

APPENDIX G: FISCAL 2003–05 COUNTRY STRATEGY DOCUMENTS FOR
FISCAL 2005 LICUS

| Fiscal year | Date | Country | Strategy document |
|------------------------------------------------|--------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 2003 | Jul-02 | Kosovo | Transitional Support Strategy |
| | Feb-03 | Afghanistan | Transitional Support Strategy |
| | Feb-03 | Tajikistan | Country Assistance Strategy |
| | Mar-03 | Angola | Transitional Support Strategy |
| | Apr-03 | Somalia | Country Reengagement Note |
| | Jun-03 | Sudan | Country Reengagement Note |
| | Jan-03 | Haiti | Country Reengagement Note |
| 2004 | Aug-03 | Republic of Congo | Transitional Support Strategy |
| | Jan-04 | Democratic Republic of Congo | Transitional Support Strategy |
| | Mar-04 | Liberia | Country Reengagement Note |
| | Apr-04 | Kosovo | Transitional Support Strategy |
| 2005 | Jul-04 | Central African Republic | Country Reengagement Note |
| | Nov-04 | Togo | Country Reengagement Note |
| | Dec-04 | Haiti | Transitional Support Strategy |
| | Jan-05 | Angola | Interim Strategy Note |
| | Mar-05 | Lao People's Democratic Republic | Country Assistance Strategy |
| | Mar-05 | Papua New Guinea | Strategy Note |
| | Mar-05 | Zimbabwe | Interim Strategy Note |
| | Apr-05 | Burundi | Transitional Support Strategy |
| | Apr-05 | Cambodia | Country Assistance Strategy |
| | May-05 | São Tomé and Príncipe | Country Assistance Strategy |
| | May-05 | Solomon Islands (Pacific Islands) | Country engagement |
| | Jun-05 | Nigeria | Country Assistance Strategy |
| | Jun-05 | Timor-Leste | Country Assistance Strategy |
| Total number of strategies, fiscal 2003–05: 24 | | | |

Source: World Bank database.

APPENDIX H: IMPLICATIONS OF THE HIPC INITIATIVE FOR LICUS

Background work was carried out on the implications of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative for LICUS as part of this review.¹ The main findings are presented below.

- **LICUS have lagged behind in establishing a record to qualify for HIPC debt relief, but a large number of these countries could potentially benefit from debt relief if they fulfill requirements for eligibility before the sunset clause expires at end 2006.**
- **It may be more difficult for LICUS to establish a macroeconomic record than it is for other countries. This is not to imply that entry requirements should be relaxed, but rather that a concerted effort should be made to help LICUS meet HIPC requirements.**

Of the 25 LICUS, none has reached the completion point, five are between the decision and completion points² (Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Congo, and São Tomé and Príncipe), and seven are potentially eligible for the HIPC Initiative (Central African Republic, Comoros, Haiti, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Togo).³ Three of these potentially eligible LICUS (Central African Republic, Haiti, and Togo) satisfy the policy performance criterion for eligibility under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. The Central African Republic and Haiti are moving toward qualification for decision point under HIPC, because they have Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance arrangements and are preparing their PRSP and I-PRSP, respectively. Togo has expressed its willingness to seek support for its programs as soon as the security condition stabilizes and has recently prepared an I-PRSP (Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper), although the paper has not yet been submitted to the Boards of the Bretton Woods Institutions. The other four potentially eligible LICUS (Comoros, Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan) have not had an IMF- or IDA-supported program since 1995, which they would need before end-2006 in order to be eligible for relief under the enhanced HIPC.

The weak capacity and volatility in LICUS will make it more difficult for them to establish a policy record before HIPC sunset in 2006, suggesting that the Bank needs to pay more attention to supporting policy measures necessary for LICUS to meet HIPC decision point and completion point requirements. This is particularly important in light of the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative for 100 percent debt cancellation for completion point HIPC countries, which will be implemented in July 2006 (World Bank 2006e). A 2003 IEG evaluation of the HIPC Initiative found that in the case of the “millennium rush” countries that qualified in late 2000, the relaxation of eligibility requirements raises the risk of not achieving HIPC objectives, given that the majority of these countries experienced policy slippages after reaching their decision points and are ceteris paribus less likely to achieve good development results (IEG 2003a). Similarly, Collier (2005) argues that “debt relief is an aid modality that, unless carefully managed, comes closest to turning aid into oil.”⁴

- **Changes under IDA 14 linking grant financing with debt distress are a welcome development, particularly for LICUS, but long-term debt sustainability depends on sustained improvements in policy.**

During the IDA 14 discussions it was agreed that debt sustainability will be the basis for the allocation of grants to IDA-only countries in IDA 14, so that the share of grants in total IDA financ-

ing will emerge from a country-by-country analysis of the risk of debt distress (IDA 2005, p. 25). The Joint Bank-Fund debt sustainability framework, which links the risk of debt distress to the quality of policies and institutions in low-income countries,⁵ was endorsed as the analytical underpinning for the link between debt sustainability and grant eligibility (IDA 2005, p. 25). This move is particularly important for debt sustainability in LICUS, since under the new framework, LICUS qualify for 100 percent grant financing. In addition, an exception to the debt-distress grant eligibility criterion was made for Kosovo and Timor-Leste, which are thus made eligible for grants.

Both the extension of the HIPC sunset clause

and the grant allocation mechanism are important steps in helping LICUS relieve their debt burden. However, as suggested by a recent IEG Evaluation Update on HIPC (IEG 2006b), debt reduction alone is not a sufficient instrument to affect the multiple drivers of debt sustainability.⁶ Sustained improvements in export diversification, fiscal management, and public debt management are also needed (IEG 2006b). Moreover, as suggested by Collier (2005), debt relief faces a potentially severe time consistency problem—that is, once debts are cancelled, there is no incentive for the government to abide by any continuing conditions. Sustained improvements in policies in LICUS will be crucial for debt sustainability.

APPENDIX I: BREAKDOWN BY COUNTRY: LENDING AND ADMINISTRATIVE BUDGET—TOTAL AND FOR ANALYTICAL WORK

Table I.1: Total Dollar (US\$) Amounts: Lending and Administrative Budget (total and for analytical work)

| Country | Lending (million US\$) | | Administrative budget ('000 US\$) | | Analytical work ('000 US\$) | |
|-----------------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|
| | Fiscal 2000–02 | Fiscal 2003–05 | Fiscal 2000–02 | Fiscal 2003–05 | Fiscal 2000–02 | Fiscal 2003–05 |
| Afghanistan | 100 | 793 | 4,190 | 19,992 | 1,094 | 7,693 |
| Angola | 33 | 176 | 2,886 | 5,791 | 537 | 1,987 |
| Burundi | 131 | 223 | 2,942 | 4,270 | 385 | 860 |
| Democratic Republic of Congo | 500 | 1,332 | 4,621 | 11,422 | 956 | 2,990 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 51 | 14 | 2,193 | 2,658 | 197 | 494 |
| Republic of Congo | 90 | 110 | 1,934 | 4,407 | 582 | 922 |
| Timor-Leste | 112 | 15 | 6,146 | 5,915 | 2,401 | 1,934 |
| Post-conflict | | 2,664 | | 54,455 | | 16,879 |
| Cambodia | 135 | 167 | 9,624 | 13,937 | 1,700 | 4,073 |
| Central African Republic | 45 | 0 | 1,328 | 1,878 | 98 | 758 |
| Comoros | 17 | 13 | 2,143 | 1,759 | 137 | 211 |
| Haiti | 0 | 75 | 1,788 | 3,623 | 202 | 1,661 |
| Kosovo | 63 | 30 | 7,240 | 5,921 | 2,302 | 1,946 |
| Lao People's Democratic Republic | 87 | 136 | 7,525 | 17,598 | 638 | 2,065 |
| Liberia | 0 | 0 | 386 | 2,069 | 169 | 1,239 |
| Myanmar | 0 | 0 | 320 | 322 | 320 | 272 |
| Nigeria | 682 | 881 | 19,432 | 22,755 | 7,229 | 5,352 |
| Papua New Guinea | 190 | 0 | 5,098 | 5,426 | 1,144 | 2,183 |
| São Tomé and Príncipe | 10 | 12 | 1,538 | 2,107 | 457 | 448 |
| Solomon Islands | 4 | 0 | 823 | 639 | 37 | 290 |
| Somalia | 0 | 0 | 37 | 1,084 | 25 | 831 |
| Sudan | 0 | 0 | 908 | 5,354 | 778 | 3,900 |
| Tajikistan | 122 | 59 | 6,060 | 11,605 | 748 | 3,578 |
| Togo | 0 | 0 | 2,656 | 1,729 | 443 | 1,017 |
| Uzbekistan | 105 | 100 | 6,341 | 7,530 | 1,518 | 2,118 |
| Zimbabwe | 5 | 0 | 5,506 | 1,332 | 1,245 | 855 |
| Non-post-conflict | | 1,473 | | 106,668 | | 32,899 |
| LICUS | 2,480 | 4,137 | 103,665 | 161,123 | 25,342 | 49,778 |
| Non-LICUS LICs | 18,557 | 20,400 | 379,941 | 449,637 | 69,088 | 109,947 |
| Non-LICUS LICs (excluding India) | 12,011 | 14,569 | 318,967 | 380,754 | 56,040 | 89,723 |

Source: World Bank database.

Table I.2: Per Capita Annual Amounts: Lending and Administrative Budget (total and for analytical work)

| Country | Lending (US\$) | | Administrative budget (US\$) | | Analytical work (US\$) | |
|-----------------------------------------|----------------|----------------|------------------------------|----------------|------------------------|----------------|
| | Fiscal 2000–02 | Fiscal 2003–05 | Fiscal 2000–02 | Fiscal 2003–05 | Fiscal 2000–02 | Fiscal 2003–05 |
| Afghanistan | 1.2 | 9.2 | 0.051 | 0.232 | 0.013 | 0.089 |
| Angola | 0.9 | 4.3 | 0.075 | 0.143 | 0.014 | 0.049 |
| Burundi | 6.3 | 10.3 | 0.141 | 0.198 | 0.018 | 0.040 |
| Democratic Republic of Congo | 3.3 | 8.4 | 0.031 | 0.072 | 0.006 | 0.019 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 12.1 | 3.1 | 0.520 | 0.595 | 0.047 | 0.111 |
| Republic of Congo | 8.4 | 9.8 | 0.181 | 0.391 | 0.055 | 0.082 |
| Timor-Leste | 46.6 | 5.7 | 2.560 | 2.248 | 1.000 | 0.735 |
| Post-conflict | | 8.2 | | 0.167 | | 0.052 |
| Cambodia | 3.5 | 4.2 | 0.248 | 0.347 | 0.044 | 0.101 |
| Central African Republic | 4.0 | 0.0 | 0.118 | 0.161 | 0.009 | 0.065 |
| Comoros | 10.1 | 7.2 | 1.249 | 0.977 | 0.080 | 0.117 |
| Haiti | 0.0 | 3.0 | 0.073 | 0.143 | 0.008 | 0.066 |
| Kosovo | 8.7 | 4.2 | 1.006 | 0.822 | 0.320 | 0.270 |
| Lao People's Democratic Republic | 5.3 | 8.0 | 0.464 | 1.036 | 0.039 | 0.122 |
| Liberia | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.040 | 0.204 | 0.018 | 0.122 |
| Myanmar | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Nigeria | 1.7 | 2.2 | 0.050 | 0.056 | 0.019 | 0.013 |
| Papua New Guinea | 12.0 | 0.0 | 0.323 | 0.329 | 0.073 | 0.132 |
| São Tomé and Príncipe | 22.1 | 25.4 | 3.393 | 4.462 | 1.008 | 0.949 |
| Solomon Islands | 3.1 | 0.0 | 0.636 | 0.466 | 0.029 | 0.212 |
| Somalia | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.001 | 0.038 | 0.001 | 0.029 |
| Sudan | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.009 | 0.053 | 0.008 | 0.039 |
| Tajikistan | 6.5 | 3.1 | 0.324 | 0.614 | 0.040 | 0.194 |
| Togo | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.190 | 0.119 | 0.032 | 0.070 |
| Uzbekistan | 1.4 | 1.3 | 0.085 | 0.098 | 0.020 | 0.028 |
| Zimbabwe | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.143 | 0.034 | 0.032 | 0.022 |
| Non-post-conflict | | 1.5 | | 0.110 | | 0.034 |
| LICUS | 2.0 | 3.2 | 0.084 | 0.124 | 0.020 | 0.038 |
| Non-LICUS LICs | 3.4 | 3.6 | 0.070 | 0.080 | 0.013 | 0.020 |
| Non-LICUS LICs (excluding India) | 5.2 | 6.0 | 0.138 | 0.158 | 0.024 | 0.037 |

Source: World Bank database.

APPENDIX J: POLITICAL ANALYSIS RELEVANT FOR STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT IN LICUS

The objective of a country team should be to commission or consume (not necessarily produce) analysis that is directly relevant to and usable in the development of a strategy. Many types and layers of political analysis are useful for this purpose. Some illustrations are outlined below.

Political risk analysis underlies the decision of whether the Bank should engage in a certain country and, if so, how it should engage. This analysis can provide an overall evaluation of the level of stability and instability in the country and suggest the different scenarios that might unfold. Political risk analysis needs to be repeated regularly in LICUS.

Structural analysis seeks to identify major characteristics of the political situation that will affect the work of the Bank, no matter what the specific strategy chosen. For example, structural analysis focuses on the existence of major ethnic or religious conflicts in the country and the distribution of various groups over the national territory that may transform a policy that would work well in a homogeneous environment into one that discriminates against a particular group. This analysis can be carried out at the national, regional, or local level, or for particular

sectors. Structural analysis focuses on the weakness of a particular state, leading to the development of strategies that avoid undermining it further.

Analysis of day-to-day politics needs to go beyond the political gossip about who is up and who is down in the capital, but also needs to look at the distribution of power among different political forces in the capital and in the regions, or even localities. Such analysis is crucial in deciding, for example, whether a more centralized or decentralized approach to reform in a particular sector is desirable. Depending on the situation, decentralization may lead to policies that are more responsive to local needs or, for example, put even more power in the hands of warlords.

Analysis of the history of reform in the country, and often in neighboring ones, is critical for designing an effective strategy. Botched privatization attempts that created a strong backlash in the recent past, for example, would suggest that further privatization should not be part of the Bank strategy immediately, but a compromise solution might be sought instead—for example, commercialization rather than privatization of utilities.

Source: Background work undertaken by Marina Ottaway for this review, 2005.

APPENDIX K: CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN LICUS

Over fiscal 2000–05, 206 projects were approved in the 25 LICUS—148 IDA, 10 IBRD, 38 Special Financing, and 10 project-related Global Environment Facility (GEF) grants. Of these 206 projects, 30 were free-standing capacity development, institutional strengthening, or technical assistance projects, or were projects in which such *components* added up to 80 percent of the total project cost (see table below).

Similarly, over fiscal 2000–05, a large number of grants were approved under different trust fund programs; for example, 29 grants were approved under LICUS Trust Funds and 56 under Institutional Development Funds (IDFs). The Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) is not a trust fund program, but since 1999 it has been eligible to receive contributions from donors. PCF supports

countries emerging from conflict—many of which are LICUS—through research, planning, piloting, and analysis of ground-breaking activities.

Given the large number of trust funds, the analysis was restricted to the LICUS Trust Fund, PCF, and IDF. Eighteen grants under the LICUS Trust Fund and 30 grants under PCF were free-standing capacity development, institutional strengthening, or technical assistance grants, or were grants in which such *components* added up to 80 percent of the total cost (see table below). The list of LICUS Trust Fund capacity-development grants was provided by the Bank’s LICUS Unit and the list of PCF capacity-development grants was provided by the Bank’s Social Development Department. All IDF grants were deemed to be capacity-development grants.

| Country | Project/program title | Instrument |
|-------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| Afghanistan | Emergency Public Administration Project | IDA |
| | Programmatic Support for Institution Building | IDA |
| | Second Emergency Public Administration Project | IDA |
| | Public Administration Capacity Building Project | IDA |
| | Enhancing Knowledge and Partnerships | PCF |
| | Reconstruction Strategy for Afghanistan with Afghan and Other Stakeholder Participation | PCF |
| | Afghanistan Priority Sectors Support Program, and Launch Package for Community Empowerment Program | PCF |
| | Launch Package for Community Empowerment Program | PCF |
| | Afghan Female Teacher in-Service Training in Peshwar (Pakistan) | PCF |
| | Teacher Training Programs for Afghan Refugees | PCF |
| | Balochistan Refugee Teacher Training Project | PCF |
| Angola | Economic Management Technical Assistance | IDA |
| Burundi | Planning for Burundi’s Future: Building Leadership Capacity | PCF |
| | Ex-Combatants Assistance (BEAP) | PCF |
| | (PREVCONB) Program for Prevention of Conflict in Burundi | PCF |

(Continues on the following page.)

| Country | Project/program title | Instrument |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| Cambodia | Land Management and Administration Project | IDA |
| | Rural Investment and Local Governance | IDA |
| | Economic and Private Sector Capacity Building Project | IDA |
| | Cambodian Center for Conflict Resolution—Capacity Development Program | PCF |
| Central African Republic | Policy Support Project | IDA |
| | Public Financial Management and Education Sector | LTF |
| | Public Financial Management and Governance | LTF |
| | Strategic Leadership Seminar for Central African Republic | LTF |
| Comoros | Support to the Comorian Transition Process | LTF |
| | Support to the Comorian Transition Process | LTF |
| | Support to the Comorian Transition Process - Leadership Seminars | LTF |
| | Anjouan Professional Integration of Militia | PCF |
| | Transitional Support to Comoros Economic Management | PCF |
| | Reintegration of Young Militias in Anjouan | PCF |
| Democratic Republic of Congo | Pilot Post-Conflict Rapid Assessment of Living Conditions and Infrastructure | PCF |
| | Demobilization & Rehabilitation Program: Preparatory Phase, Social Reintegration Program - Pilot Activities | PCF |
| Guinea Bissau | Private Sector Rehabilitation and Development | IDA |
| Haiti | Economic Governance Reform Operation | IDA |
| | Governance Technical Assistance Grant | IDA |
| | Support for Economic Governance Reform | LTF |
| | Building Institutional Capacity & Strengthening Provision of School Feeding Program | LTF |
| | Haiti Disaster Risk Management Pilot | LTF |
| Kosovo | Economic Policy/Public Expenditure Management | IDA |
| | Energy Sector Technical Assistance 2 | IDA |
| | Business Environment Technical Assistance | IDA |
| | Energy Sector Technical Assistance 3 | IDA |
| | Kosovo Youth Development Grant | PCF |
| | Energy Sector Technical Assistance | SF |
| | Private Sector Development Technical Assistance | SF |
| Lao People's Democratic Republic | Financial Management Capacity Building Credit | IDA |
| Liberia | Liberia: Community Empowerment Project | LTF |
| | Liberia: Support for Economic Management & Development Strategy | LTF |
| | Public Financial Management | LTF |
| | Reactivation of the Forestry Sector and Forest Management | LTF |
| | Support to Donor Coordination (RIMCO) | LTF |
| | Regional Support for Reconstruction of the Liberian Legal System | LTF |
| Nigeria | Local Empowerment and Environmental Management Project | GEF |
| | Economic Management Capacity Building | IDA |
| | State Governance and Capacity Building TAL (fiscal 2005) | IDA |
| | Economic Reform and Governance Project | IDA |
| Papua New Guinea | Governance Promotion Adjustment Loan | IBRD |

| Country | Project/program title | Instrument |
|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|
| Republic of Congo | Transparency and Governance Capacity Building | IDA |
| | Emergency Support for Integration of Ex-Combatants and Unemployed Youth into Agricultural Sector (FAO) | PCF |
| São Tomé and Príncipe | Public Resource Management | IDA |
| | Public Resource Management Technical Assistance | IDA |
| | Capacity Building and Technical Assistance | IDA |
| Somalia | Capacity Building for Somali Planners | LTF |
| | Livestock Project: Puntland Pastoralists Program | LTF |
| Sudan | Capacity Building for Development in Post-Conflict Sudan | LTF |
| | Expanded Watching Brief - Part 1 | PCF |
| | Expanded Watching Brief - Part 2 | PCF |
| | Nuba Mountains Project | PCF |
| Tajikistan | Empowering Women: Socioeconomic Development in Post-Conflict - 1st Phase | PCF |
| | Women's Empowerment and Socio-economic Development - 2nd Phase | PCF |
| Timor-Leste | Transition Support Program | SF |
| | Administrative Services Capacity Building Project | PCF |
| | Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reintegration Program - Part 1 | PCF |
| | Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reintegration Program - Part 2 | PCF |
| | Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Reintegration Program - Part 3 | PCF |
| | Support to Poor Widows: Widows, War and Welfare | PCF |
| | Capacity Building Assistance & Development Project | PCF |
| | Leadership Capacity Building for Economic Development (LED) | PCF |
| Economic Institutions for Capacity Building | SF | |

APPENDIX L: ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MANAGEMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES IN LICUS

Background work on accountability in the management of natural resources in LICUS was done as part of this review. The main findings are presented below.

The Bank has emphasized issues of governance in natural resource management in country strategies in recent years.

Of the 25 LICUS, 7—Angola, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, and Togo—were identified as “extractive industries–dependent countries” in the IEG 2005 evaluation *Extractive Industries and Sustainable Development* (IEG 2003b). The LICUS Task Force report pointed out high levels of opportunistic behavior in LICUS, especially in natural resource extraction activities, and recommended that measures to improve governance and intensify scrutiny over the uses of natural resource rents be among the high priorities. A review of the Bank’s strategies in the seven resource-rich (extractive industries–dependent) LICUS listed above suggests that issues of governance in natural resource management have indeed been emphasized in recent years. In most cases, this takes the form of analytical work on governance in the natural resource sectors¹ or general financial management and fiduciary studies.²

Natural resource management is also included in progress indicators and triggers.

In Angola, financial support beyond the Transitional Support Strategy was contingent on (i) publication of all government tax revenues and (ii) completion of the Oil Diagnostic Study, and movement to the Central Bank of all oil revenues (except those earmarked to service oil-backed debt) and their inclusion in the Central

Bank’s annual audit. In the Republic of Congo, publication of the annual audit of accounts of the national oil company was among the post-conflict performance indicators (PCPI).

Implementation arrangements, however, are inadequate.

In the Central African Republic, necessary actions for the forestry and mining sectors are outlined in the Bank’s country strategy, but it is unclear how they will be implemented, or what happens if they are not implemented. In Papua New Guinea, similarly, the Bank’s Interim Strategy (2005) mentions that better management of revenues from the extractive industries sector is a priority, and that the Bank will support the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC’s) investment in the mining sector through advisory work (World Bank 2005l, p. 27). At the same time, the Interim Strategy Note lacks details on its engagement, benchmarks, milestones, or other monitoring indicators against which progress could be effectively measured.

Furthermore, emphasis on governance in natural resource management is not LICUS-specific; instead, it is part of the overall trend within the Bank to base strategies more strongly on governance considerations. The IEG evaluation of extractive industries suggests, with regard to the evolution of Bank’s policy and role in extractive industries, that “in the latter part of the 1990s, there was an increased focus on reform and deregulation programs in an effort to further good governance as a central element in the improvement of country economic performance” (IEG 2003b, p. 61). Given the particularly weak governance environment in LICUS, and the abundant evidence of the negative impact of natural resource windfalls,

additional attention and more focused approaches may be required. Even in the Chad-Cameroon Oil Pipeline Project, where the Bank applied some of the strongest safeguards, including a revenue management law designed to ensure that earnings from oil are directed toward poverty reduction, an oversight commit-

tee with members from civil society and Parliament, and a Future Generations Fund in the amount of 10 percent of oil revenues, these provisions proved to be insufficient. The independent oversight committee proved to be understaffed and did not have sufficient information from the government and Exxon Mobil.