Latvia’s Dilemma: Financing
Accession Costs While Maintaining Fiscal Constraint
by Inna Steinbuka
Latvia places high priority on
joining the EU and participating in the Economic and Monetary Union soon after
accession. Through monitored programs, the Fund assists the Latvian authorities
in meeting some of the most difficult targets in order to comply with the
Copenhagen and Maastricht economic criteria. Coordination and consistency
between the Fund and the European Commission are lacking, however, because of
the different and even conflicting mandates of the two institutions.
Since
the start of transition in Latvia, the IMF has been the main agency supporting
macroeconomic stabilization, while increasingly helping implement
"transition packages" on the structural front. When Latvia applied for
EU membership (in 1995), and particularly after the Helsinki Summit approved
Latvia as a candidate for EU membership (in December 1999), the Fund’s
programs became an integral part of the EU accession strategy.
By carrying out successive economic programs endorsed by the
Fund and supported by its stand-by arrangements, Latvia was able to accelerate
the accession process and the convergence with EU member states. (Stand-by
arrangements are IMF credits that finance temporary balance of payments deficits
of member countries and must be repaid within 3¼–5 years.) The new program,
under a "precautionary" stand-by arrangement for 2000–01, seemed to
be consistent with the accession strategy. (The arrangement is considered
"precautionary" because the money is available, but the Latvian
authorities are not supposed to use it, only in case of a crisis.) However,
Latvian policymakers realize that they face a rather difficult tradeoff between
the extra budgetary spending implicitly required by the EC for EU membership and
the tight fiscal policies required by the Fund.
The IMF Insists on Tight Fiscal Policies…
Fear that high current account deficits leave the Baltic
countries vulnerable to external shocks is the key reason why the Fund requires
tight fiscal policies in all of these countries. Although the outlook for Latvia’s
external sector has improved since 1998 (table 1), the current account deficit
remains relatively large. Current improvement probably cannot be sustained in
light of the expected acceleration in domestic demand. Latvia exports low
value-added items, such as food products, textiles, and wood, while importing
high value-added products, such as transport equipment and electronics. The need
for imported capital equipment to modernize industrial production is likely to
grow rather than diminish, as will demand for oil and gas. As a result, the
current account deficit is likely to increase.
In the past decade, the current account deficit was comfortably
covered by foreign direct investment. This trend continued in the first three
quarters of 2000, despite delays in large-scale privatization. Ensuring external
sustainability remains one of the key challenges over the medium term.
Fiscal tightening is crucial in Latvia, largely because the
country has adopted a fixed exchange rate regime that leaves limited scope for
the active use of monetary instruments. In the past decade, the fiscal deficit
was relatively low, exceeding the 3 percent target only in 1994 (because of
increases in net lending), in 1995 (because of the banking crisis), and in 1999
and 2000 (because of the Russian crisis) (table 2). The Fund—which monitored
the 16-month economic program that started in late 1999—was not happy with the
results, criticizing the government for failing to reduce the deficit. As a
result, the program was suspended before its completion.
Lithuania also failed to meet its fiscal targets in 2000, but
its economic program was nevertheless endorsed by the IMF. There, however,
modest overshooting of the target reflected the ongoing recession and the
impressive reduction of the current account deficit. In contrast, in Latvia the
economy is expanding rapidly, thus fuelling imports, and the difference between
the actual and the target fiscal deficit was larger than in Lithuania. In
Estonia, where economic prospects look good, the government did not request a
new arrangement with the IMF after the successful completion of its last
program, in 2000. By early 2001 Lithuania was the only Baltic country that had
an economic program supported by an IMF precautionary stand-by arrangement.
The Latvian government is now ready for a new 20-month program,
which it expects the IMF to support. The new program includes the typical
medicines used to combat an increase in external imbalance and potential
pressure on local currencies: tightening of fiscal policies and accelerating
structural reforms.
… While the European Commission Requires New Spending
The European Commission (EC) requirements and guidelines for
macroeconomic and structural reforms are addressed in the "Joint Assessment
of Economic Policy Priorities," prepared jointly by the EC and the Latvian
government. This document is generally consistent with the Fund-supported
programs. Three differences are noteworthy, however. First, the joint assessment
is aimed at medium-term priorities, while the Fund programs focus on near-term
objectives. Second, the Fund-supported program clearly lays out the government’s
responsibilities and provides a timetable for full and timely implementation. It
is more specific than the EC-Latvia Assessment , which allows the authorities
flexibility in selecting and adjusting their policy mix in order to achieve the
medium-term priorities. This document thus provides a framework for dialogue
between the Latvian authorities and the EC rather than specifying a set of
policies. Third, implementation of Fund-supported programs is well monitored
through a set of quantitative performance criteria, indicative targets, and
structural benchmarks. In contrast, compliance with the accession strategy is
monitored by the government and EC staff.
The EC’s "Progress Report on Latvia," which
evaluates Latvia’s ability to assume the obligations of EU membership,
presents an overall assessment of the chapters on the acquis communautaire.
That implicitly imposes some potential pressure on Latvia’s fiscal position,
because it requires that Latvia adopt EU environmental and other standards. Some
experts estimate that the extra spending requirements for EU accession may be as
high as 5 percent of GDP for several years in all candidate countries. The EC
Office estimates that the costs of meeting environmental requirements alone
could amount to 2–5 percent of GDP a year. EU transfers to Latvia to finance
at least part of such spending could be somewhat above 1 percent of GDP in 2001,
at best these transfers would rise only modestly over the medium term.
Financing these costs under the tight fiscal framework will be
difficult for Latvia. The only sensible way to do so is to improve
prioritization and management of public spending.
The preparation of a Pre-Accession Economic Program has already
helped policymakers focus on medium-term budgetary targets. In the years to
come, however, the Latvian government will have to handle the difficult tradeoff
between fiscal discipline and extra spending.
Inna Steinbuka is professor at the University of Latvia, at
present, advisor to the Executive Director at the IMF. Author’s Email: ISTEINBUKA@imf.org.
Table 1. Current Account Balances in the
Baltics, 1996–2001
(percent of GDP)
| Country |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000 a |
2001 a |
| Estonia |
-9.2 |
-12.1 |
-9.2 |
-6.2 |
-6.5 |
-6.5 |
| Latvia |
-4.2 |
-5.1 |
-9.8 |
-9.7 |
-7.2 |
-6.3 |
| Lithuania |
-9.1 |
-10.2 |
-12.1 |
-11.2 |
-6.9 |
-6.7 |
a. IMF projections.
Source: International Monetary Fund.
Table 2. Consolidated Fiscal Balances in the Baltics, 1996–2001
(percent of GDP)
| Country |
1996 |
1997 |
1998 |
1999 |
2000
(performance 2001
criteria under the PSBA)a |
2000
(actual) |
2001
(indicative criteria) |
Estonia
|
-1.6
|
2.2
|
-0.3
|
-4.7
|
-1.2
|
-1.2
|
0.0
|
Latvia
|
-1.8
|
0.3
|
-0.8
|
-4.2
|
-1.9
|
-3.5
|
-1.5
|
Lithuania
|
-4.5
|
-1.8
|
-5.9
|
-8.5
|
-2.8
|
-3.3
|
1.4
|
a. Precautionary Stand-by Arrangement.
Source: International Monetary Fund.
|