

### Projecting Household Surveys to Assess the Impact of Future Economic Conditions and Climate Change on the Poor

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# The impacts of climate change will depend on future development (by 2030 and beyond)







Structural change



Structural change



Productivity growth



Demography



Structural change



Productivity growth



Demography

Structural change



Productivity growth

Redistribution

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### We reverse the problem:

- Under what set of conditions could extreme poverty be eradicated by 2030 and beyond?
- And conversely, under which conditions would extreme poverty persist by 2030 and beyond?
- What would be the impact of climate change in each of these scenarios?

## In each of the 92 countries covered by the I2D2 database, we run hundreds of scenarios



# We build hundreds of scenarios per country as a combination of the following parameters

**Productivity growth in agriculture** 

**Productivity growth in services** 

**Productivity growth in manufacture** 

Skill premium in agriculture

Skill premium in services

**Skill premium in manufacture** 

# We build hundreds of scenarios per country as a combination of the following parameters

Productivity growth in agriculture

**Productivity growth in services** 

Change in the share of agriculture

**Productivity growth in manufacture** 

Change in the share of manufacture

**Change in participation** 

Skill premium in agriculture

Skill premium in services

**Skill premium in manufacture** 

# We build hundreds of scenarios per country as a combination of the following parameters

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Productivity growth in manufacture

**Change in participation** 

Skill premium in agriculture

Skill premium in services

Redistribution

**Skill premium in manufacture** 

Demography

Pensions

We use a micro-simulation model based on household surveys. Example of Vietnam

Extreme poverty threshold

Initial distribution (gini: 0.4) -1.0 - 0.5 0.00.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 Income distribution (daily income, log10)

Households are re-weighted in order to match the new population in 2030 in terms of age and education



Extreme poverty threshold

Re-weighting also includes structural changes. Each household's income then grows depending on skills and sectors of activity



We finally model redistribution and pensions



Each combination of parameter leads to a different outcome in terms of poverty and shared prosperity. Example of **Sierra Leone** 



## In our scenarios, poverty and shared prosperity are not well correlated



### Growth is good for the poor, but not so much for shared prosperity. Example of **Sierra Leone**



## Population growth is bad for the poor, but not so much for shared prosperity

![](_page_18_Figure_1.jpeg)

### Low population growth guarantees a reduction in poverty but not shared prosperity

![](_page_19_Figure_1.jpeg)

Redistribution increases the positive impact of growth on poverty and reduces the negative impact of growth on shared prosperity

![](_page_20_Figure_1.jpeg)

#### Redistribution guarantees shared prosperity but not poverty reduction

![](_page_21_Figure_1.jpeg)

### Priorities for poverty reduction are context-specific

![](_page_22_Figure_1.jpeg)

Demography is an important driver of poverty reduction in many countries

![](_page_23_Picture_1.jpeg)

Poverty reduction cannot be achieved without sufficient growth for unskilled agriculture workers

![](_page_24_Figure_1.jpeg)

### Redistribution dominates for shared prosperity

![](_page_25_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_26_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_27_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_28_Figure_0.jpeg)

![](_page_29_Figure_0.jpeg)

### In each country, we select optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. Example of Vietnam

![](_page_30_Figure_1.jpeg)

### In each country, we select optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. Example of Vietnam

![](_page_31_Figure_1.jpeg)

### In each country, we select optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. Example of Vietnam

![](_page_32_Figure_1.jpeg)

We use scenario-discovery techniques to find the characteristics that best explain optimistic and pessimistic scenarios

![](_page_33_Figure_1.jpeg)

![](_page_34_Figure_0.jpeg)

#### Coming back to our four scenarios

We identify **two representative scenarios** that share the main characteristics of each group and match SSP4 and SSP5 GDP growth

![](_page_35_Figure_1.jpeg)

Extreme poverty \$1.25 (% of country population)

No data 9% 9.3% 5-10% 10-25% 25-50% >50%

![](_page_36_Figure_2.jpeg)

#### **Optimistic scenario 2030**:

Less than 3% of total population lives with less than usd 1.25 per day

#### Pessimistic scenario 2030:

12% of total population lives with less than usd 1.25 per day We add climate change impacts in these two scenarios, based on inputs from the other participants of this conference

Channel	Modeled impact
Prices	Increase in food prices (10% in 2030)
Human capital	20% productivity loss in 2030 for people working outside + 20% loss in productivity due to increased stunting for a random selection of poor households
Physical capital	10% loss in income in 2030 for a random selection of people exposed to natural disasters

Impact of climate change (increase in poverty percentage points using usd 1.25 as a threshold)

No data 0 0 - 1% 1-3% 3-6% 6-8% 8-10% 10-12%

![](_page_38_Picture_2.jpeg)

**Optimistic scenario 2030**: Global poverty increases by 0.5 percentage point

Pessimistic scenario 2030:

Global poverty increases by 4 percentage points

### Thank you!

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![](_page_40_Figure_0.jpeg)