This case study examines the impact of World Bank assistance to the education sector in Mali from 1990 to 2005. It also examines the ways in which government, donors, NGOs, and civil society have responded to the enormous challenges in the sector. It also suggests a variety of ways in which the support from all actors, and particularly the Bank, can be improved.
Malian children are among the poorest in the world. In 2001, 239 children per 1,000 died before reaching age five; 83 percent of children had anemia. Those children who make it to school are confronted with a system ill suited to their needs. There are not enough chairs, books, pencils, or teachers, let alone more modern teaching materials. For most children, most instruction is in a language they do not understand. Not surprisingly, a very high percentage of children in the Malian school system fail. Repetition rates averaged 19 percent per year in 2002. The pass rate for the sixth-grade primary school exam is about 50 percent; sixth-grade students are frequently incapable of decoding single sentences in their textbooks.
Significant investments over the past 30 years have improved the technical functioning of the sector. Services such as statistics, curriculum development, and in-service teacher education have clearly improved, and there is a healthy policy dialogue about substantive issues such as teacher hiring, public-private partnerships for service delivery, use of national languages, curriculum reform, and textbook policy. However, the basic story of Malian education over the past 30 years is the triumph of form over function, of expansion over quality, of inertia over reform. Neither the government of Mali nor the donors active in the sector have succeeded in bringing either access or achievement to acceptable levels.
The World Bank was very active in Mali during this time, with a total of 78 approved IDA credits. Assistance to education was continuous and can be divided into three distinct approaches: (i) financial assistance, including structural adjustment credits, Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative, and Poverty Reduction Support Credits; (ii) education policy initiatives ranging from home-grown policies such as ruralization, the Nouvelle Ecole Fondamentale, and the Programme Décennal de l’Education (PRODEC) to international initiatives such as EFA; and (iii) direct investment in discrete elements such as teachers, curriculum, infrastructure, and textbooks.
Case Study Organization
The study team reviewed progress in quantitative expansion, educational outcomes, and equity (regional, rural/urban, economic, and gender). Data on student achievement were limited, as were data on links between schooling and other outcomes, such as employment, fertility, and productivity.
The team attempted to contact all World Bank staff involved with the Malian education sector since 1990, as well as all ministers of education and ministers from other critical ministries (primarily Finance and Planning) from the same period. The team met with at least one central-level representative from all critical technical areas, such as textbooks, teacher education and school construction, and with numerous staff at all decentralized levels. Donor and NGO interview lists were constructed based on interventions during the case study time period. The team also met with members of Parliament, parents’ organization representatives, a former leader of the student union movement, other union leaders, and leaders of private school organizations. The case study team visited 18 schools.
World Bank Support for Expanding and Improving Primary Education
Early World Bank support
World Bank lending to the education sector in Mali started in 1973 with support for non-formal education. The Third Education Project in 1984 provided support for the first time to formal education through teacher education for primary school teachers, along with support for nonformal adult programs.
The implementation of the Third Education Project occurred in a difficult economic context (see chapter 2), with the country undergoing a series of adjustment and stabilization programs. These programs dominated Bank assistance to Mali in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The conditionality that they contained still affects the education sector and is still negatively referred to by Malians. One of the most disliked measures was the “voluntary departure program,” through which about 1,000 teachers left the sector, representing about 12.5 percent of the teaching force.
World Bank Support from 1990 to 2005
World Bank assistance to the education sector during this period included policy dialogue, analytic work, lending, technical assistance, and capacity building. The Country Assistance Strategies (CAS) of 1994, 1998, and 2003 cite education as a key poverty-alleviation strategy, and there was continued emphasis on policy dialogue and funding for the sector during this time.
The fourth education project (Education Sector Consolidation Project, Cr. 2054-MLI, US$26 million) opened in 1989, followed by the Education Sector Adjustment Project (ESAP, Cr. 2673, US$50 million, 1995), the Learning and Innovation Loan (Cr. 33180, US$3.8 million, 2000), and the Education Sector Investment Program (EdSIP, Cr. 3449, US$45 million).
ESAP (Cr. US$25 million) consisted of an adjustment component of US$3 million and an investment component of US$22 million. The investment component aimed at increasing primary enrollment in three Regions and improving quality nationwide. Enrollment targets were met and classroom construction exceeded targets, but the adjustment component was unsuccessful and two-thirds of the adjustment funding was cancelled. ESAP was a repackaging of the Education Sector Consolidation Project’s adjustment conditions. It
achieved most of its objectives. Sustainability seemed likely for the less-controversial reforms, but a few, including the ceiling on scholarship expenditures, were reversed prior to the credit closing date.
Concurrently with the implementation of these latter projects, the government of Mali, with Bank assistance, was preparing its 10-year education strategy. During program preparation, the Improving Learning in Primary Schools Learning and Innovation Loan (Cr. 33180, US$3.8 million) was approved. Under this project, the number of pédagogie convergente (bilingual) classrooms increased from 300 to 2,056.
In 2000, the EdSIP opened with the support of the Bank and 15 other donors and a total cost of over US$0.5 billion. Activities included: (i) increasing GER from 47 percent in 1997 to 75 percent by 2008 through school construction, preservice teacher education, and increased involvement of communities and the private sector in school financing and management; (ii) improving educational quality by expanding pédagogie convergente, increasing expenditure on textbooks and other learning materials, and decentralization of personnel and budget management; and (iii) making the education system more cost effective by hiring public school teachers outside the civil service to reduce wage costs, and redirecting scholarship resources for secondary students toward activities that would improve learning conditions at the secondary school level. The EdSIP started slowly. In March 2004, disbursement was only 45 percent and the credit’s closing date was extended from December 2004 to December 2005.
Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. The Bank’s support to the education sector in Mali continued with collaboration of the education and economic teams on the HIPC and Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) initiatives. Mali became eligible for HIPC in 1999 due to its external debt burden, its vulnerability to external shocks, and its good track record of adjustment. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process began in 1998. The PRSP
was to be Mali’s medium-term framework for poverty reduction policies and strategies. Human development, including education, was one of three priority areas. The PRSP is partially financed by HIPC funds, which totaled an estimated FCFA 75 billion in 2002-2004. Forty-five percent of this amount was allocated to education and adult literacy.
Contributions from Other Donors to the Education Sector
Many donors have been involved in Mali’s education system over the past 15 years, including through co-financing of World Bank-led projects. A range of national and international NGOs have also contributed to sector development, either with their own resources or as implementing agencies for donor programs. Save the Children (USA and UK), Care International, World Vision, World Education, and Plan International are the largest NGOs working in Mali. Many smaller NGOs have supported the sector: Santé Sud has built community schools; Paul Gérin Lajoie has supported school management committees; Action Mopti works with schools; and the Groupement des Retraités Educateurs sans Frontières conducts teacher education.
EdSIP
The PRODEC/EdSIP marked a new beginning for coordinated donor financing. Most donors participate today, making donor participation far more coherent and reducing the administrative burden on the government of Mali. Because EdSIP is sufficiently descriptive and includes a clear list of short-term activities, donors can now better direct their support. The program has improved Ministry of Education leadership, although it has not resulted in uniform implementation procedures.
The World Bank’s Contribution
In a context where partners had unequal power, it is difficult to separate Bank policy from Malian policy. At times (for instance, with higher education reforms) the Bank influence was so strong that the government of Mali changed its policies even knowing that they could not be implemented. The government was so in need
of funding that it imposed reforms until finances were released and then rescinded the reforms. The Bank often guided policy development through the offering and withholding of resources, along with continuous policy advice.
The adjustment projects stressed increasing resources for the education sector, and especially for basic education. The Bank took the lead among donors in policy dialogue with the government of Mali, raising issues such as scholarships, enrollment in upper secondary and higher education, and budget increases and reallocations. Education’s current budget as a percentage of the national current budget rose from 20 percent in 1991 to 30 percent in 2005 (MEN 2005) and the budget for basic education as a percentage of the education budget rose from 36% in 1993 to 65 percent in 2004 (MEN 2005).
To improve educational quality, the Bank supported teacher education (preservice and professional development), textbooks, and, since 2000, the expansion of pédagogie convergente. The Bank has also been a consistent supporter of gender equity in access to education and of decentralization. The case study mission was told that education is now the most decentralized sector in Mali.
The Bank has supported a variety of capacity-building activities since 1990, including training in school mapping, information and communications technology, procurement, budgeting, the use of software for educational planning and modeling, and a variety of technical areas such as curriculum and textbook development. However, capacity as measured by impact on the sector continues to be low. From 1990 until 1998, Bank-financed projects were implemented by the Bureau des Projets Éducation, an independent unit housed in the MEN and staffed with civil servants relieved from their usual responsibilities. The suppression of the Bureau in 2001 forced the administration to be more involved in policy dialogue and program implementation.
Efficiency and Sustainability of Changes Supported by the Bank
Bank support had a strong effect on Mali’s GER, which increased from 26 percent in 1990 to 71percent in 2004. The most important activities were the creation of the Basic Education Support Fund (Cr. 2054), the introduction of double shift teaching, the redeployment of teachers from administrative positions to classroom teaching positions, and the emphasis on the recruitment of contractual teachers. In addition, the Bank’s leadership of policy dialogue in the mid 1990s encouraged additional donors to contribute to the sector.
Prior to the beginning of PRODEC, the Bank was minimally involved in educational quality issues, other than its emphasis on resources for teaching and learning materials and the recruitment of pedagogic advisors. After 1998, the Bank contributed to improving educational quality by financing textbooks, recruiting pedagogic advisors from among experienced teachers, ( supporting curriculum reform and associated teacher professional development, and supporting the expansion of the bilingual education reform.
The Bank’s interventions have not been effective at improving classroom-level conditions or student learning. Investments were made in relevant areas (textbooks, teacher education, and school health), but procurement delays and the focus on the central level rather than the service delivery level have kept them from having a substantial impact. The devolution of funds directly to schools—focusing more attention on the needs of teachers, allowing schools to “contract” for services with local education offices, providing professional development opportunities to teachers and linking them with career and salary advancement—are alternative strategies that might have been more effective.
The efficacy of Bank support was lessened by contradictions in policy recommendations and project-financed activities. Structural adjustment measures reduced the number of teachers in the sector. Contract teacher recruitment was unorganized, and the Bank did not contribute substantially to contract teacher training. These policy contradictions slowed progress in improving educational quality. The Bank pressured the government of Mali to introduce double-shift teaching, which permitted rapid increases in enrollment but decreased instructional time per student, a major factor in student achievement.
In the early 1990s, the Bank pressured the government of Mali to limit access to teacher education to high school graduates, but the reluctance of graduates to enter teaching resulted in the near closure of the teacher education program. The government recruited contract teachers with little preservice teacher education and struggled without Bank support to provide them with short-term training. This decreased salary expenditures, but had a major negative impact on educational quality.
Last, although the Bank financed many textbooks, inefficient distribution and training have kept Malian students from having even one book in each core subject at the end of the case study period.
The education system will be dependent on donor aid for the long term. This was ensured by the government of Mali and Bank policy shift away from low-cost nonformal programs in the 1970s and the continued globalization of the system in the 1990s. The government and donors are pushing the system to an even higher level of dependence, with the attempted computerization of operations at all administrative levels, the ongoing purchases of expensive vehicles, and planned technology centers in teacher education institutions. The functioning of some services within the ministry has improved, but none of it will be sustainable without further external support.
The counterfactual is impossible to know fully. If the Bank had not provided resources after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the economy could have collapsed, resulting in violence and chaos. However, the adjustment program had a very negative and pervasive effect on the opinions of Malians toward the Bank. Perhaps, in the absence of Bank and other donor support, the government of Mali would have been forced to be more effective. More likely, though, the country would have been even poorer and the system even less functional. Based on the results of the case study, the more useful question at this point in the development of the sector is how the Bank can make better choices and provide better support.
Lessons
The story of the World Bank’s support to the Mali education sector over the past 15 years is a cautionary tale about the fragility of policy dialogue. It underscores how challenging it is to establish and sustain a partnership whose members are unequal in strength and change frequently. In addition to a number of country-specific lessons, the Mali experience highlights the need for evidence-based dialogue that incorporates country perspectives while maintaining core principles about the importance of educational quality, equity, and access.
Country-specific policy dialogue in education must receive sustained attention from sector managers, country directors, and regional management. During this period, the Bank was too often dismissive of flawed but promising reform initiatives championed by the government of Mali that could have been the beginning of country-led systemic change. The Bank also did not provide a consistent evidence-based reform argument. It also appeared indifferent to fundamentally important programs managed and negotiated by other donor partners, including most notably, the NGO-managed community schools program that was the cornerstone of USAID support through the late 90s and early 2000s.
Support for national languages and preservice teacher education provide further examples of the Bank’s inconsistent policy advice. The use of national languages as a medium of instruction was supported by the World Bank in the mid-70s and then dropped until 2000. Similarly, preservice teacher education, initially supported heavily by the Bank, went through a long period of neglect and hostility that resulted in the closing of much of Mali’s preservice teacher education program. Only under the EdSIP did the Bank begin to rethink its decisive earlier move away from preservice teacher education; no significant reform has yet occurred.
Donor coordination
Ultimately, donor coordination may be less important than donor coherence. Over the past 10 years, donors in Mali have taken advantage of frequent consultations and dialogue to improve the coherence of their interventions. While harmonization of procedures has proven elusive, the increased cooperation among donors has led to a far greater sense of shared purpose and goals among donors and government.
Quality at exit
Much is made of the importance of quality at entry. Similar attention must be given to quality at exit. As projects or programs come to an end, how will policy dialogue be continued? How can children be made less vulnerable to changing priorities? For example, when USAID pulled back from its community school intervention, an absolutely critical program of support in largely rural areas of the country over the past decade, there was little discussion among the donors, including the World Bank, about how to mitigate the potential negative impact among the most marginalized children.
Participation and ownership
The approach used by the Bank and other donors while preparing EdSIP significantly contributed to the development of Mali’s capacity in policy design. Malians developed the 10-year education policy largely by themselves, with external funding. The process ended with the presentation and defense of the program to the national Assembly, which was a learning and legitimizing experience for the sector.
Conclusions
The Bank has been a major contributor to educational finance and policy change since 1990. Without its involvement, system expansion would not have occurred as rapidly as it did, and educational policy may have remained incoherent and based on disparate, donor-driven interventions. Nevertheless, the quality of Bank intervention has been inconsistent and has also had negative effects. The Bank has generally been unsuccessful in leveraging its lending program into direct impact on student experiences at the classroom level.
The careful choice of approaches would increase efficiency and improve children’s lives. This approach can be based on strong in-
country and regional ongoing analytic work; reading of recent, peer-reviewed education literature and studying of successful programs; and the use of impact analysis, combined with achievement-focused incentive systems for teachers, technicians, and administrators.
Business as usual is unlikely to deliver the breakthroughs needed to reach sector goals. An intensified sector dialogue, widespread adoption of policy initiatives such as the bilingual education program, and a significant increase in resource availability at the classroom level are the only avenues likely to lead in the medium term to significant change in the Malian educational context.
