A recent World Bank research project sheds light on the many factors affecting saving. The work has important policy implications for developing countries, particularly in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa, where savinfs rates have stagnated or devlined over the past 30 years.
Over the past three decades differences in savings rates across
countries have widened significantly. The gap between industrial and
developing countries has grown, and so have differences across regions
(figure 1). Savings rates nearly doubled in a handful of countries in
East Asia, where they averaged almost 30 percent of disposable income
between 1984 and 1993. But in most of the rest of the world saving
fell. In OECD countries saving declined from more than 25 percent of
gross national disposable income in 1965 to less than 20 percent in
1995. In transition economies the rate of saving has declined since
the onset of reform in the late 1980s. Latin America and the
Caribbean's already modest savings rates fell to about 15 percent of
disposable income, and the low rates in Sub-Saharan Africa to between
10 and 15 percent.
Savings rates and long-term income growth move together, suggesting a virtuous cycle in which high rates of saving lead to greater prosperity, which in turn leads to even higher rates of saving. Countries with low saving may be caught in a poverty trap. In these countries a low rate of saving leads to stagnation, which further reduces the rate of saving, dooming the country to poverty.
A large body of literature has shed light on different aspects of consumption and savings behavior, but it has left a long list of policy-related questions on saving largely unanswered. A recently completed World Bank research project, Saving across the World, addressed many of these questions, examining three broad issues:
The World Saving Database covers 112 developing and 22 industrial countries for up to 35 years (1960-95). It includes a broader set of countries than earlier databases, corrects inconsistencies in national accounts data and savings determinants, standardizes definitions relating to the composition of the public sector, and includes a set of related savings and consumption determinants, such as income growth rates, interest rates, monetary aggregates, and demographic indicators. The database includes both raw data and data that have been adjusted to account for capital gains and losses from inflation and real exchange rate devaluation. (The data set and underlying documentation are available on the Internet; for information go to www.worldbank.org/research/projects/savings/data.htm.)
Real per capita income is positively correlated with private savings rates,
suggesting that policies that spur development are an effective way
of raising private saving. The influence of per capita income is
larger in developing economies than in industrial countries,
suggesting that the effect of the level of development on saving
tapers off at medium or high levels of income (figure 2).
Tax incentives have only small effects on national saving, particularly when the negative effects on public saving are taken into account. But tax incentives may change the composition of saving without changing the overall savings rate.
Countries with pay-as-you-go systems do tend to have lower savings rates than those with fully funded systems, other things equal. But the direct, short-term effects of pension reform on saving will depend on how the government finances the transition deficit. Theoretical models suggest that debt financing has no effect on savings rates in the short run, while the effects of tax financing are ambiguous. The welfare of low-income, borrowing-constrained earners may be reduced, however, if pension reform forces them to save more than they would have chosen to save.
In the long run the indirect effects of pension reform may predominate. If reform is effective in reducing labor market distortions and spurring capital market development, these indirect effects may increase efficiency and growth, raising the rate of saving.
Financial liberalization that includes interest rates usually results in a rise in real interest rates on deposits. This means that each unit of resources saved yields more interest income, reducing the need to save. But the "price" of current consumption rises with interest rates: households might save more because a unit of income saved now would yield greater interest income in the future. Liberalizing interest rates will increase saving only if this intertemporal substitution effect overcomes the income effect.
There is no consistent evidence supporting a positive net effect of liberalization on saving. If liberalization expands the supply of credit to agents that had been credit-constrained, this can reduce saving, because easier access to credit reduces the need to set aside resources in anticipation of adverse income changes. Cross-country evidence reveals that a 1 percentage point increase in the private credit flow to income ratio reduces the long-term private savings rate by 0.74 percentage point.
Scrutiny of the countries that have moved from low to high savings rates reveals that increases in foreign aid are positively associated with takeoffs of both private and national saving. Aid may reduce saving in some countries and increase it in others. If a country is unable to borrow all it wants, foreign aid would be expected to replace domestic saving. But if the country is undergoing economic reform that invites more aid and induces higher investment and growth, aid and savings rates would tend to move together. This is probably what we see in the takeoff economies.
Other papers and data from the savings project are available at www.worldbank.org/research/projects/savings/policies.htm.