Mexico

Ratings for the Fund for Housing Operation and Finance (FOVI) Restructuring Project in Mexico were as follows: outcome was moderately satisfactory; risk to developm... Show More + ent outcome was significant; Bank performance was moderately satisfactory and borrower performance was satisfactory. Ratings for the Affordable Housing and Urban Poverty Sector Adjustment Loan Project in Mexico were as follows: outcome was unsatisfactory; risk to development outcome was significant; Bank performance was unsatisfactory and borrower performance was satisfactory. Ratings for the Second Affordable Housing and Urban Poverty Sector Adjustment Loan Project in Mexico were as follows: outcome was unsatisfactory; risk to development outcome was significant; Bank performance was unsatisfactory and borrower performance was also unsatisfactory. Ratings for the Third Affordable Housing and Urban Poverty Sector Adjustment Loan Project in Mexico were as follows: outcome was moderately unsatisfactory; risk to development outcome was significant; Bank performance was unsatisfactory and borrower performance was moderately unsatisfactory. Lessons learned include: the expected outcomes and scope of an operation should be subject to several reality checks at appraisal. An important one is to ensure that essential partners such as INFONAVIT (National Housing Fund for Private Sector Workers) in this case-are fully on board and committed to the operation. If they are not, or cannot be engaged for reasons of political economy, then an operation's scope should be contained to cover the more modest outcomes that can reasonably be obtained without such partners. In large and sophisticated middle-income countries like Mexico, an operation should avoid promising sector-wide reforms when commensurate results cannot be realistically achieved in the short timeframe and with the relatively modest scale of assistance offered. Operations aiming to support affordable housing and urban poverty reduction need to be explicit about their target beneficiary populations, with quantification of baselines and targets, and at completion, achievements. Contrary to down-market aims, establishing a sound reputation in financial markets and sustaining a high quality and expanding portfolio can lead a new mortgage financier up-market, by targeting higher income borrowers with larger loans. Markets perceive such loans as less risky. They are also less costly to manage and contribute more to business growth. Show Less -

Project ratings for the Mexico Northern Border Environment Project (NBEP) and the Environmental Structural Adjustment Loan Project (EnvSAL I) are as follows: Projec... Show More + t outcome for NBEP is moderately unsatisfactory and for EnvSAL I the outcome is satisfactory; sustainability for both projects is satisfactory; institutional development impact for both is high; Bank performance for NBEP is rated unsatisfactory, while Bank performance for EnvSAL I is rated satisfactory; and Borrower performance for NBEP is unsatisfactory, while Borrower performance for EnvSAL Iis satisfactory. The NBEP and EnvSAL I together offer the Bank some important lessons for its future assistance in strengthening the capacity of environmental institutions and as it tries new lending instruments (such as Development Policy Loans) to achieve this goal. They are: 1) Quickly capitalizing on narrow windows of political opportunity to accelerate the Bank's processing o f large environmental infrastructure operations can be highly risky, since it can lead, as it did under the NBEP, to over-ambitious design, inadequately prepared implementing agencies and poor overall quality at entry, especially when political considerations are allowed to drive the preparation and appraisal timetable. 2) Targeting project support for local agencies in more direct ways helps them assume more responsibilities and contribute in more measurable ways to environmental sustainability. This support needs to be concrete and under their control. In contrast, "top-down" approaches tend to focus on the broader enabling environment, but may neglect the lack of skills and resources at local levels. 3) In cases where the processing triggers for the programmatic loans are different from interim results and final outcomes, these triggers should be clearly distinguished in the simplified Implementation Completion Reports. 4) Prior Government commitment and formal policies as well as a time-based plan are crucial prerequisites for the successful implementation of Environmental Development Policy Loans. Desired policy outcomes and practical constraints need to be clear in order to enhance dialogue and promote synergies. Show Less -

The audit rates the project as marginally satisfactory, similarly, the institutional development impact is rated modest, and, as for sustainability, the rating is c... Show More + onsidered uncertain, given the negligible project design, and implementation which did not address the issue of sustainability. It is considered that the project succeeded in demonstrating the technical feasibility of reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, and simultaneously reducing local contamination, through widespread installation of high efficiency lighting, however, the project failed to demonstrate the financial feasibility of such endeavor, contributing only modestly, towards building the institutional capacity for technological change, energy conservation, and demand-side management at the implementing utility. Among the many lessons, it is suggested that: 1) replicability, and sustainability are essential elements in demonstration projects, and deserve close consideration, and, be explicitly incorporated in the project design, strategy, and activities; 2) the well planned implementation scheme - based on decentralized units, and independent trust funds - was successful, giving the implementing agency an overall project control; and, 3) bulk procurement can be an important leverage. Show Less -

This is a performance audit of the Integrated Rural Development Project Papaloapan Basin in Mexico, for which loan was approved in October 1974 and closed on Decemb... Show More + er 1982, after cancellation of US$24 million. The project implementation was delayed by insufficient budgetary allocations, limited capacity within the commission for the preparation of final designs and bidding documents, lack and poor performance of contractors in the remote project area, and declining government support during the first years of project implementation. At completion, three years behind schedule, only about half of the original project components were implemented and 48 percent of the Bank loan was cancelled. Although the project was not completed by the closing date, project objectives of increasing food production and improving living conditions in the Papaloapan Basin have been partly achieved. Despite the reduction of the project scope, the productive and production-support components have been successful, resulting in significant increases in yields, cropped areas and agricultural production both in irrigated and rain-fed areas. This favorable outcome is mostly due to the suitability of technical packages and efficiency of extension services. The social infrastructure program, which benefited about 560,000 people, was adversely affected by uneven quality of construction, lack of integration with productive components, and poor interagency cooperation. Show Less -