1	Assessing World Bank Support for Trade, 1987 - 2004
2	Table of Contents Framework of evaluation Progress in trade liberalization World Bank Trade assistance Definitions Bank strategies on trade Portfolio and implementation Outcomes and impacts (project level; cross-country level) Lessons from country case studies Main findings Conclusions
3	Protection has declined most dramatically in Africa and East Asia, but less progress in MNA and South Asia
4	But non-tariff barriers remain a concern
5	…And rapid export growth remains elusive for many developing countries
6	Evaluation Framework Study objective: evaluate the Bank’s assistance to client countries on trade between 1987 and 2004 and derive lessons to improve the relevance, efficiency, sustainability and institutional development impact of that assistance. Relevance of Bank Assistance: Was the Bank’s trade-related assistance relevant to promoting improved trade and economic outcomes? Did the Bank “do the right things”? Effectiveness of Bank Assistance: Were Bank-supported interventions effective and efficient in achieving their stated objectives? Did the Bank “do things right”?
7	Bank trade assistance -- definitions Trade encompasses trade policy reforms, export promotion, trade financing (public and private), trade facilitation (institutional and infrastructure), TA for WTO accession and negotiations. Includes lending and non-lending assistance Economic and sector work (ESW) Research Advocacy Trade capacity building (including non-lending TA)
8	Bank trade assistance occurred over two phases 1987-2000: Implied Strategy 1987 WDR OD 8.60 Board papers DEC publication 2001-04: 2001/02 Development Committee paper Research Advocacy Capacity building Mainstreaming trade
9	Portfolio: Support to Trade Development (Percent of Total Lending)
10	Portfolio: Number of projects with trade-related components
11	Support for Trade Development: Data by Region
12	Thematic distribution of assistance
13	Outcome of Closed Projects
14	Lessons from country case studies Six case studies: India, Indonesia, Morocco, Mozambique, Senegal and Zambia Desk studies of Argentina, Chile, China, Peru, Vietnam Crises can precipitate reform but broad ownership sustains it Appropriate sequencing of macroeconomic policies is critical for outcomes High-quality analytical work can contribute to good outcomes The Bank underestimated the need for complementary policies Institutions matter and underpin sustainability
15	Lessons from country case studies (continued) Conditionality appeared to be neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure good trade policy/outcomes External factors were largely understudied Distributional factors received too little attention.
16	Main findings – 1987-2000 The Bank’s objectives were relevant but the strategy was too narrow in terms of its focus on what matters for trade and growth. It underestimated the complexity of complementary policies and the political constraints in undertaking them and understudied/anticipated the role of external factors. Consequently the Bank was too optimistic about trade’s ultimate benefits. The Bank often had more success in meeting immediate objectives than in improving long-term export performance or diversifying exports (in Africa).
17	Main findings – 1987-2000 (continued) Bank assistance on trade achieved better results when linked to prior ESW, low conditionality and good institutional frameworks. Unsatisfactory outcomes were associated most frequently with poor project design, unrealistic assumptions, weak ownership and unstable macro environments. Poverty and distributional outcomes, and associated political economy dynamics received too little attention.
18	Main findings – post 2001 The Bank’s focus on advocacy was perceived positively by most WTO delegates. Bank research on trade is perceived as innovative, as having made an intellectual contribution, and of high quality, though gaps exist in areas of focus. But the Bank’s advocacy strategy was not nuanced enough initially to distinguish between different groups of developing countries and less attention was paid to other relevant aspects of the negotiations. And the Bank has been slow to translate its extensive work on development aspects of WTO issues into practical policy advice for staff. The incorporation of trade into country assistance strategies has been uneven, even in instances where analytical work exists.
19	How can the Bank become more effective in its trade assistance? #1: Strengthen the micro-level underpinnings of trade. #2: Revisit balance between global and country agendas and strengthen operational links on trade issues. #3: Strengthen knowledge management efforts.
20	#1 Strengthen micro-level underpinnings Despite increased poverty research and PSIA analysis, links weak in operations and advice. Country-level: More consistent and specific analysis of potential adjustment costs, institutional framework needed in trade policy components. Institutional-wide: Concrete program of adjustment assistance. Research: Micro-level adjustment to trade policies at firm, individual and household levels.
21	# 2 Revisit global and country balance, and operational links Given multi-sector nature of current trade agenda, participation of operational staff, other networks and Trade Department likely to yield greatest benefits. Greater strategic and intellectual guidance from network to country teams (including upstream CAS assistance). More formal set of interactions on (i) agricultural trade and policies; (ii) services liberalization; (iii) distributional outcomes associated with trade policies. Establish working arrangements between PREM and PSD on trade-related issues.
22	# 3 Strengthen knowledge management Greater cross-fertilization with other networks. Better integrate work done in the center with country-level work. Establish a mechanism to obtain regular feedback from operational staff on most immediate/relevant issues from country dialogue. Enhance country economist knowledge of global and regional trade agendas.