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Fiscal Decentralization: Basic
Policy Guidelines for Practitioners
by Kenneth Davey
Fiscal decentralization
is the currently fashionable term used to describe the financial aspects of
devolution of power to regional and local government. The term covers two
interrelated issues: the division of spending responsibilities and revenue
sources across levels of government (national, regional, local, and so forth)
and the amount of discretion given to regional and local governments to
determine their own expenditures and revenues (both in aggregate and in detail).
These combined dimensions have a significant impact on the reality of
decentralization in its broad political and administrative sense. How much power
and responsibility regional and local governments actually exercise depends
crucially on what range of public services they finance, whether their revenues
are commensurate with their responsibilities, how much real choice they have in
allocating their budget to individual services, and whether they can determine
the rates of their taxes and charges (both allowing them to vary their level of
spending and making them answerable to the payers).
Spending Responsibilities
There is wide diversity across states in terms of the scale of
tasks devolved to local government. In most countries, local government is
responsible for what are often called communal services: local roads and
lighting, water supply and sanitation, waste management, parks and sports
facilities, cemeteries, low-income housing. What varies greatly is the extent of
local responsibility for the social sector, chiefly comprising education,
health, and social assistance. In some cases, these services are funded by the
state budget; in some, costs are split between levels of government, and, in
others, local budgets meet all costs except central supervision. Cost splitting
may be by function (the state pays for secondary education, hospitals, and
social benefits, and local government pays for basic education, primary health
care, and social services) or by cost factor (the state provides professional
salaries, while local government pays all other operating costs).
The degree to which local budget responsibility for the social
sector varies has an important effect on the nature and scale of
decentralization. Without devolution of such responsibility, local government
expenditure is unlikely to exceed 5–6 percent of GDP. Responsibilities for
education, health care, or social assistance are likely to increase local
expenditures by a factor of two or three, with a major impact on financial
self-sufficiency. Major social sector responsibilities are usually combined with
substantial dependence on state grants or tax shares, both because of the
limited capacity of revenues that can be assigned to local levies and because of
the need to equalize financial resources in order to meet expectations of
geographical equality in access to these social services.
It is customary to distinguish between current and capital
expenditure. Current expenditure covers such operating costs as salaries,
repairs, energy and other utilities, travel, materials, and debt service.
Capital expenditure covers investment in new construction, major renovations,
and purchase of land and durable equipment. It is also customary to distinguish
between the financial sources for these two types of expenditure. Operating
costs are normally covered by a combination of local taxes, user fees,
intergovernmental transfers (either grants or subsidies), or shares of state
taxes.
Local Discretion
Clearly, the structure of local government responsibilities and
resources affects the local government’s discretionary power—its ability to
make decisions about the nature and levels of local services. If local
government obtains a significant proportion of local taxes and charges, it is in
a much better position to determine how it spends the money. Revenue shares and
block grants should provide more freedom of allocation than targeted grants.
In practice, local discretion depends on a more complex set of
factors. Sharing a well-established national tax may support more budgetary
choice than dependence on a politically sensitive and administratively
burdensome local tax. Targeted grants may simply release local government funds
for other expenditures. Expenditure decisions may be largely determined by
national regulations over service requirements.
The classic argument for maximizing local discretion is most
associated with U.S. economist Wallace Oates. He argues that the greatest
efficiency is achieved when budgetary choices are made by local officials
elected by local people who have to meet the full cost of their decisions
through local taxes. This view has been challenged by European writers, who
consider the link between local government budget choices and popular preference
somewhat tenuous. They argue that the efficiencies of local expenditure choice
outweigh those of local taxation; many important fields of local expenditure,
such as education or environmental services, combine legitimate national and
local interests. Moreover, in recent years national macroeconomic policy has
sought to restrict fiscal burdens; it has been common for governments in both
Eastern and Western Europe to restrict local taxation, particularly on business,
to stimulate investment and growth. The extent of local discretion is,
therefore, a matter of balance between national and local interests: neither
central control nor local autonomy has priority.
Dynamic Process
Fiscal decentralization determines the framework of
expenditures, revenues, and legal discretion within which regional and local
governments operate. It does not deal with issues of financial management,
budgeting, accounting, delegation, procurement, auditing, or other similar
processes through which local governments manage their financial affairs. These
are equally important, but the subject of a separate body of law and practice.
Fiscal decentralization is inevitably a dynamic process.
Although local governments’ responsibilities and resources may be fixed in
law, demands on their services and the value of their revenues respond to social
and economic changes over which lower levels of government have little control.
It is essential to maintain channels of consultation between national government
and local government associations so that adjustments can be made in a timely
and equitable way, usually through the equalization formula.
This article is based on "Fiscal Decentralization,"
published in the LGI quarterly, Local
Government Brief in September 2000. It is available online, at lgi.osi.hu/newsletter/index.html.
Table 1. Local Expenditures as Percentage of GDP in Central Europe, 1990s–1998
Country
|
Early
1990s
|
1994
|
1995
|
1996
|
1997
|
1998
|
Czech Republic
|
9.3
|
8.0
|
7.9
|
7.1
|
6.8
|
–
|
Estonia
|
7.1
|
11.9
|
11.7
|
11.3
|
10.5
|
11.9
|
Hungary
|
17.4
|
16.8
|
14.1
|
13.3
|
12.0
|
13.0
|
Latvia
|
12.5
|
10.3
|
10.8
|
11.7
|
9.4
|
9.4
|
Lithuania
|
13.1
|
11.2
|
11.1
|
9.0
|
7.6
|
–
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Poland
|
5.9
|
7.1
|
6.5
|
8.2
|
8.6
|
8.6
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Slovakia
|
4.8
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4.3
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3.7
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4.0
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4.1
|
3.8
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Slovenia
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4.4
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5.4
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4.6
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4.9
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4.8
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4.9
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– Not available.
Source: World Bank, Ministry of Finance, Budapest, Tamás M. Horváth, and Janis Bunkss.
Table 2. Local Government Expenditure as Percentage of General Government
Expenditure in Central Europe, 1994–98
Country
|
1994
|
1995
|
1996
|
1997
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1998
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Czech Republic
|
20.6
|
20.8
|
18.8
|
16.6
|
–
|
Estonia
|
33.1
|
31.4
|
29.8
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28.1
|
30.6
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Hungary
|
26.7
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26.6
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27.2
|
25.5
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24.7
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Latvia
|
26.0
|
26.2
|
26.2
|
24.2
|
25.2
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Lithuania
|
32.7
|
31.8
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28.7
|
22.9
|
–
|
Poland
|
19.0
|
19.1
|
24.6
|
26.8
|
34.0
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Slovakia
|
11.8
|
11.0
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12.0
|
12.2
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13.9
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Slovenia
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11.5
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10.1
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10.8
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10.5
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9.2
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–Not available.
Note: Figures exclude social insurance fund expenditures.
Source: Tamás M. Horváth, ed. 2000. Decentralization: Experiments and Reforms. Budapest: LGI.
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