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A video recording of the third session on Day 1 of The Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics 2025 "Development in the Age of Populism." This session discusses "Pollution"
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00:00 Welcome to session free on pollution,

00:02 chaired by Shami Glass,

00:03 senior director and,

00:04 uh,

00:05 senior advisor and director for development policy

00:07 in the office of our chief economist.

00:09 In the session,

00:10 our panelists will share research that offers a comprehensive look

00:14 at both the challenges and opportunities

00:16 in using market-based approaches to address

00:19 pollution and climate change,

00:21 while our discussion will provide expert commentary

00:23 and help synthesize the key takeaways.

00:25 So.

00:26 With that,

00:26 let me hand over to our chair

00:29 and ask whoever is

00:30 on their way to please take their seats and and come over.

00:33 Thank you.

00:35 All right.

00:38 Thank you,

00:38 Carolina,

00:39 and welcome everyone.

00:41 Um,

00:41 you know,

00:42 I hope a lot more of you join,

00:44 but those who have joined,

00:45 thank you very much.

00:46 Uh,

00:47 I'd like to welcome all of you to our session on pollution.

00:51 And

00:52 the title

00:53 of

00:54 the session is pollution,

00:56 because

00:57 when we started thinking about the session and designing it,

01:00 we were motivated by

01:02 Professor Michael Greenstone

01:05 and his 2024

01:07 AEA Distinguished Lecture,

01:09 which was on the economics of the global energy challenge.

01:14 And in that lecture,

01:16 Professor Greenstone

01:17 highlighted that the global energy challenge

01:21 is defined by 3 often conflicting goals

01:25 that all countries have,

01:27 and this has to do with getting cheap

01:30 and reliable energy,

01:32 having clean air,

01:34 and limiting the damages from climate change.

01:37 And

01:38 when it comes to energy use,

01:40 there's a close correlation

01:43 between energy use per capita

01:46 and rising incomes per capita.

01:49 In fact,

01:50 there is no country in the world that has become rich

01:53 without a dramatic increase in energy use.

01:57 And right now there are billions of

01:59 people in low-income economies and middle-income economies

02:02 whose aspirations for themselves

02:05 include the dramatic rise in energy consumption.

02:09 So here in America,

02:11 an average American

02:12 consumes 13,000 kilowatts per

02:17 hours of electricity per year.

02:19 But around the world,

02:20 there are about 3 billion people who live in countries

02:24 with per capita

02:25 electricity consumption,

02:27 less than 1500 kilowatt hours a year.

02:32 So rising energy use has been accompanied by pollution

02:36 and carbon emissions.

02:38 And while America now accounts for 14%

02:41 of global carbon emissions,

02:44 emissions in middle-income countries,

02:45 particularly

02:46 in India and China,

02:48 have been on the rise,

02:49 linked with their growing economies.

02:51 So here's the challenge.

02:53 A policy

02:55 that's telling middle income countries and low income countries

02:59 not to have a dramatic rise in energy use,

03:03 that is to not develop,

03:05 it's just a nonstarter.

03:07 It sounds a lot like what Indemit told us this morning,

03:11 the hypocritical statements

03:13 made by elites in advanced economies.

03:16 And for all these countries,

03:18 fossil fuels are predicted

03:20 to be the dominant source of energy through the middle of the 21st century.

03:26 However,

03:27 there's a case to be made for aggressive reductions of fossil fuel,

03:31 and that's the immediate health effects

03:34 from conventional pollutants.

03:36 And Michael Greenstone's research that Kosik's going to tell us about

03:40 shows that air pollution poses the greatest external threat

03:44 to human health,

03:46 with the average person

03:48 losing more than 2 years

03:50 of life expectancy.

03:52 This loss is comparable to that from tobacco smoking.

03:55 And much greater from alcoholism,

03:59 terrorism,

04:00 or war.

04:01 So if low and middle income countries

04:04 need to take steps to reduce conventional air pollution

04:08 from fossil fuels,

04:10 it also provides a shot in the arm

04:12 for searching for alternative sources of energy.

04:15 So we're going to have a real vibrant debate this afternoon.

04:20 Because

04:20 we're going to talk about energy,

04:21 we're going to talk about clean air,

04:23 and we're gonna talk about reducing emissions.

04:27 And we have an amazing lineup of speakers.

04:30 Jan Steckel is the chair for Climate and

04:32 Development Economics at the Brandenburg University of Technology

04:36 and associated with the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research.

04:41 Barbara Haer is a senior fellow

04:43 at the Goldman School of Public Policy at UC Berkeley.

04:46 And

04:47 is the director of the Berkeley Carbon Trading Project

04:50 and Kaushik Deb.

04:51 He is the executive director of the Energy Policy Institute at

04:55 the University of Chicago and leads EPI's work in India.

04:59 And I'm very excited and delighted my colleague,

05:01 Carolyn Fisher,

05:03 who is the lead economist and research manager

05:05 for development economics at the World Bank.

05:08 So Jan,

05:09 Barbara,

05:09 and Kaushik will give us about

05:12 17 minutes each max

05:14 on their research,

05:15 and Carolyn will kick us off with a discussant.

05:18 As a discussant following that,

05:20 we'll have a panel,

05:21 but I'd love to hear your questions,

05:23 so be ready to come to those mics and prepare your questions now.

05:27 So Jan,

05:27 let's start with you.

05:28 Thank you.

05:34 Thank you very much for the kind introduction and also the invitation.

05:39 Um,

05:40 I'm going to talk

05:41 about the effectiveness of carbon pricing.

05:45 So,

05:45 while I'm in climate and development economics,

05:48 so this is

05:49 why I'm interested in carbon pricing.

05:52 And I actually would like to kind of

05:53 summarize what we know from the existing literature.

05:57 And then I would like to discuss a little bit what we can learn,

06:00 particularly for low and middle income countries.

06:03 So

06:04 if you ask an economist,

06:05 OK,

06:05 what shall we do like in terms of rising emissions,

06:08 etc.

06:08 then they probably will answer like,

06:10 OK,

06:11 yeah,

06:11 let's put a price on carbon.

06:13 This is basically the standard idea,

06:15 like it is over 100 years old.

06:18 And we consider it to be the number one instrument to curb

06:21 climate change,

06:23 and it is not only kind of an academic or ritual exercise,

06:28 it is also getting increasing attention

06:31 in

06:33 low and middle income countries.

06:34 So you see in this nice report that

06:36 the World Bank is publishing every year that like every year

06:39 you basically see some more spots in the global south here.

06:45 So,

06:46 but

06:47 I would like to argue in this talk that

06:50 kind of,

06:51 there are huge research and implementation gaps and like of those

06:55 schemes that have been implemented in low and middle income countries,

06:59 we see many schemes with very,

07:01 very low prices.

07:02 And this raises immediately a couple of questions.

07:06 I'm not promising that I'm going to answer all of them.

07:09 Because it will never actually fit in 17 minutes,

07:13 but I will try to still kind of offer some

07:17 thoughts on actually how we can think about this.

07:20 So the first question is,

07:21 is it actually effective given particular market environments?

07:24 Second is,

07:25 is carbon pricing actually the optimal

07:28 policy instrument given other market failures?

07:30 So

07:31 as climate economists we tend to kind of focus on,

07:34 yeah,

07:34 we need to basically bring down emissions,

07:36 but what if Actually,

07:38 there are not only co-benefits of climate policy,

07:41 but also other spillovers,

07:43 negative spillovers,

07:44 for example,

07:44 on increasing air pollution,

07:45 etc.

07:46 So I think we need to understand this better

07:48 to then also

07:49 kind of think of the optimal design of policies.

07:53 Third is,

07:53 of course,

07:54 the question,

07:54 why is it so difficult to implement?

07:56 And fourth,

07:57 is what would be kind of specific design features that can make it work also

08:02 in uh environments in low and middle income countries.

08:06 But I would like to actually in this talk focus on two questions.

08:10 One is

08:11 what do we actually know about the effectiveness of carbon pricing?

08:15 And the second is can we be sure that

08:18 this also applies for low and middle income countries?

08:20 And I would like to start with the first

08:23 kind of question.

08:24 With the paper that we have published last year,

08:27 which is actually a systematic review and meter analysis of

08:31 the expo elevation of the effectiveness of carbon pricing.

08:34 So

08:35 we are actually kind of looking into the literature that has in the causal setting,

08:40 looked into,

08:40 OK,

08:41 there has been some form of pricing instrument can be a tax,

08:44 can be a trading scheme.

08:45 What has actually happened to emissions.

08:48 And the reason why we

08:49 engaged in this endeavor was twofold.

08:51 First was,

08:53 well,

08:54 we're,

08:54 it's an interesting question.

08:56 But second is that basically it has been kind of,

08:59 there have been a couple of papers that came out,

09:01 like one,

09:02 for example,

09:02 by Jessicare 2020 in environmental research letters saying,

09:06 OK,

09:07 carbon pricing has not actually been effective.

09:10 And this was counterintuitive to us,

09:12 not only basically from kind of the theoretical

09:15 papers and knowledge that we have,

09:17 but also

09:18 based on the primary studies that partly we ourselves have actually conducted.

09:24 So,

09:24 and the,

09:25 the second dimension where we were puzzled was that basically what was kind

09:28 of labeled to be a systematic review was not at all systematic.

09:32 It had kind of quite a few gaps in terms.

09:34 So we,

09:34 we actually engaged in

09:37 doing a proper systematic review,

09:39 which kind of

09:40 Um,

09:41 means that we have to go through various steps.

09:44 So the first is

09:45 that we have to engage in systematic screening,

09:47 really trying to scrape all the relevant kind of uh literature databases,

09:52 including Scopus,

09:54 uh,

09:54 Redpack,

09:54 Google Scholar,

09:55 basically what have you.

09:57 And really kind of looking into with a with a

10:01 predefined set of keywords like carbon pricing,

10:04 emissions trading,

10:05 expost,

10:06 causal incidents,

10:08 etc.

10:08 etc.

10:09 uh,

10:10 kind of to make sure that we identify all kinds of the relevant literature.

10:15 So then,

10:16 basically,

10:17 uh,

10:18 we have developed some automated tools to make the sorting a little bit more,

10:22 um,

10:23 yeah.

10:23 Uh,

10:25 handy for us,

10:26 but still,

10:26 in the end,

10:27 there were about 4000 papers where we had to read the abstracts by hand,

10:31 always making sure that it's not only one person,

10:33 but at least 2 persons

10:35 to basically make sure that we don't miss anything.

10:37 So,

10:38 in the end,

10:38 we came up with a,

10:40 with a specific set of papers and literature facts that we kind of think

10:45 are

10:45 more or less comprehensive.

10:47 And as a second step,

10:49 then we had to engage and think,

10:50 OK,

10:51 how can we now extract

10:53 kind of the effects and the effect is we are interested in

10:58 is the reduction

11:00 of

11:01 carbon emissions after the introduction of a specific scheme.

11:05 And of course,

11:06 kind of the literature

11:07 gives all kinds of different methods,

11:09 different or

11:11 Um,

11:12 synthetic control,

11:13 etc.

11:14 so this had to be harmonized also this,

11:16 the literature,

11:16 the original papers look into different

11:19 kind of time frames,

11:19 etc.

11:20 but all of this basically we,

11:22 we try to harmonize and we came up

11:24 with a specific sample of

11:27 existing carbon price.

11:28 Schemes and ETS

11:30 that um

11:31 basically

11:32 uh have been covered in about 100 publications

11:36 and in those about 100 publications we identified

11:40 about 470

11:42 particular

11:43 uh treatment effects,

11:45 OK.

11:46 And you can see if you look closely into this table

11:49 that those schemes cover

11:51 like a very different um share of the emissions and also if you look into the prices,

11:58 they range from $3 in the red scheme

12:01 to about um

12:04 above $100 in

12:07 uh

12:08 in uh in Sweden.

12:10 So let's have a look into the results.

12:15 The results actually are

12:17 that

12:17 once we have seen carbon pricing schemes to be implemented,

12:21 they have on average reduced emissions significantly by about 10%.

12:26 So this is what the literature says.

12:29 And

12:30 you see that there are kind of huge

12:32 differences like ranging from about 20% in the reggie

12:35 to actually a positive effect in the Swiss ETS.

12:40 So we did some analysis aiming to try

12:44 to explain what is actually now the differences and

12:48 One of the largest differences is actually

12:50 the sectoral coverage.

12:52 So when it has been actually applied on energy or industry sectors,

12:57 um,

12:57 we we can find that actually the emission

13:00 reductions have been larger than in other sectors.

13:03 Also,

13:03 and this is kind of logical,

13:05 if the original kind of studies have looked into a longer period,

13:09 then we also find a larger reduction effect.

13:13 So you might wonder,

13:15 and I'm saying this up front because this question comes up

13:18 every time,

13:19 why has it actually been positive in Switzerland?

13:23 And this is actually the last point,

13:25 like the kind of how the study has been

13:28 conducted is also a decisive kind of predictor or like

13:32 element why these are different.

13:34 And in the,

13:35 in this particular study.

13:37 of

13:38 the authors looked into the difference between the introduction of the Swiss ETS,

13:42 which has replaced a different scheme,

13:44 the regulation in the industry sector,

13:46 which has been

13:47 actually more ambitious than the ETS.

13:50 So

13:50 it is not so surprising that we find

13:53 a positive effect.

13:55 But it's still kind of um relates to an important

14:00 question that we all know when we are in academia,

14:02 that kind of not every study is of its,

14:04 of,

14:05 of the same quality.

14:07 So what we also did is

14:09 That we wanted to know

14:11 what is actually

14:12 the effect of particular bias

14:15 and the effect of statistical power in those studies,

14:18 and I just realized that the numbers are I mistakenly swapped them.

14:23 So

14:23 when actually controlling for specific biases,

14:26 so for example the control groups are not comparable to

14:30 And the treatment groups or there are some omitted controls which we

14:34 more or less kind of did by hand,

14:37 so this coding,

14:39 then we find that OK,

14:40 this is actually not really affecting the results.

14:43 It is still 10.8%. However,

14:45 if you basically take those studies out that are statistically underpowered,

14:49 then we find a

14:51 slightly lower effect of about 7%.

14:53 But the bottom line remains the same,

14:56 so emission pricing.

14:58 Where we have robust kind of

15:00 ex post causal evidence has been effective

15:04 in negative like in bringing down emissions.

15:07 So one thing that you immediately realize when you look through

15:10 these kind of um uh set of schemes that have been studied

15:14 is that there's very little evidence on low and middle income countries.

15:19 And

15:20 I won't have time to actually go into this in detail,

15:23 but this is exactly what we're doing in my

15:25 lab that we try to provide this primary evidence.

15:28 And I just

15:29 kind of,

15:29 uh,

15:30 would like to

15:31 give a very,

15:32 very quick

15:33 insight on a study that has just been published

15:35 as a working paper by one of my postdocs,

15:38 Johannes Galli,

15:39 and they actually look into the effect of the South African carbon tax,

15:43 which has come

15:45 in effect in 2019 in the South African industry sector.

15:49 And they actually find that there is that they cannot prove

15:52 any robust evidence on emission reductions in this particular scheme.

15:58 Um,

15:59 but I would like to actually go one step further.

16:01 And this is why I decided to,

16:03 um,

16:04 actually introduce another paper.

16:06 I haven't been the co-author here,

16:08 but uh my colleagues at

16:10 at PI have actually published this last year in Science,

16:13 and they kind of ask the question the other way around,

16:16 right?

16:16 Like if we basically do policy evaluation,

16:19 then we often pick our favorite policy instruments,

16:22 emission pricing.

16:23 And then we do an evaluation,

16:24 has this been effective.

16:26 But actually the question that we're interested

16:28 in is what has brought down emissions?

16:31 And this needs a slightly kind of different research design.

16:34 And this is what they have been doing.

16:36 They have

16:37 developed basically a framework

16:39 where they for different countries and sectors,

16:42 look into how emissions have developed by a synthetic kind of control framework,

16:48 they kind of look into emission brakes.

16:50 And whenever they detect a significant emission break,

16:53 not just kind of a random 1% dip,

16:56 but like at least 5 to 10%,

16:59 they say,

16:59 OK,

16:59 this now actually is an emissions break in a particular sector.

17:03 When applying this,

17:05 they find

17:06 in overall 69 breaks.

17:09 With an average emission reduction of 19%.

17:12 You can see like all across the board,

17:15 like in Europe,

17:15 in North America,

17:16 Latin America,

17:18 Asia um Oceania,

17:20 so we have actually seen those breaks everywhere.

17:23 What they do next

17:25 is that they assign

17:27 specific policies

17:29 uh to those bricks.

17:30 So they actually use the database from the OCD on um

17:35 On,

17:35 on policies,

17:36 all kinds of policies,

17:37 not only price policies,

17:38 but also,

17:39 um,

17:40 changes in the building code,

17:41 for example,

17:42 or air pollution standards,

17:43 etc.

17:44 and they assign it to those brakes.

17:48 In the end they come up with this very complicated graph.

17:51 I don't expect you to understand it at all,

17:53 but basically it gives you kind of like all the

17:56 various kind of policies in countries where we have actually seen

18:00 some policy induced reduction.

18:03 If we just zoom in one example,

18:05 China for example.

18:07 So this has been a break detected in the industry sector.

18:11 And they can assign

18:12 kind of the pilot ETS in

18:15 in China

18:16 and the fossil fuel subsidy reform to this effect.

18:21 Doing this for many,

18:22 many countries,

18:23 they can then

18:25 also actually look into specific differences between

18:28 developed and developing countries by sector.

18:31 And I think this is really interesting to look at,

18:34 because

18:35 first result of this paper is that generally policy mixes

18:39 mixes have been much more effective than single policies.

18:43 And they have in particular been effective if there

18:46 has been some price instrument actually in place.

18:50 But there are some kind of differences.

18:52 So if you look into this graph,

18:53 the different kind of

18:55 circles here show you

18:56 kind of what kind of policy has been affected.

18:59 So for example,

19:00 here,

19:00 727.3% of the successful interventions were regulation alone,

19:05 but you see that most were actually combined with some subsidy with some pricing,

19:10 etc.

19:10 etc.

19:12 So what they find is when in those sectors

19:15 with private consumers,

19:17 they find the most complementarities if you like.

19:21 Then the pricing instruments have in particular been

19:24 affected and this is a quite similar effect,

19:26 as quite similar results to what we have found also in the systematic review,

19:31 like where we actually see profit maximizing firms at work

19:34 and this is true both in developed and developing economies.

19:38 They're basically pricing instruments have been in particular.

19:41 Um,

19:42 effective.

19:43 So now,

19:45 the most

19:46 interesting difference is in the electricity sector.

19:48 So you see in developed countries,

19:51 actually,

19:51 it's been mainly been pricing instruments that have

19:54 managed to bring down emissions in the electricity sector.

19:57 In developing countries,

19:59 they could not

20:00 find any.

20:02 Emission brake

20:03 that can be

20:04 traced back to pricing instruments alone.

20:06 It's only subsidies and it is regulation.

20:09 And this of course as a kind of immediately gets us to the question,

20:14 so what are the conditions for pricing

20:17 interventions come pricing to work successfully.

20:20 Like looking into the electricity sector of developing countries,

20:23 a couple of things come to mind.

20:25 It is the role of liberalized markets and

20:26 other price distortions that might be at play.

20:29 The role of specific,

20:30 you know,

20:30 sequences of policies,

20:32 for example,

20:32 the liberalization of an electricity market,

20:35 might need to come first before we apply a pricing instrument.

20:39 And then of course the role of institutions,

20:41 state capacity,

20:42 etc.

20:42 to regulate.

20:43 And

20:43 last but not least,

20:44 of course,

20:45 the role also of state owned enterprises that

20:47 might be particularly salient in the electricity sector.

20:52 So now I have another talk of 17 minutes,

20:55 uh,

20:56 what we can expect.

20:57 But and I won't give it to you,

20:59 but I just wanted to

21:01 mention a couple of things

21:03 uh for discussion.

21:05 So,

21:05 um,

21:06 why should it be different from,

21:08 from theory?

21:08 One is kind of the effectiveness,

21:10 and I think I have talked about this.

21:12 I would like to say two words more about the interaction with other externalities,

21:17 including health,

21:17 because we have been doing quite some work

21:20 to look into the effects of

21:23 Cooking fuels,

21:24 when actually people are exposed to price changes

21:27 by subsidy reform or by a carbon price.

21:30 And this is actually in the fact that in developed countries,

21:33 nobody would actually think of.

21:34 But in developing countries,

21:36 it is highly important because we want people to use more fossil fuels

21:39 in terms of EPG in terms of lowering exposure to indoor air pollution,

21:43 etc.

21:44 And we find

21:45 that this might actually counteract.

21:47 So the introduction of a carbon price might actually lead

21:51 to more indoor air pollution because people are pushed down

21:54 the energy ladder and actually use more firewood or charcoal,

21:58 etc.

21:58 with related health consequences.

22:00 And when thinking this through

22:02 and then looking actually into the comparison between social costs of carbon.

22:08 And these health costs

22:09 we find that in many countries including India

22:12 actually for the country itself I've seen you

22:16 um

22:17 um it would actually not be optimal to apply a car price.

22:21 So

22:22 then it comes to the last

22:24 point that I would like to make and this is

22:26 our countries actually because you could think of

22:29 design schemes right to alleviate this effect.

22:32 But the question is,

22:33 do countries have actually the

22:35 the institutional means to do that,

22:38 and

22:40 who would actually need to kind of be compensated?

22:43 Do we need to think of specific design features,

22:46 etc.

22:46 I think all of this

22:47 is highly relevant

22:49 when thinking about carbon pricing in

22:51 developing countries.

22:53 And with that,

22:54 I stop

22:55 and thank you very much.

23:00 Thanks so much,

23:01 Ian,

23:01 for those excellent insights.

23:03 Barbara,

23:03 over to you.

23:10 OK,

23:11 now let's turn attention to carbon offsets.

23:14 It's a very different story than carbon pricing.

23:17 So,

23:18 um,

23:18 offset

23:19 programs

23:20 are often appended to carbon pricing programs,

23:23 they allow

23:25 an emitter to pay someone else to reduce emissions instead of

23:29 them reducing their own emissions under a cap

23:32 or sometimes instead of paying a carbon tax.

23:35 And I've studied the quality of carbon offset programs for the last 20 years,

23:39 um,

23:40 looking at a,

23:40 at a range of of programs,

23:44 and in general,

23:45 carbon offset programs have worked dismally.

23:47 It's common for them to overcredit 10 times or more.

23:51 And overcrediting matters because to the extent that offsets are used,

23:56 they can undermine the effectiveness of the emissions cap

23:59 or regulatory system,

24:01 and when they're used by companies,

24:04 they can be used by companies to sell

24:06 carbon neutral products that are not carbon neutral.

24:12 Folks,

24:12 can we put up the slides?

24:25 OK,

24:26 thank you.

24:27 Uh,

24:28 so for the next

24:30 15 minutes or 17 minutes or so.

24:33 Um,

24:34 I'll,

24:35 I'm going to make the,

24:36 the three points.

24:37 Um,

24:38 one is that

24:39 most major offset programs to date have significantly overcredited.

24:44 Um,

24:45 I'll explain the common sources of overcrediting over

24:48 the project types that have generated the most credits

24:51 over 3 major

24:53 carbon offset markets.

24:55 Um,

24:55 second,

24:56 I'll describe,

24:57 um,

24:59 Basically why I'm having the same conversations today about poor quality as

25:03 I had 20 years ago when I started doing this research.

25:06 Why such persistent and

25:08 um

25:09 uh deep overcrediting

25:11 and

25:12 I'll I'll argue that poor quality is inherent

25:15 to the underlying incentive structure of carbon offsets.

25:19 And then I'll discuss a way forward,

25:20 and I'll conclude that given the 20 year history of carbon offsets,

25:23 given the underlying quality issues,

25:26 I think we,

25:27 we need to move

25:29 from

25:30 the from carbon offsets,

25:32 and I'm putting forward an idea of a

25:34 contributions approach.

25:38 So let's discuss the first

25:40 major carbon offset program,

25:42 which was established under the UN

25:44 under the Kyoto Protocol.

25:46 So under the Kyoto Protocol,

25:47 industrialized countries had caps,

25:49 developing countries didn't have caps,

25:51 and industrialized countries argued,

25:53 you know,

25:53 greenhouse gasses are well mixed in the atmosphere.

25:55 Why do they need to reduce emissions

25:58 domestically?

25:58 Shouldn't they be allowed to reduce emissions anywhere in

26:00 the world that is that where it's cheapest?

26:03 Um,

26:04 and I did field research in India on the outcomes of the program,

26:08 uh,

26:08 focusing on

26:10 grid-connected renewables and hydropower,

26:13 um,

26:14 which

26:17 I don't know if I can point

26:19 anyway,

26:19 it's the right most together that they,

26:22 they generate the most,

26:23 the most credits,

26:24 um,

26:25 and they both hydropower and renewable energy is the same methodology.

26:30 So I looked at them

26:31 together.

26:33 Um,

26:33 and methodologies are the backbone of carbon offset programs.

26:37 They define what projects are allowed to participate

26:39 and how to estimate and monitor emissions reductions under them.

26:44 And I found that

26:46 the large majority of these projects most likely

26:50 didn't reduce emissions at all.

26:51 The program mostly paid project developers to develop projects they most,

26:56 they were likely to build anyway or they had,

26:58 they were already building.

27:00 And the problem was that

27:02 the UN cast a very wide net

27:05 in what project types were allowed to participate

27:09 and required every project developer to prove that they wouldn't have gone

27:11 forward with the project were it not for the offset incentive,

27:15 the offset income.

27:16 And what I saw was that what I found in

27:19 this research was that it was very easy for project developers

27:22 to show that cost effective projects were not cost effective,

27:26 such as by

27:27 strategically choosing assumptions that go into a financial assessment,

27:31 um,

27:32 or by describing barriers to to projects.

27:36 And what happened was,

27:37 um,

27:38 high levels of overcrediting and non-additional

27:41 participation kept prices too low.

27:45 For that incentive to really affect new to incentivize new mitigation.

27:51 Um,

27:53 Adverse selection happened when and that

27:57 that that phenomenon is adverse selection right the first projects to participate

28:02 are the ones that

28:03 cost the least those are the ones that would have gone ahead anyway.

28:07 I concluded that the large majority of the projects are non-additional,

28:12 um,

28:12 not just in India,

28:13 but across,

28:14 across,

28:14 across the world,

28:16 and another article after mine Keal.

28:19 did a broader review of,

28:20 of more project types and and puts a number on that estimated that 85% of projects

28:26 most likely were non-additional or overcredited.

28:32 I then turned attention to California's offset program,

28:35 which was structured in a in a different way,

28:37 and I believe a much better way.

28:39 It was structured specifically to address the

28:41 quality issues with its predecessor program.

28:44 What California did is

28:46 narrow instead of casting a wide net and requiring every project developer to prove

28:51 the additionality of their project,

28:53 they defined a narrow set of project types.

28:56 And that were unlikely to move forward on their own,

28:59 that were likely to be affected or incentivized by the offset income.

29:04 And

29:05 um I,

29:07 I study the improved forest management,

29:10 which is the project type of 3 quarters of California

29:14 credits um on the mandate and the compliance market,

29:18 but these credits also generated over a third of all credits from projects in the US,

29:24 including the voluntary market.

29:26 Um,

29:29 And

29:31 What I and others have found is again,

29:35 A better structure,

29:36 but

29:37 widespread overcrediting

29:39 and

29:40 the way the protocol works,

29:41 the way to improve forest management protocol works is that

29:44 it allows any forest landowner anywhere in the US

29:48 to generate credits that they commit to holding

29:50 more carbon on their landscape than the baseline,

29:53 where the baseline for the most part is set at the average for that forest type.

29:57 Now there's heterogeneity on the,

29:59 on the landscape,

30:00 and what we would expect is again,

30:02 adverse selection.

30:03 Where the first forest landowners to participate are the ones that,

30:07 uh,

30:08 participate in costs the least that are already holding more carbon on their land,

30:12 um,

30:12 whether it's for climate reasons,

30:14 for climatic reasons,

30:15 ecological reasons,

30:17 or the type of timber they're producing,

30:19 um,

30:20 already are holding more carbon on the landscape than

30:22 the average so that they can generate credits,

30:24 um,

30:25 without any change,

30:26 and that's exactly what we see.

30:28 So the first two articles there,

30:30 um,

30:31 use remote sensing imagery.

30:34 To and found that

30:36 they found no uh

30:37 uh uh statistically significant difference in forest management

30:43 forest management practice

30:45 in the project areas compared to the past,

30:47 how they historically managed the lands and compared to control lands.

30:52 Now let's say um

30:54 some of these projects really would have logged aggressively

30:58 to bring their forest lands down to the average.

31:01 An earlier study that that that I did was on leakage

31:05 where I found that the protocol systematically underestimated

31:11 the impacts of,

31:14 of

31:14 when you reduce logging on participating lands,

31:17 but you don't change the demand for timber products,

31:18 of course you get some.

31:20 Uh,

31:21 uh,

31:21 uh,

31:21 uh,

31:22 displacement to other lands,

31:24 and it dramatically underestimated

31:26 the impact of leakage so much so though that it

31:30 overcredited 5 times.

31:32 It shows a very,

31:33 it uses a very low leakage rate

31:36 and it averages leakage over 100 years rather than deducting it at the same time that

31:41 uh avoided deforestation is credited.

31:45 So what we see here in some is that it's much better structured,

31:49 but we still have adverse selection and the quantification methodologies

31:53 in

31:54 in several ways are not science aligned.

31:59 I then

32:00 turned attention to the voluntary carbon market,

32:03 um,

32:03 which generates credits for voluntary use such as by companies,

32:07 universities,

32:08 other institutions to meet

32:10 targets like carbon neutrality.

32:13 And I studied again the project types of the

32:16 the project type of the most credits,

32:18 which is red

32:19 also that means avoided deforestation.

32:23 Um,

32:24 and I also did a study of cook stoves in the purple,

32:27 um,

32:28 that,

32:28 uh,

32:29 is the fastest growing offset project type.

32:32 I brought together a team of researchers and

32:34 we comprehensively looked at the major elements of

32:38 quality of avoided of the four main avoided deforestation

32:43 methodologies.

32:45 And a few things

32:47 we found

32:48 overcrediting under every rock we turned.

32:52 And

32:53 um

32:54 we were able to explore why what is what is happening?

32:57 Why is there so much overcrediting and what we found is flexibility.

33:01 That the protocols were written in a way that allowed

33:04 a wide range of projects,

33:06 a wide range of forests,

33:08 uh,

33:09 to participate across the globe,

33:11 um,

33:11 and project developers when confronted with,

33:15 uh,

33:16 flexibility in how they can set the baseline,

33:18 how they can assess leakage,

33:20 um,

33:21 especially given high levels of uncertainty in both

33:24 mean methodological choices that led to more credits rather than less,

33:27 you know,

33:28 why wouldn't they?

33:29 And the third party verifiers that are the enforcers of quality in the system,

33:33 they didn't enforce conservativeness,

33:35 they didn't even often enforce common sense.

33:39 They just,

33:40 they allowed projects to move forward if the

33:42 quantification methods were allowed by the methodologies.

33:46 And one other

33:48 factor that I want to mention

33:50 with red is that your work,

33:52 you know,

33:52 these projects are working,

33:54 um,

33:54 to avoid deforestation,

33:56 uh,

33:57 uh.

33:58 Around the globe,

33:59 um,

34:01 this project type could not be more important to be effective.

34:06 What we see is that many of these projects,

34:08 or most of these projects,

34:10 target smallholders rather than the

34:12 major industrial drivers of deforestation because

34:15 it's cheaper to do so.

34:17 And while they could generate credits against fictitious baselines,

34:21 um,

34:22 and so.

34:24 Many of most of these projects,

34:27 uh,

34:27 uh,

34:28 restricted

34:29 the restricted

34:31 forest communities from their,

34:33 their use of forests and also

34:36 Some of these projects came at a real risk of harm to forest communities.

34:41 Uh,

34:42 so the reason,

34:43 oh,

34:43 and really quickly,

34:45 so we did a comprehensive assessment of cook stoves offsets looking across all of

34:50 looking across all the major,

34:51 uh,

34:51 uh,

34:51 uh,

34:53 factors that go into quantifying emissions reductions

34:56 across,

34:56 um,

34:57 a sample of the projects on the market and found overcrediting of 10 times.

35:02 So the reasons that have highlighted over the three generations of offset

35:06 programs,

35:07 um,

35:07 are common among many project types.

35:11 So the question is,

35:14 Why such persistent overcrediting?

35:16 There,

35:16 there,

35:18 there's,

35:19 um,

35:20 clearly a structural reason why

35:23 20 years of learning by doing

35:25 we get the same,

35:26 the same outcomes,

35:27 and I believe it's these things,

35:29 these three things working together.

35:31 We have high level,

35:32 high levels of uncertainty.

35:34 Um,

35:35 we know how to measure emissions.

35:36 It's much harder to measure emissions reductions because you have

35:38 to measure them against the counterfactual scenario that never happened and

35:42 Uh,

35:42 it is unobservable,

35:45 um,

35:45 and information asymmetry,

35:46 the project developer always knows a lot more about what they would

35:49 have done without the offset income than any verifier or program administrator.

35:53 These high levels of uncertainty are being deliberated by a

35:56 set of market actors that all benefit from excess crediting.

36:00 So the whole idea of the market is

36:03 for buyers to be able to find the least cost emissions reductions.

36:07 Project developers want to get,

36:09 uh,

36:10 earn more credits for doing less adverse selection.

36:14 Third party verifiers are hired directly by the project developers,

36:17 so they have a conflict of interest to rule leniently,

36:20 um,

36:20 to be hired again,

36:22 especially in the context of high levels of subject uncertainty and subjectivity.

36:28 Um,

36:28 and the,

36:28 the registries themselves,

36:31 uh,

36:31 the,

36:31 the program creators

36:33 on the voluntary market,

36:35 they're vying for market share,

36:37 and in compliance markets,

36:39 there's

36:40 political pressure to keep offset prices low.

36:43 So what you get is a race to the bottom that if one methodology

36:48 were to

36:49 be tightened up and science aligned and not overcredited,

36:53 the market flows to

36:54 the other methodologies.

36:58 So what is the way forward,

37:00 and

37:01 I think

37:04 I'll argue 3 things.

37:06 One is that efforts to create quality offset programs are unlikely to succeed.

37:13 Um,

37:18 Because of,

37:18 because of this,

37:19 the history and the structural reasons.

37:22 We need to shift from offsetting to contributions claims.

37:26 And

37:27 what I'm most excited about.

37:29 Going forward is a shift from offset markets to direct contributions,

37:34 and let me discuss each of those.

37:36 So,

37:38 one is

37:39 um

37:41 Even though I think it is

37:43 unlikely that we're going to

37:45 be able to achieve an offset market,

37:48 um,

37:48 that is quality and not significantly overcredited,

37:52 it's still worthwhile to

37:54 uh have have uh quality methodologies that

37:58 can be used for contributions approaches,

37:59 they can be used for offset

38:01 programs,

38:02 you know,

38:02 a narrow set of offset project types that

38:04 we're offsetting really work with really works for.

38:09 So how do you do that?

38:10 One is most important,

38:13 I believe,

38:13 is to remove conflicts of interest.

38:16 So that means methodology should be designed and evaluated against clear

38:20 criteria by independent experts with

38:22 interdisciplinary scientific and practical expertise.

38:26 Verifier should be hired by independent bodies

38:29 rather than by the project developers themselves,

38:32 and credit calculations

38:34 should be released publicly so that independent parties like us

38:38 can evaluate quality.

38:41 And then

38:42 by

38:43 criteria,

38:44 I put forward

38:46 doing a comprehensive over undercreting analysis

38:50 where you compare methodologies and how

38:52 they're implemented in practice by projects

38:55 against the scientific literature and best practice in a quantitative analysis.

38:59 A benefit is that it acknowledges that

39:02 some projects are going to over credit.

39:03 There's going to be some non-additional crediting.

39:06 But you can structure your program so that

39:08 there's enough conservativeness and undercrediting so that

39:12 programmatically

39:13 it's a quality program you're not overcrediting.

39:16 You want to assess uh quality elements,

39:20 um.

39:23 Um

39:25 I'm going to

39:28 Um,

39:29 OK,

39:29 uh,

39:30 assess,

39:31 assess quality elements,

39:33 taking into account,

39:34 um,

39:35 uh,

39:35 the lean towards overcrediting all the things that

39:37 we've been talking to and treating uncertainty conservatively.

39:43 I,

39:44 um,

39:45 I think.

39:47 It's really important to shift from offsetting to contributions claims

39:52 where offsetting claims are,

39:55 you treat your reducing your own emissions

39:57 as equivalent to paying someone else to reduce

40:00 their emissions,

40:00 and you can call it a net number.

40:02 The problem there is,

40:03 uh,

40:04 it creates a disincentive to reduce emissions,

40:07 a company that dramatically reduces their emissions and

40:10 buys offsets for just the small remainder,

40:13 and another company that

40:15 Um,

40:15 and it's like crazy and just buys,

40:17 buys cheap carbon credits.

40:18 They look the same.

40:19 They can both claim the same

40:21 carbon neutral or net zero claim.

40:25 And if you switch to a contributions claim where you don't let those two numbers be

40:31 netted

40:31 and a company

40:33 um can discuss how much it's reduced its own emissions,

40:36 it can discuss its contributions,

40:38 it's a more complex

40:39 claim,

40:39 but it's more honest

40:41 and it refocuses attention on direct

40:44 emissions reductions and it creates flexibility

40:46 to support a wider range of activities based on a wider set of goals.

40:50 And my final,

40:52 uh,

40:52 substantive slide.

40:54 That opens the creates an opportunity to

40:59 shifting from offset markets

41:01 to direct contributions

41:03 and an offset market,

41:04 writes a set of rules and let and lets the market go and find the cheapest reductions,

41:09 direct contributions,

41:11 um,

41:12 uh.

41:14 Moves us out of that

41:16 marketplace

41:18 and buying a commodity

41:19 into a space of

41:21 uh what a company would do if they're uh

41:24 uh contracting with a supplier or giving a donation,

41:28 you would,

41:28 you would vet organizations,

41:30 you would vet programs,

41:31 you would build a relationship with them.

41:33 Um,

41:34 so,

41:35 uh,

41:36 contributions approach would mean giving directly to NGOs,

41:40 giving directly to government programs,

41:42 giving directly even to companies such as those distributing,

41:45 uh,

41:46 very fuel efficient cook stoves.

41:49 Um,

41:50 characteristics of the direct contributions approach are

41:53 you directly contribute to those entities.

41:56 So money is going directly to those entities,

41:59 not to brokers and consultants,

42:00 etc.

42:01 You provide you can provide funds upfront when they're most needed.

42:05 Um,

42:06 you can denominate primarily in money rather than in tons.

42:09 You can still quantify

42:11 the greenhouse gas benefits,

42:13 but you denominate the,

42:14 the,

42:14 the contribution in money.

42:18 And that

42:19 it invites taking many more factors into account,

42:22 not just cheap carbon.

42:24 Um,

42:24 and it also allows for supporting a

42:26 wider range of activities to drive decarbonization,

42:29 including some that are hard to quantify the greenhouse gas benefits,

42:34 for example,

42:34 like in the agricultural

42:36 sector,

42:37 supporting a range of activities to

42:39 bring farmers into different practices which can be demonstration projects,

42:44 technical assistance,

42:45 incentive programs,

42:47 outreach activities,

42:49 and be nimble and adapt over time.

42:52 Um,

42:56 And lastly,

42:56 I think we don't have time to waste on programs that have already

43:03 disproven themselves

43:04 and I'm very excited about

43:07 shifting the framework

43:10 from offsets to to direct contributions.

43:13 I think it can have much better impacts.

43:20 Thank you very much,

43:21 Barbara.

43:22 That was very insightful and bit depressing,

43:24 right?

43:25 Uh,

43:25 so,

43:26 let me turn now to Kaushik for your,

43:29 uh,

43:29 presentation on India's pollution program in Gujarat.

43:36 Um,

43:37 thanks,

43:37 Ami.

43:38 Let me just grab the water.

43:45 As my kind of slides come up,

43:47 I think

43:48 being the last speaker of the day,

43:51 uh,

43:51 it just falls to me to

43:53 put up whatever little defense I can for

43:56 economic instruments to deal with environmental problems.

44:00 Um,

44:01 This

44:02 is a piece of work that has been ongoing in a city in India

44:06 called Surat for the last 15 years.

44:10 It's an experiment to see whether we can use market-based instruments to deal with.

44:15 Environmental issues and it's an experiment that we've constantly kind of evolved

44:20 and evaluated

44:21 and gotten to a point where we think that this is a viable

44:26 tool that can be used to deal with at least a certain kind of environmental problems

44:31 and we're kind of trying to deploy it much more extensively in India and elsewhere.

44:35 So what this presentation does is of course kind of talk

44:38 about Michael's paper which came out in the Quarterly Journal of Economics

44:42 a couple of months back,

44:44 but also talk about what that paper has meant in terms of our activities

44:49 and

44:49 actually using

44:52 a textbook tool to act to create a

44:56 create an economic service that deals with environmental issues.

45:00 So what's the

45:01 problem that we're dealing with?

45:04 Essentially

45:05 air quality

45:06 and pollution,

45:07 and let me kind of just show you exactly what that means.

45:10 Shamik,

45:11 you kind of talked about

45:12 what air quality means in terms of lives lost.

45:16 On an average,

45:17 air quality causes

45:19 more damage than

45:22 Tobacco,

45:22 alcohol,

45:23 terrorism,

45:24 HIV,

45:25 malaria,

45:26 and this impact is very significant.

45:28 2 years or over 2 years of everyone's life globally.

45:32 I mean when you're living in a city in Delhi

45:35 like I do,

45:36 it's almost 8 years of your life,

45:37 and that's,

45:38 I mean,

45:39 I'd argue,

45:39 a fairly chunky piece of your existence.

45:42 So you really kind of

45:45 Dealing with this challenge on a real-time basis,

45:48 we're also dealing with this challenge on

45:49 a real-time basis where this trade-off between

45:52 the aspirations of a population of nearly 1.5 billion

45:57 people wanting to achieve a certain level of prosperity

46:01 and having to

46:03 deal with air quality and emissions that come from using fossil

46:06 fuels as extensively as is happening in a country like India,

46:10 you kind of have to start to think about this

46:12 as not necessarily.

46:14 Issues that are in tension with each other,

46:16 but how do you kind of resolve this tension

46:18 and that's really where we are trying

46:20 to use market market-based instruments to kind of

46:22 solve,

46:23 uh,

46:23 for that problem

46:25 because

46:26 historically.

46:27 Everywhere in the world,

46:28 what we've tried to do to deal with air quality and pollution

46:32 is essentially use

46:33 a plethora of regulatory instruments,

46:35 mostly command and control,

46:37 and these have been

46:39 so extensively deployed

46:42 since the,

46:43 since the early 60s in the developing,

46:46 in the developed world and then subsequently in the developing world.

46:49 In the 90s and thereafter,

46:51 that

46:52 the number of regulatory instruments that even exist

46:54 in a country like India is really,

46:56 really incredible to just deal with air quality and pollution,

46:59 but the impact,

47:00 as you saw in the previous slide,

47:02 hasn't been as dramatic as you would like that to be.

47:05 So there is something missing in this equation

47:08 that you kind of need to fix.

47:10 And if you kind of think this through,

47:11 why is this a problem?

47:13 Because how do you deal with

47:15 Air quality and emissions from industrial units

47:18 in

47:19 most parts of the world.

47:20 This is a really,

47:22 really labor intensive regulatory capacity intensive

47:26 process that cannot be deployed at an extensive scale anywhere,

47:30 even in,

47:31 even in a

47:32 very well.

47:33 Equipped regulatory capacity that you might have in the United States or in Europe.

47:37 It involves essentially

47:39 a person climbing up a stack,

47:41 an emissions stack,

47:42 a chimney stack in an industrial unit,

47:44 collecting a sample of emissions for a certain period of time,

47:48 taking that sample back to a laboratory

47:50 and testing whether that actually meets the environmental

47:54 standards or the concentration emissions standards

47:56 for that particular plant or not.

47:59 This is something that you clearly can't be doing on a daily or a constant basis.

48:02 This probably happens once or

48:04 twice in a year

48:06 for most locations in the US,

48:08 in countries like India,

48:09 perhaps even less

48:11 frequently.

48:12 And even if you were to be able to do that,

48:13 this does not really solve the problem

48:15 of air quality and emissions from industrial units

48:18 on a continuous basis.

48:20 So what we've tried to do in India

48:24 in Surat is to try and see whether the use of a market-based instruments.

48:30 Added to emissions monitoring program that kind of uses

48:34 the state of the art emissions monitoring and control

48:37 equipment,

48:38 can that be a way to kind of solve for emissions and air quality?

48:42 And

48:43 this is the experiment that we kind of carried out in Surat

48:46 that took over 10 years to kind of set up and develop.

48:49 This involved

48:50 right from the initial stages of working with the Ministry

48:53 of Environment at the federal level in India to.

48:55 Identify the role that

48:58 cap and trade schemes,

48:59 emission trading schemes could actually play

49:00 in dealing with industrial air pollution,

49:04 working with the pollution control boards,

49:06 the pollution regulators in India to develop standards and

49:11 regulations of what kind of equipment can be used

49:14 to measure emissions and how that emission measurement can be.

49:19 Put together in a manner that's kind of transparent,

49:22 above board,

49:23 without discretion,

49:24 and cannot be tampered with,

49:26 providing data on a 24/7 basis

49:29 to a central service sitting with a pollution regulator.

49:32 Identifying folks who will actually go and do the work

49:36 of installing these emissions control devices,

49:38 calibrating them,

49:39 making sure that they run

49:41 exactly as they're designed to run and

49:45 Set up

49:46 trading mechanisms,

49:47 a trading platform,

49:49 bring industry partners on board,

49:51 show them

49:52 how trading platforms actually work,

49:54 how they can actually measure their emissions,

49:55 how they can actually trade their

49:57 emissions,

49:58 and then.

50:00 Having launched this program in 2019,

50:02 go through a fairly extensive process of

50:05 randomized control

50:07 evaluations to see whether the emissions trading scheme

50:11 is actually having an impact or not,

50:13 and coming to a point where

50:15 the success of the program

50:17 in this one location in Gujarat in India

50:20 has kind of led to a

50:22 proliferation of using this tool within the

50:24 state across pollutants and across locations,

50:27 but also in other parts of the country as well.

50:31 And this

50:33 truly involved a lot of sweat and blood and a lot of kind of grimy effort.

50:38 We're

50:39 going through the process of installing these emissions control devices

50:44 across 300 odd industrial units in the city of Surat,

50:47 making sure that these

50:49 are providing data on a continuous regular basis,

50:53 that data is being

50:54 evaluated,

50:55 tested,

50:55 and made sure that it's not spurious.

51:01 Working with the regulator.

51:03 Sitting in their offices designing and implementing the

51:07 program in partnership with these officers and their

51:10 inspectors

51:12 because the idea here is to translate,

51:15 essentially a textbook tool

51:17 into the regulatory and the legislative framework that exists for

51:21 emissions management or pollution management in a state in India.

51:25 So you have to kind of work through

51:27 the entire rulebook of how emissions

51:30 are controlled and regulated at the 115 odd regulatory

51:35 frameworks that I kind of highlighted earlier

51:38 that kind of exist to deal with air quality in India.

51:43 Working with

51:44 the regulator as well as industry partners to make sure that

51:48 we are building their capacity,

51:49 they know exactly what the scheme means,

51:51 how that scheme is supposed to run,

51:53 and make sure that

51:54 they are well equipped to be able to use this tool

51:57 on a firm basis or on a regulator basis

52:00 to be able to

52:01 run the scheme itself.

52:05 To the point of

52:07 taking them through a series of mock simulations of

52:10 what an emissions trading scheme would look like.

52:12 This is the trading platform

52:14 that the firms use

52:15 to carry out trading for,

52:17 uh,

52:19 particulate matter for these 300 odd firms

52:22 in Surat,

52:25 and

52:25 just to kind of

52:27 show.

52:28 This entire process has been

52:31 evaluated through a fairly rigorous and detailed exercise

52:36 where we

52:38 took these 300 odd firms in Surat,

52:41 divided them into two groups the treatment group,

52:45 which

52:47 were,

52:48 which were kind of set up in the emissions trading scheme,

52:50 and a control group which continued to operate as

52:54 though it was in the traditional command and control.

52:57 A regime

52:58 and evaluating the differences

53:00 of what that meant

53:01 and

53:02 ladies and gentlemen,

53:03 I mean the results are truly quite dramatic.

53:07 The first,

53:08 and this is the reason why we were able to bring the regulator on board.

53:11 This is the reason why

53:13 the government kind of came on board to try out this experiment.

53:16 Essentially the problem was noncompliance.

53:19 Essentially the problem was that industries were not meeting their emissions

53:25 emissions standards.

53:26 And that's something that we kind of were able to establish very,

53:29 very quickly that the moment you put in

53:31 place the scheme and you allow the flexibility,

53:33 something that

53:35 Barbara Karo pointed out could be

53:36 a difficult thing to manage,

53:38 but the moment you can provide this flexibility to firms

53:41 to be able to meet their emission targets by buying permits

53:44 and making sure that the firms

53:46 who were meeting their targets but could do even better than that.

53:51 You increase the level of compliance in the market to nearly 100%.

53:55 This

53:56 1% or less than 1% compliance,

54:00 fun story,

54:01 this was in the first compliance period that we had,

54:03 and essentially two of the most politically well connected firms

54:09 in this in this textile cluster said that.

54:13 Sumi,

54:14 what will you do?

54:15 And that's kind of

54:16 interesting when

54:17 the chairman of the pollution control board

54:20 called up Michael

54:21 and said that,

54:23 so what do you want me to do in this case?

54:24 And essentially the response was that this is your

54:28 opportunity to draw a line in the sand.

54:31 If you establish

54:33 your authority and your ability to manage and run this market.

54:38 That's what will kind of give you the regulatory

54:41 credibility that you need to be able to run the market

54:43 in a manner that you do not have leakages or noncompliance.

54:48 And subsequently

54:50 you'd get a

54:51 hasn't been a single

54:53 compliance period where we've had firms not comply with their emission targets,

54:58 and that's really the reason why

55:00 the Gujarat Pollution Control Board

55:02 has kind of continued to use this tool and now

55:04 is trying to deploy it across pollutants and across different

55:08 industrial clusters to deal with

55:10 a variety of environmental issues.

55:14 But the reason I think

55:16 for me and for us

55:17 the scheme was an extremely important success is that

55:21 firms that were there

55:23 in the command and control

55:25 had their emissions

55:27 on an average about 20 to 30% higher depending on

55:30 which compliance period.

55:33 So the fact that there was an emissions trading scheme that allowed firms

55:37 to reduce their emissions much more

55:39 than the standards required them to do

55:41 and be able to monetize that improved environmental behavior

55:45 led to

55:46 their emissions,

55:47 the market

55:49 cohort emissions,

55:50 being about 20 to 30% lower,

55:52 and that,

55:53 I think,

55:53 is a very,

55:54 very powerful tool,

55:55 a powerful outcome.

55:57 Thanks,

55:58 Shamik.

55:58 I'll

55:59 wind up quickly,

56:01 but

56:01 this is the piece that I think makes for the success of the program.

56:07 When the firms in the command and control regime saw that the compliance cost

56:12 of the firms in the market

56:14 was lower by about 11%,

56:17 there was a clamor amongst all the firms that

56:19 were not in the market to join the market.

56:23 And

56:24 if you kind of think about it,

56:25 this is obvious.

56:25 This is Economics 101.

56:26 What does a market do?

56:27 A market achieves.

56:29 A certain outcome at the least cost,

56:32 and this is that cost

56:33 reduction that the market was able to achieve.

56:36 And that's kind of what's led to

56:38 the third part of my presentation,

56:40 the scale up activity that has happened,

56:42 but just to kind of close this out,

56:44 uh,

56:45 the cost-benefit ratio here that we've estimated is about

56:50 215 to 1.

56:51 This is an incredible number.

56:54 This is an incredible number of a population of a

56:56 city of a population of about 20 million people.

56:59 For just under 20 million people,

57:00 the asset drain program in comparison

57:03 in the US had a cost-benefit ratio of about 50 to 1.

57:08 So

57:08 the

57:10 impact that

57:11 the use of this economic instrument

57:13 has had

57:14 in terms of improving

57:16 the cost,

57:18 improving the,

57:19 the,

57:20 the,

57:20 the benefit of the society

57:22 is really,

57:22 really impactful.

57:23 But let me kind of take the last few

57:26 minutes of my presentation to show what this has actually meant.

57:30 Having seen this

57:32 happen in Surat in Gujarat.

57:36 The Gujarat Pollution Control Board

57:38 essentially wanted to kind of

57:40 use this as a tool and wants to use this as a tool

57:43 for

57:44 almost everything that they want to do.

57:47 Now,

57:47 clearly you can't use an emissions trading

57:50 scheme for every sort of environmental problem.

57:52 I mean,

57:52 you clearly won't be able to use this

57:54 for,

57:55 for instance,

57:55 dealing with transport sector emissions.

57:58 You need large point-based

58:00 emitters to be able and with enough heterogeneity

58:03 for an emissions trading scheme to work.

58:05 But having kind of

58:07 done this exercise once in Surat,

58:10 we have kind of gone through the process of scoping which

58:13 of these environmental challenges in Gujarat can be

58:16 solved using

58:17 a

58:17 market-based instrument like this,

58:19 and the scheme is now expanded to include the textile cluster in a big city in

58:24 Gujarat called Ahmedabad.

58:25 And we are now

58:26 in the process of designing an affluence-based,

58:30 uh,

58:31 affluence-based emissions trading scheme for two

58:34 industrial clusters in Gujarat for the,

58:37 for the Gujarat Pollution Control Board.

58:40 A neighboring state,

58:41 Maharashtra,

58:42 one of the largest industrial powerhouses

58:45 in India,

58:47 is now

58:48 on its way to develop a SO2 uh market.

58:51 So this is going to be a statewide SO2 market.

58:54 It would cover about 300 industrial units,

58:56 and this would be truly,

58:59 truly extensive because this will include electricity.

59:01 This will include petchem.

59:02 This will

59:03 include fertilizer.

59:05 This will include pharma.

59:06 This will include refining.

59:08 This would include cement and steel.

59:11 So this is going to be a really,

59:13 really remarkable.

59:14 Experiment this would,

59:16 uh,

59:16 this is kind of a population of 140 odd million people

59:20 so you can imagine

59:21 that the Surat cost-benefit ratio was 215.

59:24 This could easily,

59:25 I can imagine be a four digit number

59:28 and similarly we've kind of started

59:31 the initial steps of scoping out a similar market for,

59:34 uh,

59:35 uh,

59:35 another neighboring state to Gujarat,

59:36 Rajasthan.

59:39 And now

59:41 it's almost like the floodgates have opened.

59:43 We are having conversations with a number of states in

59:46 India and a number of other geographies around the world

59:49 to see whether this particular tool is viable and a solution and can actually

59:56 solve for environmental challenges of a particular kind

1:00:00 across these different geographies.

1:00:03 And

1:00:04 that's it.

1:00:06 This is what I'm offering.

1:00:08 So this is kind of bringing

1:00:09 this

1:00:10 incredible piece of research,

1:00:12 this extremely

1:00:14 intense period of design and implementation

1:00:18 to getting to a point

1:00:19 where

1:00:20 My,

1:00:22 my ultimate objective is that this is a

1:00:25 plug and play solution.

1:00:27 So Surat took 10 years to do.

1:00:30 I'm aiming that our market in Maharashtra is up

1:00:33 and running in a period of about 18 months.

1:00:35 In an ideal world,

1:00:37 this would be a plug and play solution where I can kind of

1:00:40 offer this as a service.

1:00:43 As a,

1:00:44 as an economic service

1:00:46 to any regulator,

1:00:47 any pollution,

1:00:48 uh,

1:00:49 regulator around the world

1:00:50 where we kind of go in,

1:00:51 sit with them,

1:00:52 design the solution,

1:00:54 and

1:00:54 offer them the,

1:00:56 uh,

1:00:56 give them the market

1:00:57 to run

1:00:58 on a

1:00:59 on

1:01:00 on a period

1:01:01 until kind of this environmental challenge is actually dealt with.

1:01:04 So

1:01:05 just to kind of highlight the fact

1:01:07 this is started with this incredible piece of research

1:01:12 that

1:01:14 the course theorem is

1:01:15 to this incredible piece of research that

1:01:17 Michael and colleagues published earlier this year

1:01:19 to now a solution that we are actually designing and implementing

1:01:24 on the ground.

1:01:25 Thank you.

1:01:29 Kaushik,

1:01:30 thanks so much.

1:01:30 That was

1:01:31 really inspiring.

1:01:33 And uh I hope you tell us later about how you're going to plan to scale up the work.

1:01:37 But first,

1:01:38 let me turn to Carolyn.

1:01:39 Carolyn,

1:01:40 you've heard the three presenters,

1:01:42 and you've heard about both pollution and emissions

1:01:45 using market instruments and and regulatory instruments.

1:01:48 So give us a little bit of your reflections

1:01:50 and your takeaways from this.

1:01:52 Yeah,

1:01:52 thank you and thanks to all of you.

1:01:53 Um,

1:01:54 I thought this was a really

1:01:55 fascinating,

1:01:56 um,

1:01:57 session,

1:01:58 um.

1:01:58 And so,

1:02:00 uh,

1:02:00 you know,

1:02:01 maybe taking it back to the theme here,

1:02:04 um,

1:02:04 there is this,

1:02:05 you know,

1:02:07 strong popular populist opinion that,

1:02:10 um,

1:02:11 You know,

1:02:11 a mistrust of

1:02:13 emissions pricing as a means of actually reducing emissions.

1:02:19 There isn't a lot of faith in that.

1:02:20 There are a lot of,

1:02:22 you know,

1:02:23 people

1:02:24 view

1:02:25 carbon pricing as

1:02:27 a tax and redistribution scheme.

1:02:30 And not

1:02:33 and not as,

1:02:34 as a driver

1:02:35 of,

1:02:36 of decarbonization.

1:02:37 In fact,

1:02:37 in Canada,

1:02:38 we saw some backsliding.

1:02:40 So Mark Carney prior to the

1:02:43 um

1:02:44 to the election,

1:02:46 uh,

1:02:47 just canceled the carbon tax on on households as just too politically toxic.

1:02:54 Um,

1:02:54 so it was nice to see from Jan we

1:02:56 have really solid evidence that pricing mechanisms do work,

1:03:01 um,

1:03:02 and,

1:03:02 and in the,

1:03:04 um,

1:03:04 the goal of reducing emissions.

1:03:06 So,

1:03:07 so then we kind of get to the question of,

1:03:09 of where and how,

1:03:11 um,

1:03:11 and how to make these,

1:03:13 these feasible.

1:03:14 So I thought it was really,

1:03:15 um,

1:03:16 interesting and so one of your,

1:03:17 um,

1:03:18 one of your insights is that,

1:03:19 um.

1:03:20 Yeah,

1:03:20 you,

1:03:21 you found that the emissions reductions

1:03:23 were larger in industry

1:03:25 than in other sectors like households

1:03:28 and,

1:03:29 um,

1:03:29 and I,

1:03:30 I think we,

1:03:31 we do see that,

1:03:32 um,

1:03:32 so emerging.

1:03:33 So the latest state trends of carbon pricing by my colleagues here at the bank,

1:03:37 um,

1:03:38 show that,

1:03:39 um,

1:03:40 today.

1:03:41 Um,

1:03:42 a little over half of global emissions in the power sector

1:03:46 and approaching 50% of emissions in the industrial

1:03:49 sector are covered by carbon pricing instruments now,

1:03:52 primarily emissions trading systems,

1:03:55 so that may be sort of following this,

1:04:00 uh,

1:04:01 this insight that there are more effective

1:04:06 drivers but also potentially more politically feasible

1:04:09 drivers.

1:04:10 In these sectors,

1:04:11 um,

1:04:11 but I,

1:04:12 I,

1:04:12 and also reflect,

1:04:13 you know,

1:04:13 from some of your numbers there,

1:04:15 I think that the design of the system also,

1:04:18 also matters.

1:04:19 So we saw like really big reductions from Reggie with pretty small

1:04:25 carbon prices,

1:04:26 um,

1:04:27 you know,

1:04:28 some of that may be like some of the states actually use the revenues to deepen

1:04:33 reductions by funding energy efficiency programs and demand reduction.

1:04:39 Um,

1:04:40 and,

1:04:40 and so they found that they actually

1:04:42 reduced electricity costs in some of these states

1:04:45 and deepened emissions.

1:04:47 And then when you had the sort of less

1:04:51 effective example of South Africa,

1:04:54 which actually has a higher carbon price than,

1:04:57 you know,

1:04:58 ostensibly than Reggie.

1:05:01 But you know,

1:05:01 part of the issue there is that

1:05:05 up to 90% of emissions from any given facility

1:05:10 are exempt,

1:05:11 so you're effectively rebating the tax revenues to

1:05:15 to the firms in proportion to their emissions.

1:05:18 So that really undermines

1:05:20 the effective carbon price being.

1:05:24 Uh,

1:05:25 carbon price signal.

1:05:26 But of course,

1:05:27 you know,

1:05:27 South Africa is a very different context than,

1:05:30 uh,

1:05:31 Northeastern US states and so they're also institutional issues,

1:05:35 um,

1:05:35 that we need to be cognizant of and thinking about

1:05:38 what other,

1:05:40 uh,

1:05:40 you know,

1:05:40 for emissions markets to work,

1:05:43 to what extent do we also need,

1:05:45 you know,

1:05:45 power markets,

1:05:46 uh,

1:05:47 to work,

1:05:47 to be liberalized and where,

1:05:49 um,

1:05:50 uh,

1:05:51 and,

1:05:51 and think about other market failures,

1:05:53 um.

1:05:54 So I thought that was,

1:05:56 that was very interesting

1:05:57 and I know,

1:05:58 I thought that,

1:05:59 um,

1:06:00 I think we can also talk some more about policy mixes.

1:06:04 I thought those insights were,

1:06:06 um,

1:06:07 were really compelling because,

1:06:09 uh,

1:06:10 you know,

1:06:10 showing that

1:06:11 in,

1:06:11 in a lot of situations,

1:06:13 um,

1:06:14 you get bigger emissions reductions.

1:06:16 With the policy mix,

1:06:17 partly this could be because,

1:06:20 uh,

1:06:20 you know,

1:06:21 it's hard to implement a stringent enough carbon

1:06:24 price to really send a strong signal,

1:06:26 but,

1:06:26 you know,

1:06:26 a lot of other policies,

1:06:28 infrastructure investments can enable,

1:06:30 give people

1:06:31 the options to respond to the carbon price,

1:06:36 more effectively.

1:06:37 So,

1:06:38 uh,

1:06:39 and,

1:06:39 and also on the flip side,

1:06:42 um,

1:06:42 having some carbon pricing.

1:06:44 Uh,

1:06:45 makes your other complementary policies more effective too.

1:06:48 So,

1:06:48 uh,

1:06:49 you have,

1:06:50 you know,

1:06:50 for the same renewable subsidy,

1:06:51 if you have a little carbon price there that also

1:06:55 increases the return to investments in renewable energy and so amplifies,

1:06:59 um,

1:07:00 that together.

1:07:01 Um.

1:07:03 What,

1:07:04 um,

1:07:04 so,

1:07:05 so,

1:07:05 OK,

1:07:06 so we have,

1:07:06 uh,

1:07:07 evidence that,

1:07:08 uh,

1:07:08 carbon pricing actually works,

1:07:10 um,

1:07:11 but popular opinion tends to,

1:07:13 uh,

1:07:15 show greater support for,

1:07:17 you know,

1:07:18 conventional regulation.

1:07:19 There's,

1:07:20 there's

1:07:20 survey evidence across a lot of countries that,

1:07:23 uh,

1:07:24 you know,

1:07:24 uh,

1:07:25 there's more popular support for standards,

1:07:28 uh,

1:07:29 upcoming WGR topic,

1:07:31 um.

1:07:32 Uh,

1:07:33 than,

1:07:34 than taxes,

1:07:35 for sure,

1:07:36 um,

1:07:37 and,

1:07:37 and,

1:07:37 and so we do see,

1:07:38 so in the case of India,

1:07:40 we see that there actually is quite a bit of demand

1:07:42 for regulation because the burden of air pollution is so extraordinary.

1:07:48 So there is,

1:07:49 um,

1:07:49 so there is demand for that and,

1:07:51 and,

1:07:51 and then you've ended up with an enormous number

1:07:54 of regulations,

1:07:56 our command and control regulations there.

1:07:58 And so I think this is incredibly important and showing that,

1:08:03 um.

1:08:04 Uh,

1:08:04 that market-based,

1:08:06 uh,

1:08:07 approaches are much more cost effective.

1:08:09 So,

1:08:10 so,

1:08:11 and this might be a way of like coming,

1:08:13 coming full circle and then convincing people and

1:08:16 you also mentioned in the green room that,

1:08:19 um,

1:08:21 uh,

1:08:21 you know,

1:08:21 so switching to a market-based approach is actually increased enthusiasm

1:08:26 of the firms

1:08:27 for being regulated because they felt like they were benefiting.

1:08:31 Um,

1:08:32 uh,

1:08:32 from,

1:08:33 uh,

1:08:33 from this program.

1:08:35 So,

1:08:35 uh,

1:08:35 I guess a couple questions,

1:08:37 um,

1:08:38 uh,

1:08:39 questions there.

1:08:40 I'm wondering,

1:08:41 so how,

1:08:41 how important,

1:08:42 so if my,

1:08:43 um,

1:08:43 understanding the the scheme.

1:08:45 Um,

1:08:46 the,

1:08:47 uh,

1:08:48 you know,

1:08:48 this was not

1:08:50 a redistributional scheme so much because the effectively the allowances were

1:08:56 all freely allocated

1:08:57 to the firm.

1:08:58 So like how important

1:09:00 is that aspect,

1:09:02 at least certainly in getting,

1:09:04 getting something going,

1:09:06 um,

1:09:06 uh,

1:09:06 other,

1:09:07 other folks.

1:09:08 Countries may be looking towards emissions pricing

1:09:11 mechanisms also as a source of revenue

1:09:13 for other activities that that might,

1:09:16 you know,

1:09:17 deepen energy access or

1:09:20 or you know,

1:09:20 low carbon investments

1:09:23 so,

1:09:23 so there are tradeoffs there and how you use the and allocate the revenue.

1:09:27 So I'd be curious to hear about that.

1:09:31 And also,

1:09:32 um,

1:09:33 you know,

1:09:33 often one of the motivations for carbon pricing

1:09:36 is the co-benefits,

1:09:37 the air pollution co-benefits.

1:09:39 And so I'm wondering here,

1:09:41 have you looked at,

1:09:41 thought about the

1:09:43 climate co-benefits

1:09:44 of the air pollution regulation,

1:09:46 because if it's,

1:09:46 if it's more salient

1:09:48 to,

1:09:49 to approach that regulation,

1:09:53 that can that framing help,

1:09:55 but also help

1:09:57 deepen

1:09:59 climate ambition.

1:10:00 Um,

1:10:01 because it goes hand in hand with uh these approaches.

1:10:04 Um,

1:10:05 and then,

1:10:06 uh,

1:10:06 finally,

1:10:06 Barbara,

1:10:07 um,

1:10:09 so,

1:10:09 so thinking about

1:10:11 carbon offsets and,

1:10:12 and we do see in several,

1:10:14 uh,

1:10:14 emerging economies,

1:10:16 uh,

1:10:17 interested in emissions trading systems,

1:10:20 a lot of that is also as a way to finance domestic,

1:10:24 um,

1:10:25 uh,

1:10:26 car,

1:10:26 you know,

1:10:27 carbon reduction offset offsetting activities,

1:10:30 um.

1:10:31 Um,

1:10:31 but more broadly,

1:10:33 you know,

1:10:33 I,

1:10:33 and I see within the institution there,

1:10:35 there are

1:10:36 big hopes for carbon crediting

1:10:39 as a means to generate,

1:10:41 uh,

1:10:42 climate finance.

1:10:43 Um,

1:10:44 and,

1:10:45 and so,

1:10:46 um,

1:10:47 you know,

1:10:47 so what do we do as we switch?

1:10:50 I mean,

1:10:51 we,

1:10:51 we see that

1:10:52 the,

1:10:53 you know,

1:10:53 the evidence about the massive overcrediting has,

1:10:56 has really

1:10:57 limited demand

1:10:58 for,

1:10:59 for credits,

1:11:00 um,

1:11:01 especially in compliance systems.

1:11:03 So like the EU does not allow crediting against ETS compliance,

1:11:10 um.

1:11:11 Uh,

1:11:12 but there's also,

1:11:13 you know,

1:11:13 uh,

1:11:13 voluntary,

1:11:14 voluntary markets.

1:11:16 And so thinking about,

1:11:17 so where,

1:11:18 where does demand for credits come from because these offset credit,

1:11:21 there are a lot of different kinds of offsets,

1:11:24 um,

1:11:24 so there's forests,

1:11:25 there's cook stoves,

1:11:26 renewable energy,

1:11:27 there's,

1:11:27 uh,

1:11:28 different things with very and actually removals like,

1:11:32 um,

1:11:32 direct air capture or something,

1:11:34 um,

1:11:35 and,

1:11:35 uh,

1:11:36 and then they also come with very different characteristics,

1:11:39 so.

1:11:40 Um,

1:11:41 in terms of the local community benefits,

1:11:44 um,

1:11:45 um,

1:11:46 and so as we,

1:11:48 that,

1:11:48 that are hard to quantify,

1:11:50 especially when

1:11:51 you're denominating everything in CO2.

1:11:54 And so I'm wondering as we move,

1:11:58 if we can move to more of a contributions approach as you suggest,

1:12:03 how do we

1:12:04 valorize sort of like in a holistic way,

1:12:08 all the,

1:12:09 the benefits of these different activities.

1:12:13 to um enhance demand

1:12:16 and and what do we need to do to understand like where that demand is coming from,

1:12:20 especially,

1:12:21 you know,

1:12:21 from the corporate sector and and and voluntary approaches.

1:12:25 So um

1:12:26 thank you very much.

1:12:27 Those are my uh starting for uh some discussion.

1:12:33 Thank you very much,

1:12:34 Carolyn.

1:12:34 Those were

1:12:36 really insightful comments.

1:12:38 So,

1:12:38 what we will do,

1:12:39 we have less than 20 minutes.

1:12:41 We're gonna turn to each one of you to reflect on Carolynn's comments,

1:12:45 but I may prompt you with a question as well.

1:12:47 Then we'll turn

1:12:48 to our friends here who have been patiently waiting and hopefully,

1:12:52 we'll let you all go by 6 o'clock,

1:12:54 right?

1:12:54 So,

1:12:55 uh,

1:12:55 so,

1:12:56 Yan,

1:12:56 uh,

1:12:57 Carolyn had a lot of

1:12:58 Um,

1:12:59 you know,

1:13:00 good points on your,

1:13:01 on your discussion,

1:13:02 but one of the things that struck me

1:13:05 was the role of policy complementarities on this policy mix,

1:13:09 and that carbon pricing

1:13:11 is amplified with other market-based policies,

1:13:15 particularly

1:13:16 structural economic policies are in play.

1:13:19 So tell us a little bit about this policy mix of carbon pricing.

1:13:24 And other structural market policies in,

1:13:27 in thinking about emissions reduction.

1:13:32 Yeah,

1:13:32 thanks.

1:13:34 So,

1:13:35 Like one aspect that I think is

1:13:38 extremely important,

1:13:39 and I mean from

1:13:41 for economists that is kind of straightforward,

1:13:44 but I still think it is important to emphasize and

1:13:46 it's nice that it comes out of this kind of,

1:13:49 you know,

1:13:49 agnostic data driven kind of approach

1:13:52 that these price based instruments are,

1:13:55 if you like,

1:13:55 kind of an insurance that the other policies do not rebound.

1:14:00 So if you basically just put some subsidies or some building code,

1:14:04 etc.

1:14:05 to make the system more efficient,

1:14:06 then we know that.

1:14:07 Think of the transportation sector,

1:14:08 right,

1:14:08 like where we've seen that like large scale,

1:14:11 like probably also in the US I know more of the literature in Europe,

1:14:14 right?

1:14:15 Like basically we had those standards.

1:14:17 Cars got more efficient,

1:14:19 engines got more efficient,

1:14:20 etc.

1:14:20 like this.

1:14:21 But then

1:14:22 at the same time

1:14:23 actually cars just got.

1:14:25 Heavier and like in terms of fuel consumption and then he also emissions,

1:14:30 nothing actually happened.

1:14:31 And it changes if you in addition,

1:14:34 of course,

1:14:34 have a carbon price which then makes sure that those kind of instruments can also

1:14:39 kind of really work and do not kind of overflow.

1:14:42 So I think that is an extremely

1:14:44 important aspect

1:14:45 when it comes to these kind of um kind of policy stacking,

1:14:50 if you like.

1:14:51 And

1:14:52 another one is and this is was also mentioned by

1:14:55 Caroline,

1:14:56 I think that is kind of

1:14:58 different instruments even though they might target emissions,

1:15:02 they still might,

1:15:04 you know,

1:15:04 enable kind of specific policies to work.

1:15:07 So think of basically

1:15:09 kind of,

1:15:10 I didn't mention that,

1:15:11 but like part of the policy mix also was

1:15:14 kind of uh like in financing instruments in the finance sector.

1:15:19 So I think this is extremely important.

1:15:21 the role of alternatives

1:15:23 and like yeah,

1:15:25 alternatives need to be kind of financed and think of the electricity sector

1:15:28 right like it is straightforward basically we put a price on carbon,

1:15:32 the coal fired power plant gets more important

1:15:34 and countries might actually invest in more renewablesha but

1:15:39 actually the financing structure of renewables and coal looks very different

1:15:43 for renewables you have to finance everything upfront.

1:15:46 Uh,

1:15:47 whereas kind of for coal,

1:15:48 like a lot of the costs only occur sometime in the future,

1:15:51 that is in the fuel.

1:15:53 So now

1:15:54 in Europe,

1:15:55 like where we had uh probably the same in the US where we

1:15:59 have been actually in low interest environments for a long time,

1:16:02 this doesn't really matter.

1:16:04 But it matters if you actually have weighted average costs of capital that are 10,

1:16:08 15% as they are,

1:16:09 for example,

1:16:10 in Indonesia or Vietnam,

1:16:12 then kind of the effect of such a price

1:16:14 is

1:16:15 going to zero.

1:16:16 Uh,

1:16:17 if you don't have a parallel kind of a mechanism to de-risk

1:16:20 kind of those investments to kind of bring down the cost,

1:16:24 uh,

1:16:24 the financing costs,

1:16:25 etc.

1:16:26 So just as a specific example why I think

1:16:30 that there are these two things at the one side kind of prices

1:16:33 might enable kind of the efficiency of the other instruments to work.

1:16:37 And then there are,

1:16:37 however,

1:16:38 other kind of externalities if you like,

1:16:40 that are addressed by the policy mix.

1:16:43 Thank you again.

1:16:45 I think the point about cost of capital is extremely important.

1:16:49 In advanced economies,

1:16:51 cost of capital is around 4.5,

1:16:53 5% for renewables.

1:16:55 In middle-income economies,

1:16:56 it's close to 14%.

1:16:58 I think that's a huge

1:17:00 issue that's worth looking into.

1:17:02 Let me turn to you,

1:17:03 Barbara.

1:17:04 Um,

1:17:05 you

1:17:06 pretty much said

1:17:08 that carbon

1:17:09 offsetting is fundamentally flawed.

1:17:12 And so what's the implication

1:17:16 for mechanisms under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement,

1:17:20 which really rely a lot on these sort of offsets?

1:17:28 Yeah,

1:17:28 I think.

1:17:29 OK,

1:17:29 great.

1:17:30 Um,

1:17:30 yeah,

1:17:31 thanks for,

1:17:31 thanks for the question,

1:17:33 um.

1:17:35 Yeah,

1:17:35 I mean,

1:17:35 under,

1:17:36 under the Paris Agreement,

1:17:38 countries

1:17:39 took on uh uh NDCs a suite of suite of targets,

1:17:46 and the

1:17:48 Article 6 of the of the Paris Agreement allows for trading among countries

1:17:53 and several types of trading,

1:17:55 and countries don't

1:17:57 need to trade.

1:17:58 Many countries started off

1:18:01 by committing to

1:18:02 to targets that they would do domestically.

1:18:06 Um,

1:18:07 and

1:18:08 without

1:18:09 credits,

1:18:10 buying credits from other countries,

1:18:12 and

1:18:16 I think that that is a very positive way forward,

1:18:20 given

1:18:21 The quality challenges that we that we have seen to date

1:18:25 and also some real quality challenges,

1:18:27 challenges that we see with some decisions that have been

1:18:29 made so far under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement,

1:18:33 such as allowing in

1:18:36 old CDM credits

1:18:38 that meet certain characteristics,

1:18:40 the

1:18:41 total quantity of credits that are in line

1:18:45 and have requested transition from the CDM.

1:18:49 To the Paris Agreement equals around close to 1 billion tons.

1:18:53 That's huge.

1:18:54 Those are some of the projects that I,

1:18:56 that I studied,

1:18:57 you know,

1:18:58 15 years ago,

1:19:00 um,

1:19:00 and other and mostly other projects but that

1:19:03 follow very similar method very similar methodology.

1:19:07 More than half of those credits are hydropower

1:19:09 wind power projects and cook stoves credits,

1:19:11 so.

1:19:13 There we,

1:19:14 there we see the program

1:19:17 allowing in credits with very known quality issues.

1:19:24 So

1:19:26 Thank you for that.

1:19:26 And so,

1:19:27 I like also the point you said these offsets are creating a disincentive

1:19:32 to reduce emissions at home.

1:19:34 So that's,

1:19:34 that's a really important point.

1:19:36 Kaushik,

1:19:36 let me turn to you.

1:19:38 And

1:19:40 The Surat ETS has been successful.

1:19:43 But

1:19:45 It

1:19:46 takes a lot of capabilities among the institutions in the public

1:19:49 sector to be able to roll out such an ETS.

1:19:52 And

1:19:53 what are the conditions you think have really helped

1:19:57 to put this model to scale?

1:19:59 And what does it mean you have this long list of other countries you want to work on.

1:20:04 And other

1:20:05 places in India,

1:20:07 but they have

1:20:08 pretty weak governance and institutional capabilities.

1:20:11 So how do you think about rolling out such a program?

1:20:21 The whole idea of

1:20:23 creating this cap and trade scheme,

1:20:25 this emissions trading scheme in Surat,

1:20:27 and deploying that as a tool to deal with environmental issues there

1:20:31 was to prove the point

1:20:33 that you can use the

1:20:36 Sophisticated tool like a market-based instrument like a cap and trade scheme

1:20:41 in an environment with limited regulatory capacity and

1:20:45 still be able to achieve your environmental results

1:20:47 or overachieve or achieve environmental results in a much more effective fashion.

1:20:54 There's a certain tautology here.

1:20:57 Cap and trade schemes to deal with emission control

1:21:00 in developing countries

1:21:01 isn't a thing.

1:21:02 No one kind of usually has done this.

1:21:05 And because no one has ever done this,

1:21:07 you kind of don't have any evidence of this actually working or not working.

1:21:11 The Surat example essentially is one that establishes the fact

1:21:15 that the Gujarat Pollution Control Board

1:21:17 with our support

1:21:19 and the

1:21:20 use of

1:21:21 emissions control devices was able to roll out roll out an emissions trading scheme

1:21:25 that dealt with emissions on a 24/7 basis

1:21:28 without increasing

1:21:30 even a single employee

1:21:32 as staff.

1:21:35 The

1:21:36 point here is that to be able to deal with pollution and emissions

1:21:41 in this scale and in this particular sector,

1:21:44 the use of a cap and trade scheme is a much more effective solution than,

1:21:48 you know,

1:21:48 hiring more inspectors to be able to go and carry out more

1:21:51 stack testing and measuring emissions at the tailpipe

1:21:56 on a more regular and

1:21:58 continuous basis.

1:22:00 And that's exactly the point that doing this as a tool

1:22:05 across

1:22:05 countries and states with limited regulatory capacity

1:22:09 is a much more effective solution than actually kind of having

1:22:12 a larger suite of regulatory instruments.

1:22:16 I just also kind of wanted to quick uh respond to something that Carolyn said

1:22:20 in terms of,

1:22:21 uh,

1:22:22 I mean,

1:22:22 one thing that kind of

1:22:24 all of this calls for

1:22:26 is that you have to be very careful when you're designing the scheme.

1:22:29 And when we did design the scheme in Surat,

1:22:33 we grandfathered about 85% of the permits,

1:22:36 and 15% of the permits were

1:22:39 part of the initial permit allocation auction

1:22:42 where kind of firms participated and bought these permits.

1:22:45 The design of the scheme is such that this is not

1:22:49 this is not a mechanism for the government to earn more revenue,

1:22:53 so the government

1:22:54 or the pollution control board is not making money off the scheme,

1:22:57 unlike,

1:22:57 for instance,

1:22:58 would be the case with a

1:23:00 with a standard carbon pricing regime.

1:23:03 So that motivation we've kind of tried to eliminate so that that one.

1:23:08 One potential rent rent-seeking behavior that

1:23:11 you would see from government authorities

1:23:14 does not,

1:23:14 uh,

1:23:15 does not kind of corrupt the system in,

1:23:17 in that way.

1:23:20 You're very optimistic.

1:23:21 Ah

1:23:23 great.

1:23:23 So,

1:23:24 I would encourage whoever has to ask a question,

1:23:26 please come forward,

1:23:27 Govinda,

1:23:28 come to the mic.

1:23:29 Others just line up behind him,

1:23:31 and let's have a round of questions,

1:23:33 then we'll turn to the panel.

1:23:35 Yeah.

1:23:35 So I'm Govind Thima from the research department.

1:23:39 So I have one question for each of the panel members.

1:23:41 My first question is for Ian.

1:23:43 Ian,

1:23:43 you compare the different,

1:23:44 uh,

1:23:45 you know,

1:23:45 the ETS and carbon price,

1:23:47 uh,

1:23:48 you know,

1:23:48 instrument across the countries,

1:23:50 but the one challenge is that,

1:23:51 you know,

1:23:52 these instruments have a completely different design.

1:23:55 And the exposed estimation,

1:23:57 they have a completely different,

1:23:58 you know,

1:23:59 the efforts of the estimation technique they use.

1:24:02 So in that context,

1:24:04 what you have done to make them comparable,

1:24:06 that's one example that in South Africa,

1:24:08 they don't cover the electricity sector,

1:24:10 the main polluter,

1:24:11 the main emitter,

1:24:12 right?

1:24:12 So have you done anything to compare,

1:24:15 you know,

1:24:15 to make this,

1:24:16 you know,

1:24:18 instrument comparable?

1:24:19 That is my question.

1:24:20 Barbara,

1:24:21 uh,

1:24:21 so you,

1:24:22 your presentation is a little bit disappointing,

1:24:24 but,

1:24:24 you know,

1:24:25 if we see the CDM,

1:24:26 what you said,

1:24:27 you are right at the very beginning.

1:24:29 So I was in the,

1:24:30 you know,

1:24:30 this is the

1:24:31 registration issues team under the CDM,

1:24:34 uh,

1:24:34 Executive Board

1:24:35 from 2004 to 2007.

1:24:37 I evaluated 78 projects myself.

1:24:40 At the beginning,

1:24:41 there was an issue of the additionality because those projects might have,

1:24:44 you know,

1:24:44 implemented anyway,

1:24:46 but later on,

1:24:47 CDM has done a lot of contribution in a way that it gives a kind of the momentum.

1:24:51 For example,

1:24:52 for wind and solar.

1:24:54 There's a,

1:24:54 you know,

1:24:54 this type of incentive,

1:24:55 it gives a kind of the,

1:24:57 you know,

1:24:57 market

1:24:58 incentive for the,

1:24:59 you know,

1:24:59 different actors.

1:25:00 There's also innovation incentive,

1:25:02 you know,

1:25:02 incentive,

1:25:03 for example,

1:25:04 waste to energy,

1:25:05 and a lot of new projects come because of the CDM incentives.

1:25:08 I don't think,

1:25:09 you know,

1:25:09 if there's a new CDM,

1:25:11 those type of momentum on wind and solar,

1:25:14 and also those type of innovation

1:25:16 in terms of this other technology might have come,

1:25:18 you know,

1:25:19 that is.

1:25:20 So Prakai is a fantastic presentation and this is,

1:25:23 I think,

1:25:23 the first,

1:25:25 you know,

1:25:25 implementation of the market mechanism PM 2.5 right in Surat.

1:25:30 So you sure,

1:25:31 I mean,

1:25:31 it's a very good comparison because you know

1:25:34 for the implementation of noncompliance reduced to 1%,

1:25:38 but have you

1:25:39 seen any comparison between the cost?

1:25:41 So what is the cost of the regulatory measures versus the cost of

1:25:46 this emissions trading scheme over the?

1:25:49 So that is the question for you.

1:25:51 Thank you.

1:25:52 All right,

1:25:53 uh,

1:25:54 next,

1:25:54 please come in.

1:25:56 Hi,

1:25:56 I'm Elizabeth.

1:25:57 I work at JPal.

1:25:58 Um,

1:25:59 I was wondering how you might

1:26:01 use

1:26:02 Rachel Glenister's generalizability framework from 2017 to perhaps,

1:26:08 uh,

1:26:09 replicate

1:26:09 the SEAT success in the other countries.

1:26:16 Hello,

1:26:17 um,

1:26:18 I have a question for Barbara.

1:26:19 Barbara,

1:26:20 your research has been indeed instrumental in exposing

1:26:23 the systematic flaws in the offsetting markets,

1:26:27 especially on forest credits.

1:26:29 And the contribution model seems like something that might work better.

1:26:34 My question is,

1:26:36 how can we create incentives for companies to rely on these contribution models,

1:26:41 because

1:26:42 if they cannot claim the contributions against their

1:26:44 emission and we still live in a world where

1:26:47 Shareholders' value and

1:26:49 net zero are the currency that they are working with.

1:26:52 What incentives can be there and one step moving one step forward,

1:26:57 where will they find those authentic

1:27:00 carbon

1:27:01 reduction projects that they can contribute

1:27:05 and is there a way we can combine the offsetting with the contributions so

1:27:10 we we get to a better model than the one we are in?

1:27:13 Thank you.

1:27:14 And we have the last question.

1:27:17 Hi,

1:27:17 my name is Caroline.

1:27:18 I work at CGD and my question is for Barbara.

1:27:21 Um,

1:27:22 in your contributions work,

1:27:23 I'm just wondering if you can give some bullet points on how

1:27:27 that can go to rectify

1:27:28 these traditional issues with the BCM like such as

1:27:32 Um,

1:27:33 overcrediting,

1:27:33 leakage,

1:27:34 just curious,

1:27:35 and I'm sure it's maybe in some of your research that I haven't yet seen,

1:27:38 but

1:27:39 just want to know like how this

1:27:41 contributions like mindset shift can

1:27:44 start to affect that.

1:27:45 Thanks.

1:27:45 Thank you very much.

1:27:46 We're going to do the following.

1:27:47 We have,

1:27:48 we're almost out of time,

1:27:50 so I'll give each panelist a minute and a half

1:27:53 to either answer the questions or give your big picture takeaway.

1:27:57 And after that,

1:27:58 Carolyn,

1:27:59 you get 1 minute

1:28:00 to summarize.

1:28:03 All right,

1:28:03 Barbara,

1:28:04 start,

1:28:04 let's start with Barbara.

1:28:06 OK,

1:28:07 first thing,

1:28:08 I'm here for the week,

1:28:09 and I would be delighted to talk to you.

1:28:12 So,

1:28:12 um,

1:28:13 uh,

1:28:14 um,

1:28:16 find me,

1:28:17 um,

1:28:17 email me,

1:28:18 um,

1:28:19 so,

1:28:21 Uh

1:28:22 I think a lot of the questions are,

1:28:24 are,

1:28:24 are,

1:28:25 are really similar,

1:28:26 and that is

1:28:28 um

1:28:29 uh.

1:28:32 So,

1:28:33 I guess the first question on on additionality,

1:28:36 and that is,

1:28:36 I think often,

1:28:38 um,

1:28:40 Yes,

1:28:41 I mean,

1:28:41 the offset program has

1:28:44 created incentives to build some new projects.

1:28:46 It's also paid a lot of project developers to

1:28:49 build projects that they would have built anyway.

1:28:52 Um,

1:28:53 I think so often we think about offsets like a

1:28:56 way to generate climate finance for very worthwhile things,

1:29:01 and

1:29:03 we often forget about the trade

1:29:05 that those credits are being used by someone

1:29:08 to make a claim that they've reduced emissions.

1:29:11 And if the,

1:29:12 if it's an effective incentive,

1:29:15 but it's overcredited,

1:29:17 you actually can get an increase in global

1:29:19 emissions because someone is using those credits and

1:29:22 um

1:29:24 That's why I think a shift to the contributions approach can really

1:29:29 um

1:29:30 uh

1:29:32 match the way incentives really work like you

1:29:35 want to create effective incentive programs to support,

1:29:39 to support programs,

1:29:41 um,

1:29:42 recognizing that you're going to get non-additional projects,

1:29:45 recognizing um

1:29:47 that

1:29:48 funding is needed upfront.

1:29:50 And that if you shift to a contributions framework,

1:29:54 which refocuses attention on direct emissions reductions

1:29:57 because you aren't allowing that trade,

1:29:59 it creates

1:30:00 transparency and

1:30:02 what a company has done,

1:30:03 what a country has done and what they've purchased.

1:30:08 I think just

1:30:09 It's what it's a,

1:30:10 it's a claim,

1:30:11 it's words,

1:30:12 it's rhetoric,

1:30:13 but I think it has power

1:30:15 and I think just by disentangling

1:30:18 that claim

1:30:19 refocuses attention on direct emissions reductions

1:30:22 and then also it allows it opens up the possibility for

1:30:27 a range of projects,

1:30:28 including those that take into account many co-benefits,

1:30:31 including those that are

1:30:33 needed today in order to drive deep decarbonization

1:30:37 going forward.

1:30:38 And in terms of

1:30:40 where can we contribute?

1:30:42 How do we find those good projects,

1:30:44 there are so many amazing nonprofits,

1:30:47 amazing organizations,

1:30:49 governments with programs,

1:30:51 money is needed.

1:30:53 Right,

1:30:54 um,

1:30:55 and we need money going to the right places,

1:30:58 um,

1:30:59 so,

1:31:00 um,

1:31:00 I,

1:31:01 I envision sort of a movement towards direct contributions

1:31:05 to these organizations that have been working in the ground

1:31:07 for,

1:31:08 for a very long time and know,

1:31:11 have,

1:31:11 have,

1:31:12 uh,

1:31:12 uh,

1:31:12 uh,

1:31:13 are effectively able to support decarbonization

1:31:17 that answered some of the questions.

1:31:18 Thank you.

1:31:21 Yes,

1:31:21 thanks for your question.

1:31:22 Um,

1:31:23 yes,

1:31:24 we have.

1:31:24 Um,

1:31:26 basically,

1:31:26 we have actually

1:31:28 done some heterogeneity analysis,

1:31:31 like doing some Bayesian modeling analysis to really going

1:31:35 into the primary analysis and the primary studies and also

1:31:39 looking into secondary sources such as

1:31:42 World Bank to get a glance of the specific schemes

1:31:45 and then looking actually what is driving the heterogeneity.

1:31:49 Um,

1:31:50 and then indeed actually the,

1:31:53 the,

1:31:53 I haven't mentioned this,

1:31:54 but the difference in the specific study design

1:31:57 is kind of large.

1:31:59 So like all everything else equal kind of how a

1:32:01 study is actually done is also makes makes a difference.

1:32:04 But I,

1:32:05 we can also talk more about this uh offline because

1:32:08 it might get a bit nerdy if I continue.

1:32:10 Um,

1:32:11 on

1:32:12 um on the bigger picture,

1:32:14 I just wanted to

1:32:16 Kind of make one final comment which relates to one

1:32:19 of the last things that Kaushik said like in terms of

1:32:22 kind of to make actually sure

1:32:24 that the government doesn't have an incentive for rent seeking

1:32:27 because I think this is extremely important but based

1:32:30 on some theoretical work that we have been doing,

1:32:33 we can show that as soon as this actually Happens.

1:32:37 Basically,

1:32:38 the credibility of the uh of the possibility

1:32:40 of the government to have a time consistent,

1:32:43 credible

1:32:44 kind of um signal of this presence,

1:32:47 it just crumbles.

1:32:48 And then you have two options,

1:32:49 either you have prohibitive pricing or no pricing at all.

1:32:52 So as long as you can control this in the experiment,

1:32:55 it is fine.

1:32:56 I wonder whether it can always be controlled kind of out there in in the real world,

1:33:00 so to say.

1:33:01 Yeah,

1:33:02 and thank you.

1:33:02 I've been told by the organizers we're almost out of time,

1:33:06 so Kaushik will have the final word.

1:33:08 And then Carolyn,

1:33:09 we will hear from you.

1:33:11 Uh,

1:33:12 others can,

1:33:13 uh,

1:33:14 email her question,

1:33:15 your questions to her.

1:33:16 Sorry about that,

1:33:17 but Kaushik,

1:33:17 uh,

1:33:18 that's fine.

1:33:19 I only have a 17 minute speech more to go,

1:33:22 but,

1:33:23 but

1:33:24 I mean,

1:33:24 just kind of broadly to the point that.

1:33:27 This is

1:33:28 trying to use an economic instrument to solve for a particular problem.

1:33:32 So in this case,

1:33:32 this is a cap and trade scheme.

1:33:34 Uh,

1:33:34 we allocate some permits to grandfathering.

1:33:37 Some permits are bought in the initial allocation.

1:33:42 In the design of the market,

1:33:43 we kind of try and build in this case that at

1:33:46 the end of the compliance period whatever permits remain in the market

1:33:50 have to be bought back by the government.

1:33:52 So

1:33:53 there is,

1:33:54 so in the design of the scheme itself you kind of created a situation where

1:33:58 the government or the pollution regulator does not make money in this case.

1:34:02 But also in general when you kind of think about

1:34:05 using a tool like this,

1:34:07 you compare it with.

1:34:08 The alternative,

1:34:09 what is the cost of not doing this right

1:34:12 in a command and control regime,

1:34:14 the cost of polluting is infinite because you shut down,

1:34:20 and I mean,

1:34:21 for whatever it's worth,

1:34:21 economics tells you that everything has a cost,

1:34:24 everything has a price,

1:34:25 so.

1:34:27 Pollution,

1:34:28 CO2 emissions,

1:34:29 carbon,

1:34:30 they actually have a price

1:34:32 and that price is not infinity

1:34:34 because if it was infinity,

1:34:35 the solution would be to shut down all

1:34:37 economic activity that uses any kind of fossil fuel

1:34:40 and to get to that optimal price

1:34:43 is a question of having the right design

1:34:46 and the right structure that kind of delivers that particular outcome.

1:34:52 In designing this particular scheme,

1:34:54 we were kind of very,

1:34:54 very careful in terms of making sure that the

1:34:57 burden of cost

1:34:59 in designing the scheme sits with the industry,

1:35:02 and that's reflected in the cost-benefit ratio that's

1:35:04 kind of estimated in that one paper.

1:35:08 Thank you very much,

1:35:10 panelists.

1:35:10 That was fabulous.

1:35:12 Uh,

1:35:12 I think,

1:35:13 uh,

1:35:14 and thank you very much to the audience for being here till 6 p.m.

1:35:17 Uh,

1:35:18 we have an exciting day,

1:35:19 uh,

1:35:20 and a big round of applause for our panel.

1:35:25 Before we end for the day,

1:35:27 I would like to acknowledge

1:35:29 the amazing team who made ABCD happen.

1:35:32 Kenan Karakula is leading the team.

1:35:34 Please come over,

1:35:36 uh,

1:35:36 and,

1:35:36 and Indu and Carolina and Lisette,

1:35:39 and a big round of applause to them.

1:35:41 This wouldn't have happened without them.

1:35:44 And where is Joe and A?

1:35:48 All right,

1:35:48 thank you guys.

showAllTimestamps
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transcript
Welcome to session free on pollution, chaired by Shami Glass, senior director and, uh, senior advisor and director for development policy in the office of our chief economist. In the session, our panelists will share research that offers a comprehensive look at both the challenges and opportunities in using market-based approaches to address pollution and climate change, while our discussion will provide expert commentary and help synthesize the key takeaways. So. With that, let me hand over to our chair and ask whoever is on their way to please take their seats and and come over. Thank you. All right. Thank you, Carolina, and welcome everyone. Um, you know, I hope a lot more of you join, but those who have joined, thank you very much. Uh, I'd like to welcome all of you to our session on pollution. And the title of the session is pollution, because when we started thinking about the session and designing it, we were motivated by Professor Michael Greenstone and his 2024 AEA Distinguished Lecture, which was on the economics of the global energy challenge. And in that lecture, Professor Greenstone highlighted that the global energy challenge is defined by 3 often conflicting goals that all countries have, and this has to do with getting cheap and reliable energy, having clean air, and limiting the damages from climate change. And when it comes to energy use, there's a close correlation between energy use per capita and rising incomes per capita. In fact, there is no country in the world that has become rich without a dramatic increase in energy use. And right now there are billions of people in low-income economies and middle-income economies whose aspirations for themselves include the dramatic rise in energy consumption. So here in America, an average American consumes 13,000 kilowatts per hours of electricity per year. But around the world, there are about 3 billion people who live in countries with per capita electricity consumption, less than 1500 kilowatt hours a year. So rising energy use has been accompanied by pollution and carbon emissions. And while America now accounts for 14% of global carbon emissions, emissions in middle-income countries, particularly in India and China, have been on the rise, linked with their growing economies. So here's the challenge. A policy that's telling middle income countries and low income countries not to have a dramatic rise in energy use, that is to not develop, it's just a nonstarter. It sounds a lot like what Indemit told us this morning, the hypocritical statements made by elites in advanced economies. And for all these countries, fossil fuels are predicted to be the dominant source of energy through the middle of the 21st century. However, there's a case to be made for aggressive reductions of fossil fuel, and that's the immediate health effects from conventional pollutants. And Michael Greenstone's research that Kosik's going to tell us about shows that air pollution poses the greatest external threat to human health, with the average person losing more than 2 years of life expectancy. This loss is comparable to that from tobacco smoking. And much greater from alcoholism, terrorism, or war. So if low and middle income countries need to take steps to reduce conventional air pollution from fossil fuels, it also provides a shot in the arm for searching for alternative sources of energy. So we're going to have a real vibrant debate this afternoon. Because we're going to talk about energy, we're going to talk about clean air, and we're gonna talk about reducing emissions. And we have an amazing lineup of speakers. Jan Steckel is the chair for Climate and Development Economics at the Brandenburg University of Technology and associated with the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research. Barbara Haer is a senior fellow at the Goldman School of Public Policy at UC Berkeley. And is the director of the Berkeley Carbon Trading Project and Kaushik Deb. He is the executive director of the Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago and leads EPI's work in India. And I'm very excited and delighted my colleague, Carolyn Fisher, who is the lead economist and research manager for development economics at the World Bank. So Jan, Barbara, and Kaushik will give us about 17 minutes each max on their research, and Carolyn will kick us off with a discussant. As a discussant following that, we'll have a panel, but I'd love to hear your questions, so be ready to come to those mics and prepare your questions now. So Jan, let's start with you. Thank you. Thank you very much for the kind introduction and also the invitation. Um, I'm going to talk about the effectiveness of carbon pricing. So, while I'm in climate and development economics, so this is why I'm interested in carbon pricing. And I actually would like to kind of summarize what we know from the existing literature. And then I would like to discuss a little bit what we can learn, particularly for low and middle income countries. So if you ask an economist, OK, what shall we do like in terms of rising emissions, etc. then they probably will answer like, OK, yeah, let's put a price on carbon. This is basically the standard idea, like it is over 100 years old. And we consider it to be the number one instrument to curb climate change, and it is not only kind of an academic or ritual exercise, it is also getting increasing attention in low and middle income countries. So you see in this nice report that the World Bank is publishing every year that like every year you basically see some more spots in the global south here. So, but I would like to argue in this talk that kind of, there are huge research and implementation gaps and like of those schemes that have been implemented in low and middle income countries, we see many schemes with very, very low prices. And this raises immediately a couple of questions. I'm not promising that I'm going to answer all of them. Because it will never actually fit in 17 minutes, but I will try to still kind of offer some thoughts on actually how we can think about this. So the first question is, is it actually effective given particular market environments? Second is, is carbon pricing actually the optimal policy instrument given other market failures? So as climate economists we tend to kind of focus on, yeah, we need to basically bring down emissions, but what if Actually, there are not only co-benefits of climate policy, but also other spillovers, negative spillovers, for example, on increasing air pollution, etc. So I think we need to understand this better to then also kind of think of the optimal design of policies. Third is, of course, the question, why is it so difficult to implement? And fourth, is what would be kind of specific design features that can make it work also in uh environments in low and middle income countries. But I would like to actually in this talk focus on two questions. One is what do we actually know about the effectiveness of carbon pricing? And the second is can we be sure that this also applies for low and middle income countries? And I would like to start with the first kind of question. With the paper that we have published last year, which is actually a systematic review and meter analysis of the expo elevation of the effectiveness of carbon pricing. So we are actually kind of looking into the literature that has in the causal setting, looked into, OK, there has been some form of pricing instrument can be a tax, can be a trading scheme. What has actually happened to emissions. And the reason why we engaged in this endeavor was twofold. First was, well, we're, it's an interesting question. But second is that basically it has been kind of, there have been a couple of papers that came out, like one, for example, by Jessicare 2020 in environmental research letters saying, OK, carbon pricing has not actually been effective. And this was counterintuitive to us, not only basically from kind of the theoretical papers and knowledge that we have, but also based on the primary studies that partly we ourselves have actually conducted. So, and the, the second dimension where we were puzzled was that basically what was kind of labeled to be a systematic review was not at all systematic. It had kind of quite a few gaps in terms. So we, we actually engaged in doing a proper systematic review, which kind of Um, means that we have to go through various steps. So the first is that we have to engage in systematic screening, really trying to scrape all the relevant kind of uh literature databases, including Scopus, uh, Redpack, Google Scholar, basically what have you. And really kind of looking into with a with a predefined set of keywords like carbon pricing, emissions trading, expost, causal incidents, etc. etc. uh, kind of to make sure that we identify all kinds of the relevant literature. So then, basically, uh, we have developed some automated tools to make the sorting a little bit more, um, yeah. Uh, handy for us, but still, in the end, there were about 4000 papers where we had to read the abstracts by hand, always making sure that it's not only one person, but at least 2 persons to basically make sure that we don't miss anything. So, in the end, we came up with a, with a specific set of papers and literature facts that we kind of think are more or less comprehensive. And as a second step, then we had to engage and think, OK, how can we now extract kind of the effects and the effect is we are interested in is the reduction of carbon emissions after the introduction of a specific scheme. And of course, kind of the literature gives all kinds of different methods, different or Um, synthetic control, etc. so this had to be harmonized also this, the literature, the original papers look into different kind of time frames, etc. but all of this basically we, we try to harmonize and we came up with a specific sample of existing carbon price. Schemes and ETS that um basically uh have been covered in about 100 publications and in those about 100 publications we identified about 470 particular uh treatment effects, OK. And you can see if you look closely into this table that those schemes cover like a very different um share of the emissions and also if you look into the prices, they range from $3 in the red scheme to about um above $100 in uh in uh in Sweden. So let's have a look into the results. The results actually are that once we have seen carbon pricing schemes to be implemented, they have on average reduced emissions significantly by about 10%. So this is what the literature says. And you see that there are kind of huge differences like ranging from about 20% in the reggie to actually a positive effect in the Swiss ETS. So we did some analysis aiming to try to explain what is actually now the differences and One of the largest differences is actually the sectoral coverage. So when it has been actually applied on energy or industry sectors, um, we we can find that actually the emission reductions have been larger than in other sectors. Also, and this is kind of logical, if the original kind of studies have looked into a longer period, then we also find a larger reduction effect. So you might wonder, and I'm saying this up front because this question comes up every time, why has it actually been positive in Switzerland? And this is actually the last point, like the kind of how the study has been conducted is also a decisive kind of predictor or like element why these are different. And in the, in this particular study. of the authors looked into the difference between the introduction of the Swiss ETS, which has replaced a different scheme, the regulation in the industry sector, which has been actually more ambitious than the ETS. So it is not so surprising that we find a positive effect. But it's still kind of um relates to an important question that we all know when we are in academia, that kind of not every study is of its, of, of the same quality. So what we also did is That we wanted to know what is actually the effect of particular bias and the effect of statistical power in those studies, and I just realized that the numbers are I mistakenly swapped them. So when actually controlling for specific biases, so for example the control groups are not comparable to And the treatment groups or there are some omitted controls which we more or less kind of did by hand, so this coding, then we find that OK, this is actually not really affecting the results. It is still 10.8%. However, if you basically take those studies out that are statistically underpowered, then we find a slightly lower effect of about 7%. But the bottom line remains the same, so emission pricing. Where we have robust kind of ex post causal evidence has been effective in negative like in bringing down emissions. So one thing that you immediately realize when you look through these kind of um uh set of schemes that have been studied is that there's very little evidence on low and middle income countries. And I won't have time to actually go into this in detail, but this is exactly what we're doing in my lab that we try to provide this primary evidence. And I just kind of, uh, would like to give a very, very quick insight on a study that has just been published as a working paper by one of my postdocs, Johannes Galli, and they actually look into the effect of the South African carbon tax, which has come in effect in 2019 in the South African industry sector. And they actually find that there is that they cannot prove any robust evidence on emission reductions in this particular scheme. Um, but I would like to actually go one step further. And this is why I decided to, um, actually introduce another paper. I haven't been the co-author here, but uh my colleagues at at PI have actually published this last year in Science, and they kind of ask the question the other way around, right? Like if we basically do policy evaluation, then we often pick our favorite policy instruments, emission pricing. And then we do an evaluation, has this been effective. But actually the question that we're interested in is what has brought down emissions? And this needs a slightly kind of different research design. And this is what they have been doing. They have developed basically a framework where they for different countries and sectors, look into how emissions have developed by a synthetic kind of control framework, they kind of look into emission brakes. And whenever they detect a significant emission break, not just kind of a random 1% dip, but like at least 5 to 10%, they say, OK, this now actually is an emissions break in a particular sector. When applying this, they find in overall 69 breaks. With an average emission reduction of 19%. You can see like all across the board, like in Europe, in North America, Latin America, Asia um Oceania, so we have actually seen those breaks everywhere. What they do next is that they assign specific policies uh to those bricks. So they actually use the database from the OCD on um On, on policies, all kinds of policies, not only price policies, but also, um, changes in the building code, for example, or air pollution standards, etc. and they assign it to those brakes. In the end they come up with this very complicated graph. I don't expect you to understand it at all, but basically it gives you kind of like all the various kind of policies in countries where we have actually seen some policy induced reduction. If we just zoom in one example, China for example. So this has been a break detected in the industry sector. And they can assign kind of the pilot ETS in in China and the fossil fuel subsidy reform to this effect. Doing this for many, many countries, they can then also actually look into specific differences between developed and developing countries by sector. And I think this is really interesting to look at, because first result of this paper is that generally policy mixes mixes have been much more effective than single policies. And they have in particular been effective if there has been some price instrument actually in place. But there are some kind of differences. So if you look into this graph, the different kind of circles here show you kind of what kind of policy has been affected. So for example, here, 727.3% of the successful interventions were regulation alone, but you see that most were actually combined with some subsidy with some pricing, etc. etc. So what they find is when in those sectors with private consumers, they find the most complementarities if you like. Then the pricing instruments have in particular been affected and this is a quite similar effect, as quite similar results to what we have found also in the systematic review, like where we actually see profit maximizing firms at work and this is true both in developed and developing economies. They're basically pricing instruments have been in particular. Um, effective. So now, the most interesting difference is in the electricity sector. So you see in developed countries, actually, it's been mainly been pricing instruments that have managed to bring down emissions in the electricity sector. In developing countries, they could not find any. Emission brake that can be traced back to pricing instruments alone. It's only subsidies and it is regulation. And this of course as a kind of immediately gets us to the question, so what are the conditions for pricing interventions come pricing to work successfully. Like looking into the electricity sector of developing countries, a couple of things come to mind. It is the role of liberalized markets and other price distortions that might be at play. The role of specific, you know, sequences of policies, for example, the liberalization of an electricity market, might need to come first before we apply a pricing instrument. And then of course the role of institutions, state capacity, etc. to regulate. And last but not least, of course, the role also of state owned enterprises that might be particularly salient in the electricity sector. So now I have another talk of 17 minutes, uh, what we can expect. But and I won't give it to you, but I just wanted to mention a couple of things uh for discussion. So, um, why should it be different from, from theory? One is kind of the effectiveness, and I think I have talked about this. I would like to say two words more about the interaction with other externalities, including health, because we have been doing quite some work to look into the effects of Cooking fuels, when actually people are exposed to price changes by subsidy reform or by a carbon price. And this is actually in the fact that in developed countries, nobody would actually think of. But in developing countries, it is highly important because we want people to use more fossil fuels in terms of EPG in terms of lowering exposure to indoor air pollution, etc. And we find that this might actually counteract. So the introduction of a carbon price might actually lead to more indoor air pollution because people are pushed down the energy ladder and actually use more firewood or charcoal, etc. with related health consequences. And when thinking this through and then looking actually into the comparison between social costs of carbon. And these health costs we find that in many countries including India actually for the country itself I've seen you um um it would actually not be optimal to apply a car price. So then it comes to the last point that I would like to make and this is our countries actually because you could think of design schemes right to alleviate this effect. But the question is, do countries have actually the the institutional means to do that, and who would actually need to kind of be compensated? Do we need to think of specific design features, etc. I think all of this is highly relevant when thinking about carbon pricing in developing countries. And with that, I stop and thank you very much. Thanks so much, Ian, for those excellent insights. Barbara, over to you. OK, now let's turn attention to carbon offsets. It's a very different story than carbon pricing. So, um, offset programs are often appended to carbon pricing programs, they allow an emitter to pay someone else to reduce emissions instead of them reducing their own emissions under a cap or sometimes instead of paying a carbon tax. And I've studied the quality of carbon offset programs for the last 20 years, um, looking at a, at a range of of programs, and in general, carbon offset programs have worked dismally. It's common for them to overcredit 10 times or more. And overcrediting matters because to the extent that offsets are used, they can undermine the effectiveness of the emissions cap or regulatory system, and when they're used by companies, they can be used by companies to sell carbon neutral products that are not carbon neutral. Folks, can we put up the slides? OK, thank you. Uh, so for the next 15 minutes or 17 minutes or so. Um, I'll, I'm going to make the, the three points. Um, one is that most major offset programs to date have significantly overcredited. Um, I'll explain the common sources of overcrediting over the project types that have generated the most credits over 3 major carbon offset markets. Um, second, I'll describe, um, Basically why I'm having the same conversations today about poor quality as I had 20 years ago when I started doing this research. Why such persistent and um uh deep overcrediting and I'll I'll argue that poor quality is inherent to the underlying incentive structure of carbon offsets. And then I'll discuss a way forward, and I'll conclude that given the 20 year history of carbon offsets, given the underlying quality issues, I think we, we need to move from the from carbon offsets, and I'm putting forward an idea of a contributions approach. So let's discuss the first major carbon offset program, which was established under the UN under the Kyoto Protocol. So under the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries had caps, developing countries didn't have caps, and industrialized countries argued, you know, greenhouse gasses are well mixed in the atmosphere. Why do they need to reduce emissions domestically? Shouldn't they be allowed to reduce emissions anywhere in the world that is that where it's cheapest? Um, and I did field research in India on the outcomes of the program, uh, focusing on grid-connected renewables and hydropower, um, which I don't know if I can point anyway, it's the right most together that they, they generate the most, the most credits, um, and they both hydropower and renewable energy is the same methodology. So I looked at them together. Um, and methodologies are the backbone of carbon offset programs. They define what projects are allowed to participate and how to estimate and monitor emissions reductions under them. And I found that the large majority of these projects most likely didn't reduce emissions at all. The program mostly paid project developers to develop projects they most, they were likely to build anyway or they had, they were already building. And the problem was that the UN cast a very wide net in what project types were allowed to participate and required every project developer to prove that they wouldn't have gone forward with the project were it not for the offset incentive, the offset income. And what I saw was that what I found in this research was that it was very easy for project developers to show that cost effective projects were not cost effective, such as by strategically choosing assumptions that go into a financial assessment, um, or by describing barriers to to projects. And what happened was, um, high levels of overcrediting and non-additional participation kept prices too low. For that incentive to really affect new to incentivize new mitigation. Um, Adverse selection happened when and that that that phenomenon is adverse selection right the first projects to participate are the ones that cost the least those are the ones that would have gone ahead anyway. I concluded that the large majority of the projects are non-additional, um, not just in India, but across, across, across the world, and another article after mine Keal. did a broader review of, of more project types and and puts a number on that estimated that 85% of projects most likely were non-additional or overcredited. I then turned attention to California's offset program, which was structured in a in a different way, and I believe a much better way. It was structured specifically to address the quality issues with its predecessor program. What California did is narrow instead of casting a wide net and requiring every project developer to prove the additionality of their project, they defined a narrow set of project types. And that were unlikely to move forward on their own, that were likely to be affected or incentivized by the offset income. And um I, I study the improved forest management, which is the project type of 3 quarters of California credits um on the mandate and the compliance market, but these credits also generated over a third of all credits from projects in the US, including the voluntary market. Um, And What I and others have found is again, A better structure, but widespread overcrediting and the way the protocol works, the way to improve forest management protocol works is that it allows any forest landowner anywhere in the US to generate credits that they commit to holding more carbon on their landscape than the baseline, where the baseline for the most part is set at the average for that forest type. Now there's heterogeneity on the, on the landscape, and what we would expect is again, adverse selection. Where the first forest landowners to participate are the ones that, uh, participate in costs the least that are already holding more carbon on their land, um, whether it's for climate reasons, for climatic reasons, ecological reasons, or the type of timber they're producing, um, already are holding more carbon on the landscape than the average so that they can generate credits, um, without any change, and that's exactly what we see. So the first two articles there, um, use remote sensing imagery. To and found that they found no uh uh uh statistically significant difference in forest management forest management practice in the project areas compared to the past, how they historically managed the lands and compared to control lands. Now let's say um some of these projects really would have logged aggressively to bring their forest lands down to the average. An earlier study that that that I did was on leakage where I found that the protocol systematically underestimated the impacts of, of when you reduce logging on participating lands, but you don't change the demand for timber products, of course you get some. Uh, uh, uh, uh, displacement to other lands, and it dramatically underestimated the impact of leakage so much so though that it overcredited 5 times. It shows a very, it uses a very low leakage rate and it averages leakage over 100 years rather than deducting it at the same time that uh avoided deforestation is credited. So what we see here in some is that it's much better structured, but we still have adverse selection and the quantification methodologies in in several ways are not science aligned. I then turned attention to the voluntary carbon market, um, which generates credits for voluntary use such as by companies, universities, other institutions to meet targets like carbon neutrality. And I studied again the project types of the the project type of the most credits, which is red also that means avoided deforestation. Um, and I also did a study of cook stoves in the purple, um, that, uh, is the fastest growing offset project type. I brought together a team of researchers and we comprehensively looked at the major elements of quality of avoided of the four main avoided deforestation methodologies. And a few things we found overcrediting under every rock we turned. And um we were able to explore why what is what is happening? Why is there so much overcrediting and what we found is flexibility. That the protocols were written in a way that allowed a wide range of projects, a wide range of forests, uh, to participate across the globe, um, and project developers when confronted with, uh, flexibility in how they can set the baseline, how they can assess leakage, um, especially given high levels of uncertainty in both mean methodological choices that led to more credits rather than less, you know, why wouldn't they? And the third party verifiers that are the enforcers of quality in the system, they didn't enforce conservativeness, they didn't even often enforce common sense. They just, they allowed projects to move forward if the quantification methods were allowed by the methodologies. And one other factor that I want to mention with red is that your work, you know, these projects are working, um, to avoid deforestation, uh, uh. Around the globe, um, this project type could not be more important to be effective. What we see is that many of these projects, or most of these projects, target smallholders rather than the major industrial drivers of deforestation because it's cheaper to do so. And while they could generate credits against fictitious baselines, um, and so. Many of most of these projects, uh, uh, restricted the restricted forest communities from their, their use of forests and also Some of these projects came at a real risk of harm to forest communities. Uh, so the reason, oh, and really quickly, so we did a comprehensive assessment of cook stoves offsets looking across all of looking across all the major, uh, uh, uh, factors that go into quantifying emissions reductions across, um, a sample of the projects on the market and found overcrediting of 10 times. So the reasons that have highlighted over the three generations of offset programs, um, are common among many project types. So the question is, Why such persistent overcrediting? There, there, there's, um, clearly a structural reason why 20 years of learning by doing we get the same, the same outcomes, and I believe it's these things, these three things working together. We have high level, high levels of uncertainty. Um, we know how to measure emissions. It's much harder to measure emissions reductions because you have to measure them against the counterfactual scenario that never happened and Uh, it is unobservable, um, and information asymmetry, the project developer always knows a lot more about what they would have done without the offset income than any verifier or program administrator. These high levels of uncertainty are being deliberated by a set of market actors that all benefit from excess crediting. So the whole idea of the market is for buyers to be able to find the least cost emissions reductions. Project developers want to get, uh, earn more credits for doing less adverse selection. Third party verifiers are hired directly by the project developers, so they have a conflict of interest to rule leniently, um, to be hired again, especially in the context of high levels of subject uncertainty and subjectivity. Um, and the, the registries themselves, uh, the, the program creators on the voluntary market, they're vying for market share, and in compliance markets, there's political pressure to keep offset prices low. So what you get is a race to the bottom that if one methodology were to be tightened up and science aligned and not overcredited, the market flows to the other methodologies. So what is the way forward, and I think I'll argue 3 things. One is that efforts to create quality offset programs are unlikely to succeed. Um, Because of, because of this, the history and the structural reasons. We need to shift from offsetting to contributions claims. And what I'm most excited about. Going forward is a shift from offset markets to direct contributions, and let me discuss each of those. So, one is um Even though I think it is unlikely that we're going to be able to achieve an offset market, um, that is quality and not significantly overcredited, it's still worthwhile to uh have have uh quality methodologies that can be used for contributions approaches, they can be used for offset programs, you know, a narrow set of offset project types that we're offsetting really work with really works for. So how do you do that? One is most important, I believe, is to remove conflicts of interest. So that means methodology should be designed and evaluated against clear criteria by independent experts with interdisciplinary scientific and practical expertise. Verifier should be hired by independent bodies rather than by the project developers themselves, and credit calculations should be released publicly so that independent parties like us can evaluate quality. And then by criteria, I put forward doing a comprehensive over undercreting analysis where you compare methodologies and how they're implemented in practice by projects against the scientific literature and best practice in a quantitative analysis. A benefit is that it acknowledges that some projects are going to over credit. There's going to be some non-additional crediting. But you can structure your program so that there's enough conservativeness and undercrediting so that programmatically it's a quality program you're not overcrediting. You want to assess uh quality elements, um. Um I'm going to Um, OK, uh, assess, assess quality elements, taking into account, um, uh, the lean towards overcrediting all the things that we've been talking to and treating uncertainty conservatively. I, um, I think. It's really important to shift from offsetting to contributions claims where offsetting claims are, you treat your reducing your own emissions as equivalent to paying someone else to reduce their emissions, and you can call it a net number. The problem there is, uh, it creates a disincentive to reduce emissions, a company that dramatically reduces their emissions and buys offsets for just the small remainder, and another company that Um, and it's like crazy and just buys, buys cheap carbon credits. They look the same. They can both claim the same carbon neutral or net zero claim. And if you switch to a contributions claim where you don't let those two numbers be netted and a company um can discuss how much it's reduced its own emissions, it can discuss its contributions, it's a more complex claim, but it's more honest and it refocuses attention on direct emissions reductions and it creates flexibility to support a wider range of activities based on a wider set of goals. And my final, uh, substantive slide. That opens the creates an opportunity to shifting from offset markets to direct contributions and an offset market, writes a set of rules and let and lets the market go and find the cheapest reductions, direct contributions, um, uh. Moves us out of that marketplace and buying a commodity into a space of uh what a company would do if they're uh uh contracting with a supplier or giving a donation, you would, you would vet organizations, you would vet programs, you would build a relationship with them. Um, so, uh, contributions approach would mean giving directly to NGOs, giving directly to government programs, giving directly even to companies such as those distributing, uh, very fuel efficient cook stoves. Um, characteristics of the direct contributions approach are you directly contribute to those entities. So money is going directly to those entities, not to brokers and consultants, etc. You provide you can provide funds upfront when they're most needed. Um, you can denominate primarily in money rather than in tons. You can still quantify the greenhouse gas benefits, but you denominate the, the, the contribution in money. And that it invites taking many more factors into account, not just cheap carbon. Um, and it also allows for supporting a wider range of activities to drive decarbonization, including some that are hard to quantify the greenhouse gas benefits, for example, like in the agricultural sector, supporting a range of activities to bring farmers into different practices which can be demonstration projects, technical assistance, incentive programs, outreach activities, and be nimble and adapt over time. Um, And lastly, I think we don't have time to waste on programs that have already disproven themselves and I'm very excited about shifting the framework from offsets to to direct contributions. I think it can have much better impacts. Thank you very much, Barbara. That was very insightful and bit depressing, right? Uh, so, let me turn now to Kaushik for your, uh, presentation on India's pollution program in Gujarat. Um, thanks, Ami. Let me just grab the water. As my kind of slides come up, I think being the last speaker of the day, uh, it just falls to me to put up whatever little defense I can for economic instruments to deal with environmental problems. Um, This is a piece of work that has been ongoing in a city in India called Surat for the last 15 years. It's an experiment to see whether we can use market-based instruments to deal with. Environmental issues and it's an experiment that we've constantly kind of evolved and evaluated and gotten to a point where we think that this is a viable tool that can be used to deal with at least a certain kind of environmental problems and we're kind of trying to deploy it much more extensively in India and elsewhere. So what this presentation does is of course kind of talk about Michael's paper which came out in the Quarterly Journal of Economics a couple of months back, but also talk about what that paper has meant in terms of our activities and actually using a textbook tool to act to create a create an economic service that deals with environmental issues. So what's the problem that we're dealing with? Essentially air quality and pollution, and let me kind of just show you exactly what that means. Shamik, you kind of talked about what air quality means in terms of lives lost. On an average, air quality causes more damage than Tobacco, alcohol, terrorism, HIV, malaria, and this impact is very significant. 2 years or over 2 years of everyone's life globally. I mean when you're living in a city in Delhi like I do, it's almost 8 years of your life, and that's, I mean, I'd argue, a fairly chunky piece of your existence. So you really kind of Dealing with this challenge on a real-time basis, we're also dealing with this challenge on a real-time basis where this trade-off between the aspirations of a population of nearly 1.5 billion people wanting to achieve a certain level of prosperity and having to deal with air quality and emissions that come from using fossil fuels as extensively as is happening in a country like India, you kind of have to start to think about this as not necessarily. Issues that are in tension with each other, but how do you kind of resolve this tension and that's really where we are trying to use market market-based instruments to kind of solve, uh, for that problem because historically. Everywhere in the world, what we've tried to do to deal with air quality and pollution is essentially use a plethora of regulatory instruments, mostly command and control, and these have been so extensively deployed since the, since the early 60s in the developing, in the developed world and then subsequently in the developing world. In the 90s and thereafter, that the number of regulatory instruments that even exist in a country like India is really, really incredible to just deal with air quality and pollution, but the impact, as you saw in the previous slide, hasn't been as dramatic as you would like that to be. So there is something missing in this equation that you kind of need to fix. And if you kind of think this through, why is this a problem? Because how do you deal with Air quality and emissions from industrial units in most parts of the world. This is a really, really labor intensive regulatory capacity intensive process that cannot be deployed at an extensive scale anywhere, even in, even in a very well. Equipped regulatory capacity that you might have in the United States or in Europe. It involves essentially a person climbing up a stack, an emissions stack, a chimney stack in an industrial unit, collecting a sample of emissions for a certain period of time, taking that sample back to a laboratory and testing whether that actually meets the environmental standards or the concentration emissions standards for that particular plant or not. This is something that you clearly can't be doing on a daily or a constant basis. This probably happens once or twice in a year for most locations in the US, in countries like India, perhaps even less frequently. And even if you were to be able to do that, this does not really solve the problem of air quality and emissions from industrial units on a continuous basis. So what we've tried to do in India in Surat is to try and see whether the use of a market-based instruments. Added to emissions monitoring program that kind of uses the state of the art emissions monitoring and control equipment, can that be a way to kind of solve for emissions and air quality? And this is the experiment that we kind of carried out in Surat that took over 10 years to kind of set up and develop. This involved right from the initial stages of working with the Ministry of Environment at the federal level in India to. Identify the role that cap and trade schemes, emission trading schemes could actually play in dealing with industrial air pollution, working with the pollution control boards, the pollution regulators in India to develop standards and regulations of what kind of equipment can be used to measure emissions and how that emission measurement can be. Put together in a manner that's kind of transparent, above board, without discretion, and cannot be tampered with, providing data on a 24/7 basis to a central service sitting with a pollution regulator. Identifying folks who will actually go and do the work of installing these emissions control devices, calibrating them, making sure that they run exactly as they're designed to run and Set up trading mechanisms, a trading platform, bring industry partners on board, show them how trading platforms actually work, how they can actually measure their emissions, how they can actually trade their emissions, and then. Having launched this program in 2019, go through a fairly extensive process of randomized control evaluations to see whether the emissions trading scheme is actually having an impact or not, and coming to a point where the success of the program in this one location in Gujarat in India has kind of led to a proliferation of using this tool within the state across pollutants and across locations, but also in other parts of the country as well. And this truly involved a lot of sweat and blood and a lot of kind of grimy effort. We're going through the process of installing these emissions control devices across 300 odd industrial units in the city of Surat, making sure that these are providing data on a continuous regular basis, that data is being evaluated, tested, and made sure that it's not spurious. Working with the regulator. Sitting in their offices designing and implementing the program in partnership with these officers and their inspectors because the idea here is to translate, essentially a textbook tool into the regulatory and the legislative framework that exists for emissions management or pollution management in a state in India. So you have to kind of work through the entire rulebook of how emissions are controlled and regulated at the 115 odd regulatory frameworks that I kind of highlighted earlier that kind of exist to deal with air quality in India. Working with the regulator as well as industry partners to make sure that we are building their capacity, they know exactly what the scheme means, how that scheme is supposed to run, and make sure that they are well equipped to be able to use this tool on a firm basis or on a regulator basis to be able to run the scheme itself. To the point of taking them through a series of mock simulations of what an emissions trading scheme would look like. This is the trading platform that the firms use to carry out trading for, uh, particulate matter for these 300 odd firms in Surat, and just to kind of show. This entire process has been evaluated through a fairly rigorous and detailed exercise where we took these 300 odd firms in Surat, divided them into two groups the treatment group, which were, which were kind of set up in the emissions trading scheme, and a control group which continued to operate as though it was in the traditional command and control. A regime and evaluating the differences of what that meant and ladies and gentlemen, I mean the results are truly quite dramatic. The first, and this is the reason why we were able to bring the regulator on board. This is the reason why the government kind of came on board to try out this experiment. Essentially the problem was noncompliance. Essentially the problem was that industries were not meeting their emissions emissions standards. And that's something that we kind of were able to establish very, very quickly that the moment you put in place the scheme and you allow the flexibility, something that Barbara Karo pointed out could be a difficult thing to manage, but the moment you can provide this flexibility to firms to be able to meet their emission targets by buying permits and making sure that the firms who were meeting their targets but could do even better than that. You increase the level of compliance in the market to nearly 100%. This 1% or less than 1% compliance, fun story, this was in the first compliance period that we had, and essentially two of the most politically well connected firms in this in this textile cluster said that. Sumi, what will you do? And that's kind of interesting when the chairman of the pollution control board called up Michael and said that, so what do you want me to do in this case? And essentially the response was that this is your opportunity to draw a line in the sand. If you establish your authority and your ability to manage and run this market. That's what will kind of give you the regulatory credibility that you need to be able to run the market in a manner that you do not have leakages or noncompliance. And subsequently you'd get a hasn't been a single compliance period where we've had firms not comply with their emission targets, and that's really the reason why the Gujarat Pollution Control Board has kind of continued to use this tool and now is trying to deploy it across pollutants and across different industrial clusters to deal with a variety of environmental issues. But the reason I think for me and for us the scheme was an extremely important success is that firms that were there in the command and control had their emissions on an average about 20 to 30% higher depending on which compliance period. So the fact that there was an emissions trading scheme that allowed firms to reduce their emissions much more than the standards required them to do and be able to monetize that improved environmental behavior led to their emissions, the market cohort emissions, being about 20 to 30% lower, and that, I think, is a very, very powerful tool, a powerful outcome. Thanks, Shamik. I'll wind up quickly, but this is the piece that I think makes for the success of the program. When the firms in the command and control regime saw that the compliance cost of the firms in the market was lower by about 11%, there was a clamor amongst all the firms that were not in the market to join the market. And if you kind of think about it, this is obvious. This is Economics 101. What does a market do? A market achieves. A certain outcome at the least cost, and this is that cost reduction that the market was able to achieve. And that's kind of what's led to the third part of my presentation, the scale up activity that has happened, but just to kind of close this out, uh, the cost-benefit ratio here that we've estimated is about 215 to 1. This is an incredible number. This is an incredible number of a population of a city of a population of about 20 million people. For just under 20 million people, the asset drain program in comparison in the US had a cost-benefit ratio of about 50 to 1. So the impact that the use of this economic instrument has had in terms of improving the cost, improving the, the, the, the benefit of the society is really, really impactful. But let me kind of take the last few minutes of my presentation to show what this has actually meant. Having seen this happen in Surat in Gujarat. The Gujarat Pollution Control Board essentially wanted to kind of use this as a tool and wants to use this as a tool for almost everything that they want to do. Now, clearly you can't use an emissions trading scheme for every sort of environmental problem. I mean, you clearly won't be able to use this for, for instance, dealing with transport sector emissions. You need large point-based emitters to be able and with enough heterogeneity for an emissions trading scheme to work. But having kind of done this exercise once in Surat, we have kind of gone through the process of scoping which of these environmental challenges in Gujarat can be solved using a market-based instrument like this, and the scheme is now expanded to include the textile cluster in a big city in Gujarat called Ahmedabad. And we are now in the process of designing an affluence-based, uh, affluence-based emissions trading scheme for two industrial clusters in Gujarat for the, for the Gujarat Pollution Control Board. A neighboring state, Maharashtra, one of the largest industrial powerhouses in India, is now on its way to develop a SO2 uh market. So this is going to be a statewide SO2 market. It would cover about 300 industrial units, and this would be truly, truly extensive because this will include electricity. This will include petchem. This will include fertilizer. This will include pharma. This will include refining. This would include cement and steel. So this is going to be a really, really remarkable. Experiment this would, uh, this is kind of a population of 140 odd million people so you can imagine that the Surat cost-benefit ratio was 215. This could easily, I can imagine be a four digit number and similarly we've kind of started the initial steps of scoping out a similar market for, uh, uh, another neighboring state to Gujarat, Rajasthan. And now it's almost like the floodgates have opened. We are having conversations with a number of states in India and a number of other geographies around the world to see whether this particular tool is viable and a solution and can actually solve for environmental challenges of a particular kind across these different geographies. And that's it. This is what I'm offering. So this is kind of bringing this incredible piece of research, this extremely intense period of design and implementation to getting to a point where My, my ultimate objective is that this is a plug and play solution. So Surat took 10 years to do. I'm aiming that our market in Maharashtra is up and running in a period of about 18 months. In an ideal world, this would be a plug and play solution where I can kind of offer this as a service. As a, as an economic service to any regulator, any pollution, uh, regulator around the world where we kind of go in, sit with them, design the solution, and offer them the, uh, give them the market to run on a on on a period until kind of this environmental challenge is actually dealt with. So just to kind of highlight the fact this is started with this incredible piece of research that the course theorem is to this incredible piece of research that Michael and colleagues published earlier this year to now a solution that we are actually designing and implementing on the ground. Thank you. Kaushik, thanks so much. That was really inspiring. And uh I hope you tell us later about how you're going to plan to scale up the work. But first, let me turn to Carolyn. Carolyn, you've heard the three presenters, and you've heard about both pollution and emissions using market instruments and and regulatory instruments. So give us a little bit of your reflections and your takeaways from this. Yeah, thank you and thanks to all of you. Um, I thought this was a really fascinating, um, session, um. And so, uh, you know, maybe taking it back to the theme here, um, there is this, you know, strong popular populist opinion that, um, You know, a mistrust of emissions pricing as a means of actually reducing emissions. There isn't a lot of faith in that. There are a lot of, you know, people view carbon pricing as a tax and redistribution scheme. And not and not as, as a driver of, of decarbonization. In fact, in Canada, we saw some backsliding. So Mark Carney prior to the um to the election, uh, just canceled the carbon tax on on households as just too politically toxic. Um, so it was nice to see from Jan we have really solid evidence that pricing mechanisms do work, um, and, and in the, um, the goal of reducing emissions. So, so then we kind of get to the question of, of where and how, um, and how to make these, these feasible. So I thought it was really, um, interesting and so one of your, um, one of your insights is that, um. Yeah, you, you found that the emissions reductions were larger in industry than in other sectors like households and, um, and I, I think we, we do see that, um, so emerging. So the latest state trends of carbon pricing by my colleagues here at the bank, um, show that, um, today. Um, a little over half of global emissions in the power sector and approaching 50% of emissions in the industrial sector are covered by carbon pricing instruments now, primarily emissions trading systems, so that may be sort of following this, uh, this insight that there are more effective drivers but also potentially more politically feasible drivers. In these sectors, um, but I, I, and also reflect, you know, from some of your numbers there, I think that the design of the system also, also matters. So we saw like really big reductions from Reggie with pretty small carbon prices, um, you know, some of that may be like some of the states actually use the revenues to deepen reductions by funding energy efficiency programs and demand reduction. Um, and, and so they found that they actually reduced electricity costs in some of these states and deepened emissions. And then when you had the sort of less effective example of South Africa, which actually has a higher carbon price than, you know, ostensibly than Reggie. But you know, part of the issue there is that up to 90% of emissions from any given facility are exempt, so you're effectively rebating the tax revenues to to the firms in proportion to their emissions. So that really undermines the effective carbon price being. Uh, carbon price signal. But of course, you know, South Africa is a very different context than, uh, Northeastern US states and so they're also institutional issues, um, that we need to be cognizant of and thinking about what other, uh, you know, for emissions markets to work, to what extent do we also need, you know, power markets, uh, to work, to be liberalized and where, um, uh, and, and think about other market failures, um. So I thought that was, that was very interesting and I know, I thought that, um, I think we can also talk some more about policy mixes. I thought those insights were, um, were really compelling because, uh, you know, showing that in, in a lot of situations, um, you get bigger emissions reductions. With the policy mix, partly this could be because, uh, you know, it's hard to implement a stringent enough carbon price to really send a strong signal, but, you know, a lot of other policies, infrastructure investments can enable, give people the options to respond to the carbon price, more effectively. So, uh, and, and also on the flip side, um, having some carbon pricing. Uh, makes your other complementary policies more effective too. So, uh, you have, you know, for the same renewable subsidy, if you have a little carbon price there that also increases the return to investments in renewable energy and so amplifies, um, that together. Um. What, um, so, so, OK, so we have, uh, evidence that, uh, carbon pricing actually works, um, but popular opinion tends to, uh, show greater support for, you know, conventional regulation. There's, there's survey evidence across a lot of countries that, uh, you know, uh, there's more popular support for standards, uh, upcoming WGR topic, um. Uh, than, than taxes, for sure, um, and, and, and so we do see, so in the case of India, we see that there actually is quite a bit of demand for regulation because the burden of air pollution is so extraordinary. So there is, um, so there is demand for that and, and, and then you've ended up with an enormous number of regulations, our command and control regulations there. And so I think this is incredibly important and showing that, um. Uh, that market-based, uh, approaches are much more cost effective. So, so, and this might be a way of like coming, coming full circle and then convincing people and you also mentioned in the green room that, um, uh, you know, so switching to a market-based approach is actually increased enthusiasm of the firms for being regulated because they felt like they were benefiting. Um, uh, from, uh, from this program. So, uh, I guess a couple questions, um, uh, questions there. I'm wondering, so how, how important, so if my, um, understanding the the scheme. Um, the, uh, you know, this was not a redistributional scheme so much because the effectively the allowances were all freely allocated to the firm. So like how important is that aspect, at least certainly in getting, getting something going, um, uh, other, other folks. Countries may be looking towards emissions pricing mechanisms also as a source of revenue for other activities that that might, you know, deepen energy access or or you know, low carbon investments so, so there are tradeoffs there and how you use the and allocate the revenue. So I'd be curious to hear about that. And also, um, you know, often one of the motivations for carbon pricing is the co-benefits, the air pollution co-benefits. And so I'm wondering here, have you looked at, thought about the climate co-benefits of the air pollution regulation, because if it's, if it's more salient to, to approach that regulation, that can that framing help, but also help deepen climate ambition. Um, because it goes hand in hand with uh these approaches. Um, and then, uh, finally, Barbara, um, so, so thinking about carbon offsets and, and we do see in several, uh, emerging economies, uh, interested in emissions trading systems, a lot of that is also as a way to finance domestic, um, uh, car, you know, carbon reduction offset offsetting activities, um. Um, but more broadly, you know, I, and I see within the institution there, there are big hopes for carbon crediting as a means to generate, uh, climate finance. Um, and, and so, um, you know, so what do we do as we switch? I mean, we, we see that the, you know, the evidence about the massive overcrediting has, has really limited demand for, for credits, um, especially in compliance systems. So like the EU does not allow crediting against ETS compliance, um. Uh, but there's also, you know, uh, voluntary, voluntary markets. And so thinking about, so where, where does demand for credits come from because these offset credit, there are a lot of different kinds of offsets, um, so there's forests, there's cook stoves, renewable energy, there's, uh, different things with very and actually removals like, um, direct air capture or something, um, and, uh, and then they also come with very different characteristics, so. Um, in terms of the local community benefits, um, um, and so as we, that, that are hard to quantify, especially when you're denominating everything in CO2. And so I'm wondering as we move, if we can move to more of a contributions approach as you suggest, how do we valorize sort of like in a holistic way, all the, the benefits of these different activities. to um enhance demand and and what do we need to do to understand like where that demand is coming from, especially, you know, from the corporate sector and and and voluntary approaches. So um thank you very much. Those are my uh starting for uh some discussion. Thank you very much, Carolyn. Those were really insightful comments. So, what we will do, we have less than 20 minutes. We're gonna turn to each one of you to reflect on Carolynn's comments, but I may prompt you with a question as well. Then we'll turn to our friends here who have been patiently waiting and hopefully, we'll let you all go by 6 o'clock, right? So, uh, so, Yan, uh, Carolyn had a lot of Um, you know, good points on your, on your discussion, but one of the things that struck me was the role of policy complementarities on this policy mix, and that carbon pricing is amplified with other market-based policies, particularly structural economic policies are in play. So tell us a little bit about this policy mix of carbon pricing. And other structural market policies in, in thinking about emissions reduction. Yeah, thanks. So, Like one aspect that I think is extremely important, and I mean from for economists that is kind of straightforward, but I still think it is important to emphasize and it's nice that it comes out of this kind of, you know, agnostic data driven kind of approach that these price based instruments are, if you like, kind of an insurance that the other policies do not rebound. So if you basically just put some subsidies or some building code, etc. to make the system more efficient, then we know that. Think of the transportation sector, right, like where we've seen that like large scale, like probably also in the US I know more of the literature in Europe, right? Like basically we had those standards. Cars got more efficient, engines got more efficient, etc. like this. But then at the same time actually cars just got. Heavier and like in terms of fuel consumption and then he also emissions, nothing actually happened. And it changes if you in addition, of course, have a carbon price which then makes sure that those kind of instruments can also kind of really work and do not kind of overflow. So I think that is an extremely important aspect when it comes to these kind of um kind of policy stacking, if you like. And another one is and this is was also mentioned by Caroline, I think that is kind of different instruments even though they might target emissions, they still might, you know, enable kind of specific policies to work. So think of basically kind of, I didn't mention that, but like part of the policy mix also was kind of uh like in financing instruments in the finance sector. So I think this is extremely important. the role of alternatives and like yeah, alternatives need to be kind of financed and think of the electricity sector right like it is straightforward basically we put a price on carbon, the coal fired power plant gets more important and countries might actually invest in more renewablesha but actually the financing structure of renewables and coal looks very different for renewables you have to finance everything upfront. Uh, whereas kind of for coal, like a lot of the costs only occur sometime in the future, that is in the fuel. So now in Europe, like where we had uh probably the same in the US where we have been actually in low interest environments for a long time, this doesn't really matter. But it matters if you actually have weighted average costs of capital that are 10, 15% as they are, for example, in Indonesia or Vietnam, then kind of the effect of such a price is going to zero. Uh, if you don't have a parallel kind of a mechanism to de-risk kind of those investments to kind of bring down the cost, uh, the financing costs, etc. So just as a specific example why I think that there are these two things at the one side kind of prices might enable kind of the efficiency of the other instruments to work. And then there are, however, other kind of externalities if you like, that are addressed by the policy mix. Thank you again. I think the point about cost of capital is extremely important. In advanced economies, cost of capital is around 4.5, 5% for renewables. In middle-income economies, it's close to 14%. I think that's a huge issue that's worth looking into. Let me turn to you, Barbara. Um, you pretty much said that carbon offsetting is fundamentally flawed. And so what's the implication for mechanisms under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which really rely a lot on these sort of offsets? Yeah, I think. OK, great. Um, yeah, thanks for, thanks for the question, um. Yeah, I mean, under, under the Paris Agreement, countries took on uh uh NDCs a suite of suite of targets, and the Article 6 of the of the Paris Agreement allows for trading among countries and several types of trading, and countries don't need to trade. Many countries started off by committing to to targets that they would do domestically. Um, and without credits, buying credits from other countries, and I think that that is a very positive way forward, given The quality challenges that we that we have seen to date and also some real quality challenges, challenges that we see with some decisions that have been made so far under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, such as allowing in old CDM credits that meet certain characteristics, the total quantity of credits that are in line and have requested transition from the CDM. To the Paris Agreement equals around close to 1 billion tons. That's huge. Those are some of the projects that I, that I studied, you know, 15 years ago, um, and other and mostly other projects but that follow very similar method very similar methodology. More than half of those credits are hydropower wind power projects and cook stoves credits, so. There we, there we see the program allowing in credits with very known quality issues. So Thank you for that. And so, I like also the point you said these offsets are creating a disincentive to reduce emissions at home. So that's, that's a really important point. Kaushik, let me turn to you. And The Surat ETS has been successful. But It takes a lot of capabilities among the institutions in the public sector to be able to roll out such an ETS. And what are the conditions you think have really helped to put this model to scale? And what does it mean you have this long list of other countries you want to work on. And other places in India, but they have pretty weak governance and institutional capabilities. So how do you think about rolling out such a program? The whole idea of creating this cap and trade scheme, this emissions trading scheme in Surat, and deploying that as a tool to deal with environmental issues there was to prove the point that you can use the Sophisticated tool like a market-based instrument like a cap and trade scheme in an environment with limited regulatory capacity and still be able to achieve your environmental results or overachieve or achieve environmental results in a much more effective fashion. There's a certain tautology here. Cap and trade schemes to deal with emission control in developing countries isn't a thing. No one kind of usually has done this. And because no one has ever done this, you kind of don't have any evidence of this actually working or not working. The Surat example essentially is one that establishes the fact that the Gujarat Pollution Control Board with our support and the use of emissions control devices was able to roll out roll out an emissions trading scheme that dealt with emissions on a 24/7 basis without increasing even a single employee as staff. The point here is that to be able to deal with pollution and emissions in this scale and in this particular sector, the use of a cap and trade scheme is a much more effective solution than, you know, hiring more inspectors to be able to go and carry out more stack testing and measuring emissions at the tailpipe on a more regular and continuous basis. And that's exactly the point that doing this as a tool across countries and states with limited regulatory capacity is a much more effective solution than actually kind of having a larger suite of regulatory instruments. I just also kind of wanted to quick uh respond to something that Carolyn said in terms of, uh, I mean, one thing that kind of all of this calls for is that you have to be very careful when you're designing the scheme. And when we did design the scheme in Surat, we grandfathered about 85% of the permits, and 15% of the permits were part of the initial permit allocation auction where kind of firms participated and bought these permits. The design of the scheme is such that this is not this is not a mechanism for the government to earn more revenue, so the government or the pollution control board is not making money off the scheme, unlike, for instance, would be the case with a with a standard carbon pricing regime. So that motivation we've kind of tried to eliminate so that that one. One potential rent rent-seeking behavior that you would see from government authorities does not, uh, does not kind of corrupt the system in, in that way. You're very optimistic. Ah great. So, I would encourage whoever has to ask a question, please come forward, Govinda, come to the mic. Others just line up behind him, and let's have a round of questions, then we'll turn to the panel. Yeah. So I'm Govind Thima from the research department. So I have one question for each of the panel members. My first question is for Ian. Ian, you compare the different, uh, you know, the ETS and carbon price, uh, you know, instrument across the countries, but the one challenge is that, you know, these instruments have a completely different design. And the exposed estimation, they have a completely different, you know, the efforts of the estimation technique they use. So in that context, what you have done to make them comparable, that's one example that in South Africa, they don't cover the electricity sector, the main polluter, the main emitter, right? So have you done anything to compare, you know, to make this, you know, instrument comparable? That is my question. Barbara, uh, so you, your presentation is a little bit disappointing, but, you know, if we see the CDM, what you said, you are right at the very beginning. So I was in the, you know, this is the registration issues team under the CDM, uh, Executive Board from 2004 to 2007. I evaluated 78 projects myself. At the beginning, there was an issue of the additionality because those projects might have, you know, implemented anyway, but later on, CDM has done a lot of contribution in a way that it gives a kind of the momentum. For example, for wind and solar. There's a, you know, this type of incentive, it gives a kind of the, you know, market incentive for the, you know, different actors. There's also innovation incentive, you know, incentive, for example, waste to energy, and a lot of new projects come because of the CDM incentives. I don't think, you know, if there's a new CDM, those type of momentum on wind and solar, and also those type of innovation in terms of this other technology might have come, you know, that is. So Prakai is a fantastic presentation and this is, I think, the first, you know, implementation of the market mechanism PM 2.5 right in Surat. So you sure, I mean, it's a very good comparison because you know for the implementation of noncompliance reduced to 1%, but have you seen any comparison between the cost? So what is the cost of the regulatory measures versus the cost of this emissions trading scheme over the? So that is the question for you. Thank you. All right, uh, next, please come in. Hi, I'm Elizabeth. I work at JPal. Um, I was wondering how you might use Rachel Glenister's generalizability framework from 2017 to perhaps, uh, replicate the SEAT success in the other countries. Hello, um, I have a question for Barbara. Barbara, your research has been indeed instrumental in exposing the systematic flaws in the offsetting markets, especially on forest credits. And the contribution model seems like something that might work better. My question is, how can we create incentives for companies to rely on these contribution models, because if they cannot claim the contributions against their emission and we still live in a world where Shareholders' value and net zero are the currency that they are working with. What incentives can be there and one step moving one step forward, where will they find those authentic carbon reduction projects that they can contribute and is there a way we can combine the offsetting with the contributions so we we get to a better model than the one we are in? Thank you. And we have the last question. Hi, my name is Caroline. I work at CGD and my question is for Barbara. Um, in your contributions work, I'm just wondering if you can give some bullet points on how that can go to rectify these traditional issues with the BCM like such as Um, overcrediting, leakage, just curious, and I'm sure it's maybe in some of your research that I haven't yet seen, but just want to know like how this contributions like mindset shift can start to affect that. Thanks. Thank you very much. We're going to do the following. We have, we're almost out of time, so I'll give each panelist a minute and a half to either answer the questions or give your big picture takeaway. And after that, Carolyn, you get 1 minute to summarize. All right, Barbara, start, let's start with Barbara. OK, first thing, I'm here for the week, and I would be delighted to talk to you. So, um, uh, um, find me, um, email me, um, so, Uh I think a lot of the questions are, are, are, are really similar, and that is um uh. So, I guess the first question on on additionality, and that is, I think often, um, Yes, I mean, the offset program has created incentives to build some new projects. It's also paid a lot of project developers to build projects that they would have built anyway. Um, I think so often we think about offsets like a way to generate climate finance for very worthwhile things, and we often forget about the trade that those credits are being used by someone to make a claim that they've reduced emissions. And if the, if it's an effective incentive, but it's overcredited, you actually can get an increase in global emissions because someone is using those credits and um That's why I think a shift to the contributions approach can really um uh match the way incentives really work like you want to create effective incentive programs to support, to support programs, um, recognizing that you're going to get non-additional projects, recognizing um that funding is needed upfront. And that if you shift to a contributions framework, which refocuses attention on direct emissions reductions because you aren't allowing that trade, it creates transparency and what a company has done, what a country has done and what they've purchased. I think just It's what it's a, it's a claim, it's words, it's rhetoric, but I think it has power and I think just by disentangling that claim refocuses attention on direct emissions reductions and then also it allows it opens up the possibility for a range of projects, including those that take into account many co-benefits, including those that are needed today in order to drive deep decarbonization going forward. And in terms of where can we contribute? How do we find those good projects, there are so many amazing nonprofits, amazing organizations, governments with programs, money is needed. Right, um, and we need money going to the right places, um, so, um, I, I envision sort of a movement towards direct contributions to these organizations that have been working in the ground for, for a very long time and know, have, have, uh, uh, uh, are effectively able to support decarbonization that answered some of the questions. Thank you. Yes, thanks for your question. Um, yes, we have. Um, basically, we have actually done some heterogeneity analysis, like doing some Bayesian modeling analysis to really going into the primary analysis and the primary studies and also looking into secondary sources such as World Bank to get a glance of the specific schemes and then looking actually what is driving the heterogeneity. Um, and then indeed actually the, the, I haven't mentioned this, but the difference in the specific study design is kind of large. So like all everything else equal kind of how a study is actually done is also makes makes a difference. But I, we can also talk more about this uh offline because it might get a bit nerdy if I continue. Um, on um on the bigger picture, I just wanted to Kind of make one final comment which relates to one of the last things that Kaushik said like in terms of kind of to make actually sure that the government doesn't have an incentive for rent seeking because I think this is extremely important but based on some theoretical work that we have been doing, we can show that as soon as this actually Happens. Basically, the credibility of the uh of the possibility of the government to have a time consistent, credible kind of um signal of this presence, it just crumbles. And then you have two options, either you have prohibitive pricing or no pricing at all. So as long as you can control this in the experiment, it is fine. I wonder whether it can always be controlled kind of out there in in the real world, so to say. Yeah, and thank you. I've been told by the organizers we're almost out of time, so Kaushik will have the final word. And then Carolyn, we will hear from you. Uh, others can, uh, email her question, your questions to her. Sorry about that, but Kaushik, uh, that's fine. I only have a 17 minute speech more to go, but, but I mean, just kind of broadly to the point that. This is trying to use an economic instrument to solve for a particular problem. So in this case, this is a cap and trade scheme. Uh, we allocate some permits to grandfathering. Some permits are bought in the initial allocation. In the design of the market, we kind of try and build in this case that at the end of the compliance period whatever permits remain in the market have to be bought back by the government. So there is, so in the design of the scheme itself you kind of created a situation where the government or the pollution regulator does not make money in this case. But also in general when you kind of think about using a tool like this, you compare it with. The alternative, what is the cost of not doing this right in a command and control regime, the cost of polluting is infinite because you shut down, and I mean, for whatever it's worth, economics tells you that everything has a cost, everything has a price, so. Pollution, CO2 emissions, carbon, they actually have a price and that price is not infinity because if it was infinity, the solution would be to shut down all economic activity that uses any kind of fossil fuel and to get to that optimal price is a question of having the right design and the right structure that kind of delivers that particular outcome. In designing this particular scheme, we were kind of very, very careful in terms of making sure that the burden of cost in designing the scheme sits with the industry, and that's reflected in the cost-benefit ratio that's kind of estimated in that one paper. Thank you very much, panelists. That was fabulous. Uh, I think, uh, and thank you very much to the audience for being here till 6 p.m. Uh, we have an exciting day, uh, and a big round of applause for our panel. Before we end for the day, I would like to acknowledge the amazing team who made ABCD happen. Kenan Karakula is leading the team. Please come over, uh, and, and Indu and Carolina and Lisette, and a big round of applause to them. This wouldn't have happened without them. And where is Joe and A? All right, thank you guys.
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worldbank/DEC-DEC Part 2 Session 3 Pollution
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DEC DEC Part 2 Session 3 Pollutio
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DEC DEC Part 2 Session 3 Pollutio
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A video recording of the Session 3 on Day 1 of The Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics 2025 "Development in the Age of Populism." This session discusses "Pollution".

CHAIR: Somik Lall, Senior Adviser in the Office of the World Bank Group Chief Economist and Director for Development Policy

PANELISTS:

Paper 1: Systemic Review and Meta-Analysis of Ex-Post Evaluations on the Effectiveness of Carbon Pricing (Jan Steckel, Brandenburg University of Technology)

Presentation | ➜ Paper

Paper 2: Quality of Carbon Credit Projects and Alternative Methods to Finance Sequestration (Barbara Haya, University of California, Berkeley)

Presentation

Paper 3: Can Pollution Markets Work in Developing Countries? Experimental Evidence from India (Kaushik Deb, The Energy Policy Institute at the University of Chicago's India Team)

Presentation | ➜ Paper

DISCUSSANT: Carolyn Fischer, Lead Economist and Research Manager, Development Research Group, World Bank

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