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# Latin America's Deceleration and the Exchange Rate Buffer

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
IMF-WB Annual Meetings  
October 9, 2013  
Washington, DC

# The punch line


- The current wave of economic pessimism about LAC is exaggerated...
- ...because fundamental macro-financial improvements have largely dispelled the fear of 1990s-style financial distress...
- ...not least because exchange rate depreciations can, for a first time in history, be a full part of the counter-cyclical toolkit
  - Depreciations cannot of themselves remove the structural impediments to higher growth over the trend

# The obvious worries: receding global tailwinds,...


**China GDP Growth**  
*YoY Growth Rate*



**U.S. Yield Curve**




**Commodity Prices**  
*YoY Growth Rate*



# ...nervous market overreactions to QE taper talks...


### FOMC Meeting 19 June

US Dollar per Local Currency Unit




### FOMC Meeting September 18

US Dollar per Local Currency Unit



# ...in the context of a synchronized deceleration in EMs...




*Synchronized deceleration in EMs: a 3-4 percentage point fall in growth rates from their 2010 (rebounding) peaks*

...with the predictable heterogeneity within the region

## Real GDP Growth and Forecast Within LAC

*YoY % Growth Rate*




# The “this-time-is-not-different” pessimists

- Pessimistic headlines are in vogue
  - “Submerging economies”, now that “the party is over”, are “entering a lost decade”
- This pessimism confounds two different claims
  1. That past growth had feet of clay and was a wasted opportunity
  2. That the current souring of external conditions will lead to a 1990s-style instability, where internal fragilities amplified external shocks
- Is this assessment warranted?
  - Partially “yes”, with respect to 1
  - Definitely “no”, with respect to 2

# LAC's past growth was not a pure consumption story – investment rates closed the gap with those in East Asia...


**Investment Shares**  
*Percent of GDP - Averages 2010-2011*




*The efficiency and sustainability of investment are different issues that cannot be taken cavalierly and remain a source of concern*



...credit growth was comparatively mild and closely monitored by strict supervisory authorities...




... and current account deficits have been mainly financed by FDI...




*FDI inflows in LAC are larger and more stable than non-FDI inflows...  
...and not necessarily concentrated in extractive activities*


Moreover, the *fear of depreciation* has been largely dispelled in the region due to net deleveraging...



## ... financial de-dollarization ...




## ... and a much lower pass-through



# Thus, for much of LAC, depreciations are not a problem but part of the solution

- Several LAC countries can rely on exchange rate flexibility to conduct countercyclical monetary policy...
- ...and, for the first time in their monetary history, they can savor the full range of benefits of a depreciation...
  - Achieve external adjustment (lower imports) while stimulating output and employment (higher production for foreign & domestic markets)
  - Mitigate the outflow of capital—curbing speculation and boosting the appeal of local assets relative to foreign assets
- ... which could not be had in 2009 due to the global downturn
- LAC countries are moving towards run-of-the-mill business cycles, typical of advanced economies

# In this light, it is high time to reappraise exchange rate interventions...



*No longer defending the indefensible,  
but mitigating excess volatility around the equilibrium*

# ...and the concerns about quasi-fiscal costs of intervention

## Cost of Central Bank Intervention for Selected Emerging Economies

*Total 2005-2012, Percent of 2012 GDP*

Country	Net Flow Profits	Net Valuation Profits	Net Total Profits
Peru	-3.0%	-0.3%	-3.3%
Israel	-1.9%	-1.1%	-3.0%
Russia	-6.7%	4.5%	-2.1%
Brazil	-5.3%	3.6%	-1.6%
<b>LAC</b>	<b>-2.5%</b>	<b>0.9%</b>	<b>-1.6%</b>
Colombia	-1.5%	0.0%	-1.5%
Chile	-1.6%	0.3%	-1.2%
South Korea	-1.4%	0.5%	-1.0%
Argentina	-2.9%	2.5%	-0.4%
Mexico	-1.4%	1.0%	-0.4%
Indonesia	-1.8%	1.5%	-0.3%
India	-2.7%	3.7%	1.0%



# Short-run business cycle management vs. long-run growth


- The exchange rate in much of LAC is no longer a shock amplifier, but a shock absorber that enables counter-cyclical monetary policy
- But for several LAC countries counter-cyclical monetary policy is out of reach
  - Most Central American and Caribbean countries are too small and open to be able realistically to develop an independent monetary policy
  - Other financially globalized LAC countries are dollarized or have not developed the institutional frameworks to support inflation targeting
  - Other less financially globalized South American countries are insulated in other ways—via fiscal buffers built during the bonanza period
- The improved macro-financial immune system can help cushion the cyclical component of the downturn and normalization of US monetary policy ...
- ...but it cannot solve the structural impediments to a higher growth path
  - Absent productivity enhancing reforms, LAC social progress would stall and the economy could fall into a low savings-low productivity-low growth trap

Thank you

# Absent a 1990s-style crisis, social progress may stall going forward if growth is low but is unlikely to be reversed

**Income Growth Across Quintiles in LAC**

*Early 2000s - Late 2000s*



**Middle class, vulnerability, and poverty trends in LAC**

*1995–2009*

