China

In response to the Great Recession of 2008, many national governments implemented fiscal stimuli packages in 2009 and 2010 to prevent further declines in aggregate demand... Show More + and to jump start their economic recovery. Where subnational governments responded with fiscal contraction, as in the United States, the impact was muted; where states/provinces also expanded expenditures, as in China and India, the impact was magnified. Increases in recurrent expenditure, which were made in Brazil and India, acted as short-term stimulants; additional public investment, as in China, appears to have had a more lasting impact on growth. Large developing countries typically exhibit high interregional inequality in levels of development and global integration, resulting in differential magnitude and timing of the crisis impact. For example, coastal states in India were affected more severely and quickly than landlocked states; revenue moved in opposite directions in the two types of state in 2009. Where fiscal stress varies widely across subnational entities, central transfers alone cannot prevent pro-cyclicality of subnational fiscal response to a recession. There is need for flexibility in subnational borrowing within a sustainable fiscal framework. Many Indian states were able to maintain or accelerate their spending thanks to the additional borrowing permitted in 2009 and 2010. In comparison, limited borrowing capacity and lack of flexibility in federal grants restricted the contribution of Brazilian states to fiscal stimulus. Legal prohibition of subnational borrowing induced China's provinces to finance additional investments through extra-budgetary borrowing by nongovernment entities, with significant fiscal risks on account of contingent liabilities. Show Less -

The study addresses governance challenges in public service delivery in China. It builds on the citizen scorecard survey conducted in five Chinese cities in 2006 to... Show More + gauge citizens’ experience with public services, and demonstrates the usefulness of citizens’ feedback for policy development and implementation. The survey found that citizens were generally pleased with urban public services, but worried about the associated fees. Compared with the official urban residents, the urban poor and rural migrants in cities reported sharper utilization constraints, lower readiness to complain or pay informal fees, and a much larger income share spent on public services. The reported citizens’ perceptions sometimes diverged from the evidence and pointed to significant information asymmetries. Explaining the survey results, the study reveals problems of inadequacy, inequality and misaligned incentives in public resource allocation. The study presents several successful experiments reducing the dependence on user fees in basic education and primary healthcare. It recognizes that China has been undertaking comprehensive reforms to enhance equity and quality in public service delivery. Such reforms have included measures to strengthen the regulatory, monitoring, and enforcement systems and accountability relationships. In the context of the ongoing reforms, this study highlights the need to: a) hold the provincial governments accountable for public service delivery performance; b) develop effective mechanisms to align public resources and incentives at each level of government with the national priorities; and c) develop proper means to empower the citizens. In this context, the study affirms that the Chinese government is rightly placing reforms in the intergovernmental, administrative, and public finance systems at the top of its agenda. Show Less -

In China, most of the service delivery responsibilities are assigned to the subnational governments. Yet for reasons of efficiency in tax collection and administration,... Show More + the central government collects revenues far in excess of its expenditure needs. In 2003 the central government collected 70 percent of consolidated revenues but accounted for only 30 percent of consolidated expenditures. The initial fiscal surplus of the central government enables it to use its spending power to provide financing to subnational jurisdictions for the achievement of national objectives and to influence local priorities. This paper examines the incentives associated with the design of such transfers and their implications for the efficiency and equity of public service provision and accountable local governance in China. The paper argues that the existing design of such transfers is not consistent with efficiency and equity considerations. It further undermines local autonomy without enhancing local accountability while creating incentives for imprudent fiscal management. Its main limitations include a complex and opaque system, a piecemeal approach to gap filling, lack of consistency of design with objectives, focus on input controls without regard for output accountability, incentives to support an antiquated management paradigm, a one-size-fits-all approach to local financing, and lack of transparency and regulatory framework for the intergovernmental transfer system. The paper makes specific suggestions on a reform of this system to overcome these limitations and on better use of fiscal transfers to create responsive, responsible, equitable, and accountable local governance in China. Show Less -

China has experienced more than 25 years of extraordinary economic growth. Underlying this growth has been a decentralized fiscal system, in which provinces and large... Show More + cities are given the freedom to make infrastructure investments to stimulate local development, and are allowed to retain a large part of the fiscal revenues that are generated from economic activity. Although successful as a growth strategy, this policy created two problems for national fiscal management. First, it significantly reduced the central government's share of fiscal revenues, which fell from 34.8 percent in 1980 to 22 percent in 1992. Second, it widened economic and fiscal disparities between the rapidly growing urban coastal region and the rest of the country. Rapid growth in subnational debt (which rose 23-fold in a decade) and subnational nonperforming loans (estimated by the authors to range between US$100 billion and US$150 billion) has placed pressure on China's financial system. Traditionally, China has favored bank lending as a source of finance because the banking system has provided a vehicle for central political control over local debt. But as China's financial system matures, creditworthiness standards must become more important. The authors recommend greater use of the revenue streams from infrastructure assets as a financing source, and gradual relaxation of central political control over subnational debt. One step in this direction would permit leading cities to issue municipal bonds based on objective financial standards. Show Less -