#### The Role of Financial Dispute Resolution Schemes in Enhancing Consumer Trust and Confidence

#### **Perspective of Canada's Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments (OBSI)**

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#### Agenda

#### For the Panel

- **ODES Financial Dispute Resolution (FDR) Build Trust and Confidence?**
- What FDR Does Well, and Does Not
- Ø FDR Accessibility

#### For Your Reference

- **Ø** The Value of Developing International Best Practices
- Second Second



### 1. The Role and Value of FDR



### **Does FDR Build Trust and Confidence?**

- Yes, but only when part of a broader and effective legal and regulatory framework
- Bank solvency and overall financial market stability and employment are bigger issues/concerns for the public
- Only an issue when a problem is encountered; then it matters a great deal
- FDR is no substitute for good consumer-facing market conduct regulation, in fact it needs the clear benchmark



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## **Does FDR Build Trust and Confidence?**

### FDR is also no substitute for good internal bank-level dispute resolution

- Canada adopted a 2-tier system from the beginning in both the banking and investment sectors (internal firm complaint handling, escalation to industry-level dispute resolution - OBSI)
- **Vast majority of complaints appear to be resolved at the firm level**
- Good internal complaint data is not obtained from all financial service providers (would be very useful for public policy development)
- Prevent inappropriate use of the term "Ombudsman" for firms' internal
   FDR to avoid public confusion and dilution of the role



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### What FDR Does Well

- Gives government officials a credible, impartial place to refer consumer complaints about their financial service provider
- An independent and impartial review provides "closure" even for complaints where we say "no" – usually ends the matter, which benefits the participating firms
- Provides an accessible way to address complaints that would not otherwise be resolved through the courts due to factors such as cost, time, intimidation/fear of court process



### FDR Accessibility is Key to Effectiveness

- Make it free, informal, and non-legalistic; adopt a fairness standard; employ well-trained consumer-facing staff
- No impact on legal rights of the consumer or firm
- Stops the limitation period clock
- Language OBSI conducts investigations in English and French; inquiries handled in over 170 languages – contracted service
- Audited processes to be senior-friendly; TTY access for the deaf; website readability for the blind; accessible office



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# **FDR Accessibility**

- How to make the public aware of their ability to access FDR?
  - Ø Difficult to make FDR well-known, but very important to be able to find it when a problem arises
  - Low unaided public awareness (<2%); CAD 1,000,000 per 1% increase and CAD 500,000 to keep it there</p>
  - Very reliant upon firm disclosure and referrals backed by regulatory rules an ongoing challenge



#### Other Benefits to Society from FDR

- Lower cost process for all parties (consumers/investors and financial services providers)
- Diverts many consumer complaints away from the already overburdened court system – likely averts some class action lawsuits
- Learnings from complaint cases and independent assessments by FDR structure provide valuable feedback that helps financial service providers to improve



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# Other Benefits to Society from FDR

- Individual complaints can identify systemic problems that firms and regulators may not be aware of – early warning system
- Issues highlighted in complaints are valuable for public policy development by regulators and legislators
- Enables the state to deal selectively and effectively with regulatory priorities without mixing in compensation
- Allows a different (non-legalistic) standard to be applied for compensation (e.g., fairness)



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## What FDR Does Not Do Well, Nor Should It

- Ineffective tool against financial sector corruption
- Ø Does not address concerns over the pricing of financial products and services
- Ø Does not deal with concerns about access to credit
- Does not deal with regulatory breaches; different issues and different standards ("fairness" versus "legality")
- Punishment or removal of individuals or firms



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# 2. The Value of International Work on Best Practices and Effective Approaches



# International Best Practices and Effective Approaches

- Powerful proxy for an absent or weak consumer voice
- Helps stakeholders promote more effective scheme development from their legislators and regulators
- Gives legislators and regulators useful guidance on what to design for local market needs and a template
- Provides a basis for holding non-governmental FDR schemes accountable to stakeholders, especially government; helps hold governmental schemes accountable to the public and sometimes industry as well



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# International Work on Best Practices and Effective Approaches

- Helps build more broad-based capacity in design/evaluation of FDR schemes
- Provides a focal point for informal international networks like INFO to engage with to share experience and feed into the multilateral development of effective approaches
- Undoubtedly accelerates the implementation and evolution of FDR schemes in both emerging and mature market environments



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### **Questions?**

# **Thank You**



#### 3. Canadian Financial Dispute Resolution (FDR)



## Who We Are at OBSI

- An independent national dispute resolution service established as a not-for-profit corporation (an NGO)
- An alternative to the legal system for banking services and investment firms' customers with an unresolved complaint
- Started in 1996 covering major chartered banks; in 2002 became the Ombudsman for Banking Services and Investments when the mandate expanded to all members of the:
  - Investment fund companies (mutual funds)
  - Investment dealers (brokerages)
  - Mutual fund dealers



# Who We Are at OBSI (cont'd)

- Currently have over 600 participating firms, adding over 1,000 more in 2014 at request of investment regulators
- Banks, federally-regulated trust companies, investment dealers, mutual fund dealers, mutual fund companies, and scholarship plan dealers
- Some credit unions have joined voluntarily
- Accessible by toll-free phone and fax; bilingual investigation services (English and French), customer inquiries can be handled in over 170 languages



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#### What We Do at OBSI

- Informal, confidential and independent review of complaints not resolved to the satisfaction of consumer
- We look primarily at cases of direct financial loss as a result of error, misleading information or bad advice
- Review industry standards, firm policies, regulations, laws ... and decide what would be "fair under the circumstances"
- Goal is to make the client "whole" where maladministration is found to have occurred



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# What We Do at OBSI (cont'd)

- We make recommendations to the firm; not binding on either party
- Clients do not forfeit their legal rights; may reject our findings and start legal proceedings
- "The Olive Branch" Gives participating firms an impartial service to which they can refer their unresolved complaints
- "The Stick" We will make public any participating firm's refusal of a recommendation, had only happened once since OBSI's creation in 1996 – <u>That has recently changed, 20 in the last 18</u> <u>months, all investment-related</u>



# How We Work at OBSI

- Member firms must:
  - Have an internal complaint-handling system
  - Inform their clients about their internal complaint handling system
  - Inform their clients about OBSI and refer after completion or after 90 days
  - Co-operate in OBSI investigations
  - Pay their share of OBSI's operating costs



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# How We Work at OBSI (cont'd)

- Firm has the first responsibility to resolve a complaint
- **OBSI** is an informal service, not bound by judicial rules
- We are not a regulator; we do not fine or punish firms
- Usually investigate; sometimes mediate
- Objective is to determine "Fairness in the circumstances" and recommend compensation



## Systemic Cases (Dealing with "Mass Cases")

- Controversial power introduced by senior regulators in 2008; in force starting 2010
- Strongly opposed by industry and some regulators who saw it as a matter of regulatory jurisdiction
- Conducted 10 "systemic investigations" in 2010-11, 3 resulted in recommendations; refused by firm reported to regulator
- Voluntarily withdrawn by OBSI Board in June of 2012 under pressure from industry and regulators
- Re-introduced in recent banking regulations and investment regulator rules as a whistleblower requirement (no investigation)



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#### **Governance of OBSI**

- **Independent Board of Directors** 0
- Chair of the Board is a non-industry (community) Director 0
- **Community Directors must not be associated with either** 0 industry or government for two years prior
- 0 Community Directors are the majority of the Board (7 of 10) and a majority of them are required to approve OBSI's budget and control hiring and firing of Ombudsman
- Directors not involved in investigations, decisions or  $\bigcirc$ appeals



#### **OBSI Opened Inquiries by Sector**





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#### **OBSI Case Files Opened by Sector**



Case Files Opened





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# **OBSI** Case File End of Quarter Inventory by Sector



**Case File End of Quarter Inventory** 





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# **Banking Complaint Issues in Canada**

- Banking complaints up 100% 2008-2010; then settled
- Half of OBSI's banking complaints are paymentsrelated; one-third involve debit and credit card fraud
- Mortgage pre-payment penalties
- Payment scams
- Ø Collection activity
- Privacy and service issues



# Canada Has a Unique Legal and Regulatory Environment for Financial Services

Less developed legal framework for consumer protection in financial services:

- No legal duty of care imposed on banks by Canadian law, different situation for investment issues
- Sankers not fiduciaries, no fiduciary duty for "pure" banking transactions
- Special duty may apply where financial advice is given, but not in normal "lending" or transactional situations
- So where can an Ombudsman look to determine what is fair under the circumstances?
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# Canada's Unique Environment for a Financial Sector Ombudsman

Canada's federal-provincial sharing of powers that apply to our work:

- Ø Banking is federal; trust companies can be federal or provincial
- Credit unions are provincial, but that system is currently evolving
- Non-bank consumer credit is provincial
- Securities regulation (investment leverage loans) is provincial (for now)
- **Ø** Consumer protection issues are predominantly provincial
- **Ø** Criminal Code provision restricting interest rates to 60% is federal



**Unstable Environment** 

- Uneven government support for Ombudsman-like structures
- Virtually no effective consumer voice
- Competition in banking dispute resolution and banks seeking cost and scope reductions
- Uneven regulator support for scheme mandate across sectors and jurisdictions



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**Unstable Environment (cont'd)** 

- Output States financial crisis
- Substitution Section Section Content Section Sectio and systemic (mass) cases
- Expanding mandate of investment sector dispute resolution coverage to smaller firms operating in more difficult areas



**Industry Attacks on Schemes** 

- Ø Demanding choice to have leverage over "supplier of ADR services"
- Demanding move toward determination of legality rather than subjective fairness of market conduct
- Seek greater procedural fairness safeguards that generally favour the financial institution and decrease accessibility for consumers





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Industry Attacks on Schemes (cont'd)

- Treating resolution of consumer complaints like a tactical litigation minimization exercise
- Constrain resourcing (funding, staff, access to information) where industry-funded
- Seek to contain progressive mandate evolution even in the face of opportunities to adopt best practices
- Subset of the second confidentiality of the process against the FDR scheme



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Industry Attacks on Schemes (cont'd)

# Some industry players seek to actively undermine the scheme by:

- Arguing every point
- Tying up the office with endless iterations, lengthy legalistic responses, demands for explanations and appeals of decisions
- Then complaining the scheme is inefficient or incompetent
- Initiating a campaign of misinformation to fellow industry participants, media, regulators and government



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#### **Further Information**

**Ombudsman for Banking Services** and Investments (OBSI) Toronto, Canada www.obsi.ca or ombudsman@obsi.ca

