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Accounting Standards in China
by Ray Ball, Ashok Robin, and Joanna Shuang Wu

Since China adopted its open-door policy and embarked on a path to economic reform more than two decades ago, the world has witnessed a stunning transformation. GDP growth has averaged 8 percent per year, exports have grown 15 percent per year, the state’s share of industrial output has shrunk from 78 to 28 percent, China has attracted $300 billion of foreign direct investment, and individual and foreign portfolio investment have become considerably more significant. China is now an active participant in the increasingly integrated world markets.

Prior to the reforms, China’s accounting rules were adapted to a Soviet-era planning system. Like their counterparts in many countries, China’s regulatory authorities have concluded that international transactions would stand to gain if the accounting standards Chinese companies used conformed more closely to international practice. Higher-quality financial statements also increases their utility in evaluating managers’ performance, a significant problem during China’s transition from state control to a market economy.

China has made a great deal of progress in reforming its accounting standards. Most notably, in 1992 the Ministry of Finance promulgated a completely new set of standards for domestic companies known as the Accounting Standards for Business Enterprises (ASBE). The ASBE were based on International Accounting Standards (IAS) and adapted to local conditions.

Despite these reforms, the quality of domestic financial statements was thought to be insufficient for international users for the following reasons:

  • While the ASBE are based on IAS, they are different in several aspects. They overlook the rule that inventories are valued at cost or at market price, whichever is lower, and do not report if the value of land, buildings, and equipment becomes nonrecoverable.

  • Under the ASBE international users do not receive a certification that the financial statements conform to internationally acceptable standards or an indication of the extent of any divergence.

  • The financial statements of domestic companies reporting under the ASBE are audited by domestic audit firms, whose independence has been questioned. Staff in many of these firms were formerly internal accountants in the companies they now are required to audit, and in the Chinese context their relationships with and obligations to former colleagues who now are managers in their client companies are likely to persist.

Managers have few incentives to incorporate losses in reported income on a timely basis. (Economic losses arise from reduced present values of expected future cash flows from an individual asset or group of assets, for example, a portfolio, a business unit, a subsidiary company, or a strategy. Timeliness implies that soon after managers are aware of an economic loss, an asset write-down is charged against income.) Information asymmetry is resolved at least in part by private communication rather than through published financial statements. The pressure for transparent, publicly-disclosed accounting information is reduced by the following:

  • The prevalence of guanxi (connections) networks, as well as by extensive share ownership by the state and by institutional investors.

  • The strong role the government plays in the accounting system and the resulting close link between tax reporting and financial reporting, which create demands such as ensuring a stable source of tax revenue for the state and avoiding reporting embarrassingly large profits or losses.

  • The stock exchange listing rules that require companies to be profitable, providing a further incentive to hide losses.

  • The many institutional features that limit the quality of accounting information. Transactions among organizations with historically close relationships under state ownership are widespread, and when the state remains as a major shareholder, this provides enhanced opportunities for income manipulation to hide losses. Off balance sheet liabilities of uncertain quantities (for example, to provide housing, schooling, or health care) further reduce the transparency of financial statements.

  • The shortage of qualified accounting professionals and the lack of auditor independence, which hinder the application and enforcement of accounting standards.

  • The rudimentary legal framework and the essential absence of shareholder litigation provide issuers (managers and auditors) with little incentive to incorporate economic realities, including losses, in published financial statements in a timely fashion.

Thus government regulation by itself will not induce the provision of high-quality accounting information. Managers and audit firms must face market-based incentives to ensure that such information is provided. Accounting standards interact closely with the institutional environment, including the development of an independent judicial system, the reform of the management and governance of state-owned enterprises, the implementation of bankruptcy law, and the reform of the financial and tax systems.

The real challenge facing accounting in China today involves the domestic uses of accounting information, for example, in resource allocation, corporate governance, stewardship, and performance evaluation, and the development of auditor training and independence. This implies that the most fruitful area for Chinese accounting reform lies not in simply adopting or imitating IAS, but in reforming domestic institutions.

The authors may be contacted as follows: Ray Ball, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 1101 East 58th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, tel.: (773) 834-5941, email: ray.ball@gsb.uchicago.edu; Ashok Robin, College of Business, Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY 14623, tel.: (716) 475 -5211, email: ajrbbu@rit.edu; Joanna Shuang Wu, William E. Simon Graduate School of Business Administration, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, tel.: (716) 275-5468, email: wujo@ ssb.rochester.edu. The authors’ sample consisted of 1,625 firms during 1992–98.

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