

# A “Wicked Problem:” Controlling Climate Change

Policy Research Talk

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# Ingredients of a “Wicked Problem”

- Scientific, technical, economic complexities
- Lack of agreement on how to define problem
  - Economic tradeoffs
  - Ecological tipping points
- Deep (Knightian) uncertainties
- Profound ethical issues
- Global cooperation is required

# Scope of this talk

- What actions are necessary to mitigate climate change?
  - When and how to invest in low-carbon energy and undertake other measures to limit national and ultimately global GHG emissions
- What is expected of developing countries in controlling climate change?
- What can be expected of international agreements for reducing GHG emissions?


# Key conclusions

- Reducing global greenhouse gases enough to significantly mitigate climate change risks will require complete global energy transformation starting soon
- This will have real albeit manageable costs, in particular for developing countries
- Only moderate mitigation actions appear to be feasible at present given difficulties in stepping up international commitments, and political risk aversion

# Key conclusions


- Lower-income countries still striving to meet basic needs should not be expected to bear significant cost burdens for GHG mitigation
  - Emphasis should be on low-cost, low-regret action
  - High- and middle-income countries with large emissions need to shoulder most responsibility
- Moving away from past economy-wide approaches to coordinated GHG mitigation, and putting more emphasis on sectoral and technology-focused measures, may be effective for building international cooperation

# Background on climate change risks



Source: [1]

Without additional mitigation, global mean surface temperature is projected to increase by 3.7 to 4.8°C over the 21<sup>st</sup> century – causing significant risks for the environment and human well-being.



Based on WGII AR5 Figure 19.4

Source: [2]




# Challenges for risk assessment

- Risks are uncertain and unfamiliar
- Individuals often have difficulties “rationally” evaluating low-probability, high-impact events
  - Stretches the limits of standard models for evaluating choices under uncertainty
  - Importance of considering the robustness of policy actions in the face of deep uncertainty
- Nonetheless, goals and actions need to reflect a reasoned comparison of benefits and costs

# Other environmental risks matter too

Global premature deaths from selected environmental risks: Baseline, 2010 to 2050




Source: (OECD, 2012), OECD Environmental Outlook to 2005; output from IMAGE

[3]

# Background on GHG emissions and energy trends

# Sources of GHG emissions




***Globally, about two-thirds are from energy production and use***

Source: [4]

# Regional patterns of GHG emissions are shifting along with changes in the world economy.

## GHG Emissions by Country Group and Economic Sector



Based on Figure 1.6


Source: [2]

# Decomposition formula for growth in CO2 emissions

C=emissions, E=energy, Y=income, P=population

$$\% \Delta C = \% \Delta P * \% \Delta \left( \frac{Y}{P} \right) * \% \Delta \left( \frac{E}{Y} \right) * \% \Delta \left( \frac{C}{E} \right)$$


# GHG emissions rise with growth in GDP and population; long-standing trend of decarbonisation of energy reversed.



Based on Figure 1.7

Source: [2]

# GHG emissions rise with growth in GDP and population; long-standing trend of decarbonisation of energy reversed.




Based on Figure 1.7

Source: [2]



# Even with fairly strong renewables growth, fossil energy dominates the mix absent new policies


## Growth in total primary energy demand



***While primary energy demand roughly doubles from 2011-2035, fossil energy only shrinks from 82% to about 75% absent much more aggressive GHG emissions mitigation***

# Asia will dominate future energy growth


## Share of global growth 2012-2035



IEA projection


Source: [5]

# Stabilization of atmospheric concentrations requires moving away from the baseline – regardless of the mitigation goal.




Source: [2]

# Stabilization of atmospheric concentrations requires moving away from the baseline – regardless of the mitigation goal.



Source: [2]

# There is far more carbon in the ground than emitted in any baseline scenario; fuel scarcity not a major emissions constraint




Based on SRREN Figure 1.7

Source: [2]

# Costs of GHG mitigation


# A portfolio of technologies is needed

Technology contributions to reaching the 2DS vs 4DS



Top "wedge" indicates additional effort needed to get from 6DS to 4DS  
Source: [6]


# Mitigation involves substantial scaling up of low-carbon energy.



Source: [2]




# Mitigation involves substantial scaling up of low-carbon energy.



Based on Figure 7.16


Source: [2]

# Global costs rise with the ambition of the mitigation goal.



Based on Table SPM.2

# Availability of technology can greatly influence mitigation costs.




Based on Figure 6.24

Source: [2]

# How to evaluate these costs?

- While the % deviations from baseline are small, in absolute terms even a few % of (growing) future global consumption is large – especially for lower-income developing countries
- Costs will be significantly larger if all low-carbon technologies are not available – even those that are pre-commercial and controversial
- Costs will fall disproportionately on certain sectors
- Cost estimates typically assume cost-effective measures for international mitigation (i.e. international carbon price) – costs will be significantly larger without them

# Share of energy in total production costs for selected industries




Source: [5]

***Energy-intensive sectors worldwide account for around one-fifth of industrial value added, one-quarter of industrial employment and 70% of industrial energy use***

# Unit costs and GHG intensities of different power generation technologies


## Some Mitigation Technologies for Electricity Generation

Emission Intensity [gCO<sub>2</sub>eq/KWh], Based on Lifecycle Emissions



\* Median Value in Mitigation Scenarios (430-530 ppm CO<sub>2</sub>eq by 2100)

Cost of Electricity [USD<sub>2010</sub>/MWh], Based on High Full Load Hours




Based on Figure 7.7

Technical progress is needed to reduce costs of nontraditional renewable energy, as well as other low-carbon options (esp. nuclear)

- First generation liquid biofuels are not cost-competitive with traditional petroleum (or with coal liquefaction) and have side effects; second generation still some years away
- Wind becoming competitive “at the bus bar” in certain locations but remain costly to scale up (storage, grid stabilization)
- PV is becoming much cheaper but also challenging to scale up; solar thermal still in early stage of commercial maturation and thus remains costly
- Nuclear costs remain high

# “McKinsey MAC curve” shows lots of win-win

## Marginal abatement benefits curve for 2030



Source: [7]



# Difficulties with this narrative

- MAC curve has several flaws
  - Evaluation of individual mitigation opportunity costs
  - Interactions among mitigation components
- A large body of analysis indicates that to make deep GHG cuts we will have to make intensive use of the ostensibly more expensive options
- Counting co-benefits:
  - Often are cheaper options for pursuing co-benefits than GHG mitigation
  - If many co-benefit measures should be pursued already, why aren't they?

# So how much mitigation is “optimal?”

- Standard growth-theoretic “integrated assessment models” tend to show only some slowing of emissions growth is justified. BUT:
  - Risk aversion raises value of mitigation
  - So does (endogenous) probability of catastrophic shock
  - Economically efficient discount rate for uncertain long-term climate change may be very low – also raises value of LR mitigation
  - Intergenerational tradeoffs are more than discounting


# So how much mitigation is “optimal?”

- Nonetheless, “as much as possible” is not an efficient mitigation policy either; need to consider pros and cons of different mitigation ramp-up strategies
- Do the prospective benefits justify the costs?
  - Impossible to fully answer quantitatively, but can make informed comparisons to costs and impacts of other risk mitigation expenditures
  - Benefits depend strongly on level of international cooperation

# Is holding global mean temperature increase below 2 deg. C possible?

- Maybe – but it would require unprecedented speed in cutting global emissions
- All possible mitigation technology options will be needed, and cost could be quite high without major technical advance
- Need shift in political economy away from very risk-averse positions toward policies that will have near-to-medium term costs in order to achieve any serious emissions limits


# Decoupling energy use from economic activity is critical



*Reducing the energy intensity of the economy is vital to achieving the 2DS.*

Source: [6]

# Costs of meeting GHG targets could increase considerably with delay (unless technology costs fall significantly)



Energy related mitigation outlays

Source: [8]

# GHG mitigation policies

Need a mix of mitigation policies, but putting a price on carbon is crucial

- “Law of one price” means mitigation is cost-effective
  - Costs are significantly higher – domestically and internationally – when marginal costs of mitigation are not equalized
- Economic instruments motivate cost-reducing innovation in low-carbon technologies
  - Important complement to public investment in new knowledge for lowering mitigation costs




# Carbon prices can't do everything

- The “paradox of energy efficiency” and role of regulatory performance standards
- Land use policies
  - Forest protection
  - Urban form
- Trade policies and diffusion of lower-carbon technologies
- Basic and applied R&D support
- Energy subsidy reforms

# Reform of energy consumption subsidies offers significant win-win opportunities – if political barriers can be overcome

Fossil fuel consumption subsidies in emerging and developing countries, 2012

TOP 10 COUNTRIES WITH THE LARGEST FOSSIL FUEL CONSUMPTION SUBSIDIES, BILLION US\$ IN 2012




**WORLD TOTAL** ~\$540 BILLION OF CONSUMPTION SUBSIDIES



Source: [7]

Source: IEA, 2013.<sup>97</sup>

## Impacts on GDP in 2050 of unilateral phase-out of fossil fuel consumer subsidies in emerging and developing countries (% deviation from baseline)



(1) Middle East & Northern Africa

(2) Other Asian, African and Latin American Emerging economies



Source : OECD (2012), *OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050*; OECD ENV-Linkages Model ; based IEA subsidies data for the year 2009

[3]

# GHG mitigation and developing countries

# Who should go first?

- Controlling climate change is and for some time should be an issue primarily for high-emitting upper and middle income countries
  - Consistent with UNFCCC
- Lower income countries – especially those not able to meet basic energy needs – should not be carrying out costly decarbonization
  - Important implications for MFI and bilateral project financing

# Uses of international financial resources also need to reflect this

- “Carbon finance” will have limited effect without stronger commitments from developed and major developing countries to curb emissions (no incentives)
- Mitigation financing with Green Fund should emphasize spillover benefits
  - Global cost reduction for low-C technologies
  - Local development benefits (e.g. increased availability of lighting with high energy efficiency)

# Energy priorities for most developing countries

- Improved access to affordable, clean energy
  - Basic access for cooking, heating, lighting
  - Expanded access to electricity for growth
- Improved reliability of electricity availability
  - Mitigate productivity as well as direct welfare losses
  - Increase investment in modern growth sectors
- Financial sustainability of sector
  - Subsidy, other governance reforms
- Improved energy efficiency that lowers costs

# Environmental priorities for most developing countries

- Air quality improvements from reduction in conventional pollutants
- Drinking water safety
- Natural resource protection (soil retention, reduced deforestation, coastal protection)
- Surface water quality
- Hazardous contaminants



Several policies can reduce help reduce GHG emissions at relatively low cost, risk

- The “paradox of energy efficiency” and role of regulatory performance standards
- Land use policies
  - Forest protection and reforestation
  - Urban development patterns
- Reform of trade policies that restrict diffusion of lower-carbon technologies
- Energy subsidy reforms
  - But political economy difficulties with this provide a cautionary lesson

# International cooperation for global GHG mitigation

# International cooperation for global GHG mitigation

- Idealized theory: internationally coordinated carbon price with financial transfers to handle burden sharing. Unrealistic.
- Criteria for evaluating agreements:
  - Environmental effectiveness
  - Aggregate economic performance impacts
  - Distributional and social impacts
  - Institutional feasibility (participation, compliance)

# International free riding problem

- When cooperation has the most value, shirking incentives also are high
  - Even though relatively few countries account for most emissions, there is still concern on their part for behavior of non-cooperators
  - Broader participation only with modest objectives and thus lower environmental effectiveness
  - Exception would be clearly demonstrated threat of major catastrophe
  - Search for commonly held, implementable principle of equitable burden sharing is in vain

# Changing focus of international negotiations for GHG mitigation

- Current emphasis is on a kind of “pledge and review” strategy for national targets, actions
  - Intent is to expand participation beyond Annex B countries (Kyoto commitments)
  - Includes hope that countries will agree to do more, if others also will act accordingly
- Includes many possibilities for sectoral policies, technology-based norms, emphasis on benefits from modernization
  - Near-term effects on global emissions likely modest

Focus on sector-specific and technology-based agreements may mitigate political economy of negotiating national targets


- Many developing countries need to improve their energy and transport systems anyway
  - Focus in financing on trade in new capital goods, expanded use of affordable lower-C options
- Can deal separately with different GHGs
  - Agriculture, land use
  - Montreal Protocol gases

# Adjusting international agreements over time

- Sector-based approaches not cost-effective, but do not preclude shift toward economy-wide instruments
- Countries could graduate into higher performance standards as they grow
  - But how this would be done is as contentious as debates over current national emission commitments
- International cooperation to lower the cost and reduce barriers to diffusion of low-carbon technology is a must

# Energy RD&D has slipped in priority

OECD R&D spending



*The IEA has called for a twofold to fivefold increase in annual public R&D spending on low carbon technologies to achieve the 2DS.*

Source: [6]



# Cannot lose track of need for improving adaptation

- Many pre-existing distortions limit resilience
  - Inefficient water use
  - Poor land use/hazard reduction policies (for people and structures)
  - Weaknesses in land tenure that reduce incentives for conservation
  - Agricultural market distortions
  - Inadequate investment in information provision
- International institutions need to improve performance of adaptation programs

Thank you – I look forward to  
comments and questions.

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# Sources for individual slides

- [1] WGIIAR5-Slides-June 12 2014; downloaded at <http://ipcc-wg2.gov/AR5/report/>
- [2] IPCC\_WGIII\_AR5\_Presentation; downloaded at [www.mitigation2014.org/report](http://www.mitigation2014.org/report)
- [3] *OECD 2012 Environmental Outlook* figures downloaded at <http://www.oecd.org/env/indicators-modelling-outlooks/oecdenvironmentaloutlookto2050theconsequencesofinaction.htm>
- [4] *IPCC AR5 WGIII Summary for Policy Makers* Figure SPM.2; downloaded at <http://mitigation2014.org/report/figures/summary-for-policymakers-figures>
- [5] Presentation by Fatih Birol on *IEA World Energy Outlook 2013* for OECD Parliamentary Days, Paris, 5 February 2014. Downloaded at <http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/publicaffairs/parliamentarydays2014slides.htm>
- [6] *IEA Energy technology Perspectives 2012* slide deck; downloaded at <http://www.iea.org/etp/etp2012/>
- [7] Global Commission On The Economy And Climate, *The New Climate Economy Report* (Global Report): Figures 1.6 (McKinsey curve), 5.2 (subsidies)
- [8] IEA, *Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map*, Figure 3.16.