

Chapter 1: Evaluation Highlights

- Plagued by a multitude of chronic problems, LICUS pose some of the toughest development challenges.
- Donors and researchers are grappling with how best to respond to LICUS and have chosen to focus on different aspects of the problem.
- Bank lending and administrative budgets to LICUS have increased since the start of the LICUS Initiative and have amounted to about \$4.1 billion and \$161 million, respectively, during fiscal 2003–05.
- Post-conflict LICUS absorbed a large share of LICUS lending during fiscal 2003–05; administrative budgets were more evenly distributed across the LICUS group.
- General aid effectiveness concerns in LICUS have been replaced by state-building and peace-building objectives that remain inadequately defined.
- The Bank has yet to identify appropriate performance indicators for its state- and peace-building objectives.



Background

The ongoing debates on aid effectiveness as well as international events, especially the attacks of September 11, 2001,¹ have attracted increasing attention to the problems facing Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS).

Concern is growing about the ability of these countries to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), as well as about the adverse economic effects they have on neighboring countries and the global spillovers that may follow.²

With their multiplicity of chronic problems, LICUS pose some of the toughest development challenges (box 1.1). Most have poor governance; are embroiled in extended internal conflicts or are struggling through tenuous post-conflict transitions; and face similar hurdles of widespread lack of security, fractured relations among societal groups, significant corruption, breakdown in the rule of law, absence of mechanisms for generating legitimate power and authority, a huge backlog of investment needs, and limited government resources for development. Past international engagement with these countries has generally failed to yield significant improvements.³

The donor community is grappling with the question of how best to assist countries faced with such challenging problems. With their differing motivations and objectives, donors and researchers have chosen to address varying

aspects of these problems, which has led them to focus on slightly different groups of countries.

For instance, recent research by the Center for Global Development focuses on stagnant low-income countries (defined by gross national product per capita and growth rates), and *Foreign Policy's* Failed States Index focuses on state failure. It identifies countries based on such factors as the level of economic decline, security, factionalized elites, displaced persons, human rights breaches, and external intervention. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) aims to address issues surrounding vulnerability and crisis. Many of these issues pertain to the political environment. The U.K. Department for International Development (DFID) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) definitions of fragile states are similar to that used by the Bank.⁴

As defined by the Bank, all LICUS are characterized by weak policies, institutions, and governance. The World Bank has used two criteria to define *core* and *severe* LICUS: per capita income within the threshold of Interna-

tional Development Association (IDA) eligibility, and performance of 3.0 or less on both the overall Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) rating and on the CPIA rating for Public Sector Management and Institutions.⁵ Some low-income countries without CPIA data are also included.⁶ Depending on the income level and CPIA rating, a LICUS country is classified in one of three subgroups: *severe*, *core*, or *marginal*.⁷ Marginal LICUS score on the edge of what is considered LICUS, and hence are identified by the Bank only for monitoring purposes (henceforth, *LICUS* refers to core and severe LICUS, not marginal LICUS).

In fiscal 2005, the Bank characterized 25 countries as LICUS (see table 1.1 and figure 1.2).

This review focuses on these 25 countries.

Dismal social indicators and poor prospects for achieving the MDGs are common to LICUS.

Appendix B presents the list of core, severe, and marginal LICUS for fiscal 2003–06, and illustrates which countries have moved in and out of the

LICUS category over time. The Bank has recently replaced the term LICUS with *fragile states*, while retaining the same criteria to identify these countries.⁸

LICUS share a number of similarities. They have dismal economic and social indicators (figures 1.3–1.7). Besides being home to almost 500 million people, roughly half of whom earn less than a dollar a day, they have an infant mortality rate a third higher than that of other low-income countries, a life expectancy that is 12 years lower, and a maternal mortality rate that is about 20 percent higher.⁹ If the trend continues, most LICUS will be unable to meet the MDGs (appendix C). A vast majority of LICUS are conflict-affected.

Despite their similarities, there are also important differences among LICUS. While some LICUS, such as Angola and Cambodia, grew at around 4 percent a year during 1995–2003, others, such as the Solomon Islands, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Guinea-Bissau, experienced negative growth rates of

Box 1.1: The LICUS Challenge: Views from the Field

Haiti

“Preval’s task is colossal,” said a Haitian-born professor and author. “Everything has to be built . . . There are no institutions in Haiti. The challenge is really monumental.” Preval will be forced to confront the problems of a nation with almost no functioning judicial system, corrupt and inept law enforcement, deep poverty, and abominable public sanitation. Then there are the violent gangs that rule urban slums, the kidnapping rings and a flourishing drug and money-laundering trade. There are also tens of thousands of children who do not attend school, hundreds of miles of unpaved or poorly maintained highways, and a national budget kept afloat primarily by the largess of international aid groups and foreign countries.

Afghanistan

Despite many accomplishments, the general perception among the Afghans more than three years into the reconstruction program is that there has been only minimal improvement in their lives. Many in Kabul complain about the persistent unreliability of the power supply, poor condition of the roads, and a lack of jobs.

The rural economy has suffered from prolonged drought and also because donors have had little success in supporting projects in rural areas because of concerns about security. Donors are under growing criticism for not having delivered on their much-publicized aid pledges, and for having channeled a large part of what they did deliver into the high fees and salaries of consultants and nongovernmental organizations.

Kosovo

“Out of all our non-luck came luck,” said the owner of a highly popular Thai restaurant in Pristina, referring to the vast amount of international aid that has been poured into the province since its liberation following the 1999 war. “It is as though we have been given a second chance to rebuild our own home.” Constructing the peace has, however, proved to be far from easy. Although life has demonstrably improved under the UN’s guardianship, Kosovo’s transformation into a modern, multi-ethnic society—the international community’s much-vaunted aim—continues to remain elusive.

Sources: For Haiti, *The Washington Post*, “Challenges Loom for Preval in Haiti,” February 21, 2006. For Afghanistan, work undertaken for this review, IEG, 2005. For Kosovo, *The Guardian*, “A Second Chance to Rebuild Our Home,” October 31, 2003.

Table 1.1: Twenty-five LICUS, Fiscal 2005

Severe LICUS	Core LICUS
Afghanistan ^{a,b}	Burundi ^{a,b}
Angola ^{a,b}	Cambodia ^a
Central African Republic ^{a,c}	Comoros ^a
Haiti ^a	Democratic Republic of Congo ^{a,b}
Liberia ^{a,c}	Guinea-Bissau ^{a,b}
Myanmar ^{a,c}	Kosovo (territory)
Solomon Islands ^a	Lao People's Democratic Republic
Somalia ^{a,c}	Nigeria ^a
Sudan ^{a,c}	Papua New Guinea
Zimbabwe ^c	Republic of Congo ^{a,b}
	São Tomé and Príncipe
	Tajikistan ^a
	Timor-Leste ^{a,b}
	Togo ^c
	Uzbekistan

Source: OPCS, World Bank.

Note: The countries classified as LICUS change slightly from year to year (appendix B).

a. Conflict-affected countries in fiscal 2005.

b. Post-conflict countries in fiscal 2005.

c. Countries in non-accrual in fiscal 2005. Loans to, or guaranteed by, a sovereign are placed in non-accrual status when the oldest payment arrears are six months overdue—that is, when the second consecutive payment is missed on the loans with the oldest arrears.

similar magnitudes. Vastly higher levels of external debt as a percentage of gross national income prevail in Liberia and São Tomé and Príncipe than in Uzbekistan and Haiti.

A number of LICUS have abundant natural resources, including Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, and Papua New Guinea, but not Burundi or Haiti. Furthermore, the LICUS group includes countries such as São Tomé and Príncipe, the Solomon Islands, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, where the Human Development Index (HDI) is above the low-income country (LIC) average, as well as countries such as Burundi, the Central African Republic, and Guinea-Bissau, where the HDI is considerably below the LIC average (figures 1.4–1.6).

During fiscal 2003–05 (the period after the launch of the LICUS Initiative), the Bank provided about \$4.1 billion in lending to the 25 LICUS, compared with about \$2.5 billion during fiscal 2000–02 (the period before the initiative). Sixty-four percent of the total LICUS lending dur-

ing fiscal 2003–05 went to 7 post-conflict LICUS (28 percent of the total number of LICUS)¹⁰ (figure 1.1 and table 2.1).


During fiscal 2000–02, the Sector Boards that received the most Bank LICUS lending were Economic Policy (25 percent); Health, Nutrition, and Population (12 percent); and Private Sector Development (11 percent). During fiscal 2003–05, the Sector Boards with the greatest LICUS lending were Transport (22 percent), Rural Development (13 percent), and Economic Policy (10 percent). Comparing the two time periods, 2000–02 and 2003–05, the Sector Boards with increases in LICUS lending were Transport and Rural Development; and those with a decline in lending were Private Sector Development and Economic Policy.

With respect to ad-

But LICUS are otherwise a heterogeneous group.

Lending to LICUS has increased, with a large share of lending going to post-conflict LICUS.

Figure 1.1: A Larger Share of LICUS Lending during Fiscal 2003–05 Went to Post-Conflict LICUS, While Administrative Budgets Were More Evenly Distributed across the LICUS Group



Source: World Bank database.

Note: For definitions of LICUS, post-conflict LICUS, lending, and administrative budgets, see "Definitions and Data Sources" in appendix A.

ministrative budgets, the Bank allocated about \$161 million during fiscal 2003–05, compared with about \$104 million during fiscal 2000–02. Sixty-six percent of the total administrative budget to LICUS during 2003–05 went to 18 non-post-conflict LICUS (72 percent of the total number of LICUS), and was thus more evenly distributed across the LICUS group than lending

Administrative budgets to LICUS have also increased.

(figure 1.1 and table 2.1).¹¹

While the large proportion of lending to post-conflict LICUS might have occurred even without the LICUS Initiative (given that IDA's exceptional post-conflict allocations predate it), the initiative likely contributed to the more even distribution of administrative budgets across the LICUS group (given an increase of 400 percent or more in administrative budgets between fiscal 2000–02 and 2003–05 for three LICUS—Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan—which would have received minuscule amounts of

The share of administrative budgets is more evenly distributed across the LICUS group than lending is.

administrative budgets before the initiative because of their non-accrual status).

The LICUS Approach
The Bank first articulated

its LICUS approach in 2002. The approach has since evolved and was rearticulated in 2005. Key elements of both these stages in the development of the initiative are presented below, and the main differences between them highlighted.

The 2002 LICUS approach

The Bank coined the term LICUS and established the LICUS Task Force in November 2001. The initiative thus both reflected and contributed to broader concerns in the donor community about aid effectiveness in difficult countries. The Task Force Report, published in 2002 (henceforth called the 2002 LICUS Task Force Report, World Bank 2002), aimed to describe how the Bank could best help chronically weak-performing countries get onto a path leading to sustained growth, development, and poverty reduction.

The rationale provided for the LICUS Initiative, as stated in the 2002 LICUS Task Force Report, was that:

Aid does not work well in these [LICUS] environments because governments lack the capacity or inclination to use finance effectively for poverty reduction. Yet neglect of such countries perpetuates poverty in some of the world's poorest

countries and may contribute to the collapse of the state, with adverse regional and even global consequences. The challenge of aid effectiveness in LICUS is thus to use other instruments, supplemented by financial transfers where necessary, to promote change (World Bank 2002, p. 1).

The “other instruments” referred to by the Task Force included analytical work and knowledge transfer (which were to receive much more emphasis than financial transfers, although precisely *how much more* was not defined).

The LICUS approach was also to include greater management attention and support of LICUS work within the Bank. The approach outlined in the LICUS Task Force Report was subsequently summarized as core country-level and Bank-level principles (box 1.2). Implementation of the approach began following discussion of the Task Force Report by the Bank’s Board of Executive Directors in June 2002, thus launching the LICUS Initiative. In October 2002, the Bank established the LICUS Unit in the Operations Policy and Country Services (OPCS) Vice Presidency to coordinate LICUS implementation. The LICUS Initiative was meant to be a learning-by-doing initiative.

The 2005 LICUS approach

Taking stock of experience since the LICUS Task

Force Report, the Bank elaborated its LICUS approach (reaffirming some aspects, changing the emphasis of others, and adding some new elements) in the 2005 Fragile States Good Practices in Country

Assistance Strategies Report (henceforth called the 2005 Fragile States Report, World Bank 2005e) and the 2005 Low-Income Countries Under Stress Update (henceforth called the 2005 LICUS Update, World Bank 2005h). Since the 2002 LICUS Task Force, the objectives and scope of the LICUS Initiative have shifted from general aid effectiveness concerns to state-building and peace-building objectives (World Bank 2005e).

State building and peace building have not been well defined, however, and remain somewhat abstract, especially from an operational point of view. This leaves several questions insufficiently answered. For example, what precise balance between state and non-state capacity does state building imply? To what extent are the common political and ideological connotations of the terms state building and peace building intended? What is the exact role of the Bank in the security

General aid effectiveness concerns have been replaced by state-building and peace-building objectives that have not yet been well defined.

LICUS is intended to be a learning-by-doing initiative.

Box 1.2: The 2002 LICUS Approach: Core Principles

Country level

- Stay engaged.
- Anchor strategies in stronger sociopolitical analysis.
- Promote domestic demand and capacity for positive change.
- Support simple and feasible entry-level reforms.
- Explore innovative mechanisms for social service delivery.
- Work closely with other donors.

Bank level

- Give much more attention to analytical work and transferring knowledge, and much less to transferring financial resources.
- Ensure high-quality staff in LICUS.
- Further clarify, disseminate, and revise operational policies and procedures for LICUS work to enable a faster and more effective response.
- Support a more balanced approach to LICUS country programs, underpinned by enhanced institutional support and management attention.

Source: World Bank 2004b.

sector? Furthermore, LICUS-specific approaches to achieve state-building and peace-building objectives have not been adequately articulated—how will these approaches differ from past approaches and ensure a higher chance of success than in the past?

According to the Bank, state building and peace building should be the goals by which to measure the LICUS Initiative’s success. However, the Bank has yet to identify performance indicators that would permit this to be done, beyond stating that the “logical corollary of a central focus on peace-building and state-building in the Bank’s assistance strategy for fragile states is that short-term results measurement should also emphasize these dimensions while continuing to focus on growth, poverty reduction, and the Millennium Development Goals within the long-term vision for recovery” (World Bank 2005h, p. 7).

Recognizing the diversity among LICUS, the 2005 Fragile States Report distinguishes among four types of LICUS: those experiencing deterioration;

The Bank’s recent business models aim to address the diversity of LICUS.

those facing prolonged political crisis or impasse; those that are post-conflict or in political transition; and those experiencing gradual improvement.

The Bank has proposed a different business model for intervening in each of the four types (appendix D). The Bank does not intend to maintain a list of LICUS that fall under each business model, but instead to use the business models as an aid to planning scenarios when country teams are designing assistance strategies. The expectation is that a country could fall under more than one business model and move in or out of given models over time.

The 12 Principles for International Engagement in Fragile States, agreed to by the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) at the January 2005 London Forum (appendix E), also inform the Bank’s LICUS approach.¹² The Bank has clustered the 12 principles into 4 main themes to structure its own work: building state capacity and accountability; peace, security, and development linkages; donor coordination for results; and institutional flexibility and responsiveness (appendix F).

Learning by doing and the focus on organizational issues in the 2002 approach were retained and further reinforced in the 2005 approach. The 2005 approach is based on a two-way knowledge flow: global knowledge is to inform staff guidance and country operations, and country experiences are to be distilled into staff guidance and global knowledge.

Differences between the 2002 and 2005 LICUS approaches

There are four main differences between the Bank’s LICUS approach as articulated in the 2002 LICUS Task Force Report and recent elaborations of the approach in the 2005 Fragile States Report and the 2005 LICUS Update:

- The 2005 approach emphasizes state building and puts greater focus on building state than non-state capacity compared with the 2002 approach.
- Compared with the 2002 approach, which focused on capacity building,¹³ the 2005 approach adopts the more expansive state-building objective.
- Peace building is one of the key objectives of the 2005 approach, and greater prominence is given to conflict prevention. The 2002 approach did not mention peace building or conflict prevention among its core principles.
- The 2005 LICUS approach distinguishes among LICUS and recommends a separate business model for each of the four groups of LICUS; the 2002 approach was presented in terms of core principles applicable across all LICUS.

Objectives, Purpose, and Organization of the Review

The review responds to the interest of the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors in ensuring the effectiveness of Bank support to LICUS. This review aims to answer three questions:

- How effective has the Bank’s LICUS approach been?
- How operationally useful are the Bank’s criteria for identifying and classifying LICUS and the aid-allocation system for them?

- How appropriate and adequate has the Bank's internal support for LICUS work been?

Given the relative newness of the LICUS Initiative, this review assesses implementation experience rather than outcomes. It uses the Bank's stated LICUS approach as the benchmark—how well or badly the Bank followed its core country-level LICUS principles (chapter 2). The review also assesses the Bank's criteria for identifying and classifying LICUS and for determining lending allocations for them (chapter 3), as well as the appropriateness and adequacy of the Bank's internal support for LICUS work (chapter 4). The final chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations (chapter 5).

It is beyond the scope of this review to assess the effectiveness of the Bank's fiduciary controls in LICUS or the extent of fraud and corruption associated with Bank projects in LICUS. This is a topic that needs careful review, especially in light of the Quality Assurance Group's finding that "fraud and corruption problems affect some projects as demonstrated by detailed implementation reviews in several risky countries" (World Bank 2006b, p. iv).

The Independent Evaluation Group's (IEG's) forthcoming evaluation of the effectiveness of the Bank's fiduciary work examines Country Financial Accountability Assessments (CFAAs) and Country Procurement Assessment Reports (CPARs) with a view to assessing how these instruments influenced Bank assistance and strengthened public financial management reform in client countries, including some LICUS.

Because the Bank's LICUS business models were introduced in December 2005, it was found to be premature to assess their implementation experience. Efforts to examine retrospectively the extent to which the Bank followed the guidance contained in the business models in different groups of LICUS yielded little insight, given the still broad and general nature of the business model guidance.

During fiscal 2000–05, the Bank approved 26 Regional (multicountry) programs, amounting to about \$2.9 billion, that included one or more of the 25 LICUS.¹⁴ This review does not, however, address Regional programs in LICUS. A forthcoming IEG

evaluation of the Bank's support to Regional programs will shed light on the performance of multicountry projects and partnership programs.

Finally, this review does not, at this early stage, question the need for the LICUS Initiative itself, rather deferring that judgment to the follow-up review recommended in three years, when sufficient evidence on outcomes will be available. The focus of this review is on how the Bank's stated LICUS approach has been implemented, what has been learned about effectiveness, and how the Bank can do better in the future (which may or may not be good enough to merit the existence and continuation of the LICUS Initiative).

In three years' time, based on the outcomes achieved, it will be opportune to ask—and answer—the question of whether the Bank should have a LICUS category and approach at all. At that time, it should be possible to address the more fundamental question of whether and to what extent Bank assistance can effectively support sustainable state building. In academic debates about state reconstruction, two main views prevail. One view questions "the dominant idea that failing states should always be rebuilt [consistent with the liberal democratic model] as most state reconstruction efforts have failed and bred new problems. . . . Until very recently, failing states were dismantled, not rebuilt," (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2004).

The second view recognizes the difficulties and imperfections in rebuilding states following this model, but stresses that the rebuilding of states is necessary to improve the social and economic viability of failing states and to prevent conflicts from spilling over (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2004).

Review Instruments and Methods

Several instruments were used to conduct this review:

The recent approach emphasizes state capacity over non-state capacity.

Peace building and conflict prevention are more prominent in the 2005 approach.


- Literature review
- Portfolio assessment
- Thematic reviews
- Fieldwork in 10 LICUS—Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Haiti, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Sudan, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, and Zimbabwe (chosen to ensure Regional representation, representation of post-conflict and other LICUS, and inclusion of countries of interest to the IEG-Norad partnership)
- Semistructured interviews of Bank staff
- A survey of 455 persons, including in-country stakeholders, Bank staff, and other donor staff (henceforth referred to as the Stakeholder Survey), with response rates of 16 percent (24 respondents), 31 percent (382 respondents), and 35 percent (49 respondents), respectively (appendix Z). The survey data presented in this

review should be treated with caution because the response rates, especially for in-country stakeholders, are very low.

The 25 countries classified by the Bank as severe and core LICUS in fiscal 2005 constitute the population for this review. The review focuses on the effectiveness of the Bank’s LICUS approach, but where possible, comments are made on the effectiveness of the Bank’s overall program in LICUS, noting that the two are not synonymous. Specific aspects of the Bank’s engagement in LICUS are compared with those in various other groups of LICUS and non-LICUS: post-conflict LICUS and non-LICUS low-income countries (non-LICUS LICs). Appendix A contains the definitions of these groups of LICUS and non-LICUS, other concepts used in the review, and the respective data sources.

Twenty-Five Fiscal 2005 LICUS at a Glance


Figure 1.2: LICUS Population Concentrated in Africa



Source: World Bank 2005j.

Note: Number indicates population in millions (percentages in parentheses). Total population in the 25 LICUS = 432 million.


Figure 1.3: More than Half the Population of Four LICUS (of Eight with Data) Earns Less than \$1 a Day



Source: World Bank 2005j.

Note: Data not available for 17 of the 25 LICUS. Year for which data were available is indicated along with the name of the country.


Figure 1.4: Negative Growth Rate in about Half of LICUS, Lower Growth Rate in Most LICUS Compared with Low-Income Country Average (1995–2004)



Source: World Development Indicators 2006.

Note: Data not available for Afghanistan, Kosovo, Myanmar, and Somalia. For Haiti, growth rate represented is during 1998–2004. GDP = gross domestic product; LIC = low-income country.


Figure 1.5: External Debt More than 175 Percent of GNI for Six LICUS and Higher than Low-Income Country Average for All LICUS in 2004



Source: World Development Indicators 2006.

Note: Data not available for Afghanistan, Kosovo, Myanmar, Somalia, and Timor-Leste. GNI = gross national income; LIC = low-income country.

Figure 1.6: Human Development Index for LICUS Worse than for Low-Income Countries in 2003



Source: UNDP 2005.


Note: Dark circle indicates HDI (Human Development Index) of LICs (low-income countries).

LICs include all low-income countries (including LICUS) as defined by UNDP.

HDI is a composite index produced by the United Nations and measures average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development—a long and healthy life (measured by life expectancy at birth), knowledge (measured by adult literacy rate and gross enrollment ratio), and a decent standard of living (measured by GDP per capita [purchasing power parity U.S.]). Countries with a value greater than 0.593 (outside the circle) are, on average, doing better than LICs; and countries with values smaller than 0.593 (inside the circle) are, on average, doing worse than LICs.

a. Based on an estimate for northern Sudan.

Figure 1.7: Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (KKZ) Governance Indicators Worse for LICUS than for Non-LICUS Low-Income Countries



Source: <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/data.html>.

Note: Graph presents the aggregate of: (i) control of corruption, (ii) governance effectiveness, (iii) political stability, (iv) rule of law, (v) regulatory quality, and (vi) voice and accountability. Unweighted average excludes Kosovo.

The KKZ scale ranges from -2.5 to +2.5. The KKZ indicators are a statistical compilation of responses on the quality of governance, given by a large number of enterprise, citizen, and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries, as reported by a number of survey institutes, think tanks, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations (including the World Bank and its CPIA). The KKZ results should be interpreted with caution, because even the most recent aggregate indicators, for 2004, have substantial margins of error. The margins of error are not unique to perception data—measurement error is pervasive among all measures of governance and institutional quality. An advantage of KKZ measures of governance is that they are able to be explicit about the accompanying margins of error, whereas these are most often left implicit with objective measures of governance. Aggregation of separate sources of data, the six indicators and over countries, on average, reduces the margin of error compared with an individual data source. At an individual country and indicator level, very few countries would show significant change over 2000–04.