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Accession Negotiations Surged
Ahead under Swedish Presidency At the June European Union (EU) summit meeting in Göteborg, Sweden, Central and East European leaders praised the Swedish EU presidency for its achievements in advancing EU enlargement. Not only did Sweden stick to the deadlines of the timetable for enlargement negotiations adopted at the Nice Summit in November 2000, but it also pushed the enlargement agenda forward on a number of contentious issues. Although
politely called negotiations, the talks are about changing laws and institutions
to conform Sweden upheld the principle of differentiation, recognizing that each accession country should be measured on its own merits, and when ready, accepted to the EU. This contrasts with the approach that bundles countries and lets them join together, like the first wave Luxembourg group or the second wave Helsinki group. Sweden also upheld the catching up negotiation principle, that is, the possibility for those who started negotiations later to catch up with other candidates. As part of the catching up strategy, the Swedish presidency aimed at putting as many new chapters on the negotiation agenda as possible. By the end of June, all chapters had been opened with 10 countries, 8 of which are likely to join the EU in the immediate future (the Visegrad five, that is, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia; and the three Baltic countries, namely, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). Bulgaria and Romania would join later. In addition to opening new chapters, a large number of chapters were temporarily closed. The catching up strategy has clearly worked. The race to membership has drawn closer, with two Baltic countries, Latvia and Lithuania, closing the gap with front-runner Estonia. Most observers recognize that the Swedish-Baltic connection has contributed strongly to this success. The final negotiation meeting under the Swedish presidency was held on June 27, 2001. It established the following ranking: Cyprus and Hungary were leading the pack, with each having provisionally closed 22 of the 31 negotiation chapters. Slovenia followed with 20; the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Slovakia with 19; Lithuania with 18; Malta and Poland with 17; Latvia with 16; Bulgaria with 10; and Romania with 6. Since that time Belgium, which took over the presidency from Sweden, has been able to close several more chapters with individual countries. Even though it was psychologically important for countries such as Latvia and Lithuania to catch up and affirm that they could make it to the finishing line together with the first wave countries, not all want to consider the negotiations for EU membership as a competition. For example, Latvian Foreign Minister Andris Berzins noted that "it is easy to close chapters if you just give in on all the demands of the EU and request no special deals and transition periods." This is also a reason why countries such as Poland are quite relaxed about lagging behind the faster, but much smaller, front-runner countries. "Closing quickly is not always the best tactic," said Polish chief negotiator Jan Kulakowski in a recent interview with the Financial Times. He maintained that holding a hard line on sensitive issues could be a way to put pressure on and extricate concessions from the member countries. The assumption is that the EU is genuinely worried that excessively long negotiations could further undermine public support for enlargement, both within the EU and in the candidate countries. The Swedish presidency was the first to tackle such difficult chapters as the free movement of goods and services, capital, and labor, as well as the environment. A first breakthrough occurred when the environment chapter was closed with Slovenia in March, and subsequently in June with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Lithuania. Perhaps the trickiest issue Sweden had to deal with was to find a compromise on the free movement of labor. Whereas in May at an informal meeting of EU ministers for foreign affairs tempers on this sensitive issue were still running high—with the Austrians and Germans demanding a seven-year transition period for the free movement of workers, and the Finns, under pressure from their trade unions, aligning with this position—the Swedish presidency managed to broker a compromise that will enable the EU to impose a two-year restriction on the free movement of workers from candidate countries. Individual countries may extend this period by up to seven years, but only if their labor markets are heading toward serious disruptions. Consequently, the issue of transitional rules for the free movement of workers was agreed on with Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, Malta, and Slovakia. Countries such as the Czech Republic or Poland that have publicly claimed they would never accept any transition rules on the free movement of labor will most likely ultimately accept this deal. Transition periods were also granted for the free movement of capital. One of the thorniest issues is the free sale of real estate, which is still extremely cheap in the new member states compared with EU price levels. The EU proposed a five-year transition period for vacation (secondary) properties (a similar arrangement was agreed on during the 1995 enlargement round that brought in Austria, Finland, and Sweden), and a seven-year transition for agricultural properties. The Czech Republic and Hungary approved this arrangement. Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovenia—which did not request a transition—have also closed this chapter. Clearly there was a tradeoff between the demand for moratoriums on land purchases in the capital chapter and the request by some EU countries for transition periods for the free movement of workers, which demonstrates how individual issues in separate chapters are often connected. The Swedish presidency was also successful in overcoming the attempt by the coalition of southern member states, led by Spain (the others are Greece, Ireland, and Portugal), to demand continued payments from the EU’s Structural and Cohesion Funds to their backward regions, in exchange for supporting the enlargement, that is, for not vetoing it. This sparked furious reactions from the other member states. As a result Spain dropped the demand for a formal agreement, but successfully lobbied for a "verbal understanding" that promised continued EU support to these countries. Ironically, Spain is taking over the presidency in the first half of 2002, when negotiations on the difficult regional policy chapter are scheduled with the candidate countries. Finally, Sweden has shown a great deal of support for the candidate countries’ wish to get clear target dates for accession. It managed to broker a compromise formula that states that the enlargement process is irreversible, and those candidate countries that are ready can complete negotiations in 2002. While the European Council meeting in Nice had cautiously expressed the hope that the new member states would be able to take part in the next European Parliament election in 2004, the document approved in Göteborg called for participation by the new members in much stronger terms, "even if the accession treaties were not formally ratified." This was an encouraging signal to the candidate countries. As the enlargement negotiations progress, the EU is getting ready to calculate the cost of enlargement and to negotiate the remaining financial issues, scheduled for early 2002. The author is PhD Researcher, Free University Brussels (VUB). |
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