

# Distributional Impact of Fiscal Policy

## In-Kind Benefits: Food, Health, Education

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The World Bank

- ▶ What is best practice in identifying economic incidence of in kind transfers?
  - ▶ Cost of provision or private value?
- ▶ In kind education provision
  - ▶ Nature of benefits
  - ▶ Conceptual issues
  - ▶ Evidence

- ▶ What is best practice in identifying economic incidence of in kind transfers?
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  - ▶ Nature of benefits
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# Cost of provision or private value

- ▶ Most frequent method takes cost of provision and allocates by use
  - ▶ Justified by feasibility more than theoretical attractiveness
  - ▶ Should be aware of possible distortions introduced
- ▶ Aim should be to evaluate impact of government provision on welfare in a way that can be combined with analysis of effect of cash transfers
- ▶ Cost of provision is relevant because of the need to finance this cost but this is captured in associated tax payments
- ▶ The ideal measure of benefit should be the equivalent monetary value of the service to the recipient

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- ▶ Evaluating by cost obviously goes wrong if the service provided is actually harmful
- ▶ Democratic processes should be expected to ensure typically beneficial provision
- ▶ Benefits and costs arguably linked in aggregate by rational policy making
- ▶ However distribution of willingness to pay and costs of provision may be weakly correlated

# An example where use of cost gets it right

- ▶ Suppose a good is privately provided and
  - ▶ demands are proportional to income
  - ▶ the good is competitively provided at constant marginal and average cost
- ▶ The government takes over provision and
  - ▶ provides the same quantities, proportional to income
  - ▶ funds provision by proportional tax payments
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
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# Private value: publicly-provided *private* good



# How use of cost could get it wrong

- ▶ Suppose now that government provision is equalised
  - ▶ everyone receives mean provision
  - ▶ if we like, assume now funded through a uniform lump sum tax
- ▶ Everyone except the mean recipient is worse off
- ▶ Total cost now exceeds total benefit
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
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
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




# Distribution of private values: publicly-provided *private* goods




# Private values as a function of income: publicly-provided *private* goods



# Public provision of private goods: opting out

- ▶ If individuals can opt out
  - ▶ richer households for whom value would otherwise be negative will choose to consume privately instead

# Publicly-provided *private* goods: opting out




# Public provision of private goods: topping up

- ▶ If individuals can opt out of public provision then
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- ▶ If individuals can supplement public provision then
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# Publicly-provided *private* goods: topping up



# Public provision of private goods: private reselling


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# Publicly-provided *private* goods: reselling



- ▶ Distributional impact follows from
  - ▶ the level of service provided
  - ▶ the way in which willingness to pay for service provided varies with income
- ▶ The determination of level of service is a matter of political economy
  - ▶ Presumably suits the politically most influential
- ▶ More affluent individuals may be able to find ways to enhance entitlement to consumption of better quality services
  - ▶ They may (moving to better neighbourhood) or may not (social advantage) have to pay for that

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- ▶ Several potential sources available to the inventive
  - ▶ Willingness to pay surveys
  - ▶ Voting data
  - ▶ Capitalisation of locally specific benefits
  - ▶ Markets for substitutes
- ▶ ... but none of these seem especially robust

# Benefits of education spending

- ▶ Part of the benefit of education may be consumption benefit but most is received in monetary terms in improved future earnings
- ▶ This raises important conceptual issues
  - ▶ Need to model returns to education
  - ▶ Benefits received in future - calls for life-cycle perspective
  - ▶ Identity of beneficiaries is unclear - parents, children, dynasties?
    - ▶ Makes a difference whether costs allocated according to income of parents, current income of student, future income of student

# Distributional impact of education spending

- ▶ To what extent do benefits vary with income?
- ▶ Participation differs with income
  - ▶ Private costs of participation (forgone work, earnings) higher for more borrowing-constrained - higher nonattendance, higher dropout
  - ▶ Selection into higher levels of education favour the better-off
- ▶ Returns differ with income
  - ▶ Return to education may be complementary to income-related characteristics
  - ▶ Better educated families more familiar, more socially at ease with system
  - ▶ Peer effects may be significant
- ▶ Quality of school differs with income
  - ▶ Rich can afford more effort to satisfy entry criteria (moving near to better schools)
  - ▶ Political economy of provision may direct resources to the better off

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