•Domestic oil production is on an upward trend, from 1.1 million tonnes in 1993 to 1.28 million tonnes last year. This is sufficient to generate 27 percent of Cuba's electricity production. A target of at least 1.4 million tonnes is envisaged for 1995. Cuban domestic oil has a very high sulphur content, and is mainly used for electricity and cement plants. These industries continue to operate at low levels of capacity utilization, although their output is no longer in freefall. The transport system is still heavily dependent on imported crude oil, and therefore remains in a critical condition. However, the Russian and Ukrainian sugar beet harvest has been so poor that both states have recently resumed oil deliveries in an attempt to revive the 'sugar-for-oil' barter trade. This arrangement broke down in acrimony last year.

•The Sugar harvest this year is expected to be one of the lowest in memory —probably below 4 million tonnes, less than half 1980 levels. But foreign partners are now supplying essential harvest inputs: fertilizers, herbicides and spare parts (to be paid in raw sugar, the international price of which is now rising). This should result in some improvements next year. Sugar Minister Nelson Torres in early March claimed that next year's sugar production could reach 5 million tonnes, higher than previous estimates.

•Nickel and cobalt production in 1995 could rise by 20 percent, authorities project, as a result of injections of foreign capital in modernizing plants. (From 46,600 tonnes in 1989, output fell to only 26,800 tonnes in 1994.) Cuba has the potential to be one of the three biggest producers of nickel and cobalt.

·The Number of foreign tourists visiting Cuba rose 10 percent last year to 682,000, and gross tourist expenditures increased by around 18 percent in dollar terms. Both trends can be reasonably extrapolated into the current year.

•Industrial production other than sugar is officially estimated to have risen by 5.5 percent last year, reversing previous steep declines. Barter or investment agreements with foreign companies have been established and are likely to sustain and even extend the turnaround.

•The Construction sector, deeply depressed for a long time, also showed some recovery, particularly in the critical area of low-income housing and in a few other priority sectors.

Authorities claim that GDP—the Western measure of national income—rose 0.7 percent last year, and should rebound further this year. In contrast, Miami observers claim that Cuba's economic performance in 1994 fell by more than 6.0 percent and will decline by a further 2.5 percent in 1995. Interpreting such figures is complicated by the absence of any price index through which to adjust for inflation. However, two indirect measures give some guidance as to the severity of underlying inflationary pressures:

•In spite of massive cutbacks in public bureaucracy and public sector subsidies, the public sector deficit for last year was still estimated at around 7.3 percent of GDP. This can only be financed through currency emission.

•Although in the last few months the black market rate for the dollar has stabilized at an improved level,it still stands at around 40-1, compared with an official 1-1 parity. That means that there is potentially an inflationary liquidity overhang, if dollars in circulation are included in the money supply at the free market rate.

The economic team was reshuffled in January, strengthening the presence of officials who have experience with Western market economies. Moreover, President Fidel Castro promised further incremental reforms toward a market economy, envisaging that small and medium-size private enterprises will be authorized. However, the international environment remains adverse for Cuba's economic reformers, and the domestic reforms in prospect are still too cautious and slow to create the conditions for a dynamic market economy capable of real development, rather than just basic survival.