00:00 Hello,
00:00 everyone,
00:00 and welcome to the,
00:02 I think
00:02 it's the 3rd,
00:03 3rd,
00:04 uh,
00:04 seminar of the
00:06 World Development Report 2025 seminar series.
00:09 I'm,
00:09 I'm Chavi Ginne,
00:10 uh,
00:11 the director of this year's WDR which
00:12 is entitled Leveraging Standards for Development.
00:16 So as preparation for the report,
00:17 we've commissioned a series of background papers
00:20 uh on various topics around standardization.
00:23 And so this seminar series allows the authors of the,
00:26 of the papers to present,
00:27 to present their work.
00:28 So,
00:29 we're,
00:29 we're delighted to have uh Professor
00:32 Colleen Dunavy.
00:33 She's a,
00:34 she's a professor,
00:35 emeritus professor of History
00:37 at the University of Wisconsin.
00:39 Um,
00:40 so,
00:41 you have,
00:42 Professor,
00:42 you have around
00:44 40,
00:44 45 minutes.
00:46 And we'll have,
00:48 then,
00:49 we'll postpone all questions uh till,
00:52 till the end.
00:53 OK?
00:53 Uh,
00:54 and so we'll be,
00:55 you know,
00:56 since this is online,
00:57 we'll be monitoring,
00:58 uh,
00:59 you know,
00:59 raise your hand and,
01:00 and,
01:00 uh,
01:01 and,
01:01 you know,
01:01 we'll call you
01:02 as,
01:03 as the,
01:03 as the questions arise.
01:05 Um,
01:06 so,
01:06 uh,
01:07 again,
01:07 thank you so much,
01:08 uh,
01:08 and,
01:09 and professor,
01:09 the,
01:10 the floor is yours.
01:12 OK,
01:12 thank you.
01:13 I'm gonna uh
01:16 Share my
01:20 PowerPoint.
01:31 You can see that
01:34 Yeah,
01:34 perfect.
01:35 OK,
01:36 good,
01:36 cause I don't get,
01:37 uh,
01:37 I don't have a little image
01:39 to tell me what you're seeing,
01:40 so,
01:41 uh,
01:41 all I'm seeing is what I'm seeing.
01:43 Um,
01:44 anyway,
01:44 thank you so much,
01:45 uh,
01:45 for the invitation to
01:47 participate,
01:48 um,
01:49 and to to write a background paper,
01:51 uh,
01:52 for the World Development report and to participate in the seminar.
01:55 I'm very,
01:56 uh,
01:56 happy to be here,
01:58 um.
01:59 I,
02:00 uh,
02:00 will,
02:01 uh,
02:01 give you a little bit of warning in advance that I,
02:04 like many people in Washington DC,
02:07 uh,
02:07 have been fighting a terrible,
02:09 uh,
02:09 battle with seasonal allergies.
02:11 And so,
02:12 um,
02:13 I have my cough drops at hand and a glass of water,
02:15 and I think I'll be fine,
02:16 but
02:17 don't be surprised if I have to take a little break along the way somewhere.
02:22 Anyway,
02:22 uh,
02:23 so I'm,
02:24 uh,
02:25 here to,
02:25 um,
02:26 talk about the background paper that I provided to the bank,
02:30 which you see here,
02:31 copy of here.
02:32 My assumption is that,
02:34 uh,
02:34 most of you have not read the paper,
02:36 um,
02:37 that,
02:37 that'll be my working assumption.
02:39 I hope you do read the paper,
02:40 which provides,
02:42 uh,
02:42 obviously more detail than I can give you today,
02:44 and,
02:45 uh,
02:45 even more details to be found in
02:47 My book,
02:48 Small,
02:48 Medium,
02:49 Large,
02:49 which provides the basis
02:51 uh for the paper that I
02:53 um wrote.
02:55 So I encourage you to,
02:56 uh,
02:57 to,
02:57 to forge ahead with that if you find this interesting.
03:01 What I wanna do today is just give you a
03:03 little bit of background about how I came to do this
03:06 research on the history of standard sizes,
03:08 and then walk you through the main arguments of the paper.
03:12 Uh,
03:13 it's basically organized chronologically.
03:15 It starts,
03:16 uh,
03:17 with a,
03:17 a
03:18 few words at least about the diversity of products,
03:22 everyday commodities that prevailed before World War One.
03:26 then phase one of the main story is,
03:29 well,
03:29 what happened during the Great War when
03:31 the officials tried to reduce product variety.
03:34 The war came to an end.
03:36 There's an interlude there that,
03:38 as you'll see in a minute,
03:39 sparked my interest in this whole thing.
03:41 Uh,
03:42 and then,
03:42 uh,
03:43 the Commerce Department stepped in in the 1920s,
03:46 and this is the,
03:47 the centerpiece of the story,
03:49 to revive the wartime program.
03:51 I'll close then with a few,
03:53 uh,
03:53 comments on the larger significance of the story.
03:57 So my background is hybrid,
03:59 uh,
04:00 I am,
04:01 I have a PhD in political science,
04:03 and in my studies,
04:05 my focus was on political economy,
04:08 uh,
04:09 history of technology,
04:10 and business history,
04:11 really kind of
04:12 equally divided between political science and history,
04:16 uh,
04:16 which was,
04:17 uh,
04:18 allowed in the,
04:19 um,
04:20 PhD program I was in,
04:21 which was
04:22 perfect for me.
04:24 Uh,
04:24 I then went on to teach business history and
04:26 the history of technology in the Department of History.
04:29 At the University of Wisconsin-Madison for 32 years,
04:33 approximately.
04:35 Um,
04:35 and the result of that is that if you put me in a room of historians,
04:39 I feel more like a political scientist.
04:41 If you put me in a room
04:43 of political scientists,
04:45 I feel more like a historian,
04:47 uh,
04:48 and I don't know what I feel like if you put me in a room of economists.
04:52 So,
04:52 um,
04:53 that's the,
04:53 the,
04:54 the disciplinary hybrid hybridity that
04:57 Uh,
04:57 identifies me.
04:58 My core interest,
05:00 uh,
05:00 throughout,
05:00 I think probably going all the way back to my undergraduate work,
05:04 is in how politics broadly conceived,
05:07 has shaped economic change.
05:10 That means economic development or non-development for that matter,
05:14 but it's the interplay between politics
05:16 and economics that has held my interest all these years.
05:20 Uh,
05:20 my earliest work was on the,
05:22 uh,
05:22 history of railroads,
05:24 uh,
05:24 19th century.
05:25 United States and Prussia,
05:27 and there my particular concern was to understand
05:30 the impact of the two different political structures in the United States
05:35 and Prussia
05:37 on
05:37 the emergence of that development of that industry.
05:41 From there,
05:42 I turned to corporations and shareholder voting rights in particular,
05:47 uh,
05:48 and I'm actually now currently writing a history of the corporation.
05:52 Uh,
05:53 for Polity Press.
05:54 This research on standard sizes represented a detour of sorts.
05:59 Um,
06:01 not,
06:03 let me say that the history of business
06:05 and history of technology both
06:07 focused on and for,
06:09 for a long time centered on the history of mass production.
06:13 So
06:13 mass production itself didn't represent a detour,
06:16 but this particular research did.
06:18 What got it started was a paragraph I read in a journal article.
06:22 Uh,
06:23 a,
06:23 a primary published source appeared in 1928.
06:27 I remember very distinctly
06:29 sitting in my little basement workspace
06:32 in
06:32 Madison,
06:33 Wisconsin,
06:34 when I read this,
06:35 this paragraph.
06:37 And it took me by surprise,
06:38 it startled me,
06:40 uh,
06:40 and here's the paragraph.
06:42 It says the 5 years immediately following the World War
06:45 were marked by a tendency on the part of industry
06:49 to return to
06:50 the old uneconomic conditions of over diversity.
06:55 Many products which had been simplified by the
06:57 Conservation division of the War Industries Board,
07:00 were again offered in a bewildering variety of sizes,
07:04 types,
07:04 and shapes.
07:06 Uh,
07:07 what
07:08 Surprised me here was not the reference to
07:10 the conservation division during the war Industries Board.
07:13 Two of my undergraduates had done research papers
07:17 on medical instruments and agricultural instruments,
07:20 and the
07:21 conservation division worked
07:23 to
07:24 push manufacturers of those products towards mass production during the war.
07:28 That wasn't surprising.
07:30 What was surprising to me was the reversal.
07:32 Uh,
07:33 the,
07:34 the,
07:35 the having manufacturers having learned how to mass produce during the war,
07:38 then stopped doing it,
07:39 then went back to
07:41 offering,
07:42 uh,
07:42 what the,
07:43 what the
07:44 writer here condemned as a bewildering variety of sizes,
07:48 types,
07:48 and shapes,
07:48 and I thought,
07:50 oh,
07:50 that's weird,
07:51 uh,
07:52 how,
07:52 what,
07:52 what's that about?
07:53 And so that took me down a rabbit hole then.
07:56 That eventually produced this
07:58 um
07:59 uh
08:00 book on the history of standard sizes.
08:04 Let me begin by just clarifying what the term standard sizes refers to.
08:09 It refers to standards
08:11 relating to size or style,
08:13 obviously,
08:14 that are adhered to collectively by competing firms.
08:18 Uh,
08:18 and those two,
08:19 those two words are key.
08:21 They're collective standards,
08:23 so industry-wide
08:25 standards,
08:26 and
08:27 they are adhered to by competing firms.
08:32 In other words,
08:33 firms that all
08:34 make
08:35 the same products
08:36 have agreed to just make this
08:39 small set of of
08:40 sizes.
08:42 Uh,
08:42 these are so taken for granted today that we often,
08:45 we don't even think about them,
08:46 but if you think for a moment
08:48 about bed sizes in the United States,
08:51 there are 4,
08:54 Four main bed sizes,
08:56 twin,
08:56 full,
08:57 queen,
08:57 and king.
08:59 Uh for those of us of a certain age,
09:02 uh we know that the twin extra long and the California king are newcomers.
09:06 They were introduced in the 60s.
09:09 Uh,
09:09 but these are standard bed sizes.
09:10 You go to the store today,
09:11 you don't,
09:12 you,
09:12 you decide in advance what size you can get,
09:15 and then you look for
09:16 that size.
09:18 Uh,
09:18 and this is true of electrical outlets,
09:20 toilet paper rolls,
09:21 uh,
09:22 a,
09:22 a host of other products.
09:25 Uh,
09:25 you bring home a lamp from the lighting store,
09:27 and you know,
09:28 as long as you stay in the United States,
09:30 it'll fit in the outlet on your wall.
09:33 Toilet paper will fit in the toilet paper holder,
09:36 printer paper will fit in your,
09:39 uh,
09:39 letter letter-sized printer paper will fit in your letter-sized folder,
09:43 etc.
09:43 etc.
09:44 They're just part of the modern landscape of consumption.
09:48 Uh,
09:48 but the question then is,
09:49 in particular because they're collective standards adopted by competing,
09:54 otherwise competing firms,
09:56 the question
09:57 I wanted to,
09:58 to,
09:58 I wanted an answer to was how did they get established?
10:02 And not only established,
10:03 but
10:04 when they were established,
10:05 how did it come about so quickly?
10:08 Um,
10:09 in 1921,
10:10 it is fair to say there were no standard sizes,
10:14 no nationwide,
10:15 um,
10:16 standard sizes.
10:18 But,
10:19 uh,
10:20 in 1922,
10:22 the standard bed sizes were adopted,
10:24 for example,
10:25 the four standard bed sizes.
10:27 Uh,
10:28 by a nationwide agreement in 1922.
10:30 By 1930,
10:32 90% of the
10:34 bed manufacturing was uh
10:37 conformed to these four,
10:39 standard sizes.
10:41 And by then,
10:42 1930,
10:44 uh,
10:44 standard sizes had been established for more than
10:47 100 everyday commodities.
10:50 And here I'm going to
10:51 quietly
10:53 Prevent my throat from scratching.
10:57 So,
10:58 um,
10:58 what I,
10:59 uh,
10:59 argue in brief,
11:00 in the,
11:01 in the paper and in the book
11:03 is that
11:06 The diffusion of mass production techniques
11:09 was not a natural process of learning and emulation.
11:14 This is the way that it's done.
11:17 That it is,
11:17 I'm gonna
11:19 talk more quietly.
11:20 I'm sorry,
11:21 my throat is
11:22 not liking this.
11:23 I'm gonna talk more quietly,
11:24 so let me know if I'm
11:26 speaking too quietly.
11:28 Um,
11:29 so the,
11:30 the conventional understanding in the historical literature is,
11:34 uh,
11:34 of the development of mass production techniques
11:37 over the course of the 19th century.
11:40 Culminating in
11:42 Henry Ford's automobile manufacturing process
11:46 in the early 20th century.
11:49 And then,
11:50 uh,
11:50 from there it was a process of learning.
11:52 Henry Ford was very open about his manufacturing
11:55 process.
12:00 He encouraged publicity.
12:02 And historians have assumed largely
12:05 that once manufacturers had that information,
12:08 they knew what to do and they did it.
12:11 Uh,
12:11 and this history that I've delved into here
12:14 shows to the contrary that
12:16 there was intense competition among middling manufacturers,
12:20 and that
12:21 that prevented them moving towards mass production.
12:25 Uh,
12:25 that intense competition,
12:27 uh,
12:28 produced a
12:29 a,
12:29 a,
12:29 a proliferation of product varieties.
12:32 Uh,
12:33 and the diffusion of mass production techniques,
12:35 which did ultimately happen,
12:37 in fact,
12:38 required a pushback against market forces,
12:41 against that competition.
12:43 That pushback came from the government,
12:45 uh,
12:45 and in that sense,
12:46 one can say
12:48 that the government made the
12:50 the Commerce Department,
12:51 as we'll see,
12:52 made the US into a manufacturing powerhouse.
12:56 Um,
12:57 so that's where I'm headed.
12:58 Uh,
12:59 let me start then with product diversity before the war.
13:03 Point of clarification,
13:05 uh,
13:06 there,
13:06 there is a term in the business literature called product diversification.
13:11 Uh,
13:11 this means,
13:12 um,
13:13 It generally means adding product lines,
13:17 related product lines to one business,
13:20 um,
13:21 related in this,
13:21 in,
13:22 in a technological sense,
13:23 so maybe if you,
13:25 uh,
13:26 I work in chemical processes,
13:27 you add some chemically related product lines
13:31 that you can use the same manufacturing facilities or similar facilities,
13:35 uh,
13:35 or that are related to your sales organization,
13:38 if you're equipped to handle
13:39 refrigerated or frozen products,
13:41 for example,
13:42 you may
13:43 Uh,
13:43 add other frozen or,
13:46 uh,
13:46 refrigerated product lines.
13:47 What I'm talking about here is proliferation
13:50 of product varieties within product lines.
13:54 Um,
13:55 So making slightly different products within the product line,
13:59 whether it's
14:00 uh shoes or beds or whatever,
14:02 uh,
14:03 and,
14:03 and this is crucial,
14:05 product changes that require changes in the manufacturing process.
14:10 Uh,
14:10 that means stopping
14:12 a production run,
14:13 changing the equipment to make the new slightly different product,
14:17 and then going on,
14:18 uh,
14:18 the way.
14:19 There are costs,
14:20 uh,
14:20 entailed there.
14:21 It reduces production runs,
14:22 etc.
14:23 etc.
14:24 So that's the kind of
14:25 product diversity that I'm talking about here.
14:28 Um,
14:28 there isn't a lot
14:29 of,
14:30 uh,
14:30 systematic,
14:31 there isn't much at all systematic evidence on product diversity.
14:35 Um,
14:36 before World War One,
14:38 this partly because historians haven't really paid attention to it,
14:43 um,
14:43 having been sort of enthralled to,
14:45 uh,
14:47 Mass production,
14:48 and then later to specialty manufacturers.
14:51 Um,
14:52 we do have some anecdotal evidence.
14:54 For example,
14:54 the Union Bed and Spring Company reported,
14:57 uh,
14:57 and it was a major producer of beds and springs,
15:00 reported that it was making
15:02 full width,
15:03 uh,
15:04 springs,
15:05 just full with springs,
15:07 in 62 varieties.
15:10 Uh,
15:10 41 of which it made in 2 widths,
15:13 even though these are quote unquote full width
15:15 springs,
15:16 made those in 2 widths,
15:17 and all of the varieties
15:19 it made in lengths,
15:21 which
15:22 produced a grand total of 206 varieties
15:25 of
15:26 full width springs.
15:29 Just a,
15:29 a,
15:29 a little,
15:30 um,
15:31 uh,
15:31 anecdote,
15:32 uh,
15:33 to illustrate product diversity.
15:36 Uh,
15:36 we also know that there was some
15:38 business disgruntlement with the diverse proliferation of product varieties
15:43 before the war,
15:44 and this we can see
15:46 in the efforts by trade associations
15:48 to diminish,
15:49 to reach collective agreements that would diminish.
15:53 Um,
15:53 product variety.
15:55 So for example,
15:56 um,
15:57 lengthy efforts to,
15:58 uh,
15:59 standardize screw threads,
16:01 automotive standards reached by the Society of
16:04 Automotive Engineers
16:06 were in fact
16:07 adhered to by small manufacturers,
16:09 but not,
16:09 not the large companies,
16:11 not the large auto manufacturers,
16:13 which had their own standards.
16:15 Machine tool manufacturers,
16:16 paint varnish manufacturers,
16:18 bed manufacturers,
16:20 farm implements,
16:21 lu
16:21 lumber,
16:22 paving bricks,
16:23 all of these lines of business through their trade associations,
16:26 tried
16:27 to reduce product variety before the war,
16:29 but were unsuccessful.
16:32 Um
16:33 There are a variety of sources of product diversity,
16:36 and once I kind of began to spell them all out,
16:38 I thought,
16:38 oh,
16:39 this is almost overdetermined.
16:41 Number one,
16:41 they're,
16:42 they're the specialty manufacturers whose conscious
16:45 uh
16:45 strategy,
16:46 business strategy was to specialize,
16:49 change products quickly.
16:51 These are the manufacturers that
16:53 historian Phillip Scranton has,
16:55 uh,
16:55 studied at considerable length.
16:58 They existed back in the early 20th century,
17:00 they exist,
17:01 of course,
17:02 to this day.
17:03 Uh,
17:04 second factor is hand to mouth buying.
17:07 Um,
17:07 this was,
17:08 uh,
17:08 prevalent in the early 20th century.
17:10 It basically meant
17:12 buying small quantities of goods frequently,
17:15 as opposed to,
17:17 um,
17:18 ordering seasonally,
17:19 say twice a year,
17:21 a large amount of goods.
17:23 Hand to mouth buying
17:24 became a widespread practice,
17:26 um,
17:27 in the early 20th century,
17:29 and in fact,
17:30 and thus encouraged product diversity.
17:33 Because
17:33 buyers were coming back regularly,
17:36 and manufacturers there wanted to offer them something new
17:39 in small quantities,
17:41 because that's what they were buying,
17:42 was small quantities.
17:44 A third factor is the American
17:46 political structure itself,
17:48 to the extent that there were regulations
17:50 governing,
17:51 say,
17:51 food,
17:52 uh,
17:53 electrical equipment,
17:54 building codes,
17:55 etc.
17:55 They tended to be fragmented.
17:57 Between the national,
17:59 state,
18:00 and municipal levels,
18:01 or local levels,
18:02 and so,
18:03 uh,
18:03 and those codes didn't agree,
18:05 they all had their own codes.
18:08 So that was another factor.
18:10 4th factor,
18:11 American individualism is something that uh some
18:14 um
18:16 Uh,
18:16 commentators pointed to,
18:18 uh,
18:19 seems to have been particularly rampant
18:21 where agricultural implements were concerned.
18:24 Farmers apparently had very definite ideas of what they,
18:27 uh,
18:27 needed to have in farm implements.
18:30 Uh,
18:30 it's also evident in some regional preferences,
18:33 for example,
18:34 uh,
18:36 concerning the length of the pants
18:38 in overalls.
18:40 The 4th factor,
18:41 the,
18:42 the,
18:42 the 4th factor,
18:43 uh,
18:43 5th factor,
18:44 sorry,
18:45 um,
18:46 was generally seen by observers as the root cause
18:50 of product diversity,
18:51 and that was competition,
18:53 uh,
18:53 for the
18:54 consumer's dollar.
18:56 Um,
18:58 middling manufacturers.
19:01 We're scrambling,
19:02 uh,
19:03 adhered to
19:04 a business strategy of,
19:06 of offering the consumer
19:08 whatever they wanted,
19:09 and sometimes
19:11 taking orders back to the factory that required some
19:14 changes to meet the demands of the consumer.
19:17 That was the dominant strategy,
19:19 pleasing the consumer,
19:21 or consumer sovereignty,
19:22 we could call it.
19:24 And the fear,
19:25 of course,
19:25 is if they didn't,
19:26 one of their competitors would,
19:28 and this is the way
19:29 uh a writer in the journal Industrial Management put it,
19:33 um.
19:34 This production of numerous varieties of a single commodity,
19:38 as long as
19:39 competition is the life of the trade.
19:42 One is always fearful lest the next uh
19:46 business competitor will display the latest style,
19:49 and that's why you've got this large variety.
19:53 Of products on the market.
19:55 Uh,
19:56 so that was certainly
20:00 It seems pretty clearly to have been the situation
20:03 uh on the eve of the war.
20:06 Yet,
20:06 as if you know the history of this period,
20:09 then you also know that this was an era of growing,
20:12 some could even say raging enthusiasm
20:15 for efficiency.
20:17 This is the era
20:18 of uh scientific management.
20:21 Anyway,
20:21 so,
20:22 uh,
20:22 the,
20:22 the upshot then
20:24 is that
20:25 um
20:25 manufacturers adhering
20:27 to the strategy of diversity of product diversity.
20:31 They found themselves
20:33 sort of caught
20:34 uh between a rock and a hard place.
20:36 On the eve of World War One,
20:38 then,
20:39 uh,
20:39 middling manufacturers were caught,
20:41 uh,
20:42 and in a um
20:44 Factory magazine in 1916,
20:46 before the US entered the war.
20:49 ran a uh
20:52 Uh,
20:52 an article,
20:53 in fact,
20:53 about Henry Ford with his Model T
20:56 and an adding machine company,
20:58 contrasting their styles,
20:59 one model
21:01 uh versus
21:02 In the case of the adding
21:04 machine company,
21:05 100 models offered in 600
21:08 different styles,
21:09 and concluded
21:11 it's hard to know which way the wind does blow.
21:14 Um,
21:14 so that was the situation when,
21:17 um,
21:18 the United States entered the Great War.
21:21 The war had broken out in
21:23 1914 in Europe.
21:25 The US entered in the spring of 1917.
21:28 Once that happened,
21:29 efficiency
21:31 came to the fore.
21:32 Consumer sovereignty
21:34 went by the wayside.
21:35 Uh,
21:36 the balance was tipped towards efficiency almost immediately.
21:40 Um,
21:40 the government scrambled to mobilize the economy for war over 19 months,
21:45 not knowing,
21:46 of course,
21:46 when exactly the war would end.
21:50 And the focus uh that uh I'm particularly interested in here
21:54 was on conserving civilian resources for the war effort.
21:59 So what I'm talking about here is manufacturing aimed at the civilian market,
22:03 not
22:04 military market.
22:05 There's a separate story there.
22:08 So as part of that
22:10 effort to conserve conserve civilian resources,
22:12 that meant labor,
22:14 um,
22:14 raw materials,
22:15 transportation,
22:16 etc.
22:18 Also they could be used directed towards the war effort.
22:23 Um,
22:23 the,
22:24 the
22:25 initial entity was something called the Commercial Economy Board,
22:29 created in 1917,
22:31 just before American entry into the war,
22:34 uh,
22:34 and this was succeeded,
22:35 um,
22:36 in a reorganization in the spring of 1918 by
22:39 the conservation division in the War Industries Board.
22:44 Both of these were headed by a man named Art Wilkinson Shaw.
22:49 He was a a
22:51 a marketing expert and business publisher.
22:54 With the close ties to uh
22:57 the new Harvard Business School.
23:00 He,
23:01 um,
23:01 uh,
23:03 His interest centered on distribution rather than production,
23:06 and so
23:07 when the Commercial Economy Board first got underway,
23:10 it focused on distribution.
23:13 Uh,
23:13 bread deliveries,
23:14 retail deliveries,
23:15 and the like.
23:17 And then in the reorganization of 1818,
23:20 when that became the conservation division,
23:22 uh,
23:23 Arch Wilkinson Shaw was the man who pushed,
23:26 it was his ideas,
23:27 uh,
23:28 driving this,
23:28 and he pushed forward
23:30 the process.
23:32 His strategy
23:34 began with trade associations.
23:37 There were some several 100 trade associations in the US by that time.
23:42 Uh,
23:42 and the kind of peak association was the Chamber of Commerce of the United States.
23:48 He worked with trade associations,
23:50 which appointed
23:51 uh
23:52 committees,
23:53 war service committees.
23:54 These were also
23:55 used elsewhere in the war effort.
23:57 Uh,
23:57 the US Chamber of Commerce stepped in and helped
24:00 industries organize,
24:02 if they didn't already have an association,
24:04 and appoint a committee to work with government officials.
24:08 Um,
24:08 he then held a,
24:10 a series of conferences with those committees representing their industry
24:15 and arrived at
24:17 measures that
24:18 everybody agreed would help to conserve resources during the war,
24:22 reached,
24:23 in other words,
24:24 collective agreements.
24:26 That included reductions uh on product
24:30 variety.
24:31 Um,
24:31 these were then published as conservation schedules.
24:34 They appeared in the official,
24:36 uh,
24:37 uh,
24:37 what is it called?
24:38 Official register,
24:39 Official Digest or something of the federal government.
24:42 They were published in the relevant trade journals and so on.
24:46 Um,
24:47 The goal here was simply to maximize output.
24:50 They didn't expect
24:51 uh companies to achieve Henry Ford style productivity levels.
24:56 They just wanted him to use less labor,
24:58 skilled labor,
24:59 and a minimum of materials and produce as much as possible,
25:03 uh,
25:04 as soon as possible.
25:06 That meant streamlining production and distribution,
25:09 lengthening production runs,
25:11 carrying less inventory,
25:13 reducing transportation costs,
25:15 also that those resources.
25:17 could go to the war effort.
25:19 Over time,
25:20 that came to be called,
25:21 generally called simplification.
25:25 And it was premised on reductions in variety.
25:29 Um,
25:30 that I think,
25:31 I hope that connection,
25:32 uh,
25:32 is clear.
25:34 For enforcement mechanisms,
25:36 the,
25:36 uh,
25:36 Commercial Economy Board initially relied on social sanctions,
25:41 appeals to patriotism.
25:43 Uh,
25:44 and also pledges,
25:45 public pledges.
25:47 Companies
25:48 had to pledge to adhere to the conservation
25:50 schedules and to do business only with companies
25:53 that adhered to the conservation schedules.
25:56 Uh,
25:57 then when the um
25:59 conservation division was created in the 1918
26:03 reorganization,
26:05 The War Industries Board's
26:07 priorities power
26:09 um was ramped up,
26:11 and what this did was
26:13 empowered the War Industries Board to
26:16 assign a priority level
26:19 to
26:19 uh purchase orders.
26:22 So a company wanting to purchase the raw materials that it might need,
26:26 or get transportation or fuel or whatever,
26:29 uh,
26:29 had to submit a purchase order,
26:31 which was given a priority number.
26:35 Companies that did not
26:36 adhere to the conservation schedules went to the bottom of the of the pile.
26:42 Then that meant essentially that if you
26:44 didn't adhere to the conservation schedule,
26:46 you're likely not to have the resources you needed
26:49 to keep your
26:50 uh business going during the war.
26:53 Uh,
26:55 it was a short experience,
26:56 19 months overall,
26:57 but nonetheless,
26:59 pretty effective system,
27:00 it seems
27:01 to be.
27:03 Some of the reductions achieved,
27:04 this is the table that the
27:06 US Chamber of Commerce,
27:08 which was a great
27:09 proponent of reducing varieties,
27:12 put together after the war.
27:14 It actually includes
27:16 uh fruit containers that were uh
27:19 that were um
27:21 uh reduced by Congress,
27:22 uh.
27:24 Set by Congress
27:26 And paving brick,
27:28 which was actually the first of the Commerce Department initiatives
27:32 that I'll be talking about in a minute.
27:34 But you can see there,
27:35 there's some considerable
27:37 um
27:38 Reductions,
27:39 uh,
27:39 piano stools in the middle of the chart,
27:42 piano benches and stools,
27:44 reduced pocket knives,
27:45 reduced,
27:46 uh,
27:46 a whole array of,
27:48 um,
27:48 agricultural implements.
27:51 Total implements is the total
27:54 agricultural implements included elsewhere in the table,
27:58 reduced from about 1100 to 137.
28:02 So that's um
28:04 The,
28:04 the,
28:05 an indication of the effects.
28:07 Uh,
28:08 now I'm gonna show you a list,
28:09 a partial list
28:11 of the
28:12 Affected lines of business.
28:14 This happens
28:15 uh to be alphabetical,
28:17 it was appeared in a post-war report,
28:20 um,
28:21 but it gives you a sense.
28:23 Just of the range of commodities
28:26 that were affected by uh conservation schedules during the war.
28:31 Um,
28:31 there is an interesting backstory here about the clothing industry,
28:35 which,
28:36 and the
28:37 promotion of the quote unquote,
28:39 slim silhouette as the wool conservation measure.
28:45 But I'm not gonna tell you about that.
28:47 Um,
28:48 And the editor of Shaw's Factory magazine concluded the war
28:53 left its impress everywhere.
28:56 In American manufacturing.
28:59 When the war ended,
28:59 of course,
29:00 the big question was,
29:01 would product
29:02 uh variety,
29:04 um,
29:05 uh,
29:05 proliferate again after the war.
29:09 There was widespread support in the business
29:11 community for continuing the conservation measures.
29:15 Um,
29:15 continuing these collective nationwide agreements.
29:19 Some,
29:19 a few of the better organized industries were able to hold the line,
29:23 at least in part,
29:25 for example,
29:25 paint and varnish.
29:28 But most industries succumbed.
29:30 To competitive pressures and began
29:33 uh allowing their products to proliferate again.
29:40 Um,
29:42 And in the economic turmoil after the war,
29:46 um,
29:47 competitive pressures became especially
29:49 um harsh
29:51 economic depression in 1920-192921,
29:54 consumer resistance to rising prices,
29:56 and so on,
29:57 and the result is that that companies generally reverted to their pre-war strategy
30:03 of making whatever the customer wants.
30:07 This then set the stage for Herbert Hoover,
30:11 who became
30:12 President Warren G.
30:13 Harding's
30:15 Secretary of Commerce in 1921.
30:18 He was a a a man of humble background,
30:22 a mining engineer.
30:24 A world renowned mining engineer,
30:26 in fact,
30:27 um,
30:29 An organizational wizard,
30:32 uh,
30:32 and,
30:32 uh,
30:34 a,
30:34 a,
30:34 a humanitarian,
30:36 um,
30:36 as well.
30:38 He took office in 1921 at the age of 46 and came to office
30:43 with the conviction
30:45 that the elimination of waste in the American economy
30:48 was key to achieving a higher standard of living,
30:52 and he thought the United States had to
30:54 achieve a higher standard of living,
30:56 uh,
30:56 to fend off
30:58 socialism,
30:58 communism,
30:59 and so on.
31:00 This is just a few years after
31:02 the Russian Revolution,
31:03 of course.
31:04 One of his first actions
31:06 at the Department of Commerce was to establish in the Bureau of Standards,
31:10 a division of Simplified Practice,
31:13 1921.
31:14 Uh,
31:15 and just
31:16 a,
31:16 a word about terminology.
31:19 He used the word,
31:20 they used the word simplified practice,
31:23 um,
31:24 which
31:25 is kind of interchangeable.
31:28 With simplification.
31:33 But you can see here a broad distinction between the two
31:36 simplified practice focusing on reducing product variety.
31:42 The similarities with
31:43 Shaw's project during the war were uh over
31:47 overwhelming,
31:48 I think,
31:48 remarkable certainly.
31:50 Uh,
31:51 he created a similar kind of structure.
31:55 That entailed collaboration with
31:57 uh committees of businessmen representing their trade associations,
32:02 empowered to speak for their trade associations.
32:06 The emphasis was on maximizing consensus.
32:10 So these uh collaborative projects
32:13 brought together producers,
32:15 distributors,
32:15 and consumers,
32:17 and the idea was to reach consensus
32:20 industry-wide across all of those.
32:23 Groups on
32:24 uh standard sizes.
32:27 Uh,
32:27 it was also a data-driven process,
32:30 as it had been during the war.
32:32 Very quickly,
32:33 they are,
32:33 the staff arrived at what
32:36 they call the 80/20 axiom,
32:39 and this is the idea that,
32:40 or the finding,
32:41 they're
32:42 based on their,
32:43 uh,
32:44 collections of data
32:46 that
32:47 Approximately 20% of the varieties that an industry produced
32:52 accounted for 80%
32:56 of the business.
32:58 The other 80% of varieties counted for only 20%.
33:02 And so what simplified practice was about is
33:05 uh designating those
33:07 uh
33:08 those varieties that furnished approximately 80% of business
33:13 and
33:13 designating those as standards.
33:17 The other varieties might still be available,
33:19 uh,
33:20 but they had to be special ordered,
33:22 and you could figure on paying more for them.
33:25 Um,
33:27 Out of this
33:28 came out of these uh
33:30 uh industry-wide deliberations came simplified practice recommendations.
33:36 These were published by
33:37 the
33:38 federal government.
33:38 You can see
33:40 um the United States Department of Commerce emblazoned across the top,
33:44 um.
33:46 In the middle,
33:47 this is issued not by trade associations or private sector
33:50 entities,
33:51 it's issued by the Bureau of Standards,
33:53 and down at the bottom printed by the Government Printing Office.
33:57 Uh,
33:58 if once you open the inside,
33:59 you would see that the,
34:01 the specific SPR.
34:04 Simplified practice recommendation
34:06 had been endorsed by the Secretary of Commerce
34:09 and by the Director of the Bureau of Standards.
34:12 So these came with the full force and power of the federal government behind them,
34:17 even though they were voluntary
34:19 standards.
34:21 By the mid 1920s,
34:23 they had worked out a detailed and codified process
34:27 uh
34:27 for arriving at simplified practice agreements.
34:32 Um,
34:32 this is the top portion of that graph.
34:35 Uh,
34:35 the principal avenue was,
34:38 um,
34:39 the trade association,
34:40 manufacturer,
34:41 distributor,
34:42 or consumer group,
34:43 meaning a trade association who came to the division of simplified Practice
34:48 and asked the division to help it
34:50 in organizing this collective agreement,
34:53 and the division was adamant,
34:55 and Secretary Hoover was adamant.
34:57 That the initiative had to come
35:00 from the private sector or
35:01 at best from technical
35:04 private technical associations,
35:06 but it did not come from the division
35:09 of simplified practice.
35:12 Uh,
35:12 once a request came to the division of simplified Practice,
35:15 a preliminary conference was called
35:18 to try and get a sense of whether they thought
35:20 that the industry would be receptive to something like this.
35:23 If there was agreement that it might be receptive,
35:26 then they would survey,
35:27 uh,
35:28 existing production and sales,
35:29 that was the data,
35:31 um,
35:31 component.
35:33 Out of that would come the recommendations
35:36 for standard sizes or styles,
35:38 which would then come through a general conference.
35:41 This was usually held again
35:44 uh
35:45 industry-wide
35:46 and nationwide.
35:48 And it was generally held at the Department of Commerce in Washington.
35:53 Here's the bottom half of the chart.
35:58 If the general conference accepted the recommendations,
36:01 which they almost,
36:02 but not always did,
36:05 Then those recommendations would be
36:08 publicized by the Department of Commerce industry-wide,
36:11 and when 80%
36:13 of manufacturers,
36:15 distributors,
36:15 and consumers
36:16 had accepted them,
36:18 80% by volume of production or consumption,
36:21 uh,
36:22 then they became official.
36:23 Uh,
36:24 they were
36:25 Published and distributed by the Commerce Department,
36:28 the equivalent of those World War One.
36:31 So this is the bottom of that process chart.
36:34 Um,
36:35 acceptance by 80%.
36:37 Um,
36:38 of the industry of a
36:41 conservation schedule published by the Department of
36:44 Uh,
36:45 commerce.
36:46 So it was a detailed,
36:48 uh,
36:48 well-defined process that virtually
36:51 that literally remained unchanged for decades,
36:55 um,
36:56 what some scholars have see as,
36:58 uh,
36:59 one of Hoover's,
37:00 um,
37:01 Uh,
37:01 most impressive accomplishments,
37:03 organizing industries
37:05 in this way to reach collective agreements,
37:07 uh,
37:08 among competitors.
37:11 Um
37:13 So,
37:14 uh
37:18 There are a couple of differences between
37:20 uh Hoover's and Shaw's practice that I wanna
37:23 mention just briefly.
37:25 Both of them related to the fact that
37:28 what Hoover was doing was in uh in peacetime rather than
37:32 um in wartime.
37:35 One was that this process
37:37 uh was entirely voluntary.
37:39 It had also been characterized
37:41 as voluntary
37:43 um
37:43 during the war,
37:44 but of course,
37:46 The war was the context,
37:47 and here it was in peacetime,
37:49 and so uh
37:51 uh Hoover and uh division staff were adamant
37:55 that this is entirely voluntary.
37:58 Also entirely to come from the pri the initiative
38:02 was to come from the private sector.
38:04 Um,
38:05 it also had softer enforcement powers.
38:08 It too relied
38:10 on social sanctions in the form of pledges,
38:13 which is to say that when companies accepted.
38:17 Uh,
38:17 the simplified practice recommendations,
38:20 uh,
38:20 they had to sign,
38:21 literally sign a pledge,
38:23 uh,
38:23 that they would adhere to it.
38:26 And then also
38:27 um
38:28 uh pledge to do business only
38:31 with other companies that adhere to it.
38:34 Social
38:35 enforcement.
38:39 Of course,
38:39 it didn't have the um
38:41 war industry board's
38:43 priorities power.
38:45 But what it did have was an alliance with
38:48 the Federal Specifications Board,
38:51 which was also a Hoover creation
38:53 in 1921.
38:56 The Federal Specifications Board
38:58 um
38:59 wrote specifications
39:01 that purchases
39:02 in order for the products in order to be
39:04 purchased by the federal government had to meet.
39:07 And those are often incorporated
39:10 um simplified practice recommendations.
39:13 I do wanna thank you
39:14 for,
39:15 you know,
39:15 taking time to write the book and,
39:17 and,
39:17 and,
39:18 you know,
39:18 telling us about,
39:19 about this,
39:20 uh,
39:20 this initiative.
39:21 So,
39:22 um,
39:23 thanks all for,
39:23 for the attendance.
39:24 Colleen,
39:25 do,
39:25 do get better.
39:26 Uh,
39:26 um,
39:27 uh,
39:27 Devesh,
39:27 you wanna,
39:28 you wanna say some,
39:29 some,
39:29 some,
39:30 some words?
39:32 No,
39:32 uh,
39:32 just to say,
39:33 uh,
39:34 that,
39:35 that,
39:35 that it was such a pleasure reading your book and your paper.
39:38 It's so,
39:39 so,
39:39 so clearly written,
39:40 and I wish,
39:42 I hope we can
39:43 write half,
39:44 half as clearly in the WDR
39:47 and I'm very sorry to see your health,
39:50 uh,
39:50 and we,
39:51 we hope you get better very soon.
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