Reforms on the Silk Road: Institutional Reform in Central Asia
by Tony Verheijen, Sergei Sirotkin, and Anastazia Kozakova

Before regaining independence, Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—had similar institutional systems, based on the leading role of the Communist Party. Their public institutions, established by law, were duplicated and superseded by the unregulated party administration. Thus once the Soviet Union fell apart, initial institutional reforms aimed at eliminating this duplication and establishing basic democratic institutions. This did not mean that the former communist nomenklatura left the political scene in mass, rather that they moved into new nonparty institutions. Thus in Central Asia the composition of the ruling elite has changed less than institutional systems.

· In the first phase of chaotic or naive democracy, between 1991 and 1995, national assemblies became more influential. But the increased political role was not accompanied by higher professionalism. As a result political processes became more spontaneous. Attempts by parliamentary institutions to intervene in the turf of the executive branch pushed the executive power to limit the role of these democratic institutions. By the mid-1990s it became obvious that the government had lost control over social and economic processes in most of the region’s states.

· During the second phase, which began in the mid-1990s and continues today, presidential power became stronger in response to the perceived loss of government control over social and economic development. Thus it would be a mistake to interpret the institutional transformation in Central Asia solely as a development toward authoritarian rule. The centralization of power in presidential institutions was the result of a search for more effective governance. Parliaments in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic recently made moves to regain some of the lost ground—possibly indicating another shift in the balance of power between state institutions.

· It is ethnically centered. The renaissance of national identity has occurred at the expense of the region’s non-native-speaking populations. As a result a substantial percentage of ethnic Slavic citizens have emigrated and are continuing to leave Central Asia. Apart from the civil war in Tajikistan, the primary causes of emigration are discontent over measures to promote national languages as state languages and related concerns that the rights of ethnic Russian minorities may suffer. In Kazakhstan during the first half of 2000 the population shrank by more than 53,000, compared with 45,500 during the same period in 1999. More than half the emigrants were ethnic Russians. Similar trends prevail in other countries of the region; in the Kyrgyz Republic the portion of ethnic Russians fell from 8 percent in 1989 to 3 percent in 2000. Tajikistan has lost more than 75 percent of its Russian minority, who now constitute just 2.7 percent of the population. In all five countries the Russian-speaking population has been practically removed from top-level policymaking. The departing citizens possess vital technical expertise and managerial experience. Thus the ongoing emigration is potentially damaging to economic stabilization efforts and institutional development.

· The traditional clan structure. Historically, all Central Asian nations are divided into clans and tribes that form larger territorial factions. The political status quo reflects the balance of power between clans and factions. Preserving this balance is crucial to maintaining political stability. (The power relations between clans and factions were observed even by the communist administration during the Soviet era.) Developments in Central Asia cannot be accurately assessed without heeding this phenomenon. Changing the clan structure that serves as the framework for the governing elite is much more difficult than implementing institutional reform. Often, the modern and (semi-)democratic institutional system is just a thin layer covering the traditional clan structure (see page 26).

· Significant discrepancies between the existing legal model and the main features of policymaking. Various traditional and informal practices, bypassing democratic institutions, play an important role. In other words, a modern institutional system is filled with traditional cultural and mental "stuffing" that substantially affects how the system functions. Widespread nepotism based on clan affiliation coexists with (and fills in) the modern legal and institutional framework for the civil service. The functioning of the institutional system simply cannot be understood and explained without paying attention to these traditional informal practices and structures.

· In Kazakhstan in the late 1990s, the number of ministries and the direct ties between the state administration and the economy were sharply reduced. The Civil Service Agency, created to manage implementation of the Civil Service Law (1999), has emerged as the driving force in administrative reform. The agency has had to cope with strong resistance from line ministries wary of having restrictions imposed on their recruitment and dismissal practices. So far the agency has been able to overcome this resistance: a system of job descriptions and job classifications has been created and is being piloted.

· In the Kyrgyz Republic the civil service law adopted in 1999 is already being reviewed by a working group because the law provides limited protection against political dismissals and lacks clarity in defining the boundaries between political office and state administration. But progress is being made on restructuring the state administration; several years of across-the-board staff cuts, driven by ever-declining budgets, have created a system of small and weak central ministries that are running an extensive network of subordinated bodies with insufficient human resources.

· In Tajikistan political conditions still do not allow the government to focus on capacity building, as security continues to top the political agenda. Nevertheless, a civil service law was adopted in 1999, and a special Public Administration Reform Unit has been created under the president’s administration, with the support of the World Bank.

· In Uzbekistan public sector reform was designated a priority by President Islam Karimov in 2000. The development of a training system and the adoption of a civil service law are being considered, although little information is available on the current state of these two initiatives. Administrative reform appears to be focused on transferring functions to lower levels of government, as well as decentralizing certain social welfare functions to the community level.

· In Turkmenistan the Institute of Democracy and Human Rights, under President Saparmurat Nyazov, has been commissioned to develop a concept on strengthening local governance. (This indicates that administrative development is on the table even in the most closed of the Central Asian states.)

· Clarifying the division of powers between the state government and the local self-government at all levels.

· Strengthening financial management to sustain economic prosperity and ensure the efficient allocation of funds.

· Increasing local sources of revenue, stabilizing spending responsibilities, and giving the authorities greater financial autonomy—including less restrictive central control.

· Clearly identifying responsibilities for procuring public services.

· Promoting the convergence of national and local development objectives.

· Involving citizens in decisionmaking and policy planning.

· Developing sustainable capacities to promote professionalism among local government officials.

Tony Verheijen is chief technical adviser, Sergei Sirotkin is human rights adviser, and Anastazia Kozakova is decentralization adviser at the United Nations Development Program/RBEC (Regional Bureau for Europe and CIS) Regional Support Center in Bratislava.