Mongolia

Ratings for the Renewable Energy for Rural Electricity Access Project for Mongolia were as follows: outcomes were satisfactory, Global Environment Objective (GEO) outcomes... Show More + were satisfactory, the risk to development outcome was moderate, the risk to GEO outcome was moderate, the Bank performance was satisfactory, and the Borrower performance was also satisfactory. There were four lessons learned: 1) Transfer of international experience should be done with appropriate adaptations. 2) Team should have flexibility to change based on evidence on the ground. 3) There must be a balance between cost recovery and affordability. 4) Focus is needed on institutional aspects of Soum center electrification. Show Less -

Ratings for the Second Development Policy Credit Project for Mongolia were as follows: outcomes were satisfactory; risk to development outcome was moderate; Bank performance... Show More + was satisfactory and borrower performance was also satisfactory. Some lessons learned includes: the operation emphasized the crucial importance of understanding the political economy context for policy reforms. The financial crisis highlighted the need for Mongolia to improve its overall policy framework in order to prevent future boom-and-bust cycles, and provided a key window of opportunity for engagement by the World Bank and other partners. The ability and resources to scale up such work quickly, are essential for a successful and timely outcome in crisis- response operations, and particularly when trying to lay the basis for sound medium term policy framework. It is important to gauge from the beginning of an operation the capacity, both technical and political, of the borrower or the implementing agency to implement the reforms. Show Less -

Ratings for the Financial Capacity Development Project for Mongolia were as follows: outcomes were moderately satisfactory, the risk to development outcome was moderate,... Show More + the Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and the Borrower performance was also moderately satisfactory. Some lessons learned included: the Bank and Government should be realistic about the risk of procurement delays at the outset to avoid administratively costly extensions or squeezing the timeframe for implementation. The Government and Bank should extend projects if there is a reasonable chance of increasing the developmental impact. The Bank should be realistic about the risks related to designing financial sector projects that target only a few banks. Monitoring and evaluation indicators must be sufficiently demanding if they are to serve as useful tools for a project. For a successful privatization, government must maintain a commitment to a controlled and transparent privatization process. The savings bank privatization in Mongolia demonstrated the well-known lesson that the most important factor affecting outcome is not the government's development of a good action plan, but the Government's commitment to fully implement the plan. Show Less -

Ratings for the Transport Development Project for Mongolia were as follows: outcomes were moderately satisfactory, the risk to development outcome was significant, the... Show More + Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and the Borrower performance was also moderately satisfactory. Some lessons learned included: use of trials and pilots in the case of countries facing severe climatic conditions is important. During the project several pilots of alternative road surface designs were carried out. Pilots are helpful to assist with the selection of proper technologies given the conditions of Mongolia: harsh weather, long distances making it costly to carry road construction materials, sparse population making it difficult to secure personnel to carry out road maintenance. Since Mongolia road engineering standards were relatively old and inadequate, such trials and pilots were essential to assess proposed new standards before they were adopted. Better-than-average project preparation is necessary in countries with short construction seasons. Countries with long and harsh winter conditions such as Mongolia only have a few months when conditions allow for carrying out road improvement works. Thus, better and more rigorous planning and procurement compared to other countries is necessary to ensure that works can be scheduled and implemented in a way that maximizes utilization of the short construction season, thus minimizing the cost of road works and facilitating an early completion of the works. Show Less -

Ratings for the Justice Sector Reform Project for Mongolia were as follows: outcomes were satisfactory, the risk to development outcome was moderate, the Bank performance... Show More + was satisfactory, and the Borrower performance was also satisfactory. Some lessons learned included: the projects with limited and targeted objectives, which are firmly embedded in the Borrower's reform priorities and offer both judicial training and infrastructure enhancement can, provide both the physical and human capacity foundations necessary for substantially new court systems. The projects must offer flexibility while not being overly-ambitious. Careful attention must be given to what is relevant and attainable in the context of a country's legal reform efforts. Full achievement of project outcomes often can only be accurately measured well after the closing of an individual intervention, raising potential problems with using the Learn Investment Loan (LIL) as the best investment vehicle for such projects. Projects offering grants can provide assistance in supporting priority research topics, increasing access to legal databases and reforming legal training curricula. The project team might have injected more of a sense of urgency in the early stages of the implementation of the legal curriculum reform activities which were late in getting underway. The Bank, using its well recognized comparative advantage as an effective convener, especially in leading donor coordination, and having access to global knowledge, might have accelerated the start of the curriculum reform activities by organizing an international conference on the subject. The lack of a robust monitoring and evaluation system and its dependent baseline data deprive otherwise good projects of the possibility of being systematically reviewed and its performance judged. Staffing of Bank supervision missions should include those with specialized skills. Additional technical skills, beyond those currently found among the Bank staff will strengthen such supervision and could provide valuable benefits to the Borrower's own legal and training advisory groups. Bank supervision budgets may have to be augmented in order to add appropriate consultants to critical supervision missions. Show Less -

The assessment shows a satisfactory project outcome, likely sustainability, and substantial institutional development impacts, accompanied by satisfactory performances... Show More + both by the Bank and Borrower. The following lessons emerged from the experience of the project. Conditionality in an adjustment operation: The large number of conditions for project effectiveness and second tranche release will need to be balanced with the implementing capacity of the borrower. In Mongolia, this presented a serious challenge to the government, and as well, for maintaining the momentum and the continuous attention it required, particularly in light of Administration changes. This was reflected in the weak capacity, and lack of information among government agencies. This requires a technical assistance operation in capacity building programs, to prepare the ground for, or a technical assistance operation in parallel with, the adjustment operation. A key to ensure fulfillment of tranche release conditions is the Bank team/management's continuous dialogue with the main stakeholders on the longer-term benefits of difficult policy actions required by the adjustment lending. In addition, an appropriate time frame is required for the institution-building components, particularly so in countries with weak civil service such as Mongolia. The time frame required to introduce fundamental changes in the financial and banking sectors, as well as for institution building, requires better programming and sequencing. Therefore, new institutions, once established, would need continuing monitoring and improvement in order to be effective in fulfilling their role in the financial sector. Show Less -

Project ratings are as follows: Project outcome is satisfactory, sustainability is likely, institutional development impact is substantial, Bank performance is satisfactory,... Show More + and borrower performance is satisfactory. A number of valuable lessons were learned from implementing this project, and have been incorporated in the follow-on project, UBSIP2, as appropriate. They include the following: 1) Procurement was complex because of (1) IDA prior review of all aspects of procurement from designs, bid documents, and contract awards; (2) a large number of small packages; and (3) the enactment and implementation of a new procurement law in Mongolia from 2001, which introduced high level interdepartmental committees for procurement, and delayed contract awards significantly. These issues have been addressed in UBSIP2 through better packaging and establishment of prior review thresholds. In addition, following the IDA Country Procurement Assessment Report of 2003, Mongolia's procurement law is being revised with a view to overcoming the major issues identified. 2) Consultant support for design review, construction supervision, and project management: During implementation the SAR assumption that consultant support for these activities would only be required during the first two years was much too optimistic. In practice, consultant support became essential until the extended project closing date of December 2003. UBSIP2 will include consultant support throughout that project. In addition, in order to improve construction supervision, UBSIP2 will involve the Ulaanbaatar Water and Sewerage Company (USAG) through a Project Implementation Unit, with adequate staff. 3) Designs: Chief issues are the extent of protection required against freezing and the need to standardize designs of pumping stations, bath houses, and water kiosks. These matters have been addressed in UBSIP2. 4) While institutional development of USAG was very successful overall, a number of second generation issues remain. These include the development of policies for metering and house connections, an appropriate role for the private sector, further improvements to maintenance, development and implementation of a communication strategy, and on-going upgrading of staff skills. Again, these are being addressed under UBSIP2. 5) Financial sustainability of USAG -The project did not succeed in its ambitious objective of making USAG commercially viable from an early stage because of a variety of factors, including the need for a phased progression to commercial operation and the lack of Government (also, local government) commitment to USAG's financial objectives. Under UBSIP2 periodic tariff increases required for financial viability will be a disbursement condition for implement ting the physical investment program. 6) Medium-term water and sanitation strategy - This is needed to determine the feasibility of expanding the water supply network to germ areas, the strategy for sanitation in germ areas, the institutional framework for the water sector, and the prospects for involving the private sector in the overall management of USAG. IDA will assist Government in obtaining grant technical assistance for this work. Show Less -

The outcome of the Coal Project is rated as satisfactory, sustainability as likely, institutional development impact as sustainable, Bank performance as satisfactory,... Show More + and borrower performance as satisfactory. The key lessons learned from this project are: 1) The project could have benefited from a more comprehensive approach to addressing the problems of the energy sector, and particularly from a more deliberate and stronger connection to the downstream energy companies. Development of a stronger IDA relationship with those downstream companies might have helped alleviate the coal payments arrears issues. 2) The use of a numerical target as part of the project's main development objective proved to be imprecise, compared to a more strategic development goal. 3) The development of the Energy Project as part of a broader energy assistance program, proved to be a very important factor in IDA's ability to convince the government to address its failures to meet assurances during this first energy project. 4) At the outset of this project in Mongolia, IDA could complete this project in time mainly because the project design was simple, the objective was focused, and there was only one principal beneficiary. 5) The appointment of an internationally experienced financial auditor by Baganuur Joint Stock Company (BJSC) to audit the project and corporate accounts, as IDA's initial insistence, proved to be particularly important and beneficial to BJSC in this project. Show Less -

The overall outcome of the Poverty Alleviation for Vulnerable Groups Project is rated satisfactory. Its success under difficult conditions during a period of economic... Show More + transition can be attributed to: a highly committed and dedicated implementing agency at the national level; Poverty Alleviation Program Office's and local government's capacity to learn from experience; the use of an existing network of local government institutions aimag and sum level as a delivery mechanism; the introduction of a bottom-up approach to project identification and implementation; the trust placed in local government's capacity to identify, contract, supervise, and report on public works schemes and basis education and rural health projects; the cross-sectoral approach that allowed districts a choice between health, education, public works and income generating credits; and the emphasis on making certain that funding was in place for operation & maintenance of whatever structure and services were rehabilitated by the project. Some important lessons include: Successful implementation of a bottom-up, demand-driven approach is facilitated by open public meetings at grassroots level. The establishment of a cross-sectoral implementing agency facilitates poverty project implementation but creates conflicts and uncertainty. Sustainable access to credit for the poor requires the creation of a rural finance system. A diversified menu of activities is needed for reaching the poor. Show Less -

Ratings for the Technical Assistance Project for Mongolia were as follows: outcomes were satisfactory, project sustainability was likely, Bank performance was satisfactory... Show More + and Borrower performance was also a satisfactory. Some lessons learned included: government commitment remains central to implementation success. The enthusiasm of the Government was a critical factor in meeting project objectives. However, when the respective agency did not consider the specific advisory service relevant to its perceived needs, implementation was less successful. Umbrella-type projects with their high degree of flexibility require careful assessment of the Borrower's capacity to implement. Involvement of many international agencies may make project, related budget plans too complicated. While reliance on agencies to make their own work plans may make the process demand-driven and participatory, it may not always be appropriate or relevant in fulfilling objectives of project. Show Less -