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Managing World Bank Operations in the Balkan Hot Spot—Interview with Country Director Christiaan J. Poortman

Country Director Christiaan J. Poortman is responsible for World Bank operations in Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, FR Yugoslavia, and Macedonia, a region that is considered one of the most dangerous hot spots in the world. What are the strategic priorities of the Bank considering its limited resources? How can the Bank contribute to peace and stability in this area? These were some of the issues discussed with Transition Editor Richard Hirschler in the following interview.

Q. Does the Bank have a regional policy for this area, or do you deal with the individual countries separately?

A. As you know, we are providing loans on a country by country basis; individual country programs are the focus of our work. But we are trying to follow a more coordinated, regional strategy, especially since the crisis in Kosovo. We increasingly collaborate with Andrew Vorkink, Country Director in charge of operations in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania, on a regional approach. So, for example, under a Trade and Transport Facilitation Project, we provide similar loans or credits to Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, and Romania to update customs administrations and improve border control, and thus promote trade flows across the borders in Southeast Europe.

Our regional approach is coordinated with the Balkans Stability Pact, signed by countries of the region and the international community after the Kosovo crisis. The Bank, together with the European Commission, is charged with coordinating development assistance to the area. Last year the Bank produced a regional strategy paper, "The Road to Stability and Prosperity in South Eastern Europe," which served as a background document at the first Regional Balkans Donor Conference (see box). So we are increasingly looking at the regional dimensions of our country assistance programs.

Q. If implemented, the strategy will radically change the political and economic landscape of the Balkans. But recent events in Macedonia remind us that the region can easily become destabilized, that ethnic conflicts can erupt with frightening force. What are the chances that the Stabilization Pact holds?

A. This being the Balkans, we cannot plan with certainty. After Milosevic was overthrown and a democratic Yugoslavia emerged, it seemed finally that regional integration could become a reality. But this optimism is being overshadowed by the crisis in Macedonia, which erupted so quickly and unexpectedly. We are also facing new problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Croats threaten to create their own entity. A split between Montenegro and Serbia also is a distinct possibility.

We still hope that economic development and greater political stability will elevate these countries to a higher plateau, where conflict is increasingly seen as the wrong way to resolve issues. Significantly, these countries aspire more than anything else to get closer to Europe. The European Commission has indicated a path toward eventual integration into the European Union—the path of collaboration and coordination among the Balkan countries—and the Bank is helping that process along.

Q. Certainly, but as you were pointing out, ethnic hostilities can rise to the surface quite unexpectedly, upsetting ambitious reconstruction and development plans, as is happening right now in Macedonia.

A. These conflicts will continue to be a problem and a challenge. Economic development, poverty alleviation, and across the board income generation will certainly contribute to stability and peace among the various ethnic groups, but we are also dealing here with political issues, vested interests, and criminality. In Macedonia, for example, the Albanian minority complains about being treated as second-class citizens—in the political but also frequently in the economic sense. The Macedonian government, in which the Albanians are also represented—has been trying to address that concern.

Q. They are certainly racing against time. Aided by the World Bank, the reconstruction of Kosovo is making impressive progress, but its economy is run by foreign experts. Locals are not involved in a substantive way in the work of the "fiscal authority" or the "monetary authority," as the Ministry of Finance and the National Bank are called in this territory.

A. This is the result of the United Nations Security Council resolution that created UNMIK, the Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. It is Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General who has ultimate authority. But UMNIK’s administrative departments, which are analogous to ministries in a national administration, are headed jointly by international civil servants and local officials. A joint interim council has been set up in which both Albanians and Serbs are represented. This is an advisory council, it lacks executive power, but it reviews a wide range of issues.

At the beginning of this year Kosovo held municipal local elections, which went well. Local people now represent the population at the local level. The next step may be elections for an assembly with delegated responsibilities. The recent donor conference underlined the need to train local Kosovars, give them more responsibility, and make sure that they are ready to assume administrative duties. Part of our program is focused on building up local capacities, so that Kosovars can one day manage the economy themselves, whatever political settlement is reached.

Q. So, you have no clue about the political future of Kosovo?

A. No, and that is not my business either. But it would be useful to get some clarity, because political developments affect the environment for economic development, too. Uncertainty and insecurity do not create a good climate for private investment. This is the greatest handicap the region faces.

Q. Yugoslavia’s membership in the IMF, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has been established, but its World Bank membership is still not settled.

A. Although FR Yugoslavia is not yet a member of the Bank that does not mean that we are not very active there. The Bank’s Board recently approved a $30 million Trust Fund to provide grants to Yugoslavia. We will commit that Trust Fund very quickly to bridge the period between now and the time membership be established and we are up and running with the regular program. In addition, together with the European Union, the Bank co-chaired the first donor conference on supporting FR Yugoslavia. We are also working with the authorities on a major medium-term structural reform program, which will be submitted to the donor conference to be held sometime in May or June.

Membership is a complicated issue, because of Yugoslavia’s arrears. Arrears to the IMF were relatively small ($150 million) and were financed with a bridge loan. Yugoslavia’s debt to the Bank is much larger ($1.7 billion). So we have to work out an arrears clearance plan, which is not easy. All this takes considerable time. But we are making good progress and intend to take the membership recommendation to the Board next month. It was easy for Yugoslavia to join the EBRD, as it had no arrears there. Arrears with the European Investment Bank have not been cleared yet.

Q. You outlined three major areas where the Bank is involved in Kosovo: building institutions, strengthening the private sector, and helping the poor. Are these also the priorities of the Bank’s strategy elsewhere in the region?

A. Yes. We need in particular to support the private sector in the region, creating favorable conditions for private investment, bringing in foreign investors. The conflict in Macedonia could not have come at a worse time: it can destroy the investment climate that was built up in that country over the past 10 years. Macedonians were introducing the right macroeconomic policies, but for a long time investors were absent and the economy stagnated. Later things started to look better. The country was settling its differences with Greece, investors became interested in Macedonia, and the economy started to expand. And then came this crisis, which can harm not only the Macedonian economy but the region as a whole. For example, the tourist industry in Croatia is hoping for another bumper year on the Adriatic, but if the armed conflict drags on, there may be fewer visitors.

Q. Even without conflicts, the governments in the region are pressed hard by the transitionary recession: the postsocialist economies must adjust to a free-market economy, which means, at least in the early phases, shrinking GNP, cutting back on living standards, and accepting price hikes and increased unemployment. This can easily turn societies against their governments. Is the Bank ready to adapt its strategy to these realities? How will it be able to help defuse the escalating social conflict?

A. Very much in the same way it has in other countries. We are combining our investment operations with social programs for the truly needy and vulnerable, while promoting new job creation. It is also important to help micro, small, and medium-size enterprises. We have introduced in the region some extremely successful small and microenterprise projects, but obviously it takes some time before they start to have major effects. Privatization often fails to bring about the desired employment creation and economic growth. Many state enterprises have been stripped of their assets and are in need of radical restructuring, including downsizing their labor force. They require new investment. New private investment is really the key to accelerated development, because that is eventually where the strong supply response is going to come from, which will generate the employment that is so badly needed to deal with these social problems.

Q. There are heated discussions within and outside the Bank about its future role, all underscored by budget cuts and staff downsizing. In Southeast Europe, however, the Bank has responsibilities to maintain if not increase its activities. Will you be allocated more funds to use in Southeast Europe?

A. The short answer is no. Of course, the Bank will continue to be involved in these countries, where per capita income is in the lower range. Most of the countries are IDA recipients, but the pool of IDA money we can offer is limited. On the other hand, many of these countries are only gradually becoming creditworthy, so the amount of IBRD loans we can offer them is relatively small. They also have problems of how to absorb reasonably the borrowed money. Macedonia, beginning this July, will "graduate" and receive only IBRD loans. As a result, none of them may be able to borrow as much as they did earlier. Kosovo might receive more, and new lending is expected to FR Yugoslavia. To sum up, with the exception of FR Yugoslavia, there won’t be dramatic changes in our level of total lending.

Q. So, you have to manage operations with limited resources. What will be your priorities be in the next couple of months?

A. First of all, in all these countries—Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and potentially Yugoslavia—we are going to work more intensively with the governments on poverty-reduction strategies. We will continue with private sector development and public resource management. We will assist capacity-building in Kosovo and support private sector expansion in Macedonia and Bosnia–Herzegovnia. In Albania we will finance relatively more infrastructure investment. We continue to provide budgetary support through adjustment operations. In all of these countries operations reflect a change in the Bank’s overall activity: we are gradually reducing our infrastructure investment and moving increasingly toward a radical approach on poverty alleviation.

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