Cambodia

Ratings for the Trade Facilitation and Competitiveness Project for Cambodia were as follows: outcomes were moderately satisfactory, the risk to development outcome was... Show More + significant, the Bank performance was moderately satisfactory, and the Borrower performance was also moderately satisfactory. Some lessons learned included: the higher risk can sometimes produce higher return; the success of customs automation has led to systemic and institutional changes in the way customs clearance is operated. IT may be a good tool for institutional and structural changes. It can bring about a more transparent and predictable way of conducting transactions which can lead to growth of trade and of the economy. The crucially important factor in this success was the strong ground team, with close and frequent exchanges with the client. The Bank may not want to implement the same type of project in a country where there isn't such a strong field presence. This kind of customs automation/modernization project serves and supports the backbone of the private sector, and Cambodia's national poverty reduction strategy emphases that the private sector is the engine of economic growth. The project responded well to that. It may be useful for other LDCs to learn from that approach. Another lesson was learned when stakeholders in this project accused the Bank of excessive rigidity in its management of procurement, resulting several times in the rejection of all bids. In such cases rebidding delayed implementation by 6-12 months, which has been costly to the Government. Show Less -

Ratings for the Greater Mekong Subregion Power Trade Project for Cambodia were as follows: outcomes not applicable; risk to development outcome was also not applicable;... Show More + Bank performance was moderately unsatisfactory; and borrower performance was also moderately unsatisfactory. A two-year closing date extension was included in the Royal Government of Cambodia's (RGC's) official restructuring request in August 2010. Initially, the Bank informed RGC that it would confirm the project restructuring only if the implementing agency could demonstrate concrete progress in preparing the new 230 kV transmission line (notably processing the necessary procurement that would ensure project completion by December 31, 2013). In June 2011, Bank management informed Electricite du Cambodge (EDC) that the RGC's request for project restructuring-including the closing date extension and a change in the project development objective to remove reference to Vietnam-could not be processed due to country program conditions. Without the two year extension of the closing date, EDC could not proceed with International Competitive Bidding (ICB) procurement for the supply and installation of the 230 kV line because it could not afford to self-finance the associated works. EDC would also suffer huge financial losses if it did finance the line and then Lao PDR was unable to meet the agreed schedule. Seeing no viable options, RGC requested a full cancellation of the grant for this project on October 4, 2011. Show Less -