Germany, for instance, which has influenced to some degree legal history and legal development in eastern countries, has a very strong administrative law review system. Indeed, there is an entire judicial branch solely concerned with the legality of administrative acts—structures similar to the civil courts, with a Federal Administrative Supreme Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) at its head. The constitutional court (Bundesverfassungs-gericht) has the constitutional right to check the constitutionality of laws, and hear complaints that a law is unconstitutional and therefore administrative action based on it that damages the plaintiff’s interests should be voided.

France has a different history, but its Conseil d’Etat (infamous recently because of its President, Roland Dumas) has its own, different rules for the control of administrative acts, which are also, to a certain extent, reviewed by ordinary courts.

The Anglo-Saxon legal history and system is indeed peculiar and quite different from the Continent, and crucial distinctions exist between Britain and the United States, as Rainer Grote persuasively and clearly explores in his article "Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat and Etat de Droit" in Constitutionalism, Universalism and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis, (Christian Stark, ed.) Nomos Ed., Baden-Baden, 1999, page 269 sequitur. This legal tradition has led England to have no constitution but still one of the most powerful judicial checks on the legality of laws and administrative acts.

This is precisely the reason, however, why "implanting" the common-law system is not advisable: bereft of tradition and intimate understanding of what the rules are meant to achieve and how they are supposed to be applied, it will create adverse results in the host country. Interpretation of statutory regulations will breed more predictable results. Also the countries of the former Soviet Union do have a "code tradition," however faint. Therefore it seems to be bad advice to persuade them to change course onto a more risky path.