Vietnam

Ratings for the Second Phase of the Second and Third Program for Communes Facing Extreme Hardship in Ethnic Minority and Mountainous Areas (Program 135) Project for... Show More + Vietnam were as follows: outcomes were moderately satisfactory; risk to development outcome was substantial; Bank performance was moderately satisfactory and borrower performance was also moderately satisfactory. Some lessons learned includes: for the Development Policy Credits (DPCs) in support of decentralization reforms, active engagement with both national and sub-national leadership and levels of government is essential to build consensus and gain backing for the intended decentralization reforms. Promoting policy reforms for poverty reduction requires a multiple and coordinated engagement with the Government. Successful gender mainstreaming requires strong awareness raising and endorsement at all levels from policy makers to implementing agencies and local authorities. Program design should be flexible enough to allow for adjustments in poverty targeting over time. Policy interventions promoting innovative approaches to improving livelihoods are likely to be more successful if they directly address the core business and quality of agricultural sector services. Systematic and effective impact evaluation arrangements can greatly enhance learning. Show Less -

Ratings for the Vietnam First Poverty Reduction Support Credit Project was as follows: outcomes for the first project were satisfactory, the risk to development outcome... Show More + was moderate, the Bank performance was satisfactory, and the Borrower performance was satsifactory. Ratings for the Vietnam Second-Fifth Poverty Reduction Support Credit Projects were all as follows: outcomes were satisfactory, the risk to development outcome was low to negligible, the Bank performance was satisfactory, and the Borrower performance was satsifactory. Some lessons learned included: 1) a stable macroeconomic and political environment contributed greatly to the successful implementation of difficult structural reforms in Vietnam; 2) overall, progress was slower in policy areas characterized by limited political will, conflicting institutional responsibilities or insufficient analytical work; 3) an effective coordination mechanism is essential to overcome the logistical challenges posed by a wide ranging and cross-cutting policy dialogue; and 4) the Vietnam experience demonstrates that poverty reduction support credit programs, with very low conditionality, are a well-suited aid instrument in countries with strong government ownership of the reform agenda and its capacity to deliver in practice. Show Less -

The ratings for the Vietnam Second Poverty Reduction Support Credit Project were as follows: the outcome was satisfactory, the sustainability was satisfactory, the institutional... Show More + development impact was substantial, and the Bank and borrower performance were both satisfactory. Following are findings and implications: In Vietnam, a stable political environment contributed to the successful implementation of macroeconomic and structural reforms. The risk of erosion of political support was minimized and reversals due to political changes became less likely. The political support was achieved with the building of a broad-based consensus and strong government commitment through the preparation of the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (CPRGS). To complement the government's strong ownership, the availability of technical assistance grants from donors, and strong and close Bank team support played a key role in low-income countries with weak technical working level capacity. Show Less -

The assessment of outcome is satisfactory, sustainability highly likely, and institutional development impacts were substantial. Lessons primarily suggest that a stable... Show More + political environment is helpful for successful implementation of macroeconomic, and structural reforms - given the risk of erosion of political support was minimal, and reversals due to political changes were unlikely. Second, the broad-based consensus, and strong government commitment permitted a timely implementation, while the presence of capable, and committed officials, was key to overcoming some of the emerging difficulties in implementation, especially in state-owned enterprises (SOE), and trade reform, as well as in the Joint-Stock Bank restructuring. Third, the availability of technical assistance grants from donors, and strong Bank team support were extremely useful, particularly true of process reforms of the sort undertaken in SOE and banking reforms, which need a lot of handholding within institutions. Fourth, effective donor coordination is crucial in a transitional economy: capacity to implement structural reforms can easily be overwhelmed by the relatively large number of donors, therefore, it is critical that donors coordinate their activities closely, and minimize duplication of efforts, an aspect well handled, both in the design, and implementation of the project. Show Less -