Vietnam

Ratings for the Three Cities Sanitation Project for Vietnam were as follows: outcomes were satisfactory, the risk to development outcome was moderate, Bank performance... Show More + was satisfactory, and Borrower performance was also satisfactory. Some lessons learned included: 1) the project successfully introduced the concept of user pay in the sector. However, cost recovery targets proved to be too ambitious and did not adequately account for the slow pace of change in the legal framework and the risk of economic crisis slowing plans to raise fees; 2) slow uptake of house connections by households in the project areas has reduced the efficacy of the sewerage system installed under the project. Future project should consider working with the Government to include house connections as part of the civil works; 3) future projects working at a sub-national level need to address the issue of protracted delays in the approval of contracts, compensation and site clearances. Strong commitment by local government is critical; 4) these firms need to have not only technical expertise/financial ability but also contractual management/project management capacity. Adequate resources need to be mobilized for achieving satisfactory performance; and 5) the valuable lessons on building the capability and services of sanitation and drainage companies need to be captured in a systematic manner to guide future projects. Show Less -

Ratings for the Mekong Delta Water Resources Project for Vietnam were as follows: outcomes were satisfactory, the risk to development outcome was moderate, the Bank... Show More + performance was satisfactory, and the Borrower performance was also satisfactory. Some lessons learned included: appraisal rated the risk of a resettlement-related counterpart funds issue as 'substantial', and this proved to be true during implementation. However, it did not anticipate the magnitude of soaring land prices in the Delta area which made this issue much more complex and the resettlement process much more difficult during the course of the project. The government knew as much as International Development Association (IDA) did that timely release of counterpart funds was a determinant factor for this project but delays in the approval or release of resettlement funds occurred due to bureaucratic factors, some of which were beyond the control of the implementing ministry or even the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) and Ministry of Finance (MOF). It should be recognized that although these kinds of development interventions can be implemented well they involve time-consuming processes with numerous social uncertainties which do not fit the time-frame of a typical IDA project. More flexibility should be allowed in budget releases and the use of allocated resettlement funds in a given year since physical works of irrigation projects must fit into narrow construction windows of the Delta area (i.e. the six-month dry season) by allowing unused budget to be carried over into the next fiscal year. This, however, may require a reform of the budget management system at the MOF and the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD). Technical design flexibility should be allowed at project design, appraisal and continue to be so during implementation stage to quickly respond to new demands from beneficiaries. The implementation could be much quicker if the Government could arrange sufficient counterpart fund to advance the technical design process to ensure the early project start-up. Show Less -