:50 the skills of abilities

1:09:51 of those migrants.

1:09:54 So that's the threefold question.

1:09:56 So please provide a few samples.

1:09:57 Thank you.

1:09:58 Perfect.

1:09:58 Thank you.

1:09:59 Uh,

1:09:59 we're gonna take,

1:10:00 uh,

1:10:00 what

1:10:01 you guys volunteer there.

1:10:02 There's the one,

1:10:03 the speed of the aging.

1:10:03 I think you might wanna say something about that.

1:10:05 So the second question,

1:10:06 I think we're gonna have a whole new ABCD next year for that.

1:10:09 Uh,

1:10:10 so I don't know.

1:10:11 So,

1:10:11 so it's exactly about the speed of aging.

1:10:14 I think nobody anticipated it.

1:10:16 Uh,

1:10:17 I think a lot of demographers,

1:10:19 uh,

1:10:19 some are not,

1:10:20 but some are still not fully coming to grab.

1:10:23 And it is,

1:10:24 it is true,

1:10:25 but

1:10:26 the

1:10:28 alternative is we do nothing,

1:10:29 which is even worse.

1:10:30 Whatever we do,

1:10:31 I think we need to do it quickly,

1:10:33 but it is absolutely about the

1:10:35 speed of aging and especially.

1:10:38 You know,

1:10:38 the speed of the,

1:10:39 the fertility decline,

1:10:40 and it is almost irreversible in many countries.

1:10:45 China is implementing all these policies,

1:10:47 but you look at the,

1:10:48 the trends,

1:10:48 I don't know if we can come out of it.

1:10:51 So,

1:10:51 but it goes back to why

1:10:54 labor market policies,

1:10:55 education policies,

1:10:56 and migration policies,

1:10:58 those are the figures I showed,

1:10:59 they need to be complementary.

1:11:01 And fortunately the labor market,

1:11:04 I'm not a labor economist per se,

1:11:06 but you know people work longer.

1:11:08 People work part time,

1:11:10 so that's,

1:11:11 that's got to be part of the solution.

1:11:13 But the speed of aging,

1:11:16 by,

1:11:16 by speed of aging,

1:11:17 I don't mean be physically aging,

1:11:20 but basically the share of the elderly people in the population is increasing.

1:11:24 There's nothing

1:11:25 we can do about it,

1:11:26 right?

1:11:26 I mean it's a natural phenomenon.

1:11:28 We just,

1:11:28 it has to be a

1:11:30 Direct part of the decision making process which we have ignored for a long time.

1:11:36 Um,

1:11:37 uh,

1:11:38 I,

1:11:38 I'm,

1:11:38 I'm gonna a little bit answer your question even though I'm the moderator,

1:11:41 uh,

1:11:42 and kind of also maybe reframing which is like do

1:11:44 you guys know of any examples of in terms of

1:11:47 databases or information where,

1:11:49 where this could actually leverage,

1:11:51 uh,

1:11:51 the situation.

1:11:52 I do know of an NGO called Talent Beyond Boundaries

1:11:55 who do a little bit of this,

1:11:57 maybe not at the port of entry.

1:11:58 But they actually do collect data on people who are willing to,

1:12:04 maybe I'm not explaining it well,

1:12:06 so I'm not gonna put my words in their mouth,

1:12:08 but,

1:12:08 uh,

1:12:09 collecting data on people who are willing to move in terms of labor

1:12:13 data and CVs and experience and sharing this with employers in other places,

1:12:17 um,

1:12:17 so that's one,

1:12:18 but I don't know if you have,

1:12:19 if you have other examples or you wanna add anything in general about that.

1:12:22 I think I would just add that I

1:12:23 think this sometimes happens on the private sector side

1:12:25 in a place like the Philippines where active recruiters

1:12:28 are working quite aggressively in cities like Manila.

1:12:31 Some of those jobs are going government

1:12:33 to government through bilateral agreements and so

1:12:35 the Department of Migrant Workers in the Philippines

1:12:38 gets these jobs and they sort of have a bunch of people

1:12:40 that have applied for them that they can put into these jobs.

1:12:42 Now it's not quite the database you're thinking about,

1:12:44 but I think it's helping facilitate those flows

1:12:47 and the match between

1:12:48 destination countries and origin countries.

1:12:52 There there's,

1:12:52 there's different experiments on this.

1:12:54 I mean,

1:12:54 there's experience on,

1:12:55 uh,

1:12:55 with like the Philippines doing that on,

1:12:57 on,

1:12:58 you know,

1:12:58 people,

1:12:59 their own nationals who might want to work elsewhere.

1:13:01 The Canadian

1:13:02 government does it for people who apply,

1:13:03 right?

1:13:04 They,

1:13:04 they have ranking people according to human capital.

1:13:06 Come back to that in one second.

1:13:08 Um,

1:13:08 the US government tried to do this,

1:13:10 um,

1:13:11 with the,

1:13:12 uh,

1:13:13 the,

1:13:13 the mobility offices,

1:13:15 safe mobility offices,

1:13:16 though it was fairly crude.

1:13:17 I mean,

1:13:18 they knew that they were trying to refine it,

1:13:19 but actually figure out.

1:13:21 They were much better at figuring out who had protection

1:13:22 needs than they were and figuring out people's skills,

1:13:24 and they started to rebalance it and they are no more,

1:13:26 so

1:13:27 that kind of ended.

1:13:28 Um,

1:13:28 the European Union has been trying to do a talent database,

1:13:31 and I've lost track whether they've launched it or not,

1:13:33 but they're trying to do a talent database for

1:13:34 people who might want to come to Europe,

1:13:36 um,

1:13:37 to different countries to be available to different national governments.

1:13:40 So there's a lot of thinking about this.

1:13:42 The,

1:13:42 the challenge in,

1:13:44 in the end,

1:13:44 I mean,

1:13:44 there's some skills that are really easy to measure like the plumbers,

1:13:47 right?

1:13:47 That,

1:13:48 that you really want someone who knows you don't want me doing your plumbing,

1:13:51 right?

1:13:51 I mean,

1:13:51 that would be bad.

1:13:52 You don't know me,

1:13:53 but

1:13:53 you don't want me doing your plumbing.

1:13:55 Um,

1:13:56 the,

1:13:56 you know,

1:13:57 so there are certain skills you,

1:13:58 you wanna know if someone's an actual accountant,

1:14:00 a certified accountant,

1:14:01 if they're a certified nurse,

1:14:02 but,

1:14:03 you know,

1:14:03 the,

1:14:04 the labor market of the future is gonna be much more

1:14:06 flexible and fluid than the labor market of the past,

1:14:09 right?

1:14:09 I mean,

1:14:09 I think we should assume

1:14:11 that things will shift over time.

1:14:13 And so the larger question is also broader human capital also,

1:14:17 who is able not just who just has skills,

1:14:20 but who is able to adapt,

1:14:22 right,

1:14:23 as things change.

1:14:24 I mean,

1:14:24 you know,

1:14:24 a certain programming language,

1:14:26 great,

1:14:26 but that programming language may be irrelevant in 5 years,

1:14:29 right?

1:14:29 And so who has the ability to adapt?

1:14:31 And,

1:14:32 and,

1:14:32 and I think that's a larger challenge.

1:14:33 And by the way,

1:14:34 that's a huge,

1:14:34 if you talk to HR people at large companies,

1:14:36 I mean,

1:14:37 they'll

1:14:37 tell you the same thing.

1:14:38 This is,

1:14:38 it's hard to measure,

1:14:40 right?

1:14:40 I mean,

1:14:40 this is the kind of,

1:14:41 and,

1:14:41 and I'm not sure

1:14:42 there's an answer to that even

1:14:44 on how you do it.

1:14:45 I mean,

1:14:45 and,

1:14:45 and for companies that recruit abroad,

1:14:47 by the way,

1:14:47 they do actually.

1:14:49 You know,

1:14:49 where this is really happening is in employment-based migration.

1:14:52 Companies either through intermediaries,

1:14:54 recruitment agencies,

1:14:56 or,

1:14:56 or themselves are looking at skill sets,

1:14:59 but

1:15:00 it has the same limitations it does for domestic workers,

1:15:02 right,

1:15:02 which is the kind of things we really value for all of us that have hired people,

1:15:06 right?

1:15:07 The kind of stuff we really,

1:15:07 really value in hiring someone that sets someone apart

1:15:10 is actually really hard to measure and much

1:15:12 harder to measure across a cultural divide.

1:15:14 We,

1:15:15 we need to migrate to the coffee break,

1:15:16 I think.

1:15:18 Go to WD sorry,

1:15:19 no,

1:15:19 WEDR 2023.

1:15:20 We have all the migration data there.

1:15:22 You'll see it for the whole world bilateral by education.

1:15:26 Thank you.

1:15:28 Thank you so much.

1:15:29 This was fascinating.

1:15:30 We're gonna stick around and there's,

1:15:32 uh,

1:15:32 of course this is a very important

1:15:33 ongoing discussion and hopefully we have more forums

1:15:36 here and elsewhere to continue talking about it.

1:15:37 Thank you and you continue.

1:15:43 You can continue these conversations at lunch after the next event,

1:15:47 but,

1:15:47 um,

1:15:48 not,

1:15:48 not right now,

1:15:48 but yes,

1:15:50 please leave the stage.

1:15:57 OK,

1:15:58 so while we,

1:15:58 uh,

1:15:59 work in that transition,

1:16:00 um,

1:16:01 we are at the,

1:16:02 uh,

1:16:02 last,

1:16:03 uh,

1:16:03 event of this fantastic conference,

1:16:06 um,

1:16:07 and that is going to be a fireside chat between,

1:16:09 um,

1:16:10 Mamta Murti,

1:16:10 who is the vice president or the people vice presidency of the World Bank,

1:16:14 um,

1:16:15 and,

1:16:15 um,

1:16:16 David Evans,

1:16:17 who is a senior fellow and newly minted program director

1:16:19 of the Education program at the Center for Global Development.

1:16:22 Um,

1:16:23 they will speak until about one and we'll go directly to lunch after that,

1:16:27 and you'll have a chance to

1:16:29 continue these conversations.

1:16:30 Thank you.

showAllTimestamps
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transcript
OK, great. So we're going to get started on our last panel, um, of ABCD 2025, which is on migration. Uh, this will be moderated by my colleague Danny Bahar, who is a senior fellow and the director of the Migration Displacement and Humanitarian Policy, um, Program at the Center for Global Development. Um, right after that, we'll go to a fireside chat, but I'll be back to, um, introduce that. Thank you, everyone. Good morning. er Friday weekend is coming. Um, but not before we talk about this very interesting and exciting panel that we have, um, and I'll just, uh, as a moderator, I'm gonna also take advantage of, uh, sharing framing a little bit the conversation because we're gonna try to have more of a conversation, um, on a topic that, um, that, you know, it's, it's, uh. Uh, a lot of people has a lot of opinions on, um, and, and the idea is to really bring this bound to evidence and try to think forward about the importance of this topic for, for, for development at large, so, um. Uh, I, I, I call a little bit, uh, the frame of this uh uh the next big shift in the world. Um, and, uh, I wanna start by claiming that the demographic imbalance, the demographic imbalance, the global demographic imbalance is probably the most pressing and neglected issue in the world that we have today. There's many other pressing issues, um, I think many of them people are aware of, have opinions on, but I think the demographic imbalance is somebody is, is one that is kind of under the radar. Um, and there's two, the metaphor I like to use is that there's two things happening at the same time under, underneath that we're not even appreciating much, and one of them is an earthquake. It's like the tectonic plates are moving in the world. Um, and a slow earthquake is happening because in many, mostly developed countries, also middle income countries, um, populations are aging really fast. Fertility rates have dropped below replacement rates, um, and we are beginning to experience, uh, labor shortages that, um, are gonna keep these countries from just fulfilling the natural economic growth that they've been seeing if these shortages are not. Fulfilled somehow. So in those countries we have a situation of jobs without people. Um, but in developing countries, um, South Asia, Africa, of course we have a little bit of a volcano that is about to erupt. where there's abundance of young people ready to work without enough jobs. Um, so there we have people without jobs and of course part of the framing here is that that seems to be a very obvious problem to solve. On paper, but maybe not on practice. A and I don't think this is moving. OK. This is an example of, of what I'm saying that comes from actually the WDR of 2023 with Jaer was one of the lead authors. He's also accompanying on the panel, and here you see very clearly an example of a developed country. Um, uh, Italy, uh, and a developing country, Nigeria, and how their pyramids of population are completely almost the opposite yin yangs, um, and the projections are, you know, you also have their projections until 2050, so, um, it's kind of obvious, uh, this, this is kind of a proof of, of a little bit of what I was saying of the earthquakes and the volcanoes. Um, and one of the things that are that I, I, I, I claim that this is the most pressing, pressing issue because these labor shortages are challenges that are transversal across a number of other critical issues are transversal in terms of the energy transition because there's just not enough electricians to install solar panels if that's what, uh, countries wanna do. Um, there's just not enough nurses. To, uh, deal, uh, you know, for, for public health challenges that we have in developed countries, and we're talking about AI. There's just not enough talent, or, or, or skills to be able to supplement the infrastructure that developed countries need in their race for AI. So this is a, it's not just one issue, it's a transversal issue across all other elements that are critical for the global economy. and a little bit the framing of this panel is going to be, well, it's labor migration. A feasible solution, a possible solution, maybe one of many or in these times, particularly these times of populism. Um, the last thought here is that I also want to claim that the clock is ticking because some of the irregular migration that we have seen in many places in the world could be part of this imbalance actually, so we talk a lot about a lot of determinants, but I just sharing with you a couple of graphs from a paper that I Uh completed last year in which I was looking particularly at some of the determinants of the labor, the border crossings here in the US over the past 25 years. So this graph is showing um in a year over year difference, so it's taking out the seasonality of the series of all the border crossings in the southwest border of the US since 2000 until mid last year. Um, and I'm going to put on this graph another variable which is the, the, the, the labor tightness of the US during that period, which is how many vacancies there are for each unemployed person in the US, and this is how it looks. That correlation is strong, uh, in the, of course you see here in the last 5 years where those numbers went up significantly, the border crossings also labor market tightness was reached about 2 in according to this data, so there were essentially at some 0.2 vacancies per each unemployed person in the US. And as many of you remember walking around any city in the US, there were help wanted signs everywhere in hotels there were not enough workers in construction, there weren't enough workers. So, so, so what I'm going to claim is that this is the beginning of this. What we're seeing is part of the beginning of this earthquake that is happening. So therefore it needs to be addressed. So we're going to try to explore in this panel some of these questions. Is migration one of the solutions to this imbalance? Maybe there's other solutions. What are they? What policy instruments are available to make this a win win win situation? We're going to talk about skill building, credentials, financing, pathways, um, and we're also going to revisit the long old question about the brain gain versus the brain gain gain because we also want to make sure this is a win-win for developing countries. So we have really the most fantastic panel that we could have had. So we have Caroline Theoharides, who is an associate professor at Amherst College. She's the global scholar expert on brain gain with many publications, in particular one I would recommend in Science magazine very recently summarizing the literature, so we're really pleased pleased pleased to have you. Um, Andrewilley, a good friend and also the president of the Migration Policy Institute who has been at the frontier of both academia and policy work on this matter, and of course the World Bank's very own, uh, Jalar Oz and also a good friend who's now the deputy chief economist of, of MENA here at the World Bank who's a leading scholar on everything that has to do with migration. So Jalar, why don't you come and then we'll, we'll have a discussion. Thank you. OK. Uh, thank you, Danny. It's great to be here and I'll echo Danny, thank you for being here on a Friday. Uh, on, on an interesting topic, uh, at least two of us, OK, I cannot see half of my PowerPoints, so I apologize, but oh, I, I'll look there. All right, so what I'm gonna talk about, uh, Danny kind of built the pathway, so I'll start there, but I want to start with, um, the following. Last night during dinner, uh, Dion mentioned the 1984, uh, World Development report that Nancy Bursall did on demography. And which embarrassingly so, I didn't know about it. Uh, I said, well, I was in elementary school at the time, but nevertheless I should have known about it, but it really, so last night I sat down and read through it and it was remarkable how much the world has changed. I mean, other than the art cover of the WDRs, I think that's one of the few dimensions we have improved. And anyway, so the 1984 WEDR basically was about two things. It was, you know, the fertility population growth rate is way too high in developing countries, and that's a problem. It impacts growth. We really have to worry about it, and we are so proud of South Korea because they lowered the fertility rate to 2.1. Right, uh, the shocking thing there in the WDR there was the implicit assumption that fertility rate can never fall below 2. There are all these long term projections and as if there's a line that fertility rate cannot go down. I'm going to get back to that point quickly. And how much the world has changed in in 40 years since 1984 and this is the, the whole thing has almost shifted and at the time also in 1984, the fertility rate in high income countries also around 2% and they're saying, see, this is fantastic that's why they're wealthy and that's why they're gonna stay wealthy right so Danny put this, the, the, the this is from the WDR. But I'm going to say the shocking and important thing is not Nigeria or Western Europe, it's actually Mexico here. The biggest shock is what happened to Mexico, because the vast majority of the world's population lives in middle income countries, and the rapid decline in fertility and the rapid aging is the middle income countries, it's the biggest actually threat I'm going to argue here. We knew what was going to happen in high income countries even in 1984. We kind of knew what was happening, although the fertility decline in low income countries has been faster, but still we kind of kept the shape. But the big shock happened in the middle income countries. So if you look at it, this is the US fertility decline. So the bump during the war years, you know, people have a way of smoothing out everything including income and number of children. But it took almost 200 years for the US fertility rate to decline from 6 and 7 to replacement. Now look at what happened in a range of middle income countries. Even India today is below replacement. I'm Turkish. In Turkey it is 1.4. Nobody has expected it to decline that far, that fast. Now there's a phrase associated with China becoming old before becoming wealthy. It is not about China. It is about pretty much every middle income country we know that decline and in At the same time, the US income, depending on how you calculate it our endowment left, uh, the, the growth rate, like 30-40 times income growth in the US in the same time period, it is significantly less in all these countries, right? You, you're seeing the rapid decline now and you also, when we put the this is the inverse dependency ratio working age to elderly and you're seeing even the low income countries like this year today is the where we are falling off the cliff. Right, you're seeing how rapidly it's gonna start falling even in low income countries, and the most important one, the upper middle income countries are basically rapidly converging to high income countries, right? Now why is this important? So if you look at the dependency ratios in high income countries, middle income countries, and low income countries, you're seeing this pattern, and the middle income countries are basically starting to pick up. high income countries already did, but the remarkable thing, the remarkable thing is the following. If you look at the world today, the whole world, we are in this remarkable era of stability. It has never, never happened in human history since we started collecting data that we have a fixed, stable, almost 40 years of basically. The stable dependence ratio. The problem is this is going on its own. I'm not clicking. Is one of you guys doing it? I mean, I understand I have 20 minutes, 15 minutes, but don't, don't, don't rush me. All right, so this era of stability, we are smack in the middle of it, right? 2025 is right there, and this is a great opportunity of demographic arbitrage. We've been saying this. OK, 10 minutes. Saying this for a long time. The issue obviously the, the, the young people are in one place where the jobs, what this is what Danny said, where the jobs are needed in another place and migration is optional, you know, optimal choice, but it doesn't end there, and that's because of fine. So side point, all this stuff where we are today, I'm going to put part of the blame on the UN population divisions overestimation of fertility rates. This is their errors. Which was this is the data they used in the 1984 WDR. Do you see how much off they are, for example, in the case of Thailand for young people. They're almost overestimated by 80%. They underestimated the rapid fertility decline, and all of our projections and, you know, our planning is based on this, these fertility declines and completely overestimated the world population. So if anything, Manta, this is one thing I think the World Bank has to go back and looking at the demographic transition as an economic issue, not just some sort of mechanical issue which automatically declines, but at a relatively low rate. All right now. This is what the world is going to happen. We all know sub-Saharan Africa is going to increase. South Asia is increasing, although fertility has gone down because people are living longer right everywhere else, actually we're seeing a shrinkage of labor force. So this is a back of the envelope exercise we have done. If you want to maintain 2.5 working age people per each elderly retiree, this is how many people you're going to need by education. Right now, the second problem is the following. Historically, if you look at the post-war migration patterns, it's a middle income country guy like me going to a high income country person, right? This applies to pretty much half of us in this room. That has stopped because the middle income countries have run out of people. This is Mexico. This is Turkey. This is Morocco. This is Philippines. It is not there. These middle income countries for a variety of really successful development initiatives, not at the level we have, but we want, but still there, they have decent education systems, right? There's mandatory 12 year education in Mexico and Turkey, and the periphery countries, these migrants, they are the ones who supply the migrants to the high income countries. That has stopped. Where you have the excess people and where you need them, including the middle income countries, there's a huge education gap. So the whole what we're talking about this whole labor market thing is not just about the number of people missing, it's the education, the human capital that's missing. So you cannot have a migration policy or labor market policy without an appropriate education intervention. In the rapidly growing countries, that's the, that was one of the messages of the WDR. So in a sense I always say the 2023 WDR was as much about education as it was about labor mobility, right now if you look at it, this is the, the high income countries, how many people you're gonna need and possible policy interventions. Right, so suppose we increase the labor force participation of women, we go a little bit, we increase the elderly labor force participation, push the retirement age, and we increase migration way more than what is currently. But you see, migration actually, sadly, sadly enough, does not really solve the problem in high income countries, and also in China. But in the Chinese case it's for a low base, so. Take it with a grain of salt. So we still have a huge remaining labor force gap in upper middle income and high-income countries. Now, if you look at the low-income countries. There's a shortage of the high, uh, highly educated, tertiary educated people. There's a slight surplus. India again, like China bucks the trend, so it's good to take out India from the analysis because they're so big and the trends are different. But this is what you are seeing, right? There's a surplus of labor, but they are not educated. All right, now when we actually put the whole thing together, you're seeing the numbers are actually pretty good. This is why we have that stability. Uh, the demographic, uh, window of arbitrage, uh, yeah, alright, now let's come to the education. I'm gonna wrap it up very quickly. This is where we are. Upper middle income countries have done remarkably well. The whole world has done remarkably well with primary education. We are at almost 100% everywhere around the world. Uh, part of the credit goes to my education colleagues in the bank because we have done a very decent job there. But look at secondary and especially tertiary enrollment, you're seeing upper middle income countries are converging to high income countries, but that is not the case for lower middle income and especially low income countries. They're actually stabilizing, uh, if you look at the, the transit data at really suboptimal levels. So we need more, uh, more funding and not necessarily for tertiary education. Remember, the shortage actually in high-income countries are the, the middle educated people, especially in vocational training. US and Europe have no problem actually educating the tertiary. That's, that's, we are doing much better. It's the vocational and secondary education that we need, uh, especially in low income and low middle income. Now, a potential solution, this was a follow-up report we did with the SBJ colleagues on global skills partnerships. Now there's this whole debate about migration. There are tons of different types of migration, whether it's forced migration or whether, um. You name it, right, it's a continuum that was the framework of the WDI. So I'm going to talk about a small portion where we can address this, these issues, the demographic and the education mismatches, gaps between where the people are and where the jobs are. Uh, so here it is. GSP, for those of you who don't know, is a very simple idea. It says basically, uh, Germany needs nurses. Uh, and the German standards of education and professional whatever licensing are such that it's not easy to, you know, convince the German authorities to grant licenses to people even if they're coming from Italy, say. So we convinced the Germans, uh, to basically open a nursing school in, in Senegal. They train 1000 people. Half of them, whatever portion you agree, stay in Senegal and the rest come to Germany with the proper German licensing, with proper legal pathways and with the proper human capital. Senegal gains because they have 500 extra nurses. Properly trained by the Germans and the Germans gained because they have now more nurses that they have trained according to the criteria of their labor market needs and licensing requirements. Now the devil is of course in the details. I have 3 minutes. The details are that. You need whatever 22 ministries in both countries to agree on this, from the foreign ministry to the finance to the education to the labor, and it becomes a nightmare. This is where the World Bank actually enters the picture. This is our value added smoothing out the bureaucratic mess. The SBJ unit has actually active between 8 and 14, depending on how you counted GSP programs, but that's where you can address all the concerns from brain drain. To, uh, legality of, of migration, right? Now, the, the important thing, I'm gonna start from the, the other side, the legality because they're coming under, um, legal pathways with the proper licensing. So, uh, presumably all the burdens on Germany is taken care of in that process because it's a bilateral agreement. The second one, it's, uh, the, the firms, the employers have a stake in this. Right, so it becomes sustainable and scalable, and the most important thing is, uh, it's, it's a bilateral agreement and it doesn't impose necessarily a big financial burden on Senegal and kind of the markets take care of it. And for example, the Australians, Australians started this program. In Pacific islands, it was just a vocational training program. They did not think of it as a migration actually. But then they realized all these people now that they had Australian training back at home, the employers in Australia were easily hiring them, and then the officials in Tonga and Papua New Guinea got really upset. I thought, we thought you were going to educate our people to work here and now you're stealing them, and Australians said that wasn't our intention. But the market somehow way of fixing things, so Australians actually doubled down and expanded it rapidly, and it has been very successful. Unfortunately, a lot of the other GSP programs pilots have not been as successful. They stayed as pilots partly, partly because of the 22 ministries getting involved and partly because COVID intervened in a lot of the cases. But I want to end with this. A lot of my presentations, I have slides from football. And actually after the Bosman rule in the European leagues where you had free mobility of football players, A lot of the European soccer football clubs opened up academies in West Africa. These are boarding schools. They take 23, 400 young boys, give them proper uh high school education, and at the same time train them for football. Around 10% go to leagues in Europe that finances the whole operation. Around another 20% play football at home, and 70% don't even play football, but they end up with high school education which they would not have. There's no government involvement, completely private sector. This is what you see when the skills are transferable. And when there is legal pathway opportunity, then everybody benefits from it except a couple of the European football players now who are placed out by by the Africans who are coming there. All right, thank you so much, and I think I did OK in terms of. Good morning, everybody. Oh, good. OK, great. I know it's hard on a Friday morning here. Thank you all for being here. Thank you to Danny for the invitation. Um, I'm gonna repeat a little bit of what, uh, both Danny and Shagler have already said, um, but I will then go into a bit of, of some of the policy considerations here. Going forward, um, you know, demography is going to necessitate movement. It's going to drive movement, and you saw two different examples. You saw one way of doing this in a healthy way, right? Thinking about how we could actually plan for mobility in ways that help the, the source countries as well as the destination countries. Right now you'll hear more about this, uh, shortly as well from the next speaker. And you also saw, even though Danny didn't dwell on it, but you saw in his slide there, the number of people who move through irregular channels across the US border when the economy is there. I mean, the bottom line, if you take those two, is people are going to move, right? We actually have a, we're living in a time where there will be labor market openings. There will be opportunities, there will be a pull factor for people to come, not just to the United States, but to other countries, to a lot of middle-income countries as well. And unless we think about how we build the legal channels, which Tyler finished here, uh, uh, to move through which people can move, people are gonna move through irregular routes, right? But we should assume that the future has a lot of mobility and, and much more than we've seen in the recent past. And it's not. Just the United States and Canada and Western Europe and Australia and East Asia and sort of the obvious ones that got there first with low birth rates. We actually just literally have a book that's about to come out as an advance copy on migration policies in Latin America and the Caribbean. This was with three colleagues of mine. And much of the last 15 years in Latin America and the Caribbean has been movement because of displacement crises Venezuela, Haiti, Nicaragua. But where we end the book actually is saying this is not likely to be the future, right? This has been the past. The future conversation's going to be about labor mobility, and there'll be a handful of countries Honduras, Guatemala, Haiti that people will be leaving still where there'll still be surplus labor, but there's going to be lots of countries like Mexico, like Brazil. Like Colombia, already Uruguay and Barbados, the Bahamas, um, where there are real labor needs, Guyana, oddly enough, which was one of the countries that had lots and lots of people left, which suddenly will be looking for workers abroad, right? And no one's noticed it yet for the most part except for Uruguay's talking Barbados, but most are not talking about it yet because displacement crises have actually taken up the conversation. Same thing in Turkey, right? But, but in the end this is the future conversation that's coming. Um, of course, you could say technology will make a difference. Some jobs will disappear. That's almost certainly true. Um, you know, the, the workforce of the future is not the workforce of the past. Um, but what we know for those that lived through the 1990s and we heard that all the jobs would disappear and that everything was gonna be replaced by robots and the internet and all that, what we also know is productivity increases also generate new kinds of employment. Uh, it is certainly possible that there will be fewer workers, also be fewer workers on the planet eventually. Um, but it's also very likely that in many countries what you're going to see is, is perhaps, you know, you're seeing this in Japan, for example, getting by with fewer workers, but you will also see lots of other jobs that are created also by aging populations, for example, care work. So. Um In many countries what we see is what we see in the United States, um, and I'm going to make a, a political but nonpartisan comment on this, which is in the US we tend to zigzag between allowing people in through irregular channels to meet our workforce needs and then shutting down and then going back to figuring it out. Um, there are a few countries that have more or less gotten this right. And by getting it right, what they have done is both figure out legal pathways to meet workforce needs. They've thought about immigration policy as part of their economic and labor force policy, but they've also made sure that there's not a lot of irregular migration because irregular migration, what it does is undermine the credibility of immigration systems. And I'm not surprised that a lot of people were actually turned off by the number of people that came across the border, not because they're bad folks, because they actually, as I always point out to people, the folks that came across the border are likely to be contributing members of American society. Their kids will be great Americans, but because when people see that there isn't a selection system. For people coming, it undermines the public's willingness to support legal pathways. So we need to see a future where we can do both of those. In some countries like Canada and Australia and New Zealand, granted, they're all de facto islands, real islands are de facto island Canada. Everyone's Canadian, no offense, but de facto island. Um, the, uh, you know, the, the, to, to have been good both about making sure there's limited irregular migration. A little easier when you're an island or you got the US as a buffer, but still. And at the same time been proactive on building legal pathways and we're starting to see this happening in some other countries. Italy, you wouldn't think of Italy with a government that is often seen to be on the populist right would be doing this, but actually has, you know, been very intolerant of boat arrivals but has actually passed one of the most ambitious labor migration. Reforms in the past two years. Spain, which actually has a lot of migration control, they're the opposite. They don't talk about that part, but they do, also has a new labor reform. Germany is leaning into trying to reduce arrivals, um, and asylum applications, but also has a fairly ambitious, not totally successful, but fairly ambitious immigration reform. So we are seeing in Korea and Japan, which have always been and again have the advantage of distance and an island in one case, peninsula and an island. They have the advantage of being a little bit distant but have also been cautious about arrivals but as a result have actually been able to lean into now thinking about legal pathways at a time when demography. Uh, warrants it. So let, let me lay out three sets of principles here of what I think we need to think about for the future. And then we can, I'm timing myself here because I want, don't want to go over time. Um, but three principles I think we need to think about. So the first is we will need to build, we need to be intentional about building legal channels for people to come in. If we want this to work. If we want to be able to figure out how countries that have surplus labor can contribute them to people that do not have it and make this work in ways that are regular and predictable for advantages for both sides, right, we have to actually figure out these channels and we have to be proactive about it and the way Canadians and Australians have been. Japan is now doing. Uh, Italy is doing and others. Um, that means, uh, thinking about a mix of permanent pathways because some jobs are permanent. Um, seasonal. Some jobs are seasonal. It's OK to have seasonal work. And by the way, lots of people, lots of potential migrants would love to do seasonal work and live in their home country and come back. There's always challenges with anything that's temporary in terms of imbalance of power, but with, with employers, but it works very well in places where it is policed well. And then there's temporary work because. Also in the mobile society, this is particularly true of knowledge workers. I mean, we've always thought that we want people co-located, right? We want everyone to be together increasingly in a mobile world. In fact, I'm surprised there's lots of us here in one room. This is kind of a rare experience for most of us, right? Don't we spend our days, you know, sitting on the screens? You know, we do lots of work across screens. You still need to bring people together. Periodically, however, right, and so we may want to think, particularly for some kinds of work, and this is probably more high-end, that we don't actually need permanent immigration, but we do need the ability for people to come and go, right? We do need a team, an innovation team to get together, a management team to be able to get together on a regular basis for a period of time, and then we're gonna have to think agilely about this. Um, one ways of approaches are skills partnerships. I'll let you know the others focus on that because they have much more expertise, but I would say access matters. We've done some looking at skills partnerships between countries in Europe and several countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, and there are lots of unseen barriers to access, and that will actually matter as these things scale up. I mean, scaling up labor partnerships. Really matters. And at the same time it really matters who has access and how people get access. We can talk more about that later if people want to. And finally, actually thinking about transitions between education and work matter. There are some countries like Korea and Japan that are doing a lot of work on this. In the US historically we've actually done a lot of work on this, particularly for, for high skilled work. But actually thinking that for many countries people who come into the education system are often prime candidates to stay and move into the working into the workforce. So something that we should focus on. Two second principle is that we need to invest in the credibility of legal immigration systems or legal migration systems. This is not something you tend to hear from people who say the first principle that we need legal channels. We often leave off the second part, which is we need to make sure people use those channels. Um, I think many of us who are immigrants, children of immigrants, married to immigrants, live in immigrant communities, we're very comfortable with people whether they come legally or not, right? It doesn't matter to us a whole lot, but I think we should assume that in most societies, publics lose confidence with immigration systems if most people don't come through legal channels, right? And we do have to be sensitive to that. We have to be conscious of that. Um, as a real need. And so this makes the, it makes it important to, to figure out how you reduce irregular migration. By the way, I think it's hard to, unless you're draconian, it's hard to reduce irregular migration when the economy is good. Going back to Danny's slide and his, his previous paper on this, unless you have legal channels, there's a reinforcing effect. But the opposite is true. Legal channels don't work unless you also enforce them, right, and make sure they work. Pacing matters, and I think we need to be sensitive to pacing, to timing. Um, how the effects on schools, the effects on healthcare systems, the effects on housing. This is an issue that's being debated in Canada right now, right, as the number of migrants shot up, the actual pressures on housing, not all of which was driven by immigration, but it's an easy target and certainly was a contributing factor. Um, and we need to think about redesigning humanitarian protection, and I know this is controversial probably in this group and most groups that I'm in, but the reality of sort of open-ended asylum processes will probably not survive. I mean, de facto, we do not have an asylum system on the US border right now, and I'm not sure it's coming back, and I'm, I'm afraid we may see Europe go that way, but there is a midpoint where you can make asylum of non-neighboring countries or non-narby countries. Much higher standard, preserve it at a much higher standard and invest much more in regional, um, in regional protection, much more in legal pathways for resettlement, and much more in making employment-based pathways accessible to refugees and displaced populations. So happy to talk more about that, but I think we do have to have that displacement is not going to go away. In fact, it's probably going to increase over time in a post-liberal order, global liberal order world. And so we do have to think about this as part of the equation. The final thing I would say is we need to think the third principle be how we incorporate people who migrate into the destination societies. Integration really matters, right? And it's actually one of the toughest pieces of this, and it's not just about entry, it's about remaining, um. You know, there is an increasing body of economic research, and I would recommend a paper that is Leah Bustan and others at Al. It's a group of researchers that published both through the National Bureau of Economic Research and through the Institute for Labor Economics that looks at 15 countries, and one of the things they find is that countries that have a history of immigration. The UK, Australia, Canada, US, the second generation born in the country has much more upward mobility than in countries where there's less history of immigration. Now there's a lot of things you need to dig down in this, right, which they have not had a chance to do yet, which is how did people arrive? Were they refugees? Were they labor immigrants? I mean, you ask questions what income level, so on and so forth. So I don't think this is definitive, but I think it tells us something we intuitively know already, which is you need to have templates for immigrants to come, those who are going to stay permanently. To become part of their country, for their kids to be part of the country, and to have mechanisms to succeed over time, and this leads us to a set of things that we're ill prepared to deal with and frankly have to be dealt with in national contexts, right? The World Bank can be helpful on this, but ultimately these are national decisions. I mean, and, and some of these are about mediating institutions at the local level, schools, community organizations, um. You know, migrant-led organizations that can help their own coming in, you know, how, what is the institutional con context? Some of this is about debates around national identity, right? I mean, and these are tough conversations, right? Some countries have very fluid national identities, you know, Australia, right? Australia, you know, that's not always been fluid. It's actually, and it's not that there aren't debates and that there isn't pushback and there isn't inequality in it, but there's some ability in. Some notion in Australia you can come from India and you could end up, by the way, UK, you could, you know, you could be of Indian descent with your parents born in Uganda and end up as prime minister right now may be a harder road, maybe there's a lot of inequality certainly, but, but not a crazy idea all of a sudden, right? Um, that's not equally true everywhere, right? And so these are gonna get into questions that are really tough that have to be answered in national contexts about who gets to belong and I, and I think we just need to be. To be aware that's there. So let me just conclude by saying one way or another we're going to see a world of increased mobility in a pessimistic scenario. Um, this is going to lead to enormous tensions, reassertions of narrow ideas of national identity, and lots of conflict between nations. Like why are you letting your people come over here? That would never happen in this country, right? Um. In an optimistic scenario, we will see, we will build the right channels for people to move. Those channels will also, as Shagler said, you know, also involve upskilling people for people both to move and to stay with greater skills. They will, these channels will be enforceable. We'll actually make sure that they're respected and we'll be sensitive to the fact that, that we don't want people moving outside those channels for the most part, and we will invest in integration. Right? And this will be a win-win for both sending countries and for receiving countries. In reality, I suspect we're going to end up with a little bit of both in different places, and we're gonna have to figure out how to navigate this going forward. Thank you. Great. Thanks so much to Ashanti and Danny for inviting me to be here today. I'm what I'm going to talk about is I'm going to think a little bit about the development impacts on migrant origin countries. Um, I'm going to focus this particularly thinking about human capital and the way that this responses to international migration. So I don't think I have to convince you that international migration rates are high and they've been increasing globally, and this is particularly true for skilled workers. For example, 18% of workers from low income countries with a bachelor's degree are currently living in the OECD. And so as a result of this, researchers, policymakers, government officials, um, often argue that this sort of international migration is going to lead to a loss of human capital in countries of origin, something we colloquially colloquially referred to as brain drain. OK. This is particularly pervasive and arguments about healthcare workers. OK, we've seen this ramp up during the COVID-19 pandemic as it became particularly apparent, um, the global shortages that we had for medical workers. OK, but I think well it may be intuitive to think about that when people leave, they take their human capital with them and this depletes the origin country. What I want to think a little bit about today is how migration opportunities may also be able to lead to increases in human capital, what we can refer to as brain gain. OK. And so there are a number of mechanisms through which this process could happen. And I would say historically, we haven't had a lot of evidence on this. Economists have talked about this as a potential, um, a potential channel, but they haven't really empirically been able to estimate this. And in the past, um, several years, there's been a lot of progress made on this as an empirical channel. OK. Um, so what I want to talk about first is I want to kind of put forth some of the theoretical underpinnings of what we're thinking here in terms of the way these mechanisms might work. OK, so this is a figure from the paper that Danny mentioned that we just had come out in Science, um, and I think it does a nice job of hopefully helping illustrate the different channels that I'm thinking about here. OK, so I want to start with the most obvious, um, The most obvious path. And what I want to think about is how migration opportunities can lead to impacts on human capital. So let's start on the left. And go toward this brain drain channel where I talk about immigration. This is sort of the intuitive case. People leave, they take their human capital with them. OK. Now, alternatively, if you look above this, OK, toward educational investments, there's another story. OK. So perhaps the prospect of future migration actually incentivizes people to invest in education that they wouldn't have bothered to if the only labor market opportunities available to them were those available in their origin country. OK? If not all of those individuals choose to migrate, which is typically the case, given restrictions on labor mobility, this can actually lead to an increase in human capital in migrants' countries of origin. OK, so that's sort of the other direct pathway that I'm thinking about here. Now, I want to leave that one aside for a minute. I'm going to come back to it. And I want to come back to this brain drain channel where we have people leaving and taking their human capital with them, OK? What I want to argue is that there are still a number of other theoretical mechanisms through which international migration can actually lead to increases in human capital. OK, so let's start with probably the most obvious. That's the one on the bottom, where we think about that. People leave and they send financial remittances back home. OK. Um, they send these financial remittances back home. This can have direct impacts on investment in human capital. OK. More people go to school, can also have direct impacts on income, on consumption, on investment, as well as on investments in health. OK. Similarly, we can think about return migration. OK, we have lots of circular migration, temporary migration happening around the globe right now. And so many of these workers are going to come back home again. OK. And when they come back home, there's been some evidence that shows that this leads to more innovation at home. It leads to more entrepreneurship, it leads to better trade linkages between origin and destination countries in a way that has real development impacts and real impacts on human capital. OK? You don't need the workers to return home though to necessarily reap these benefits, OK? We're living in a world where technology is expanding, people are communicating on WhatsApp and social media and Zoom, and so these knowledge transfers can happen even in the absence of this sort of return migration. OK, and so these knowledge transfers can lead to some of these channels about innovation and business development. But they can also lead to what, um, many in the field have started calling social remittances. OK. So there can be these transfers of norms from the destination country back to the origin country. There's some really nice evidence that thinks about this in terms of sociopolitical outcomes. So thinking about particularly when migrants go to more democratic destination countries, these democratic norms often gets transmitted back to the country of origin and can have real meaningful change in terms of the political systems in the country of origin. I have some relatively new work with Susan Godlinton where we look at this in terms of fertility norms, OK, and so we look at migrants going abroad, they get exposed to, say, new reproductive health policy, maybe the pill is legalized in their destination country. When they're exposed to this, um, this transmits back to their country of origin, and fertility actually reduces beyond just the migrants themselves through the mechanism of increased adoption of modern contraceptives. OK? So these sorts of channels can really matter in terms of shaping things socially beyond the story that we've kind of all been telling about financial remittances for a really long time. Still super important, but I just want to push you to think beyond that financial remittance story. OK? These things can matter in the long run. Um, I have some other new work, um, with a few co-authors where we're thinking about positive income shocks to migration, um, for Filipino migrants, and we can show that 20 years after these income shocks, there are real increases, not only in global income, but in domestic income coming through entrepreneurship and increased investment in education. So, Thinking of these, these mechanisms, I think what I want to argue is at least theoretically, and there's a lot of empirical evidence to this human capital, um, there can be real human capital effects kind of diffusing through migration. OK, so for what, what I want to do for the rest of my time today is focus on a case study where migration leads to increases in human capital in the origin country. OK, I'm gonna focus specifically on this top channel about educational investments, um, and I'm gonna think about a case in the Philippines, uh, where incentives to invest in human capital due to migration opportunities led to gains in human capital. And you know, this behind this figure, there are a lot of really great empirical work that I'm not going to have time to talk about today. Um, so I just point you toward this review piece that we have in science, uh, to dig into some of that. I'm happy to chat more at lunch as well. OK, so when we think, um, about many wealthy countries, many of them have shortages of medical workers and they're relying on workers from developing countries to fill in as nurses, as doctors, and, um, other medical professionals, care workers, um, broadly. By the same token, many origin countries, many lower income countries are actually developing migration policy to actually encourage the migration of healthcare professionals as part of their development strategy. The Philippines, I think, is the example of a country that's done this for the longest, um, largely because of the colonial ties between the US and the Philippines, um, and the US setting up nursing schools back in the 1940s. But I think thinking about this, we're kind of left in this situation where we think about, you know, how is this working? Is this leading to brain drain? OK. So Filipinos broadly come as nurses to the United States. About 74% of Filipino nurses who migrate come to the United States, and their opportunities to come to the United States are largely dictated by US visa policy. OK? And so what I'm gonna show you in this figure, what I've done here is I've plotted Filipino migrants to the United States and to other countries, um, along here. And so you can see that between 1990 and 2000, this was relatively stable, OK? That was about, you know, Say 1500, um, workers coming each year on visas to the United States. In 2000, we start to see this increase. OK, so what happened in 2000? Well, in 2000, the United States lifted the 7% cap on countries of origin in terms of like diversification of where people could come from. So they lifted that. They also authorize the use of some employment-based visas, EB-3 visas that hadn't been used before. Um, and they, they profit, they, uh, they prioritize Schedule A occupations, which are occupations where there's a shortage, which is what nursing falls under. OK. So what do we see here? We see a really dramatic increase in the number of Filipinos that are coming to the US as nurses between 2000 and 2006. OK. By 2006, this is about 7000 individuals coming on nursing visas each year. 2007, policy changes, 7% caps back in place. The EB3 visas that were unused have now been used up, and we, and we see this dramatic drop in 2007. OK. It increased a little bit. It didn't go quite back to the original levels, but it never increases back to these levels that we see during this kind of period where visas are relatively available. OK, so what Paulo and I do in our paper is we use these shocks to immigration policy, um, from US visa policy. And we combine it with geographic migrant networks in the Philippines. So, like most places, migrant networks really matter in terms of where people go abroad and the occupations that they do in destination countries. And so we're able to combine these two things to have places where they have historically sent lots of nurse migrants to the US. Those are sort of our treated places. And then we have places that haven't had a lot of nurse migration to the US. And so we combine these two sources of variation. To investigate this using an event study and look at the implications that this has on human capital back in the Philippines. Now, I'm actually just going to show you this in the aggregate today. I think, um, one of the reasons I like this paper is because I can just show you a time series and it tells you the whole story. If you want to see the event studies, they're all in the paper, but I think the time series actually makes this in a really compelling way. OK, so what I've done here is this is plotting for your enrollment, um, in tertiary education in the Philippines over time. OK. And so you can see nursing in black, and you can see that this follows that liberalization of visas, kind of the expansion of visas, um, for, uh, for Filipinos to the US, and then the subsequent contraction. OK, so in 2000, we start to see enrollment increase pretty dramatically. We're going from around 150,000 individuals enrolling in nursing school over, so this is, you know, in the Philippines, you have to have a 4-year degree to become a nurse. So this is all 4 years of enrollment, um, And so you see this go from about 150,000 in the year 2000. To about 550,000. OK, by the peak of this. Now, I just want to draw your attention back to this. We were going from 1500 to 7000 visas. What we see here is going to almost 550,000 people enrolled in school. And we see, if you look at graduation, you can see the same picture. It's just lagged 4 years, um, because it takes 4 years to finish your degree. So what this resulted in is this visa expansion led to about a 247% increase in the number of nursing graduates. Now, in the Philippines, you also have to pass a nursing licensure exam. They come to the US, they also have to pass the NCLEX. But what we find is that for each additional nurse who migrated to the US on a visa, 9 more passed the licensure exam. OK, it's important that we think about licensure because we want to make sure that they actually meet the standards to actually practice in a Filipino hospital. Um, and so, so we find these 9 more licensed nurses. Now the enrollment effects, you can see this here are really driven by switches from other fields. OK? So you see these dips in business and education and STEM that are kind of trading off with the increases in nursing. However, people appear to persist to degree at higher rates in nursing. And so we actually find an overall increase in the amount of people that have a tertiary education. So we see an overall increase in regardless of degree type in the number of people that got a tertiary education. OK, so what made this possible? So I think economists for a while that you can look at some writings, you know, from 20 or 30 years ago that say, yeah, theoretically brain drain seems like it could be possible, but the supply is not going to respond. So it's not going to be able to happen empirically. OK? So what we're able to do with the Philippines data, which is pretty amazing, is we can look at the supply of nursing programs. OK, so I've just again plotted this for you, just the time series across the country as a whole. And you can see that there was a dramatic increase in nursing schools, um, in response to demand for people to get nursing degrees. This was driven mostly by private institutions. OK. And I want to emphasize the Philippines has a very well developed tertiary education system, and I'll talk about that a little bit more in just a minute. This increase was driven almost entirely by existing institutions adding programs rather than entirely new schools. And the enrollment effects that we find are coming from provinces that had A lot of tertiary education institutions, but didn't have nursing programs. So Amherst College adds a nursing degree, OK? Not the new nursing school of Amherst, Massachusetts opens. It's coming through the the former. OK. OK, so where does this leave us? OK, so brain drain and brain circulation are more than just theoretical possibilities. I think what this paper shows is that you can experience these real gains in human capital as a result. But I want to emphasize a number of other things, OK, because I think for me, this, this, uh, project on Filipino nurses has led to even more questions that I think we need, um, we need input on. So the outcomes may differ in poorer countries, OK. They may differ in more fragile economies, they may differ in conflict, um, prone regions. OK. There may be fewer opportunities in those places for skill acquisition. And so that supply side and response may differ. And I think what our work shows is the supply being flexible and agile, and this speaks to some of what was mentioned before. It's going to be really important for, for low-income countries to get the benefits of this. The other thing I want to mention is that a lot of the literature focuses on low, low middle income and middle income countries that are quite large. OK. So Philippines, India, and Mexico, we need to take this literature to other places that may be vulnerable to try to push this forward. OK? Um, and so I think the other place that I really think we need to push on is what are effective policies for origin regions, OK? Really, we need to consider the general equilibrium effects for all of the relevant labor markets. OK? So if people are switching to nursing, does that mean they're not engineers and infrastructure is not happening at home in the ways that it would have before? OK, what are these switches happening? I think perhaps obviously, what are the externalities in terms of health and well-being for the population countries of origin? And then I think thinking about our countries investing in the wrong type of skill, and you can think of this at a pretty micro level. There are a lot of anecdotes in the Philippines that nurses that want to go abroad, they're investing in geriatric skills. They want to go to Japan, they want to go to Israel and work in those places. And so as a result, that's not what the Philippines needs. The Philippines still needs pediatric care, still needs OBGYNs, right? And so this, this heterogeneity may have implications at home as well. And one last point that I want to make on this before I'll conclude is like, two countries actually capitalize on this brain game? OK, so, you know, I think I can show you in the time series is pretty compelling in terms of the number of nurses, but if I talk to say the Department of Labor in the Philippines or the Department of Health, they're still reporting shortages of nurses in hospitals. OK. Now, why is that? OK, when I talk to nurses about this, they'll say, yeah, well, or people who got a nursing degree, they'll say, well, the conditions are terrible, the wages are terrible. I'd, I'd prefer to work in a call center or, or, or BPO and use my nursing skills, um, you know, for an insurance company or something like that. And so thinking about how we can help the labor markets in origin countries actually make use of these gains and human capital, I think is really important. OK. So, the last things that I'll say are just that. International migration shapes the labor force. It shapes the human capital that happens in the labor force. And so on the previous slide, hopefully I, I, uh, outlined some areas where I think we need future work. But the last point that I want to leave you with is that, you know, there's been a lot of good empirical work that has looked at origin country responses to migration shocks. OK, and this has been really important for being able to document these human capital responses. And I hate to knock this because that's what most of my work has done is looking at migration shocks and seeing what happens. But I think where we need to go next is not there, OK? That work is great. um, but what future work needs to do is really think about partnerships with policymakers to actively identify the types of policies that will enhance the benefits for origin countries, for the migrants themselves, and for the destination countries. And I think things like diaspora engagement, as well as the global skills partnerships we've talked about are things that have a lot of potential, and these partnerships are going to be really important. So thank you so much. Um, all right. Well, this was Um, this was fantastic and um I don't know if I'm going to disappoint you going back to the microphone myself, but Um, I want to, we have a bit of about 20 minutes, 15 minutes, so, um, I'm going to do, I just have to do a round of questions myself and then we're going to open it. Can you, can you tell me when you have like 7 minutes, 8 minutes ish or something, um. I, uh, help me, this is gonna be very hard because I'm throwing you questions that are hard to answer, but just let's try to be concise. Um, I loved your football example and I appreciate you calling it football. Very much, um. What, uh, it, it, because a big part of this which we probably won't be able to go too much in detail is about the financing of these models, and it's a completely private sector, um, endeavor, and, and I, I wonder if you have thought, and you probably have, like how much of this is actually replicable to other industries because I guess in the football example there's a bit of a portfolio approach like one of these people is gonna be the next Messi. And that's gonna bring millions and millions of dollars. It's not the same you cannot say that about manufacturing or nurses, I guess, uh, so tell us, you know, how much, what are the lessons or one lesson, or how, how would you think this about for other industries perhaps? Is this actually doable, or you, you foresee that this will always need some sort of public sector involvement? Uh, I can speak for hours about football, but the short answer, I don't think I agree with you, Danny, because I don't think when Barcelona or Ajax sets up a football academy, they think they're gonna find the next Messi, because if they find the next Messi, which happened with Messi, they bring him to Spain at age 10, right? The, the whole thing there is actually partially, I, I honestly believe some sort of social service. And provide education and most of these players go to 2nd or 3rd tier countries. They go play in, in Poland and they play in Latvia and stuff. The, the really, really, really talented ones, they identify at a young age and they bring them to the Netherlands and Spain right away. Uh, but now, football is a very small market. It, but it, it works really well as an example because it's minimal government intervention and it is so close to the hearts of the consumer. If the government said in in Italy or Spain or England we're not going to allow more foreign players, you know, you would have riots. I mean there are British English teams which don't have a single English player, and I think 49 of the top 50 players in the world are. Playing in a country in which they are not citizens, so it's an anomaly in a way. But the unique thing about football, what I'm going to tell you compared to the doctors from Africa, if you look at the data, the growth of the doctors' migration in the football players is almost identical. So I had those slides in other presentations. You cannot tell them apart. The difference is is what Carolyn said is the supply response. The training, the medical school facilities in Africa did not expand with increased demand from high income, but the football markets did, right? I think that's where the private sector plays a key role. If it can be addressed through private sector, it's nursing or actually shipping crews in the Philippines, it's the same thing. Private training facilities address that or football players. You know, and we kind of keep the governments and even sometimes the World Bank out of it. The markets actually do pretty well, right? I think that's what we should be focusing on how to. Set up the legal framework as as as we talked about that the legal pathways are there where the rights are protected and the the the. The locals, the natives in the migrant destination country are also protected, but also the full rights of the migrants and their credentials are recognized. Finding those systems, and I think the market kind of takes care of it. I mean, I come from a left wing family. My father would be devastated in seeing, but the private markets, I think, take care of it. I think that's what the football markets are teaching us. Let me take that and go to Carolyn because um er I was very struck by what you said at the end uh on how to capitalize the rate gain and and and there were shortages of nurses in the Philippines but the wages weren't maybe adjusting as fast or that the market maybe wasn't uh getting that cue so um bigger question for you but also maybe if if you can brief about be brief about because you thought about this, what, what would you say are like important. Policies or key ideas to keep in place to actually capitalize on that boring game because I think that's kind of the core, one of the cores of the issue on how to really make this a win-win. Yeah, OK, it's on. Um, yeah, I think it's a great question, Danny, and I think Frustratingly, I think that that question gets more or less attention as political administrations change in the origin country. So there was a lot of interest in the Philippines and thinking about this, um, maybe 5 years ago and then priorities changed and there's sort of been less interest in thinking about it, but some of the ideas that we were talking about. Um, were twofold. So first, you know, I told you that for each licensed nurse that goes abroad or each nurse that goes abroad, there are 9 newly licensed nurses. Well, there are also a bunch of people who never passed the licensure exam. OK. These schools that increased weren't all great schools, and so there's a lot of concern about people that invested in a costly degree and couldn't actually work in the profession that. That they were trained to do. And so one of the things that we were talking about was trying to develop some retraining programs because they actually have a lot of skill. Maybe they could migrate as caregivers, um, not as a nurse, but as a caregiver. Maybe they could, um, work as the Philippines has a lot of these like rural healthcare workers. They don't need to be a nurse, but they could do some sort of, um, training along those lines. So thinking about ways that we can capitalize on that, um. And then I think that there, there's been some discussion about like, how can we improve the conditions in the the local hospitals in such a way that it's a more appealing, um, place to work. And I think the Department of Labor was really keen to kind of push some ideas forward on that front. So maybe a little bit stalled now in terms of thinking about it, um, so yeah, I don't know, I don't know if I have more to say than that, um, no, that's, that's, that's, that's a great insight, Andrew, um, going back to the, the difficult part of the policy making which Jalar kind of also, uh, explained about all the, you know, different departments and ministries that need to be involved with you, you've spent a lot of time with, with decision makers. Um, talking about this, so what are, uh, another very easy question, what are the kind of the low hanging fruits in terms of the, I don't know if you want to go through the narrative or the actual, um, policy making in to, to, to, to actually, you know, make this again a win-win with with the decision makers that are. Uh, maybe, um, uh, you know, worried about all the things you said, the, the social narrative or the social cohesion, all, all these aspects of what, what, what would be kind of at this stage in, in where the world is kind of a good way to, to, to get this past the political process in a way that it's being, uh, appreciated as a win, win, win. Let me start by saying something that is not in my self-interest since I work at a place called the Migration Policy Institute, but it is better not to talk about it as migration. Um, and I'm actually serious about that. I mean, I think the, the conversation about labor markets, about skills, about, you know, I, I think you gets you broader buy-in. You can find very few countries. I mean, again, you go back to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, where immigration has always been part of economic policy. You say immigration and most people go, yeah, that's about skills, about population growth, we got that, you know, but most other countries, immigration is still a controversial. World word and it's slightly isolated and people who run the immigration policy tend not to be strong actors within the interagency system, right? So vis a vis labor ministries, vis a vis treasury, vis a vis, you know, or finance ministries, vis a vis commerce, vis a vis other ministry education that you need to get engaged, that's, I think Tyler's point I think was really important actually in Germany where I mean the fact that the World Bank comes in. Is really useful. Outside actors matter a lot. The fact that actually your counterparts are often finance ministries is really helpful. Actually something we found, we, we keep bemoaning the fact that we don't spend enough time with finance ministries and then we still don't spend enough time with finance ministries. But, um, but it, but in fact, a lot of things we keep recurrently discovering a lot of immigration policy, and this is particularly true in developing countries more perhaps than. Than say in in highly industrialized countries, but finance ministries drive a lot of policy decisions because they actually get the labor market questions and the innovation question. There's a whole question around innovation which we haven't talked about in high skilled immigration as well, but they're actually really looking at this as an economic issue and finance ministries are really important, right? They do tend to have A lot because they do budgets, right? They tend to have a lot of weight with other ministries and so I think figuring out who the actors are, it's very easy to get the immigration people excited about things, um, but they may not always be and look, those are often our counterparts, right, who we're talking to, but, but I do think it is important thinking about who the other stakeholders are that may. Actually be able to to weigh in and then the other thing we found we did some work with with Colombia for example, the Colombian government on putting together an interagency process and you know the other thing is on immigration you tend not to have interagency processes even in the US, by the way. I mean they're sort of a vague there there was eventually sort of a senior adviser on immigration at the White House but it was actually a fragmented. Way of, uh, we, we have a fairly fragmented way of dealing with, with immigration policy in this country, but it's true most places, right? And so when you get into things in the case in Colombia where there were, you know, 2.8 million Venezuelans who have come over the past few years, this next generation of issues are not the province of the immigration agency or the foreign. Ministry right who are who are interested in the question of who could come and whether people got legal status and all that but the next set of questions really are about, you know, what are the barriers to access to education for a kid to sign in who doesn't have, you know, the birth certificate family left the other country without the birth certificate. They don't have any history of their studies. We're we're discovering a lot of people actually leave school for reasons we don't know in Latin America. Um, among particularly Venezuelans and so figuring that out, you need the education ministry of that and so figuring out who the stakeholders, so creating the interagency, um, and it's something the Colombian government did, but we were fortunate to be able to accompany them in this. What you know, figuring out how you create an interagency that's got everyone at the table is really helpful because most of the time they're not thinking about immigrants as a separate group even though they may actually have some specific needs that they need to address. OK, thank you. We are gonna take a couple, and this is my fault that I took much time, but a couple of questions from the public and then uh wrap up and, and I'm not gonna be able to take all those, but we are gonna stick around here for more questions kind of on the coffee break, so the lady here and the gentleman over there, and I don't know. I'm Fiona Stewart. I'm the global lead here at the Bank on aging and pensions. Um, just wanted to ask about the, the, totally agree, underappreciated mega trend, but the speed, the speed of the aging, I think is also really underappreciated. How do we make sure in these programs that we're not targeting countries where the window of this demographic change is happening so fast that by the time the programs, etc. in place, the windows actually shut. So do we need to think about the speed of the demographic window as well when we're building these sort of programs? Alright, let's take that one and then we'll answer yes, great, thank you. Good morning, everyone. Uh, my name is Alejandro Lara, and the line of my research is about lifelong learning, aging, and productive aging, um, and I encounter a gap in the migration system, doing, you know, doing my research and my question is threefolded all related, um. I would like to know if there is any database that assess people, migrants at the point of entry. Because in that way, you know, the country will reduce the burden on, you know, those individuals, right, that there will be a better place if they said that, for example, Andrew. Has 20 years of experience as a plumber in in your own country. So, you know, therefore X country will be able to place you. At a specific organization or company, um, and, and I say very quickly and, and, uh, uh, I understand that it's a handful of countries doing that, but very few. So In that way, if we know that, then one will reduce the burden, and 2 will be better allocate those training resources, you know, if we, if we, if we know what are the the the the skill, the knowledge, the skills of abilities of those migrants. So that's the threefold question. So please provide a few samples. Thank you. Perfect. Thank you. Uh, we're gonna take, uh, what you guys volunteer there. There's the one, the speed of the aging. I think you might wanna say something about that. So the second question, I think we're gonna have a whole new ABCD next year for that. Uh, so I don't know. So, so it's exactly about the speed of aging. I think nobody anticipated it. Uh, I think a lot of demographers, uh, some are not, but some are still not fully coming to grab. And it is, it is true, but the alternative is we do nothing, which is even worse. Whatever we do, I think we need to do it quickly, but it is absolutely about the speed of aging and especially. You know, the speed of the, the fertility decline, and it is almost irreversible in many countries. China is implementing all these policies, but you look at the, the trends, I don't know if we can come out of it. So, but it goes back to why labor market policies, education policies, and migration policies, those are the figures I showed, they need to be complementary. And fortunately the labor market, I'm not a labor economist per se, but you know people work longer. People work part time, so that's, that's got to be part of the solution. But the speed of aging, by, by speed of aging, I don't mean be physically aging, but basically the share of the elderly people in the population is increasing. There's nothing we can do about it, right? I mean it's a natural phenomenon. We just, it has to be a Direct part of the decision making process which we have ignored for a long time. Um, uh, I, I'm, I'm gonna a little bit answer your question even though I'm the moderator, uh, and kind of also maybe reframing which is like do you guys know of any examples of in terms of databases or information where, where this could actually leverage, uh, the situation. I do know of an NGO called Talent Beyond Boundaries who do a little bit of this, maybe not at the port of entry. But they actually do collect data on people who are willing to, maybe I'm not explaining it well, so I'm not gonna put my words in their mouth, but, uh, collecting data on people who are willing to move in terms of labor data and CVs and experience and sharing this with employers in other places, um, so that's one, but I don't know if you have, if you have other examples or you wanna add anything in general about that. I think I would just add that I think this sometimes happens on the private sector side in a place like the Philippines where active recruiters are working quite aggressively in cities like Manila. Some of those jobs are going government to government through bilateral agreements and so the Department of Migrant Workers in the Philippines gets these jobs and they sort of have a bunch of people that have applied for them that they can put into these jobs. Now it's not quite the database you're thinking about, but I think it's helping facilitate those flows and the match between destination countries and origin countries. There there's, there's different experiments on this. I mean, there's experience on, uh, with like the Philippines doing that on, on, you know, people, their own nationals who might want to work elsewhere. The Canadian government does it for people who apply, right? They, they have ranking people according to human capital. Come back to that in one second. Um, the US government tried to do this, um, with the, uh, the, the mobility offices, safe mobility offices, though it was fairly crude. I mean, they knew that they were trying to refine it, but actually figure out. They were much better at figuring out who had protection needs than they were and figuring out people's skills, and they started to rebalance it and they are no more, so that kind of ended. Um, the European Union has been trying to do a talent database, and I've lost track whether they've launched it or not, but they're trying to do a talent database for people who might want to come to Europe, um, to different countries to be available to different national governments. So there's a lot of thinking about this. The, the challenge in, in the end, I mean, there's some skills that are really easy to measure like the plumbers, right? That, that you really want someone who knows you don't want me doing your plumbing, right? I mean, that would be bad. You don't know me, but you don't want me doing your plumbing. Um, the, you know, so there are certain skills you, you wanna know if someone's an actual accountant, a certified accountant, if they're a certified nurse, but, you know, the, the labor market of the future is gonna be much more flexible and fluid than the labor market of the past, right? I mean, I think we should assume that things will shift over time. And so the larger question is also broader human capital also, who is able not just who just has skills, but who is able to adapt, right, as things change. I mean, you know, a certain programming language, great, but that programming language may be irrelevant in 5 years, right? And so who has the ability to adapt? And, and, and I think that's a larger challenge. And by the way, that's a huge, if you talk to HR people at large companies, I mean, they'll tell you the same thing. This is, it's hard to measure, right? I mean, this is the kind of, and, and I'm not sure there's an answer to that even on how you do it. I mean, and, and for companies that recruit abroad, by the way, they do actually. You know, where this is really happening is in employment-based migration. Companies either through intermediaries, recruitment agencies, or, or themselves are looking at skill sets, but it has the same limitations it does for domestic workers, right, which is the kind of things we really value for all of us that have hired people, right? The kind of stuff we really, really value in hiring someone that sets someone apart is actually really hard to measure and much harder to measure across a cultural divide. We, we need to migrate to the coffee break, I think. Go to WD sorry, no, WEDR 2023. We have all the migration data there. You'll see it for the whole world bilateral by education. Thank you. Thank you so much. This was fascinating. We're gonna stick around and there's, uh, of course this is a very important ongoing discussion and hopefully we have more forums here and elsewhere to continue talking about it. Thank you and you continue. You can continue these conversations at lunch after the next event, but, um, not, not right now, but yes, please leave the stage. OK, so while we, uh, work in that transition, um, we are at the, uh, last, uh, event of this fantastic conference, um, and that is going to be a fireside chat between, um, Mamta Murti, who is the vice president or the people vice presidency of the World Bank, um, and, um, David Evans, who is a senior fellow and newly minted program director of the Education program at the Center for Global Development. Um, they will speak until about one and we'll go directly to lunch after that, and you'll have a chance to continue these conversations. Thank you.
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DEC Day 4 Session 9 Migration
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DEC Day 4 Session 9 Migration
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A video recording of Session 9 on Day 4 of The Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics 2025 "Development in the Age of Populism." This session discusses "Migration".

CHAIR: Dany Bahar, Senior Fellow and Director of Migration Displacement and Humanitarian Policy Program, Center for Global Development

➜ Presentation

PANELISTS:

Paper 1: Skills, Labor Market Shifts, and International Migration (Çağlar Özden, World Bank)

➜ Presentation | ➜ Report

Andrew Selee, President of the Migration Policy Institute (MPI)

Paper 2: Development Impacts on the Sending Country (Caroline B. Theoharides, Amherst College)

➜ Presentation | ➜ Paper

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