People with no choice but to use a government service can influence the quality of that service by getting a "voice"---speaking up at public meetings or through user groups
Public accountability is eroding in developing countries. Layers of bureaucrats in charge of public services rarely respond to the service users' needs. But a government service is frequently a monopoly. Customers seem to have no alternative but to accept poor and often declining efficiency and effectiveness.
In the late 1980s, however, the Indonesian government began encouraging villages to organize user associations that give farmers a voice in the delivery of water to their fields. In some villages these associations pay a user fee that covers a portion of the irrigation service expense. In others they do not. Still other villages have neither association nor fee. Drawn from all three categories, 12 villages in two districts of East Java provide a sample of the differing results and point to some general conclusions.*
During a period in which areas without user associations saw no improvement in irrigation service, villages that got organized got better action from the irrigation agency. The number of complaints from farmers declined. The response time of the agency improved. And the farmers in user groups reported improvements in the fair sharing of irrigation water and, most important, in the likelihood that they would receive sufficient amounts at the proper time---essential to the success of their crops (see figure).
One small surprise, however, is that the users' satisfaction with the irrigation agency's response to requests and complaints has not changed markedly. That is not necessarily bad. Gaining a way to voice complaints probably raises expectations and standards. When farmers are better informed about plans and promises, they are likely to be less tolerant of poor performance---especially if they are paying a fee. In any case, nearly all farmers in water user associations agree that they have been better off since the associations were founded.
Part of the gain for the farmers comes about because membership in a user group gives them a better understanding of their rights. The organized groups work out a division of responsibility with the agencyÑan agreement, for example, on who performs what maintenance. Such communication and setting of responsibilities are even stronger in the groups that pay fees.
The fee structure is laid out in a legal document. If the group doesnÕt pay, it doesn't get water. If the irrigation agency fails to deliver water as promised, the fee can be withheld.
For the government the fee is a way to cover some costs. For the farmers it is another means of "voice," a tool that they can use to get a response to their needs. To help ensure that this voice is heard, a portion of the fee is used as an incentive payment for the government agency employees. One outcome: a more reliable supply of water appears to have yielded better crop results. Another: farmers who pay fees are not quite as satisfied with the agency as those who don't.
The Indonesian experience points to several ways that developing nations can improve the accountability of government bureaucrats and, through this, the efficiency and effectiveness of public services:
While much has been learned about the role and impact of competition and user choice in society, "voice" is an underresearched area. As the demand for improved service and accountability increases in the developing world, governments need to pay more attention to this mechanism. Privatizing some functions and services now performed by the government is one way to improve accountability and service delivery. But many essential services will continue to be the responsibility of government agencies. New ways are needed to make these institutions servants of the taxpayers. The lessons from 12 villages could have an impact that spreads well beyond two districts of one developing country.
* For more details, see Samuel Paul, "Does Voice Matter? For Public Accountability, Yes," Policy Research Working Paper 1388, World Bank, Washington, DC, 1994.