Independent Evaluation of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund- South Sudan (MDTF-SS)

Final Report

25 July 2013
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# Acronyms

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CABIHRD</td>
<td>Capacity Building Institutional Development and Human Resource Development Project</td>
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<td>CFSSP</td>
<td>Core Fiduciary Systems Support Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERP</td>
<td>Education Rehabilitation Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan [name prior to Independence]</td>
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<tr>
<td>GRSS</td>
<td>Government of the Republic of South Sudan [name after Independence]</td>
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<tr>
<td>GSDP</td>
<td>Gender Support Development Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICR</td>
<td>implementation completion report</td>
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<td>JAM</td>
<td>Joint Assessment Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFDP</td>
<td>Livestock and Fisheries Development Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDTF-N</td>
<td>Multi-Donor Trust Fund-National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDTF-SS</td>
<td>Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South [ern] Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoFEP</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPTF</td>
<td>Multi-Partner Trust Fund [of the United Nations]</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Police and Prisons Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSDP</td>
<td>Private Sector Development Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>RIEP</td>
<td>Rapid Impact Emergency Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>RWSSP</td>
<td>Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAFDP</td>
<td>Support to Agriculture and Forestry Development Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SETIDP</td>
<td>Sudan Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Development Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSRDF</td>
<td>Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund</td>
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<td>SSRMP</td>
<td>South Sudan Roads Maintenance Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTL</td>
<td>Task Team Leader [of the World Bank]</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPHSD I</td>
<td>Umbrella Program for Health Sector Development –Phase I</td>
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<tr>
<td>UPHSD II</td>
<td>Umbrella Program for Health Sector Development –Phase II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSSP</td>
<td>Water Supply and Sanitation Project</td>
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Acknowledgements

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Honor Flanagan and Lars Oscar of the Joint Donor Office provided assistance identifying persons of interest, sourcing documents and coordinating the team’s communication with donors. They also served as liaisons with the donor community and provided comments on the drafts of the inception report and preliminary report, in addition to the main evaluation report (May and June 2013).

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The evaluation was written as an independent report. The conclusions presented are those of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the position of the World Bank, the GRSS, donors or other MDTF-SS stakeholders. Notwithstanding the high quality of the inputs received, the evaluation team has sole responsibility for any errors or omissions.
Note on Vocabulary

At Independence in 2011, Southern Sudan changed its name to South Sudan. The names of government institutions and of the MDTF-SS also changed; from the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan. To avoid confusion and for consistency, the report uses the name South Sudan throughout, unless otherwise indicated. Also, “State” is capitalized when referring to a sub-level of government, and not capitalized when referring to the “state” of South Sudan or “state” institutions.

Dedication

The evaluation team dedicates the evaluation report to the memory of Ronald Isaacson, who passed away in January 2013. Ron arrived in Rumbek in 2005 and remained in South Sudan until 2009. He was present during the “early days” of MDTF-SS operations, living in a tent and working from the original MDTF-SS container at the United Nations compound. Ron was mentioned frequently by South Sudanese informants and others, always with fondness and respect, as a committed person who found “creative ways to get the job done”.

Expanded Executive Summary

Introduction

1. Almost 50 years of civil conflict in Sudan came to an end in 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Two trust funds were established in 2005 as part of the CPA Protocol on Wealth Sharing: the Multi-Donor Trust Fund-National (MDTF-N) and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan (MDTF-SS). To support implementation of the agreement, the funds would serve as “a coordinated funding mechanism for the governments’ priority interventions to reconstruct and develop Sudan”, as outlined in the CPA text and reflected in the Joint Assessment Mission’s report, Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication (JAM 2005).

2. The MDTF-SS was operationally closed on December 31, 2012, and financially closed at the end of June 2013. Total receipts at closure stood at USD 728 million, of which GRSS contributed 25 percent. During its seven years of operation, the MDTF-SS delivered a portfolio of 21 projects in five Strategic Priority areas. Project activities were implemented over the full geographic territory of South Sudan, primarily through state institutions, and with implementation support from United Nations agencies and national and international NGOs.

3. An independent final evaluation of the MDTF-SS was commissioned as part of the fund’s closure process. The objectives of the evaluation were to: (i) analyze the performance of the Fund by comparing its achieved results and impacts with goals and expected results, and; (ii) contribute to future development interventions through the collection, analysis and documentation of lessons learned. The evaluation was conducted between November 2012 and June 2013. It included a review of MDTF-SS documentation, interviews with 130 informants, and a field study in three States of South Sudan.

Origins of the MDTF-SS

4. **The two multi-donor trust funds for Sudan were established within a three-part framework of international support for the CPA; i) direct international engagement with the CPA negotiations, beginning in the mid-1990s through the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and accelerating after 2001 with involvement of the “Troika” countries- the United States, United Kingdom and Norway;**
(ii) design of the architecture for international support for the CPA, occurring between 2003 and 2005 as an integral part of the peace negotiations; and (iii) identification of priority areas for national focus and international support. These were originally defined in the CPA text and expanded in the Joint Assessment Mission and Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication (JAM 2005), which guided the design of the MDTFs.

5. **International engagement in the negotiations changed the strategic calculus of the two CPA Parties and created positive momentum.** International engagement locked the Parties into a process from which they could not credibly withdraw. It reduced and then closed options to circumvent negotiations, and provided a structure of incentives that changed the strategic calculus and reinforced the positive momentum of the negotiating process. This included significant pressure on both Parties to compromise on key negotiating positions and remain within the negotiations.

6. **The two Sudan MDTFs were proposed as a measure to consolidate the positive momentum of the negotiations and prepare for the post-conflict phase.** The CPA was an ambitious and time-bound political process, leading to a referendum on the South’s self-determination in 2011. Within the CPA framework, the funds were part of a mutual commitment between the international community and the CPA Parties; the Parties agreed to compromises in exchange for the promise of financial and technical support to implement the agreement, among other incentives. International pressure and national compromises, therefore, would be balanced with quick-launch financial and technical assistance. Creation of the Sudan MDTFs also signaled that donor nations would remain engaged after signing the CPA. The final linkage between the CPA and the Sudan MDTFs was confirmed by embedding the funds in the agreement’s Protocol on Wealth Sharing (2004, Article 15).

7. **Discussion on aid architecture began in 2003 after signing of the Machakos Protocol.** The Troika countries convened the first donor meeting in January 2003 (held in Norway, followed by a broader discussion in April 2003 (held in the Netherlands) with the Government of Sudan, the SPLM, NGOs and multilateral organizations, including the World Bank. Consensus on the use of a World Bank-managed MDTF modality was reached at the Naivasha meeting (held in Kenya) in September 2004, although the decision was not formalized until the Oslo Pledging Conference (April 11-12, 2005), when the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Joint Assessment Mission’s report were in place.

8. **In selecting the World Bank to manage the Sudan MDTFs, the CPA Parties and international Donors explicitly chose to use the Bank’s recipient execution modality.** From interviews, the choice was based on the conclusion of stakeholders the World Bank’s systems and procedures were the most appropriate to both CPA requirements and the South Sudan context. This selection was made after consideration of two options, one from the Bank and the other from the United Nations. A “two-window” model was neither requested nor presented, although there were informal discussions between 2003 and 2005.
9. The MDTF-SS was established as the primary channel to co-mingle national investment and international assistance for CPA implementation. National resources were to be the primary source of funding for achieving the CPA aspirations. International assistance would be provided during the transition period, to sustain momentum and fill critical resource gaps, both financial and technical.

10. The Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) positioned itself as the largest MDTF-SS contributor, committing funds at the matching rate of 2:1. Former SPLM negotiators described the ratio as signaling their strong commitment to the MDTF-SS and intention to play the leading role in the fund’s governance. They perceived the MDTF-SS as an effective channel for state-building investments, given the low capacity of institutions and the need to manage the large flow of oil receipts scheduled to begin in 2005. SPLM officials also described a good working relationship with Bank personnel, including through the JAM process. Donors sought to: (i) coordinate their assistance and preserve scarce state capacity; (ii) reduce fiduciary risk in a low-capacity environment by using the World Bank’s systems and procedures, and; (iii) sustain their involvement in policy dialogue and resource allocation decisions.

11. The Joint Assessment Mission report described a situation of absolute deprivation in South Sudan, as first steps were being taken to implement the CPA. The report provided a comprehensive overview, adding to earlier discussions on aid architecture and in the SPLM’s own Strategy for War to Peace Transition (2003). Specifically, the JAM outlined, with extensive detail, the: (i) difficult physical and climate conditions in South Sudan; (ii) absence of durable state institutions; (iii) almost complete lack of physical infrastructure and public services, and; (iv) human development indicators that were among the lowest in the world, among other factors. The mission’s report, with its analysis, targets and timelines, was subsequently used as the framework for the MDTF-SS, including the fund’s Strategic Priorities and portfolio of projects.

12. Processes of recovery and development are open-ended. In contrast, CPA implementation was time-bound within a six-year Interim Period. Into this context, the JAM introduced a scope of work, program targets and timeline that were realistic given conditions in South Sudan, and arguably exceeded the targets outlined in the CPA text. These added to the political optimism around the CPA process, and the high expectations in society for a “peace dividend” that had been created by the SPLM prior to 2005. While expectations were expanding, the newly-formed GoSS had limited capacity to: (i) assert the leadership it desired over the MDTF-SS, and; (ii) implement the complex programs and targets established in the JAM through state institutions.
13. The pressures of time, inflated expectations and the perception of an urgent need to deliver a “peace dividend” influenced the realism of the MDTF-SS’ original design. There was significant political pressure for quick implementation, and to expand the scope and complexity of the portfolio. These pressures contributed to ineffective design for early projects, and to the financial and transaction costs, forms of political and reputation risk and inefficiencies that were later manifested with implementation delays and project restructuring.

14. The MDTF-SS was designed to implement a larger program than the available resources allowed. The JAM estimated the cost of its recovery and development framework at USD 2.6 billion. The MDTF-SS’ experience showed that these costs were underestimated, often significantly. The MDTF-SS was never intended to be the sole channel, but it would be a “principle” channel. Against this requirement, the MDTF-SS was originally to be invested with approximately USD 1.5 billion (60% of the JAM estimate), with actual receipts at closure amounting to USD 728 million (28% of the JAM estimate and only a small portion of total GoSS/GRSS investments and aid flows during the Interim Period). The MDTF-SS, therefore, overreached to deliver the large program prescribed by the JAM with only part of the resources needed.

15. The fund was established before the GoSS was consolidated. The World Bank’s Executive Board approved the Bank as administrator of the two Sudan MDTFs on April 7, 2005, just prior to the Oslo Pledging Conference. Within the sequencing of events, the MDTF-SS Technical Secretariat was established in August 2005 and the GoSS cabinet was sworn-in by October 2005. The formation and staffing of national and State-level ministries was on-going through 2005 and 2006, while the first MDTF-SS Grant Agreement was signed in November 2005. During this transition, Dr John Garang died in a helicopter crash (July 30, 2005) and was replaced by HE Salva Kiir Mayardit (then the First Vice President of the Government of National Unity- GoNU). The MDTF-SS, therefore, was established before the institutional structure of the GoSS and GoNU were consolidated, and during a traumatic period of leadership change in South Sudan. The fund’s recipient execution modality had only a limited state institutional capacity to work through during its start-up.

16. The SPLM/A was in transition, from a military to a civilian organization. It had limited capacity and was managing multiple challenges simultaneously. One South Sudanese informant recalled: “In 2004 and 2005, there was no government. There was a small group of individuals, some based out of the country, working on peace negotiations with Khartoum at the same time as we tried to establish a regional government and maintain our internal coherence.” The persons originally responsible for the CPA and MDTF negotiations were dispersed after signing the CPA, to different entities in the GoSS and...
between Juba, the 10 States and Khartoum. Government had almost no institutions, physical infrastructure or civilian government experience for engaging the fund. The delay in choosing a capital city and then in moving from Rumbek to Juba during 2005 also contributed.

17. **The Donor presence in South Sudan was not up to full capacity until the end of 2006.** Donor activity was constrained by then- Southern Sudan’s status as an autonomous region within a sovereign state. Donors opted to establish a Joint Donor Office (JDO), to coordinate their resources and to participate in governance of the MDTF-SS. The JDO opened in mid-2006, and was fully functional by the end of that year. At that point, the interim governance arrangements for the MDTF-SS were also transferred from Khartoum to Juba. The process were not complete until approximately 1.5 years after creation of the MDTF-SS. United Nations agencies and international NGOs also faced challenges, in moving their operations into South Sudan and transitioning from humanitarian to recovery-oriented programs.

18. **The World Bank was slow to mobilize its operations in South Sudan.** The Bank made a significant corporate investment in contributing to the design of the CPA aid architecture, lobbying to administer and manage the Sudan MDTFs, supporting the JAM and mobilizing resources for the first Oslo Pledging Conference (2005). However, it did not mobilize the internal resources needed between 2005 and 2007 to meet its commitments for MDTF-SS start-up.

19. **The reasons for the Bank’s slow mobilization were both institutional and contextual.** The Bank:

a. **Over-prompted what it reasonably could deliver in South Sudan during negotiations over the aid architecture.** Over-commitment was driven by the optimism and aspirations of CPA Parties and donors and of the Bank itself; it was politically important at that point for the Bank to manage the Sudan MDTFs. In this context, the Bank mismanaged the expectations of the CPA Parties and donors, making commitments that reinforced unrealistic expectations that were also being expanded by the JAM targets.

b. **Did not internalize the contextual challenges once more complete information was available in 2005.** The Bank was the leading provider of institutional support to the JAM process and had full knowledge of the report findings. However, its contextual knowledge was not translated into an effective MDTF design, operational structure or portfolio. In particular, the Bank (along with the JAM mission and most other stakeholders) underestimated the logistical challenges and resource limitations.

c. **Had little recent experience in Sudan and no pre-existing program infrastructure on which to build a new operation.** The Bank, therefore, had to establish two complex trust funds without the foundation of a country program. All the work was done from scratch, at the same time as other MDTF-SS stakeholders were establishing their operational capacity.
d. The MDTF-SS had limited internal institutional support, including from senior management during the start-up period. The years 2003 through 2005 were still “early days” for the trust fund modality, particularly in fragile states and post-crisis situations. The Bank focused its institutional support leading up to the inception of the MDTF-SS operations in 2005. However, its support began to dissipate once the operational phase began. Institutional engagement did not strengthen again until after 2007, when MDTF-SS performance concerns had caused reputation damage.

20. Concerns for the performance of the MDTF-SS emerged as early as 2006. Project commitments and disbursements lagged behind donor deposits until 2009. By the end of 2008, only about 35 percent of the available MDTF-SS donor funds had been disbursed. During 2008-09, the World Bank and MDTF-SS stakeholders took steps to accelerate the implementation of project activities. As a result, over 60 percent of the total disbursements were achieved during the last three years of the MDTF-SS implementation period, between 2009 and the end of 2012. Performance was improved with an expansion of World Bank institutional resources devoted to the MDTF-SS, including its field presence in South Sudan. United Nations agencies also played an essential role in accelerating implementation.

21. Performance concerns resulted in political pressure being placed on stakeholders by mid-2007. Donors perceived that their commitments to the GoSS and the larger CPA process were not being kept, and that this had an impact on the stability of the CPA itself. Donors were also accountable to their domestic constituencies. For its part, the GoSS was under growing pressure to meet the expectations that it had created in society for delivery of a material “peace dividend” Government was also concerned over the slow pace of its own consolidation, and perceived that the resources promised during the pre-2005 negotiations were not being delivered. All stakeholders believed they suffered reputation damage, with political consequences.

22. Some tensions emerged among the MDTF-SS stakeholders during 2007 and 2008 as a result of performance. Among the consequences, the political consensus among stakeholders that the MDTF-SS should be the principal mechanism for delivery of international assistance began to erode. The government’s spending priorities began to shift, and it contributed less into the MDTF-SS than original intended. As a result, the resources available to the MDTF-SS over its full operating life were less than half of the intended levels. Some donors began to develop alternative channels for the delivery of assistance, including other pooled modalities and building up their bilateral capacity. The combination of high expectations, importing unrealistic JAM targets into the MDTF-SS framework, contextual factors in South Sudan and the low capacity of stakeholders all contributed to start-up delays for the MDTF-SS. Performance did not accelerate until 2009, three to four years into implementation. Performance was also affected by changing conditions in the program environment, related to slow CPA implementation, financial shocks and the government’s resource allocation decisions.
importance of the MDTF-SS within the overall aid architecture for South Sudan, therefore, began to decline after 2008.

23. **Further, the scope and timeliness of MDTF-SS outputs were affected by at least two contextual factors:** (i) the dynamics of CPA implementation and the manner in which these affected the decisions of the government, and; (ii) three oil-related economic shocks. These factors produced important changes in the kinds of results that the MDTF-SS delivered, when compared to the results intended.

24. **Core CPA issues were not resolved during the Interim Period.** The CPA process did not deliver the enabling conditions for delivery of a “peace dividend” that were intended. Among its benefits, the CPA allowed for a formal cessation of fighting, the creation of a semi-autonomous government in the South, and the basis for self-determination; a decision on the future status of the South based on free choice. However, many core CPA issues were not resolved by the Parties during the Interim Period. They remained a source of tension and insecurity, both during the Interim Period and carrying into the post-Independence era. In addition, South Sudan experienced significant internal political tensions, with various forms of politically motivated and resource-based conflict.

25. **The context affected GoSS/GRSS decision-making on the resources available for recovery and development activities,** particularly in relation to security expenditures. Most visibly, conditions have resulted in the government prioritizing expenditures to security and public administration, with smaller than expected investments made in public service delivery and development-related activities that would reinforce MDTF-SS accomplishments.

26. **Three financial shocks also reduced the availability of resources.** During the implementation period, South Sudan experienced: (i) a short-fall in revenue transfers from Khartoum during 2007; (ii) a more significant fiscal crisis in 2008-09 as declining global oil prices reduced GoSS revenues by two thirds, and; (iii) the loss of 100 percent of oil revenues after January 2012, or 95 percent of state income as the GRSS suspended oil exports transiting through Sudan.\(^1\) These reduced the overall funds available to implement and sustain projects. On each occasion, the shocks were driven by South Sudan’s dependence on oil revenues.

27. **Regarding the situation as of January 2012, there was clear evidence from the field study that the on-going fiscal crisis is undermining the scope and quality of MDTF-SS outputs,** and the ability of the government to convert outputs into outcomes. Austerity policies placed severe constraints on resources and capacity, and the state’s ability to

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\(^1\) The GRSS suspended oil exports in January 2012. The decision resulted from a long-standing dispute with the Government of Sudan over transit fees, the actual amounts of oil transiting through pipelines to the port and the final sale prices, among other factors. Suspension of exports resulted in a significant loss of revenue, for both Parties. In South Sudan, oil receipts were estimated to account for between 70 and 80 percent of GDP and up to 98 percent of state revenues. As a result, the GRSS implemented a policy of fiscal austerity, beginning in May 2012. The policy remains in effect.
deliver public goods and services. It has become increasingly difficult for state institutions, therefore, to make effective use of and sustain fund assets. The risk to MDTF-SS-generated assets will continue for some years into the future; beyond the point that oil revenues resume as debt is paid down and deterioration of infrastructure and capacity are addressed.

Performance of the MDTF-SS against the Evaluation Criteria

28. The MDTF-SS was important beyond the scope of its operations. The fund channelled only 10 percent of total aid flows to South Sudan during the evaluation period (2005 to 2012). While deposits accounted for 89 percent of total donor commitments in 2006 that percentage declined to 11 percent by 2008 and to two percent by 2010. Regardless, high expectations and visibility were attached to the MDTF-SS throughout its operational life. The fund was the original focal point of collaboration between the government and donors. It was invested with much of the optimism of the CPA process and with the expectation of delivering the “peace dividend” promised by government to society.

29. In response, the MDTF-SS delivered a large body of outputs, across a large geographic space and under difficult conditions. The final performance of the MDTF-SS appeared to exceed stakeholder perceptions, which were heavily influenced by their recollections of start-up difficulties. Outputs were consistent in nature with those intended in the Fund’s original design. Regardless, most projects were subject to restructuring, involving some combination of revisions to the development objectives or budget, extension of the closing date, and reduction in the scope of work. As a result, the MDTF-SS portfolio delivered partial outputs against its original targets. Quality concerns also affected the ability of the government and society to convert some outputs into outcomes. This was particularly the case for some “rapid impact” activities.

Effectiveness of the MDTF-SS Portfolio

30. Under the five Strategic Priorities, the MDTF-SS delivered significant outputs under at least four, and contributed to outcomes in all five. At the same time, the fund only partially delivered on some aspects. Implementation delays resulted from the failure of all stakeholders to fully grasp constraints on the ground, including limited capacity and reliance on procedures that were not fit for quick delivery. Targets for rapid scale-up of services and the delivery of peace dividends were unrealistic. Also, while capacity building at the sector level contributed to increased aid harmonization in some sectors,
the fund as such did not play the role intended in terms of coordinating and harmonizing donor activities.

31. **MDTF-SS outcomes were strongest under Strategic Priority 1 interventions: building the capacity of state institutions.** The MDTF-SS made a significant contribution to establishing and consolidating institutions, at the national and State levels. There were no durable state institutions in South Sudan at the start of the Interim Period in 2005. Institutions had to be created from scratch, at a time when the GoSS was attempting to manage multiple and often competing demands on its scarce capacity and resources. Informants noted that managing relations with Khartoum was a first priority, with GoSS participation in the Government of National Unity.

32. **From this baseline, the MDTF-SS made an important contribution to the overall development of institutional capacity, both across national ministries and at the State level.** The MDTF-SS’ contributions included legislation and regulatory frameworks, strengthening financial management and oversight systems, and building institutional capacity to develop policies and sector plans and providing training to personnel. Most MDTF-SS projects helped build state capacity through investments in essential physical infrastructure and equipment. Ministries visited, at the central and State levels, were able to demonstrate that the management and planning systems provided by the MDTF-SS were in place, functioning and had improved efficiency, even where these systems were rudimentary.

33. **The MDTF-SS’ approach integrated policy and legislative frameworks with physical infrastructure and equipment, systems and training,** and provided a foundation for future strengthening. Working through vertically integrated (national to State) and sectoral projects was more effective than the stand-alone capacity building project; the former approach was better integrated into the institutional development process, provided a more direct support to service delivery and contributed to the formation of national systems.

34. **Outcomes delivered under Strategic Priority 2—providing access to basic services with rapid scale-up of education—were mixed.** Strategic Priority 2 was an essential part of the rapid and tangible “peace dividend” that MDTF-SS was to deliver. Activities of the Sudan Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Development Project (SETIDP) and Rapid Impact Emergency Project (RIEP) delivered critical infrastructure that expanded connectivity in South Sudan and helped develop state institutions and services during the first years of the Interim Period. They did this with limited state capacity to build on. For example, in Central and Eastern Equatoria, SETIDP helped re-open the main transport and commercial routes, from Juba through the main population centers and markets into Kenya. Among the outcomes, State officials noted the revitalized internal markets and production and the opening of areas to improved public service delivery.

35. **RIEP-delivered pharmaceuticals also contributed to meeting urgent health requirements.** State health officials credited the RIEP with stocking-up State and County
facilities on a one-time basis, meeting an urgent need with a positive and short-term impact. The supplies contributed to broader efforts at expanding the health system. In the education sector, the MDTF-SS delivered a large volume of materials used to start the delivery of education services, notwithstanding delays and a reduction in the number of schools constructed. These undermined the rapid scale-up of education services.

36. **However, Strategic Priority 2 showed a partial outcome toward meeting urgent needs and “jump-starting” service delivery.** As emergency projects, many RIEP and some SETIDP activities were not designed for sustainability. Urgent goods, such as pharmaceuticals, were intended to be consumed. Although a health service project was implemented, the project was not sufficient to ensure predictable expansion in the sector. Some rehabilitation works deteriorated quickly, as the result of poor construction or lack of maintenance.

37. One result was that education, health and core fiduciary projects were not able to build on RIEP activities to the extent anticipated. Quality concerns also affected the credibility of the government among beneficiaries in society, at the cost of some reputational damage and increased political pressure. Re-investment in the same activities was also required, and many beneficiaries stated that they would have preferred that work be “done right the first time”. In this regard, the MDTF-SS did not resolve the tension between getting activities done “quickly” and “well”.

38. **Results under Strategic Priority 3—priority sector programs, including basic infrastructure, education, and health—catalysed the expansion of public services, including at the State and sub-State levels.** Many project activities appeared catalytic in creating the conditions for future investments. By working through government structures, project activities also strengthened national systems and the core stewardship functions of line ministries at both central and State levels, thereby building the basis for further improvements in access to basic services. This includes investments in core infrastructure and information systems. Regardless, results are being undermined by sustainability concerns and the impact of South Sudan’s current fiscal situation.

39. **Increased access to basic services and related outcomes were documented across all sectors.** MDTF-SS projects contributed to the expansion of access to basic health services and laid the building blocks for a national health system. Available data also indicates improvement in access to safe water and sanitation facilities. Local informants cited improved access to water and sanitation in formerly under-served communities, a decrease in water-borne disease and some increase in economic activity, such as brick making. In terms of transport infrastructure, the contribution was modest in the context of overall needs, even when the projects reached their output targets. However, these MDTF-SS activities contributed to improved connectivity, integration and mobility. Finally, investments in the education sector aimed at scale-up (already discussed under Strategic Priority 2) also contributed to the strengthening of the national education system.
40. However, concerns over sustainability and the lack of consultation with State and local stakeholders during project planning and implementation undermined the gains made under Strategic Priority 3. Informants in all sectors noted the mixed quality of construction works and materials and the lack of plans and/or resources for maintenance. More generally, there are limited resources available at the State level to sustain or expand on gains made during the Interim Period. Finally, service delivery mechanisms for basic services are still nascent and service delivery remains heavily reliant on NGOs. This reliance has increased during the post-2012 fiscal crisis and is most visible at the State level.

41. **Strategic Priority 4**—facilitate the transition from subsistence-based livelihoods to a development-oriented economy—delivered important outcomes strengthening state institutions and the enabling conditions for future private sector development. However, there were limited productivity gains in the natural resource sectors. Strategic Priority 4 outcomes were strongest institution building, at both the national and State levels. Both the agriculture and livestock projects also contributed to productivity-related increases. However, institutional strengthening and productivity gains at the project level did not result in sector-level productivity gains outside of MDTF-SS projects. The effectiveness of the livestock project was undermined by design problems, and a number of assets delivered were found to be no longer in use.

42. **Several factors contribute to the mixed outcome.** First, the Strategic Priority 4 objective of economic transition was too ambitious, given initial conditions and the limited resources eventually dedicated to productive projects. Second, government expenditure and support for the productive sectors has been low, and in decline since 2008. In the 2011 budget, natural resources accounted for only 2 percent of expenditure, whereas almost 80 percent of the population lives in rural areas, mainly engaged in agriculture and livestock. Government expenditure indicates a low priority given to these sectors, with insufficient investment to expand on Strategic Priority 4 productivity achievements.

43. **The private sector project contributed to a more enabling environment for business,** which provides a foundation for current efforts to diversify South Sudan’s economy. At inception, private sector activity in Southern Sudan was almost non-existent and supportive government policy, legislation and enabling services had to be built from scratch. Today, activity in the sector has increased tremendously with registered businesses up from less than 1,000 in 2005 to more than 7,300 in 2010.

44. **Strategic Priority 4 projects made a contribution to improved livelihoods for women.** The gender project provided grants and training in agricultural and non-farm income generating activities, to local women and Community Based Organizations. The Private Sector Development Project (PSDP) and Support to Agriculture and Forestry Development Project (SAFDP) also contributed directly to enhanced economic opportunities for women. Under PSDP, women accounted for more than half of the entrepreneurs who received start-up capital and about 70 percent of microfinance loans. Under SAFDP, about 40 percent of the producers organized in farmers groups and associations were female.
45. **The MDTF-SS did not fully achieve its objective for Strategic Priority 5: harmonizing international assistance.** The fund was highly effective prior to 2008 in mobilizing and coordinating resources. A direct result of the MDTF-SS was to improve the GRSS’ capacity for coordination of international assistance, including at the sector level through strengthened line ministries.

46. **However, the MDTF-SS process contributed to the fragmentation of South Sudan’s aid architecture later in the implementation period.** Arguably, the declining importance of the MDTF-SS reflected an evolution in the context, as donors and other international actors strengthened their presence, over time and after Independence. Also, coordination structures also moved to a sector-based orientation. However, donors’ concerns with MDTF-SS performance that emerged after 2008, and their decision to create new modalities and/or shift to bilateral implementation as their operational capacity in South Sudan strengthened contributed to the trend of aid fragmentation. After 2008, the number of aid channels in South Sudan increased and the importance of the MDTF-SS as a coordinating body decreased.

**Relevance**

47. **The relevance of the MDTF-SS was satisfactory, at the fund’s inception in 2005.** The fund was integrated into the CPA and aligned with the JAM framework. It was also relevant to the goals and aspirations of stakeholders (the two CPA Parties and donors), who approved the MDTF-SS after two years of discussion.

48. **The relevance of MDTF-SS was sustained over time,** including through the use of restructuring to align projects with changes in the program context and available resources. The exception was late approval and implementation of a gender-specific project. While contributing to institutional strengthening and livelihoods, the project came too late in the MDTF-SS program cycle to be considered a “peace dividend”. The MDTF-SS continued to reflect the government’s stated priorities throughout its operational life. However, relevance to South Sudan’s aid architecture declined over time, as donors and the government channeled a diminishing portion of resources and energy through the fund.

49. The finding of satisfactory relevance was made notwithstanding two factors. First, the MDTF-SS was relevant to JAM priorities. However, the JAM was overly ambitious and did not have satisfactory relevance to the contextual reality of South Sudan. The lack of realism was transferred into the MDTF-SS portfolio. Also, the MDTF-SS’ relevance to GoSS/GRSS priorities arguably shifted over time. Government decision-making on resource allocation was influenced by re-occurring financial shocks and volatile security conditions, internal and external. Over time, the government increasingly prioritized expenditures for security and public administration, reducing the resources available to meet its matching contributions to the MDTF-SS. Smaller than expected investments were made in the public service and in the development-related activities needed to reinforce MDTF-SS accomplishments.
National Ownership

50. National ownership was satisfactory during negotiations to establish the fund, through the JAM process and into the early phase of MDTF-SS formation and implementation. The government demonstrated early its intention to exercise strong leadership during this period, although it was constrained by limited capacity. Ownership was enabled by the World Bank MDTF-SS modality, which placed the government in key governance and implementation roles, in addition to making it the primary beneficiary of MDTF-SS activities. However, national ownership declined with time, as budget allocations to the MDTF-SS were reduced, priorities were changed, and frustration over early MDTF-SS performance increased. Regardless, the government sustained its ownership and involvement at the operational level. The ownership of donors also declined, as they established new aid modalities after 2008.

51. National ownership at the State level was undermined by centralized project management. The MDTF-SS worked through central GoSS/GRSS ministries, where most project planning occurred. A significant portion of fund resources were pushed down to the State level, either directly implemented from Juba or in collaboration with counterpart State ministries. However, State-level ministries had limited involvement in the planning process and information from the center was not well communicated. Project activities were often delivered with little or no consultation and not included in State-level planning. While State officials acknowledged the importance of the MDTF-SS outputs, the lack of consultation had an impact on the ability of State institutions to “own” the project and plan for its effective use and sustainability. This was the single most important concern emerging from the State-level field study.

Sustainability

52. The sustainability of MDTF-SS outcomes is uncertain. As noted earlier, some outputs delivered under Strategic Priority 2 were not intended to be sustainable, and the results of Strategic Priority 1 continue to support the functionality of state institutions. Elsewhere, concerns for sustainability were driven by three factors: (i) whether projects had an effective exit strategy in their design; (ii) severe resource constraints related to South Sudan’s current fiscal crisis; and; (iii) fragmentation of the country’s aid architecture and resulting concern as to whether resources would be coordinated to fill gaps in the overall aid portfolio. In addition to project design, therefore, the choices of government and donors emerged as a key sustainability variable.

53. Sustainability was already a concern prior to the suspension of oil exports in 2012. Government resource allocations to key MDTF-SS sectors were limited, given other priorities for resource allocation. Sustainability for some projects, particularly under Strategic Priority 2, was also affected by the mixed quality of the physical assets delivered and the MDTF-SS’ centralized planning and implementation model, which involved limited consultation and communication with State-level beneficiaries in government and society.
54. Since 2012 and under austerity, institutional capacity built with MDTF-SS support is helping to preserve the core functionality of institutions, at the central and State levels, while operations and service delivery have been severely reduced. Government currently lacks the resources to sustain the gains made during the MDTF-SS implementation period, let alone maintain many of the physical assets delivered. The situation becomes more acute moving from the center out to the Sub-levels of government. The field study observed that many physical assets have deteriorated prematurely, with others already beyond use due to lack of maintenance.

Reasonability of Cost

55. A comparative analysis of the reasonability of cost was not possible given the lack of data and “like” comparators. There are large discrepancies in availability of cost information for South Sudan and differences in how costs are categorized and reported. Also, the operational model of the MDTF-SS, with its reliance on recipient execution, is unique in South Sudan and there are no clear-cut comparator mechanisms. More importantly, the evaluation did not have good comparators as the documents available for review were silent on the costs associated with different context-specific factors. As an alternative, the evaluation addresses reasonability by identifying the context-specific drivers of costs.

56. The main drivers of costs for MDTF-SS outputs were: (i) capacity constraints and institutional weaknesses; (ii) fiduciary and procurement procedures; (iii) underdeveloped markets; (iv) logistics; and (v) security. These resulted from the interaction between the South Sudan context, the recipient executed implementation modality, and the trade-offs related to risk; finding a balance between contextual, institutional, and program risk. At the operational level, inefficiency was largely contextual (linked to capacity constraints, difficult physical conditions, underdeveloped markets and insecurity, among other factors identified). About 73 percent of the project activities assessed achieved full or partial value-for-money under the Monitoring Agent’s assessment. Administrative costs were found to be reasonable at the project level, in that they followed the Bank’s established practices.

Cross-Cutting Issues

57. Gender did not emerge as an MDTF-SS priority until late into implementation of the portfolio. Gender was not integrated into the MDTF-SS’ Strategic Priorities, or in the original definition of MDTF-SS’ cross-cutting issues. Early IOC and Oversight Committee meetings make some reference to the importance of addressing gender, but it was not taken up in a substantive manner until 2008-09. As a result, while the MDTF-SS
showed important gender-related achievements in areas such as health, education and private sector development, gender was not effectively mainstreamed into most projects. The stand-alone gender project made important contributions to development of relevant policy and institutional frameworks, however it was launched late in the MDTF-SS’ operational life.

Summary of Lessons Learned from the MDTF-SS Experience

58. The long-term effectiveness of an MDTF depends on the pre-establishment assessment and political economy analysis done by the principle stakeholders. Government leadership is essential to the assessment process as the basis for relevance and long-term political commitment.

59. The MDTF governance entity must manage the interaction between political aspirations and expectations, and fund operations. Expectations concerning what an MDTF can and cannot deliver must be clearly articulated, based on a consensus between the stakeholders, and communicated to stakeholder constituencies in national and international society. Expectations must be realistic in the context, and must avoid burdening the MDTF with aspirations and responsibilities that are beyond its scope of action.

60. Expectations are difficult to change once they have been set in the minds of stakeholders and the public. Among other effects, the experience of South Sudan shows that inflated expectations can: (i) leave an MDTF vulnerable to being held accountable for events beyond its scope; (ii) create benchmarks for assessing performance and credibility that may be unrealistic; (iii) undermine the credibility of a fund and create reputation risk for all involved, and; (iv) contribute to instability, where an MDTF’s performance is tied to perceptions of success and/or the political justification for a peace process and is then perceived to fail on such expectations.

61. Expectation management is a political act and different from a communication strategy. A communications strategy can be part of expectation management, but it is not a substitute. Expectation management is political; principal stakeholders, usually in the governance entity, define what a fund can reasonably accomplish and the messages that will be conveyed to different constituencies. The Secretariat can then implement a communication strategy to reinforce and deliver those messages. However, a communications strategy is not a substitute for an expectation management strategy.

62. The World Bank has a responsibility to assess technical realism against the contextual and political reality of an MDTF. The Bank has limited influence as manager over the larger political

The design of an MDTF modality, including the choice of Administrator and Managing Agent, must be requirement-based. Fragile state and post-crisis situations will often call for a variety of implementation arrangements, which cannot usually be delivered by a single organization. Solutions, such as the “two-window common governance” model, allow for the use of different implementation arrangements and organizational capacities within a single modality that provides strategic coherence.
aspirations that stakeholders attach to a fund, unless the Bank is also a decision maker in the governance body. The Bank should regularly do its own “reality assessment” to check the alignment between the aspirations of stakeholders, the realism of objectives within the context and what a technical modality is able to deliver.

63. **The recipient execution modality depends on strong government leadership and capacity.** The modality has difficulty outperforming government systems, where capacity is limited and/or government’s priorities are not consistent with those of the MDTF. The tension between urgent needs and capacity makes it difficult for the recipient execution model to deliver on some short-term requirements. Expectations and implementation plans must be calibrated accordingly, with alternative delivery channels to meet urgent needs when necessary.

64. **Design solutions, such as the “two-window common governance” model allow different organizations to apply their comparative advantage,** within a coherent strategic framework. There is still no global consensus on the most effective MDTF model for achieving these objectives simultaneously. However, multiple priorities and operational requirements may call for the use of different systems and procedures within a single fund modality. Where this occurs, a “two-window” or other model may be appropriate. Regardless, the design phase should include an assessment of the systems and procedures that will be most effective in the context, and the institutional arrangements needed for effective collaboration between different organizations within the MDTF structure.

65. **Trust Funds are an integrated system.** Performance and progress toward objectives depend on how well each part of the system functions. Too often, the focus is placed on the operational dimensions, with less attention to strategic direction, or performance of governance arrangements and of stakeholders in their individual roles and responsibilities.

66. **Governance is essential to MDTF effectiveness in post-crisis situations.** Governance systems must be based on clearly defined roles, responsibilities, assumptions and expectations of what the principal stakeholders will contribute. Consensus on these issues should be embedded in the foundation documents and reaffirmed, revised and sustained over time. The lack of consensus on institutional roles and mutual accountability can undermine the effectiveness of fund governance.

67. **The key performance variable is government leadership, with donors and the MDTF modality aligned behind the government’s agenda.** Weakness in government leadership can undermine the strategic coherence of a fund, and the fund’s alignment with priorities. It can also create a leadership vacuum that other stakeholders try to fill, based on their own perspectives and priorities.
68. **The first responsibility of governance is to sustain the political consensus that anchors an MDTF.** The consensus is the fundamental agreement among stakeholders about the purpose of a fund and what it is intended to achieve. Where the consensus erodes, stakeholder commitment, strategic coherence and working relationships will also erode.

69. **MDTF Governance has a critical responsibility to provide strategic direction and oversight,** particularly in a dynamic context. Strategic direction assures the relevance of the fund, serves as the basis for effective allocation decisions, and enables actions to adjust the MDTF for contextual change and performance concerns. The experience of South Sudan is that stakeholders tend to micromanage operational details when performance concerns emerge, rather than focusing on the broader enabling conditions.

70. **The highest level of a governance system should minimize its involvement in operational details.** Technical tasks, such as the detailed review, assessment, and recommendations on individual projects are most effectively delegated to working groups or other technical entities within, or reporting to, the governance body. The governance structure, therefore, should include the appropriate technical entities, mandated to review technical and implementation issues and to support decision-making within an Oversight Committee.

71. **The scope of monitoring and evaluation systems should include the performance of the governance mechanism** and of the principle stakeholders in their mandated roles and responsibilities. Effective governance requires transparency and mutual accountability among the principal stakeholders. This can only be accomplished when monitoring and evaluation systems are in place, and fund governance is included within their scope of work.

72. **In the MDTF-SS’ experience, successful projects:**

   a. *Have strong national leadership,* and are clearly embedded in the priorities and policies of Government.

   b. *Are well prepared, have a simple design,* and *have realistic development objectives, scope and implementation schedules.*

   c. *Do not exceed the capacity of national implementing institutions,* even as they build capacity, and do take into account a realistic assessment of field conditions.

   d. *Avoid top-down approaches* when delivering on national implementation through sub-levels of government and communities. Enhancing long-term ownership and sustainability sometimes effective consultation with sub-levels of government. A community-based approach may also improve performance, depending on the project.

   e. *Integrate risk assessment and mitigation measures into the design,* taking into account the full scope of risks that may affect performance.
f. Are implemented with a robust field implementation presence, management oversight and with regular and direct contact with national counterparts.

73. Projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations are usually developed with incomplete information and under dynamic conditions. Assessment and design are likely to be imperfect. As mitigation measures: (i) information gaps should be acknowledged and explicitly stated, and steps should be taken to develop such information during implementation; and (ii) risk assessment must not be unduly influenced by unrealistic political aspirations.

74. A balanced approach to risk is needed in fragile-state and conflict-affected situations. Using the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) framework, MDTF stakeholders, and particularly donors, gave priority to institutional risk when making decisions on design of the modality and in their governance and management of the portfolio. Notwithstanding the existence of important institutional risks in South Sudan (such as weak public finance management), privileging them over contextual and program risk undermined the relevance of design to context and negatively affected performance. International good practice in finding this balance is still at an early stage of development.

75. A limited number of activities can be done “quick and well”, while other projects can only be done “well” with time. South Sudan demonstrates the trade-off between “quick” and “well” is a false choice. There are a limited number of things that can be done “quick and well”, depending on the context. Implementation modalities play an important role (Recipient Execution vs. Direct Execution modalities). Most projects can only be done “well” with adequate time and resources, especially when they depend on building institutional capacity. Delivering “quick and badly” has a corrosive effect on public perception, when the goods and services delivered as a “peace dividend” are of poor quality, are not sustainable and/or do not produce meaningful improvements in living conditions.

76. In response to institutional capacity constraints, local market conditions and other risks, procurement policies need to be more flexible. The South Sudan MDTF experience shows that project performance is inextricably linked to efficient procurement. The weak performance of procurement had a significant impact across the MDTF-SS portfolio. It delayed projects aimed at the rapid rehabilitation and expansion of basic services, as well as those focused on mid- to long-term development, including capital investments. Problems also emerged throughout the procurement process, from planning to contract management and oversight, leading to high transaction costs and substantial delays in the delivery of outputs.
Part One: Introduction to the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan

1. Almost years of civil conflict in Sudan came to an end in 2005, with the signing of Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Two trust funds were established in 2005, in compliance with the CPA’s Protocol on Wealth Sharing and to support aspects of the agreement; the Multi-Donor Trust Fund-National (MDTF-N) and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan (MDTF-SS). They were to be “a coordinated funding mechanism for the governments’ priority interventions to reconstruct and develop Sudan”. The World Bank was appointed as the Administrator, and to manage the two MDTF Technical Secretariats.

2. A Multi-donor Trust Fund (MDTF) is a mechanism to finance a coherent government program. In Sudan, the framework for such a program came from the Joint Assessment Mission (JAM 2005). The JAM was led by the United Nations and World Bank, working in partnership with the Sudanese Parties and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Partners’ Forum for Peace (IPF). It produced the Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication, which was presented at the Oslo Donors’ Conference on Sudan in April 2005. The framework covered a six-year Interim Period, which began in July 2005 and ended with Southern Sudan’s CPA-mandated referendum on self-determination. It included an assessment of urgent rehabilitation and recovery needs to be addressed between 2005 and 2007, and for recovery and early development through to 2010.

3. The MDTF-SS was mandated as a central partner of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), to support implementation of the JAM framework. The fund was established under the government’s leadership to channel both international assistance and a significant South Sudanese investment. It worked through the World Bank’s recipient execution modality and delivered a portfolio of 21 projects in five strategic priority areas, between 2005 and 2013. The MDTF-SS portfolio was designed to build the capacity of state institutions while simultaneously delivering on urgent needs, rehabilitating core physical infrastructure, establishing essential public services and facilitating the transition from a subsistence-based economy to a development-oriented economy. Projects would be implemented through state institutions, with technical assistance from the Bank and

2 A six-year interim period, dated from 9 July 2005, was established by the CPA. During the Interim period, a Government of Southern Sudan was established, with the right to govern affairs the region and participate equitably in the national government. Implementation of the CPA was to be done in a manner that made peace attractive. After the Interim Period, the CPA enshrined the right of Southern Sudanese to vote in an internationally monitored referendum on self-determination; either to confirm Sudan’s unity or to vote for secession. The referendum took place in January 2011, with 98.83% of the population voting for independence. South Sudan became an independent state in on July 9, 2011.
implementation support from United Nations’ agencies and national and international NGOs.

4. **The MDTF-SS formally closed at the end of June 2013.** Its eight years of operation spanned the CPA Interim Period and the first two years of South Sudan’s independence. Total fund receipts at closure were USD 728 million, of which USD 718 million had been committed to project activities that were implemented at the national level and throughout the full geographic territory of South Sudan. The Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GRSS, formerly the GoSS) was the largest individual contributor (25%) while 14 international donors contributed the remaining 75 percent of the funding.

5. **The MDTF-SS’ importance went beyond the scope of its own operations.** The fund channelled only 10 percent of total international aid flows to South Sudan during the evaluation period (2005-2012), and an even smaller portion of national development investments. Regardless, high expectations and visibility were attached to the MDTF-SS throughout its operational life. The fund embodied the mutual commitments made between the CPA Parties and donors during the negotiations (2003-2005), and was the original focal point of collaboration between them. It was invested with the aspirations and optimism of the CPA process, and the expectations of society that the CPA would deliver a “peace dividend”.
Part Two: Methodology for Independent Final Evaluation of the MDTF-SS

Objectives of the Independent Final Evaluation

6. The Independent Final Evaluation of the MDTF-SS took place between November 2012 and June 2013. The objectives of the evaluation were to:

   a. Analyze the performance of the MDTF-SS by comparing achieved results and impacts with the goals and expected results of the fund; and

   b. Contribute to future development interventions through the collection, analysis and documentation of the lessons learned.3

7. The criteria for evaluation included the relevance, effectiveness, and the efficiency and accountability of the MDTF-SS, as well as the sustainability of the results achieved. The scope of work covered all aspects of fund operations, from the early discussions on creating the two Sudan trust funds (2003 to 2005) to the closure of the MDTF-SS at the end of June 2013. The Terms of Reference (2012) placed an emphasis on:

   • Assessing MDTF-SS outcomes at the portfolio level, building on existing project and portfolio output data and on monitoring and evaluation reports.

   • Approaching the MDTF-SS as an integrated system, focusing on the performance and contribution of each part of that system.

8. The evaluation was framed by the overall goals and five strategic priorities of the MDTF-SS, as established at inception of the fund in 2005.4 An outcome methodology was selected to perform a systematic review of the MDTF-SS mechanism at three levels:

   • The performance and results of the MDTF-SS at the portfolio level, moving beyond the delivery of project-level outputs to assess progress made towards the development outcomes desired.

   • The performance of the overall MDTF-SS modality in delivering the outputs intended and contributing to outcomes.

   • The MDTF-SS’ contribution within the larger South Sudan context, in relation to other aid modalities and the changing program context.

9. The evaluation process was designed in three sequential parts: an outcome analysis of the results achieved at the portfolio level, an output analysis focused at the project level, and

3 The objectives of the Independent Final Evaluation of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan are established in Section II of the Terms of Reference (October 2012), “Objectives and Scope of Work”. The Terms of Reference are included as Annex A to this report. More detailed information on the methodology is provided in Inception Report (January 2012) and Preliminary Report (March 2013).

4 Related information is posted at http://www.mdtfss.org/
assessment of the *linkages between outcomes and the MDTF-SS’ outputs*, to identify the fund’s contribution to development changes in the five strategic priority areas.

10. Output-level analysis was supported largely by the extensive data that the MDTF-SS already had available, some information gaps notwithstanding, and augmented by interviews and a field study in South Sudan. Outcome analysis relied primarily on secondary sources of information, the field study and interviews, given the limited outcome analysis done through the MDTF-SS’ monitoring and evaluation system.

11. **The methodology approached the MDTF-SS as an integrated system.** Results were influenced by a combination of: (i) the performance of each component part of the fund modality (at a minimum, funding arrangements, governance, the Technical Secretariat, and MDTF-SS implementation and monitoring arrangements); (ii) the performance of each individual fund stakeholder in mandated roles and responsibilities; and (iii) interaction between the MDTF-SS and factors in the external environment, many beyond its control or influence. This included the decisions and actions of MDTF-SS stakeholders that were taken outside of the fund but influenced the fund’s program environment.

12. **Within this formulation, the main responsibility for outputs was placed with the MDTF-SS.** In turn, government had the primary responsibility for converting MDTF-SS outputs into outcomes and for sustaining those outcomes. Delivery of outputs does not automatically translate into outcomes. It is influenced by: (i) the relevance, quality and timeliness of the outputs delivered by the MDTF-SS; and (ii) the capacity of the government to use MDTF-SS outputs in achieving its development goals.

**Document Review, Interviews and Field Study**

**MDTF-SS Documents Reviewed**

13. **The document review began during the evaluation inception process** (November to December 2012) and continued over the full duration of the evaluation period, as information became available. The evaluation team referenced core MDTF-SS documents, focusing on the fund’s inception period (2005-06) through to its closure. The documents included Monitoring Agent reports, in addition to other monitoring and evaluation reports at the portfolio and project levels. Other historical and contextual documents were consulted, including reporting from South Sudan and international media.

**Interviews with MDTF-SS Stakeholders**

14. **The evaluation process included interviews with approximately 130 informants, in both groups and individual sessions.** In-person interviews were conducted during the field mission to South Sudan, at the World Bank headquarters in Washington, DC, and in Norway. Additional interviews by telephone, Skype and video conference were conducted.

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5 The *List of Documents Consulted* is included as Annex J to this report
with current and former donors and World Bank officials, including persons with historical knowledge of the fund’s creation and early operations.  

Field Mission to Three States
15. The field study in South Sudan took place over a five week period, between February 12 and March 15, 2013. The objectives of the mission were to: (i) confirm the outcome model and other aspects of the evaluation methodology with stakeholders in Juba; (ii) gather qualitative and quantitative data on MDTF-SS outputs and outcomes; and (iii) visit a sample of MDTF-SS activities to cross-reference, verify and complement the available reporting.

16. The field mission began in Juba with key stakeholder interviews during week one (government, donors, the United Nations, the Technical Secretariat and the Monitoring Agent), and with validation of the evaluation methodology and proposal for field locations where the mission would take place. On the basis of that validation, the field study continued in three States; Eastern Equatoria, Western Bahr el Gазal and Jonglei. The study consisted of interviews with informants (government at the State and County levels, communities and with implementing partners) and visits to selected MDTF-SS activity sites.

17. The field study sampling included interviews and site visits across all five strategic priorities and 17 of the 21 MDTF-SS supported projects. Project activities were observed in Juba, and at the State and sub-State levels down to Payams in three sample States. The field study concluded with interviews in Juba, a debriefing presentation to available MDTF-SS donors and World Bank officials and presentation of an Aide Memoire (April 2013).

Assessing the Reasonability of Cost
18. The evaluation was asked to assess the “reasonability of cost” for the MDTF-SS portfolio. The original intent was to conduct a financial analysis, comparing the MDTF-SS to other funding mechanisms in South Sudan and/or similar contexts elsewhere. However, a comprehensive analysis was not possible given the lack of data for “like” comparators; on funding modalities in South Sudan and elsewhere with available data and similar cost structure and operating contexts. Instead, the evaluation adopted a cost-driver comparison across pooled funds in South Sudan.

19. Cost drivers in the South Sudan context were identified from the financial data and contextual information in MDTF-SS documents, and from interviews and the field study. The team searched the evaluations of other pooled funds in South Sudan, and invited MDTF-SS stakeholders to share output-level cost data from their own operations. However, the evaluation received no cost data or assessments of costs. Accordingly, it drew solely on a review of external evaluations in the public domain. For the same reason, the comparison excluded bilateral programs and projects implemented by MDTF-SS donors.

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6 The List of Informants is included as Annex C to this report.
7 A Summary of Field Observations is included as Annex H.
Limitations of the Evaluation

20. **The main limitations on the evaluation related to the availability of data and documents:**
   Specifically:
   
   a. *In general, outcome level data for South Sudan remains scarce.* As a result, it was difficult to identify and quantify trends in most of the Strategic Priority areas and attribute change resulting from the MDTF-SS. This was particularly the case given the loss of oil revenues in January 2012 and the resulting cuts in government spending under austerity policies.
   
   b. *The MDTF-SS did not keep comprehensive data on the geographic location of project activities,* which extended the process of choosing a representative sample for the field study.
   
   c. *Uneven access to information affected development of the main findings.* The evaluation relied on project monitoring and evaluation reporting for a portion of the output-level data. However, less than half of the implementation completion reports (ICRs) were available prior to the field study, with some in draft form or arriving after the mission was complete.⁸
   
   d. *The evaluation received limited information from donors* to support a more robust analysis of the context, their internal assessments of the MDTF-SS and/or the reasonability of cost analysis. Donor participation in other aspects of the evaluation was also limited.

21. Some concerns were expressed during a review of the initial draft report that the reasonability of cost assessment was not based on comparison with other trust funds. The evaluation team signaled during the inception process that comparative data was not available, either from other funds or from donors. Accordingly, the methodology focused on identifying the main cost drivers and whether these were effectively managed within World Bank systems and procedures. There was further concern that a gender-based evaluation methodology should be used. Again, the evaluation was limited by the agreed scope of work and available data.

22. Otherwise, the evaluation experienced many of the same physical and institutional constraints that affected MDTF-SS projects and the daily work of all stakeholders. These included the physical limitations on travel and the difficulties of communication and of sourcing information. These were partially offset by the support received from stakeholders during the field study.

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⁸ Completion of the ICRs is required within six months of project closure. Since some projects were closed in December 2012, the project-level ICRs were generally on track but occurred too late to inform the field study process.
Part Three: Overview of MDTF-SS Architecture

Development Objective and Organization by Strategic Priorities

23. The goal of the MDTF-SS was to provide “a coordinated funding mechanism for the governments’ priority interventions to reconstruct and develop Sudan, as reflected in the [World Bank and United Nations-led] Joint Assessment Mission’s report, Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication”\(^9\). The goal statement includes at least six basic assumptions about the fund’s design. The MDTF-SS:

- **Was designed as an integrated aid modality**, though which government and international partners would collaborate to implement some aspects of the CPA.

- **Would increase aid effectiveness** and serve as the primary channel for co-mingling international investments and international assistance to South Sudan, during the Interim Period.

- **Would ensure the coordination and alignment of international assistance**, through the MDTF-SS governance structure and implementation through state institutions.

- **Use the 2005 Joint Assessment Mission report** as the program framework for portfolio design.

- **Rely on United Nations agencies and NGOs for some rapid implementation activities**, during the period when state capacity was being strengthened.

- **Depend on CPA implementation and the actions of the CPA Parties and the GoSS to create an enabling environment for the projects.**

24. **The two overarching Strategic Priorities were to build the capacity of the GoSS and coordinate and align international assistance.** The MDTF-SS had two cross-cutting priorities (Strategic Priorities 1 and 5) that would enable the remaining three priority areas (Strategic Priorities 2, 3 and 4). Most projects had a capacity building element (Strategic Priority 1) to strengthen state institutions in their governance, management, planning and service delivery functions. Capacity building would occur simultaneously with the expansion of basic service delivery. At the same time, the overall effectiveness of MDTF-SS would benefit from the coordination, harmonization and alignment of international assistance, and co-mingling with national resources (Strategic Priority 5).

\(^9\) There are multiple formulations of the MDTF-SS’ Development Objective. The evaluation used the formulation from the Memorandum of the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to the Executive Directors on a Proposal for the World Bank to Administer two Trust Funds for Sudan (March 17, 2005) as included on the original MDTF-SS website.
### Table 3.1: Goal and Five Strategic Priorities of the MDTF-SS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Priorities of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDTF-SS Goal:</strong> To enable effective coordination and harmonization of international assistance, to preserve scarce capacity and enable key programs to be launched.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Priority 1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Priority 2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Priority 3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Priority 4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic Priority 5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. **Projects were sequenced in response to the phases of meeting urgent needs, and assisting the recovery and development efforts anticipated during the CPA Interim Period.** The sequence ran from addressing urgent needs (Strategic Priority 2) to expanding infrastructure and basic service delivery (Strategic Priority 3) and supporting long-term development (Strategic Priority 4). The progression of was presented as linear. However, the fund recognized that capacity building and project components related to service delivery and economic development would occur simultaneously and be mutually reinforcing.

26. **Each of the five Strategic Priorities was aligned with a cluster of projects, through which the priority’s objectives were to be achieved.** The MDTF-SS’ goal, therefore, would be achieved by building the capacity of state and society while simultaneously delivering core governance functions and public goods and services. This would be done through state institutions, as these expanded. Working through government systems would have a dual objective: (i) gradually expanding the capacity and competence of the state by investing in capacity and using state institutions, while; (ii) strengthening the legitimacy and credibility of the state, after an extended period of violent conflict and through the delivery of public goods and services that would benefit society.
**Figure 3.1: MDTF-SS Portfolio Design**

**MDTF-SS Portfolio Design**

**Building State Capacity**
- SP1: Establish effective core of public sector administration

**Urgent Needs**
- SP2: Provide access to basic services with rapid scale-up of education.

**Reconstruction**
- SP3: Priority sector programs, including basic infrastructure, education, and health.

**Development**
- SP4: Facilitate the transition from subsistence-based livelihoods to a development-oriented economy.

**Coordination**
- SP5: Harmonize development assistance

---

**Figure 3.2: MDTF-SS Portfolio Assignment by Strategic Priority**

**Building State Capacity**
Projects: CABIHRD, CFP, Census, Currency, GSPO and cross-cutting

**Humanitarian Aid**
- RIENP
  - ERP
  - SETIDP

**Reconstruction**
- WSSP
- RWSSP
- ROADS
- UPHSD I and II
- HIV/AIDS
- DDR
- Police and Prisons I & II

**Development**
- LFDP
- SAFDP
- PSD
- GSPO

**Aid Coordination**
Projects: Cross-cutting theme of the portfolio

---

10 RIENP – Rapid Impact Emergency Project; CFSSP - Core Fiduciary Systems Support Project; SETIDP - Sudan Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Development Project; ERP - Multi Donor Education Rehabilitation Project; CABIHRD - Capacity Building, Institutional and Human Resources Development Project; RWSSP - Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Program; LFDP - Livestock and Fisheries Development Project; PSDP - Private Sector Development Project; SAFFDP – Agriculture and Forestry Development Project, HIV/AIDS - Scaling up the National Response to HIV/AIDS project; WSSP - Water Supply and Sanitation Programme; UPHSII - Umbrella Program for Health System Development Phase II; RMP – Road Maintenance Project; DDR – Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration project; P&P – Police and Prisons Project.
MDTF-SS Beneficiaries

27. The MDTF-SS was designed with four primary beneficiary groups: (i) the newly-formed Government of Southern Sudan; (ii) South Sudanese society; (iii) the Government of National Unity (GoNU) in Khartoum; and (iv) South Sudan’s international development partners (bilateral donors, multilateral organizations and national and international NGOs). In turn, each Strategic Priority had several beneficiary groups associated with it. Only the Government of South Sudan benefited under all five priorities, with improved institutional capacity, service delivery and effective relations with its international partners.

28. The Government of National Unity and the Government of South Sudan benefited directly from political and financial support to the CPA process, and the opportunity to leverage national resources with the international assistance being channeled through the two Sudan Trust Funds (MDTF-N and MDTF-SS). Both governments were also to derive a mutual benefit from the three “national” projects implemented under Strategic Priority 2 and Strategic Priority 3 and from the intended coordination between the two Sudan MDTFs. This was in addition to overall international support for CPA implementation.

Figure 3.3: MDTF-SS Beneficiary Groups

29. The newly-formed GoSS benefited at its central, state and sub-state levels. The state was the main beneficiary of capacity building activities (Strategic Priority 1) and was to benefit from the “preservation of scarce capacity” that would result from the harmonization and coordination of international assistance (Strategic Priority 5). Projects delivered under Strategic Priorities 2, 3, and 4 would expand the delivery of basic public goods and services and strengthen the state’s credibility and legitimacy in its relationship with society.
30. **Groups in the South Sudanese society were to benefit from MDTF-SS projects delivered under Strategic Priorities 2, 3, and 4.** Further, society in general was to benefit from the state’s improved capacity to govern and deliver goods and services on their behalf (Strategic Priority 1). At its highest level, society would also benefit from improved human security conditions supported by the MDTF-SS and from sustained peace in South Sudan under the CPA framework.

31. **Government, donors and South Sudan’s other international development partners were to share in the benefits of harmonization and coordination under Strategic Priority 5.** Further, working through a pooled funding modality and a donor coordinating counterpart with technical capacity, the Joint Donor Office (JDO) allowed donors to function with limited presence in South Sudan during the early years of the Interim Period.

### Governance and Operations

32. **The MDTF-SS was designed with a three-tiered structure:** (i) a high-level political forum to monitor and support CPA implementation; (ii) a governance body for both of the Sudan MDTFs, bringing together the principal national and international stakeholders; and (iii) an Administrator and Technical Secretariat to manage fund operations. The Technical Secretariat also had responsibility for engaging a Monitoring Agent. Project implementation was to occur primarily through state institutions. However, provisions were also made to work through third parties (United Nations’ agencies, NGOs and others) for rapid implementation projects. These were considered urgent, and timely implementation would be constrained by the government’s limited capacity.

*Figure 3.4: MDTFs Governance Structure*

33. **The MDTF-SS architecture was designed with vertical integration linking high-level political support to the CPA with fund governance and technical operations.** The Sudan Consortium was the highest forum for consultation between the international community and the two Parties to the CPA process. The consortium grew out of international support to the CPA negotiations. It was to meet twice a year and discuss overall progress on CPA
implementation against agreed monitoring targets. The consortium was the forum to make or renew donor pledges, build confidence between the Parties and to promote transparency, including transparency in the budgets of both the GoNU and GoSS. Its mandate, therefore, established a direct link between the two Sudan trust funds and ongoing political international support to the CPA process. The consortium was to enable resource mobilization, govern the mandate and composition of the MDTF-N and MDTF-SS Oversight Committees and oversee fund performance.

34. **The Oversight Committee was to be the main governing body of the Sudan MDTFs.** The two Sudan MDTFs were to be governed for one year by an Interim Oversight Committee (IOC) working from Khartoum. The MDTF-SS Oversight Committee became operational in September 2006, coinciding with the opening of the Joint Donor Office in Juba. The MDTF-SS Oversight Committee was chaired by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning and co-chaired by the Joint Donor Office. The Committee was to meet once every quarter, with responsibility to provide strategic guidance, make allocation decisions, maintain an oversight of fund operations and mobilize resources.

**Table 3.2: Mandate of the MDTF-SS Oversight Committee**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandate of the MDTF-SS Oversight Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Make programmatic and allocation decisions for funding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Set and revise general guidelines for MDTF operations, including criteria for the allocation of funds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Provide strategic guidance, review results on the ground, and address impediments to progress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Ensure integrity, competition, and equitable allocation of implementation responsibilities to different entities, consistent with the framework and MDTF objectives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Monitor progress reports submitted by the Technical Secretariat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Solicit proposals for MDTF financing so that there is an equitable distribution of available funds for priority activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g. Raise funds from current and potential donors to help finance priority activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h. Provide guidance on all other matters that affect the efficiency, effectiveness, and economic and financial sustainability of the MDTFs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

35. **Technical and coordination bodies were created at different points to support the Oversight Committee,** some on a temporary basis. Their general objective was to improve the efficiency of the governance structure by addressing punctual issues, improving information exchange and coordinating on technical matters between projects. Two specific groups were cited by stakeholders:

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11 The evaluation did not find a mandate that was formally approved by the Oversight Committee. Information in the Table is taken from the World Bank, *MDTF North and South Operations Manual* (2006) as the most comprehensive source found.
a. *Project Directors and Coordinators Meetings* were held quarterly between 2009 and 2013. The meetings brought together project coordinators and technical specialists from government, with World Bank, United Nations and some donor specialists. The meetings reviewed issues affecting implementation.

b. The *Implementation Working Group* was active between 2007 and 2010. The group included representation from the Technical Secretariat, the United Nations, some donors (the European Commission, the Joint Donor Office and Germany) and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. The group was convened quarterly or on an “as needed” basis to review project implementation issues that later went to the Oversight Committee for review.\(^\text{12}\)

36. **The World Bank served as the Administrator of the MDTF-SS and managed the Technical Secretariat.** As Administrator, the Bank carried the sole fiduciary responsibility for the MDTF-SS, and responsibility for the technical appraisal and review of all projects.\(^\text{13}\) The Technical Secretariat was guided by funding criteria established by the Oversight Committee. Among other points, the Secretariat had technical, managerial, informational, and logistical responsibilities for the fund’s operations.

**Table 3.3: Mandate of the MDTF-SS Technical Secretariat**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandate of the MDTF-SS Technical Secretariat(^\text{14})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Provide guidance to potential and actual recipients on World Bank and MDTF procedures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Receive and evaluate project proposals (jointly with the assigned World Bank task teams and country/sector managers), make recommendations to the OCs, and follow up on OC’s decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Coordinate with governments and donors to ensure that the proposed operations are consistent with priorities identified in the MDTF Framework. Provide sectorial and cross-sectorial coordination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Ensure that the MDTFs were coordinated with other programs funded from the national budget and bilateral donors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Organize technical appraisals by World Bank-led teams and prepare and present semi-annual reports detailing MDTF operations, including the receipt and use of contributions and the activities financed or in the pipeline, and progress against agreed benchmarks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Oversee the work of the Monitoring Agent and exercise oversight over procurement and audit.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{12}\) Information on sub-groups to the Oversight Committee came from references to the minutes and informant interviews. The evaluation did not have *Terms of Reference*, minutes of the meetings or other supporting documents.

\(^{13}\) World Bank, *MDTF North and South Operations Manual*, 2006, 10

\(^{14}\) World Bank, *MDTF North and South Operations Manual*, 2006, 10
37. The World Bank engaged Monitoring Agent for the MDTF-SS. The role of the agent was to review, support and report on the efficient and effective financial utilization of the MDTF-SS and its resources. The agent delivered quarterly and annual reports over the operational life of the MDTF-SS, beginning in 2006.

Stakeholders Roles and Responsibilities

38. While responsibility for performance was shared through the full system, primary responsibility for achieving outcomes rested with national stakeholders, in government and society. Figure 3.5 summarizes the roles and responsibilities of each MDTF-SS stakeholder, within the framework of an integrated trust fund system. The diagram confirms that primary responsibility for achieving outcomes rested with national stakeholders. In contrast, the quality of MDTF-SS outputs depended on the performance of the full trust fund system, for which all stakeholders shared responsibility. The evaluation criteria for relevance and efficiency are placed at the output level while the effectiveness and sustainability criteria are with outcomes and national stakeholders. Sustainability can be placed at both outcome and output levels.

39. Within the MDTF-SS system, the contribution of stakeholders was organized into at least six components:

   a. *Donor coordination* through the overall MDTF-SS platform, including alignment of assistance with national priorities and co-mingling of national and international funds as foreseen in the wealth-sharing agreements.

   b. *Governance of the MDTF-SS*, including strategic direction, decision-making on resource allocation and oversight of fund operations.

   c. *Financing of the MDTF-SS*, as provided by both the government and 14 international development partners.

   d. *The technical assessment and design of projects*, as led by the government under the fund’s recipient execution operating procedures but with support from the World Bank MDTF-SS Technical Secretariat. The United Nations played a similar role on six projects.

   e. *Project implementation*, as led by government under the fund’s operating procedures, but with support from the Technical Secretariat, the United Nations, and national and international NGOS, and with the involvement of private contracting entities.

   f. *Monitoring and evaluation of projects and the portfolio*, as provided by the Technical Secretariat, the Monitoring Agent, independent evaluations, and monitoring and evaluation that occurred in the government systems.\(^{15}\)

\(^{15}\) Reference was made to the original documentation outlining the structure of the MDTF-SS, the mandate of each part of the system and the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders within the mandate. These were best summarized in the *World Bank Operations Manual* (2006).
Figure 3.5: Stakeholder Roles and Responsibilities in Relation to the MDTF-SS Results Chain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responsibilities</th>
<th>Results Chain</th>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>Evaluation Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IMPACT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Effectiveness</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OUTCOME</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OUTPUT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Sustainability</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ACTIVITIES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INPUTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Efficiency</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDTF DESIGN</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Relevance</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

National Stakeholders have primary responsibility for Outcomes and Impacts achieved, based on their use of MDTF-SS Outputs.

MDTF-SS has primary responsibility for Outputs delivered, beginning with design of MDTF-SS architecture and moving up through the results chain to Outputs.

40. Figure 3.5 therefore, demonstrates that implementation of the MDTF-SS depended on a series of interlocking political/strategic, financial, governance, technical and monitoring and evaluation functions. Each MDTF-SS stakeholder group had specific roles and responsibilities in relation to these functions. In turn, their collective performance determined the overall quality of the outputs delivered to the state and society in South Sudan.  

41. The roles and responsibilities of MDTF-SS stakeholders and interaction between them changed along the results chain. Specifically, the MDTF-SS system had a direct role and responsibility for delivering outputs of high quality, relevant and fit for purpose. However, the role of the international stakeholders either ended or diminished after outputs were delivered. Responsibility was transitioned to the national stakeholders for outcomes. Any continuing roles from other stakeholders related to ongoing technical assistance, financial support, monitoring, evaluation and donor coordination were negotiated at the project level.

42. Government worked at all levels of the results chain, based on the “recipient executed” modality and the design principles of national ownership and leadership. The

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16 A complete summary of the roles and responsibilities for stakeholder groups is included as Annex D to this report.
Government of South Sudan was a party to the CPA and shared responsibility for the agreement’s implementation. It was the largest individual funder of MDTF-SS projects (although funding arrangements shifted over the life of the MDTF-SS the government remained the single largest shareholder) and a principal stakeholder in the fund’s governance (as Chair of the Oversight Committee). The government was also responsible for MDTF-SS design and implementation outputs and had primary responsibility for the outcomes. Some of these responsibilities were shared with implementing partners in the United Nations and NGO communities. Furthermore, the government had primary responsibility for conditions in the MDTF-SS’ overall operating environment, as these related to CPA implementation and factors such as the policy environment.

43. **International donors provided support to the CPA process and were principal actors in the creation of the two Sudan MDTFs.** They continued to play a role in shaping the larger political context over the full MDTF-SS implementation period. Directly related to the MDTF-SS, donors provided financial support and were represented on the Oversight Committee, where they were principals to the overall governance of the MDTF-SS. Donors had no mandated technical or implementation responsibilities at the operational level.

44. **The World Bank had multiple roles, related to fund administration, management, technical assistance to government and fund governance.** The Bank was present at the initial negotiations on creation of the MDTF-SS, providing technical assistance to the fund’s mandating and design process. The Bank also contributed financially as a donor, although its contribution was relatively small. It had, therefore, limited authority or leverage as a “donor”. The Bank’s primary role and responsibilities related to MDTF governance (as member of the Oversight Committee), providing fiduciary management and oversight (as the Administrative Agent with sole fiduciary responsibility), and providing technical and operational support to the government at the operational level (Technical Secretariat). The Bank also oversaw project assessment, design, procurement and implementation support.

45. **The United Nations was a political actor at the international level in the Sudan context, both before and after CPA ratification.** The United Nations had country knowledge, experience with trust fund management in other contexts, and an established field presence throughout Sudan and South Sudan. It shared responsibility for MDTF-SS governance (as member of the Oversight Committee). United Nations agencies were involved in the implementation of six projects.

46. **National and international NGOs, acting through the South Sudan NGO Forum, had observer status to the Oversight Committee.** National and international NGOs and civil society organizations participated in the Sudan Consortium meetings, and individual NGOs played an implementation role in some projects.

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17 The World Bank’s financial contribution would be larger if the real cost of operations in Juba were considered.
Part Four: MDTF-SS Status at Closure

Pledges and Receipts

47. **Total MDTF-SS receipts were less than expected, with a reduction in the GRSS matching contribution.** Figure 4.1 shows a breakdown of MDTF-SS receipts as of February 28, 2013. At closing, total MDTF-SS receipts were USD 727.6 million.\(^\text{18}\) The GRSS was the largest single contributor to the MDTF-SS, at USD 179 million or 25 percent of funds. International donors paid in receipts of USD 548.6 million, or three-fourths of total funds.\(^\text{19}\) Five donors provided most of the international funds, with Netherlands, Norway, UK, Canada and the EC accounting for 80 percent of donor funds paid in.

48. **Initially, the GoSS counterpart ratio was set at 2:1;** every dollar contributed by donors would be matched by two dollars from the government. If the ratio held, the total value of the MDTF-SS would be approximately USD 1.5 billion.\(^\text{20}\) The ratio was revised down to 1:1 after South Sudan experienced financial difficulties in 2008-09. By closure, the government’s share of total MDTF-SS receipts had declined further, to one quarter of the total funds, or approximately USD 180 million. The overall GRSS to donor funding ratio, therefore, shifted from 2: 1 (the intended ratio) to 0.25: 1 (actual ratio at MDTF-SS closure). As a result, just over 50 percent fewer resources were available to the MDTF-SS budget than originally planned.

**Figure 4.1: Sources of MDTF-SS Receipts (in USD millions)**

\[\begin{array}{c|c|c}
\text{Donor} & \text{Receipts (USD millions)} & \text{Percentage} \\
\hline
\text{GRSS} & 179 & 25 \%
\\
\text{Netherlands} & 151 & 21 \%
\\
\text{Norway} & 92 & 13 \%
\\
\text{UK} & 75 & 10 \%
\\
\text{Canada} & 60 & 8 \%
\\
\text{EC} & 60 & 8 \%
\\
\text{Sweden} & 34 & 5 \%
\\
\text{Finland} & 30 & 4 \%
\\
\text{Others} & 47 & 6 \%
\\
\hline
\end{array}\]

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\(^{18}\) This sections draws on the *Monitoring Agent Completion Report* (PricewaterhouseCoopers, March 2013 draft) which provides financial accounts as of February 28, 2013.

\(^{19}\) Total donor commitments to the MDTF-SS in the form of signed administrative agreements stood at USD 542.8 million. Donors paid in more than their original pledges due to exchange rate variations between the times of signing of the respective administrative agreements with the World Bank to the time of receipt of funds.

\(^{20}\) The estimate was based on a linear projection against final donor receipts. The first round of projects prior to 2007 was designed on the assumption of a 2:1 match. Budgeting was revised over time for the adjusted ratio.
Source: MDTF-SS Monitoring Agent Completion Report (March 2013 draft). “Other” sources of receipts include: Spain, Germany, Denmark, the World Bank, Italy, Egypt and Iceland. Further details are found in Annex I.

**Commitments, Disbursements and Actual Expenditures**

49. **Actual expenditure on project activities amounted to 95 percent of MDTF-SS funds.** Donor payments to the MDTF-SS were received progressively over a six-year period between 2005 and 2011. In addition, the fund earned an investment income totaling USD 38.4 million on undisbursed funds (see Annex E for further details on donor deposits, commitments and expenditure). As shown in Table 4.1, in terms of actual expenditures, nearly 95 percent of funds were spent on MDTF-SS project activities. The remaining five percent went for MDTF-SS administration and monitoring.

**Table 4.1: MDTF-SS Commitments and Actual Expenditures**

(Donor and RSS funds, in USD millions as of February 28, 2013)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cumulative USD million</th>
<th>Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commitments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grant agreements signed*</td>
<td>718.2</td>
<td>93.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDTF-SS Technical Secretariat administration</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>5.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring Agent contract</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>1.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total committed</strong></td>
<td>766.5</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actual Expenditure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projects</td>
<td>711.9</td>
<td>94.7 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDTF-SS Technical Secretariat and processing costs</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>4.2 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring Agent</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>1.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total expenditure</strong></td>
<td>751.8</td>
<td>100.0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MDTF-SS Monitoring Agent Completion Report (Draft, March 2013)

*Including government counterpart financing.

50. **The MDTF-SS spent a total of USD 712 million on the delivery of outputs, or 99 percent of funds committed to projects** (Table 4.2). With the exception of Core Fiduciary Systems Support, all 21 projects had closed by December 2012. Table 4.2 provides a detailed overview of the use of funds for project activities, including both commitments and expenditures. As of February 28, 2013, USD 717.2 million had been disbursed of a total commitment of USD 718.2 million. This means that MDTF-SS projects have disbursed close to 100 percent of the funds committed in the form of signed grant agreements. Expenditure incurred amounted to 99 percent of committed funds, with a total of USD 712 million spent on the delivery of the outputs.
Table 4.2: MDTF Project Portfolio Commitments and Actual Expenditures (in USD millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MDTF Projects</th>
<th>Commitments (signed grant agreements)</th>
<th>Actual Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USD</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Impact Emergency Project (RIEP)</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Development Project</td>
<td>176.4</td>
<td>176.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Fiduciary Systems Support</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umbrella Program for Health Systems Development I</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Rehabilitation Project</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Population Census - Phase I &amp; II</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock and Fisheries Development Project</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Water Supply and Sanitation</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity Building, Institutional, and Human Resource Development</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police &amp; Prisons Support I</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector Development</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan New Unified Currency Project</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Population Census - Phase II</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan - South Sudan MDTF HIV/AIDS Project</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Support and Development Project</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply and Sanitation</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police &amp; Prisons Support II</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads Maintenance Project</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Project</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umbrella Program for Health Systems Development II</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>71.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Agriculture and Forestry Development Project</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total MDTF-SS</strong></td>
<td><strong>718.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>712.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MDTF-SS Monitoring Agent Completion Report (PricewaterhouseCoopers, draft March 2013)

51. **Low disbursement rates in the first years of the Fund indicate challenges at start-up and in the early phases of implementation.** Project commitments and disbursements lagged behind donor deposits until 2009. By the end of 2008—three years into the fund’s implementation period—only about 35 percent of the available MDTF-SS donor funds had been disbursed. During 2008-09, the World Bank and MDTF-SS stakeholders took steps to address performance concerns and accelerate the implementation of project activities. Efforts were supported by recommendations of the Country Portfolio Performance Review (2009a) and the report Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Sudan: Taking Stock and a Way (2010a). Figure 4.2 illustrates how both commitments and disbursements pick up after 2009. As a result, over 60 percent of the total disbursements were achieved during the last three years of the MDTF-SS implementation period, between 2009 and the end of 2012.
Figure 4.2: MDTF-SS Cumulative Deposits, Commitments and Disbursements  
(In USD million as of February 28, 2013)

Source: MDTF-SS Monitoring Agent Completion Report (PricewaterhouseCoopers, draft March 2013)

The MDTF-SS Project Portfolio

52. The evaluation intended to identify the distribution of MDTF-SS project activities by geography, sector, theme, beneficiary groups and other possible categories, in a portfolio mapping exercise. However, existing project expenditure data, including Monitoring Agent data, was not organized by state, county, and/or project sites. Many informants perceived a center-bias in the allocation of MDTF-SS resources that privileged activities in Juba. The perception was also noted in national media commentary. However, this perception did not take into account the role of the central government in reallocating MDTF-SS resources to State-level activities, which was significant. Data on the geographical distribution of resources and activities would have provided a more accurate overview of disbursement patterns. With the available information, the evaluation can only provide an overview of project activities across sectors and themes.

Distribution across Strategic Priorities

53. The majority of MDTF-SS resources were allocated to basic service delivery and infrastructure, with a smaller investment in development oriented activities. Table 4.3 shows that access to basic services (Strategic Priority 2) and priority sector programs (Strategic Priority 3) account for well over 83 percent of the total expenditure. Productive activities under Strategic Priority 4 were allocated nine percent of the expenditures, indicating less emphasis in the portfolio on the “transition from subsistence-based livelihoods to a development-oriented economy”. Finally, building state capacity (Strategic Priority 1), by this measure, accounted for eight percent of total expenditure. Harmonizing
international development assistance (Strategic Priority 5) received support from the Technical Secretariat and did not have or require a specific allocation.\footnote{Some projects had small allocations for internal governance and coordination processes.}

*Table 4.3: Project Allocation by MDTF Strategic Priorities (Actual Expenditure in USD millions, as of February 28, 2013)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic priority</th>
<th>MDTF Project</th>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>RSS</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Priority 1: <em>Build state capacity</em></td>
<td>CBIIHRD</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CFSS</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Census I</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Census II</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Currency</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>53.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>57.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Priority 2: <em>Provide access to basic services with rapid scale-up of education</em></td>
<td>RIEP</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ERP</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UPHSD I</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SETIDP</td>
<td>89.9</td>
<td>86.5</td>
<td>176.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>183.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>144.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>327.7</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Priority 3: <em>Priority sector programs, including basic infrastructure, education, and health</em></td>
<td>RMP</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RWSSP</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WSSP</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UPHSD II</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>71.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police &amp; Prisons I</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police &amp; Prisons II</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>239.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>20.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>259.9</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Priority 4: <em>Facilitate the transition from subsistence-based livelihoods to development-oriented economy</em></td>
<td>SAFDP</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LFDP</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSD</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GSDP</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>61.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>67.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL, MDTF-SS</strong></td>
<td><strong>537.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>174.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>712.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Monitoring Agent Completion Report (PricewaterhouseCoopers, draft March 2013)
54. The presentation of data underestimates the funds allocated to investment in building state capacity (Strategic Priority 1). Table 4.3 organizes expenditures as “Capacity Building” only those projects whose sole objective was to strengthen governance and build the capacity of state institutions. However, capacity building was a cross-cutting priority of the MDTF-SS. All projects included at least one core component aimed specifically at strengthening government capacity for the planning and delivery of public goods and services. Sector-specific capacity building components include: (i) investments in physical infrastructure; (ii) human resource strengthening; and (iii) establishing and strengthening institutional systems and structures. These were an integrated component of the project design and were difficult to disaggregate from the final project-level expenditures.

Distribution across Sectors
55. Figure 4.3 illustrates the allocation of MDTF-SS resources to different sectors (as per actual expenditure). It shows that approximately two-thirds of funds were allocated to projects to strengthen public service delivery in basic infrastructure (43%) as well as in health and education (29%). The remaining funds were evenly distributed across Stabilization and Security (10%), Livelihoods (9%) and Capacity Building (9%). Again, the analysis does not count allocations for capacity building under sector-specific projects as part of capacity building, which were substantial.

Figure 4.3: MDTF-SS Actual Expenditure by Sector

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22 The evaluation had insufficient data to disaggregate expenditures on Capacity Building from other project activities.

23 One exception is the Rapid Impact Emergency Project (RIEP), for which total expenditure was divided between Basic Infrastructure (62.7%), Human Development (21.7 percent) and Capacity Building (15.7%).
**MDTF-SS Distribution in Relation to GRSS Expenditure**

56. The GoSS/GRSS made limited budget expenditures in key public and infrastructure sectors that were being supported by the MDTF-SS. Health and education sectors were not prioritized by the government (see Figure 4.4) in relation to other sectors in terms of expenditure. Actual expenditure on health and education in 2011 accounted for two percent and four percent, respectively. This is low in absolute terms and also represents a halving of planned expenditure (budget). Priority spending areas relate to security, a result of ongoing insecurity, both external and internal, and to public administration (expansion of the public sector).

57. While there was an expressed wish from the government to build national systems in health and education and to move away from service delivery dominated by non-state actors, the sectors lacked public resources and remained dependent on international assistance. Limited investments affected the enabling environment for MDTF-SS outcomes, and the ability of the government to scale up services through state systems. Similarly, the government made a modest investment in productive activities, many of which fall under natural resources. As a result, only a limited amount of national resources were channeled into sectors related to Strategic Priority 3 and Strategic Priority 4 outside of the MDTF-SS, which were necessary to achieve the outcomes desired.

*Figure 4.4: Allocation of Public Expenditure, by Function, 2011*

Source: *South Sudan Economic Brief*, No. 2 (World Bank, 2013g)
Part 5: MDTF-SS Output and Outcome Analysis

58. The evaluation assessed the outputs and outcomes achieved under each of the MDTF-SS’ five Strategic Priorities. A comprehensive list of MDTF-SS outputs is provided as Annex F to this report, based on information provided in the World Bank ICRs and ISRs, and cross-reference to the Monitoring Agent reports. The assessments also draw on findings from the field study, a summary of which is provided in Annex H.

59. The MDTF-SS delivered a large body of outputs, across the full territory of South Sudan and under difficult conditions. Final performance exceeded stakeholder perceptions, which were heavily influenced by start-up difficulties encountered prior to 2008-09. Slow mobilization meant the MDTF-SS did not deliver the “rapid impact” peace dividend anticipated, although a substantial body of support was delivered over time by Strategic Priority 2 projects. Rather, the fund’s main achievements occurred over the medium term, helping to establish and strengthen state institutions (Strategic Priority 2 and Strategic Priority 3).

60. In addition to expanding public service delivery (education, health and water) and infrastructure, the MDTF-SS delivered an institutional framework for future economic transition (Strategic Priority 4). However, production gains in agriculture and livestock at the project-level did not translate into sector-wide gains, given limited national investment outside of the MDTF-SS. For Strategic Priority 5, early accomplishments with the harmonization and coordination of assistance declined over time, as the MDTF-SS became less important and the overall aid architecture for South Sudan fragmented.

61. The Output Boxes in this section provide highlights of the MDTF-SS’ contribution in each of the five Strategic Priority areas. These are examples and are intended for demonstration only. A complete list of the outputs is found in Annexes F and G, drawing on the ICRs and Monitoring Agent reports.
Strategic Priority 1: Establishing an Effective Core Public Sector

**SP1 Output Summary**

Strategic Priority 1: Establish an effective core of public sector administration, including core capacity to plan and finance GoSS programs with key accountability mechanisms in place

The MDTF-SS had three mechanisms for strengthening institutional capacity: (i) the recipient execution modality that worked through government systems; (ii) capacity development embedded in the design of all projects; and (iii) a stand-alone capacity building project (CABHRD). Further, there were usually three types of capacity building activities: improvements to physical infrastructure, human resource strengthening, and establishing and strengthening institutional systems and procedures. Capacity building, therefore, was central to the design of the MDTF-SS’ portfolio and the World Bank’s comparative advantage as a fund manager. It was also designed to enable the fund’s service delivery and economic development activities.

### Highlights from MDTF-SS training for GRSS officials and ministry staff

- 1,220 officials from central and state governments trained in basic management and administration (CABIHRD).
- Training for government personnel on procurement of health supplies (RIEP).
- 360 Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries staff trained in technical and managerial skills; 1,182 community animal health workers and veterinary pharmacists trained (LFPD).
- 645 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry staff trained. Training of 589 local officials, in government and community organizations (SAFDP).
- Basic police training of 6,500 recruits; 1,450 prison officials trained and deployed to the states; 1,000 prison staff trained in cross-cutting issues; 60 prison officers trained in special issues; 30 staff trained at the Finance Unit at Prisons HQ in Juba; and 10 prison officers trained in medical issues (PPP 1 & 2).
- Training of Audit Chamber staff and MoFEP in procurement (CFSSP).
- Pre-service training for 415 teachers; in-service training for 1,649 teachers; 3,725 teachers trained for the alternative education program; and 120 teachers for the pastoralist education centers (ERP).

62. **Institutional capacity emerged from the available project Implementation Completion Report (ICR) as a key factor affecting project implementation and outcomes.** There was a correlation between the strength of the governments’ leadership and implementation capacity, on the one hand, and the performance of MDTF-SS projects, on the other. Overall effectiveness of the recipient execution modality, therefore, was related to institutional capacity.

63. **There were no durable government institutions in South Sudan at the start of the Interim Period in 2005.** State institutions had to be created from scratch at the same time as the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army was: (i) in transition from a revolutionary military force to a civilian political organization and consolidating its political structure, and (ii) participating in the Government of National Unity. Capacity development, therefore, was a perquisite for other activities to take place.

64. The JAM report included a detailed assessment of Southern Sudan’s institutional deficit, and envisaged a decentralized state requiring the formation of (i) the
institutional structure of government; (ii) a civil service, with appropriate training support; (iii) policies and systems, including for financial management and procurement; and (iv) measures to decentralize capacity and service delivery to the sublevels of government.

65. From this baseline, the MDTF-SS made an important contribution to the overall development of institutional capacity, across national ministries and at the State level. The MDTF-SS’ contributions included the following:

a. Legislation and regulatory frameworks: At least seven MDTF-SS projects directly contributed to the development of key legislation or regulatory frameworks in their respective sectors. These included the Labor Policy Bill (CABIHRD), Audit Legislation and Public Procurement Bill (CFSSP), and the South Sudan Roads Authority Bill (RMP). The PSDP supported the development of legal and regulatory frameworks for mining and microfinance and helped draft key legislative measures such as the Competition Bill, the Counterfeit Goods Bill, the Insurance Bill and the Microfinance Bill.

b. Financial management and oversight: Under the CFSSP, financial management systems were established and maintained at the national level. Furthermore, the project strengthened the capacity of the Audit Chamber through the development of audit legislation and audit manuals, training of staff, and support for a five-year strategic plan. Various projects also contributed to establishing financial management systems in State-level ministries.

c. Policies and sector plans: All MDTF-SS projects contributed to policy and planning at the sector level to some extent. Twelve reports with specific sectorial strategic plans, action plans, policy frameworks, and national policies were produced under the MDTF-SS. The reports ranged from a five-year strategic plan for the National Audit Chamber (CFSSP) to a Sector Growth Strategy for medium-term industrial competitiveness (PSDP).

d. Physical infrastructure and equipment: Most MDTF-SS projects helped build state capacity through investments in essential physical infrastructure and equipment. Sixteen projects listed outputs in this category. These included the construction or rehabilitation of core physical facilities both at the central and state levels and the delivery of furnishings and equipment, including vehicles and motorcycles, necessary for the functioning of state systems. The fund contributed to the rehabilitation/construction of the President’s office; the National Assembly; the Presidential House and Cottage; the Vice-President’s house.

24 Annex I summarizes capacity building outputs aggregated from available reporting. It lists achievements specifically reported as an output, either in the MA completion report or in the respective project ICR. This is a conservative measure of the fund’s achievements and does not capture the indirect contribution of enhanced government capacity to formulate legislation, policies, and strategic plans and implement them. It is also important to note that not all outputs are attributed solely to the efforts of a specific MDTF project. For instance, in most cases a range of actors, including donors, United Nations’ agencies, and NGOs may have contributed to the government’s development of a specific sector policy or strategic plan.
18 ministry complex buildings; and state governor offices in 10 states (RIEP and SETIDP combined).

e. Technical assistance and training: Most reports identify the provision of technical assistance and training as project outputs. Capacity building components commonly report results in terms of the number of public employees trained in different categories, often at both central and state levels. Another key contribution is the development of training manuals and codes of conduct.

f. Information systems: Monitoring and evaluation systems and management information systems were typically developed and established as part of the capacity building component of MDTF-SS projects. These systems strengthen ministries’ capacity by providing critical data for program planning, implementation and supervision. MDTF-SS projects also supported the development of other data collection systems that are critical to the specific institutions’ functioning, such as a database on disease prevalence established in the states under the LFPD and a database with information on boreholes including GPS coordinates supported under the WSSP. Finally, the Census project contributed to the development of the country’s overall statistical capacity—a key priority identified in the JAM.

66. The ICRs and field study found that capacity building was most effective when implemented as an integral component of sectorial projects and the development of sector-specific systems. This context allowed for the most effective combination of project-related assistance and use of the recipient execution modality. It better ensured that capacity building initiatives were directly tied to the delivery of goods and services. The capacity building was most effective when implemented as an integral component of sectorial projects and the development of sector-specific systems. This context allowed for the most effective combination of project-related assistance and use of the recipient execution modality. It better ensured that capacity building initiatives were directly tied to the delivery of goods and services. The capacity building was most effective when implemented as an integral component of sectorial projects and the development of sector-specific systems. This context allowed for the most effective combination of project-related assistance and use of the recipient execution modality. It better ensured that capacity building initiatives were directly tied to the delivery of goods and services.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MDTF-SS Outputs under Strategic Priority1: Establishing an Effective Public Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction and rehabilitation of core physical structures and infrastructure includes:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 10 functioning state offices equipped and linked to the ministries; 18 ministries rehabilitated and/or equipped (RIEP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Rehabilitation of the President’s office, National Assembly, 19 ministry complex buildings, 47 buildings at the Juba teaching hospital and the Juba water treatment plant for 250,000 persons (SETIDP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 52 primary schools completed; 33 training rooms and dorms in county multipurpose education centers built and/or rehabilitated (ERP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 84 health clinics rehabilitated and equipped, community health clinics equipped, and 50 vehicles procured for the distribution of pharmaceuticals (UPHSD I and II).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 5 RWSSD offices and the Amadi Rural Training Institute constructed; 10 water quality laboratories established; and 10 mobile water-testing kits distributed in 10 states (RWSSP and WSSP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Southern Sudan Civil Service Commission, the GoSS email server, and offices for labor administration and employment services in seven states established; Malakal VTC upgraded (CABIHRD).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Construction or rehabilitation of 22 police facilities; 8 state-level training facilities; 9 prisons; and 5 state offices (PPP I and II).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Agricultural and forestry services made operational in 27 counties and 5 states; 5 key sector policies, legislation (SAFDP).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Five state offices constructed and equipped, with 12 mobile veterinary clinics distributed in 10 states (LFPD).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
building activities delivered through the CABHRD project were assessed as being less effective.

Observations from the Field Study

67. **Senior government officials expressed appreciation for the support received from the MDTF-SS and a preference for the fund’s integrated approach.** Institutional capacity remains a significant constraint on governance at the State level, with early gains now being undermined by the impact of austerity measures. Regardless, officials appreciated the contribution of the MDTF-SS in establishing core capacity during the period when the State ministries were being consolidated, attempting to establish a more visible presence before society and push service delivery out to the rural areas. Delays notwithstanding, the MDTF-SS was an early contributor to the expansion of the State-level administration when few other organizations existed at this level.

68. **Government officials showed a strong preference for the MDTF-SS’ integrated approach to institution building over stand-alone projects.** The MDTF-SS was designed to work across the full governance system; horizontally with core government institutions at the national and state levels and vertically within sectors at different levels of the government (national and State). Some officials noted that MDTF-SS portfolio design had the potential to promote uniform development across governance institutions. Within individual ministries, the MDTF-SS promoted the even development of institutional capacity by working on core infrastructure and systems. Officials noted that working with individual donors or organizations tended to privilege some aspects of capacity over others, depending on the priorities of the donors. Furthermore, meeting overall institutional needs could require working with several organizations, carrying a transaction cost.

69. **Most ministries visited demonstrated that the management and planning systems provided by the MDTF-SS were in place and functioning with improved efficiency,** even when these systems were rudimentary. In particular, State finance ministries were using the Integrated Financial Management System and cited improved efficiency, capacity for planning, accounting, and

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Establishing an effective public sector

Development of information systems and other knowledge to enhance capacity for planning, monitoring and evaluation:

- Fifth Population Census, South Sudan’s most comprehensive and accurate census (PCP).
- Management information system put in place for State Ministry of Agriculture (SAFDP).
- Database for disease prevalence of established and supporting surveillance (LFDP).
- Health information management system established with almost 70 percent of health facilities reporting monthly (project name missing).
- Education management system established and operational (ERP).
- Guidelines for environmental monitoring

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25 The findings address capacity development delivered through all projects.
payroll as a result. Officials in all three States noted that payroll systems have reduced the number of ghost workers in their systems. Prior to installation of the system, officials recalled that all work was done on paper, and systems and records were inefficient.

70. The field study found that physical infrastructure and equipment were in use, as part of core capacity. The quality of building construction and rehabilitation was mixed in all three States visited. Most works showed some deterioration after a few years of occupation, the result of poor construction and materials and inadequate project supervision during the construction phase.26 The deficiencies were a source of frustration to personnel and are likely to result in a shorter working life for buildings. Some facilities were not fit for purpose, particularly the containers provided to the HIV/AIDS project.27 Notwithstanding, facilities, furniture, and equipment were in use, appreciated, and providing reasonable work sites for officials, where prior to 2007-08 no facilities existed. These were considered essential to the consolidation of State ministries.

71. The result of training at the State level was less clear and was dependent on the training service provider. Officials in two States recounted high quality training for their institutions in financial management and planning and in the technical aspects of health and agriculture. Regardless, there was a perception that capacity building was focused at the central level, was ad hoc in its delivery, and of mixed quality. Where received, training focused at the level of State administration and generally did not push down to the County or Payam levels, where officials noted the greatest human resource deficiencies. Exceptions included extension workers in agriculture and health working at the County level. Quality was also affected by the low level of skill and experience that many officials brought to the process.

72. Officials often had difficulty identifying efficiency gains in the daily performance of responsibilities. Gains were more easily identified when discussing systems and procedures or equipment. Some noted that the expansion of the public services meant that the original training targets were inadequate: (i) the hiring of additional personnel without the required qualifications tended to overwhelm the small number of personnel that received training; and (ii) MDTF-SS-trained personnel formed a relatively small cadre in the total work force and were not able to serve as mentors in their positions.

73. Finally, and in the context of austerity, the MDTF-SS helped State-level ministries preserve and sustain their core functions. Capacity gains were being visibly reversed by deep cuts to operational and capital budgets. In this context, the field study observed that State governments were placing emphasis on preserving the core capacity and functions of

26 The most common deficiencies observed were surface and structural cracks in wall and floors, shifting of buildings on poor foundations, and poor fixtures (doors and windows). These existed in most buildings observed.

27 The containers required air conditioning to be habitable after-mid morning. With budget cuts, the commissions did not have resources to operate or maintain generators. Two Commissions were using alternative facilities.
ministries, many developed with MDTF-SS support. The intent was to ensure that these capacities would be in place once austerity measures were relaxed and government was in a position to scale up service delivery. There was particular concern expressed with regard to losing capacity that would have to be rebuilt later at additional cost.

**SP 1 Outcomes**

74. **From a baseline of no durable state institutions, there were significant achievements in building the government’s core institutional capacity.** First attribution for achievements goes to the GRSS, with the MDTF-SS as one of several contributing international entities. The MDTF-SS’ unique contribution was its system-wide approach and that it provided much of the early support for establishing institutions. Its contribution, therefore, was catalytic and established a foundation on which other work proceeded. The attribution is made, notwithstanding delays that affected timeliness, particularly during the early Interim Period when there was growing pressure to deliver public services.

75. **Strategic Priority 1 was the strongest performing component of the MDTF-SS portfolio.** Efforts to establish “an effective core of public sector administration, including core capacity to plan and finance GoSS programs” showed tangible results that the GRSS has used to deliver core governance functions. Outcomes are strongest at the national and then State levels, with limited results moving outward to Counties. There were fewer direct gains at the community (Payam) level. Capacity building was more effective when delivered through sector-based projects than the one stand-alone capacity-building project. Sectorial interventions were better when integrated into overall institutional development. They were also better aligned with the recipient execution modality, by directly linking capacity building with service delivery activities.

**MDTF-SS Outputs under Strategic Priority 1:**

*Establishing an Effective Public Sector*

Development of sector strategies and key legislative and regulatory frameworks such as:

- Public Service Strategy and Labour Policy bill (completed) (CABIHRD)
- Five-year strategic plan for the National Audit Chamber (completed) (CFSSP)
- Audit legislation and Public Procurement Legislation (developed)
- A WASH sector strategic framework document (RSSWP).
- Sector Growth Strategy for medium-term industrial competitiveness and Trade and Investment Policy developed, including four pieces of legislation: Competition Bill; Counterfeit Goods Bill; Insurance Bill; Microfinance Bill; and Mining Act and supporting regulations (PSDP).
- 5 key sector policies and legislation developed (SAFDP).
- Transport sector policy developed; rural roads development plan prepared; Draft Act Road Agency establishment prepared; MTR and MHLPU established and staffed (SETIDP).

76. **Prior to austerity, capacity was used by government, at all levels, to gradually expand the delivery of essential goods and services.** Within the MDTF-SS framework, results were seen in the delivery of Strategic Priority 3 and Strategic Priority 4 activities, scaling up through national and State institutions as they strengthened. Important aspects of South Sudan’s policy and legislative framework are now in place and enable other initiatives.
Also, financial management systems were put in place. In the context of austerity, there was evidence that the institutional systems delivered by the MDTF-SS are still being used by the government and are helping to preserve its core capacity and functions. However, the fund’s results will be affected if the current financial crisis continues for a prolonged period of time.

77. The MDTF-SS’ distinctive contribution was the use of a recipient execution modality and integrated approach to strengthening institutions. The fund delivered a comprehensive package of support, from institutional frameworks (policy, legislation, procedures and systems) to physical infrastructure (buildings, equipment and vehicles), to human resource development and various forms of technical assistance. In addition to strengthening individual institutions, the MDTF-SS outcomes were found on both vertical and horizontal axes:

- **Horizontally**, simultaneously building core ministries across two levels of government (national and State) and contributing to the formation of a critical mass of public administration.

- **Vertically**, within specific sectors at different levels of government, from communities to Counties, States, and the central government. Although the MDTF-SS made a limited contribution to institutional development at the Payam and County levels, some projects contributed to the government’s capacity to deliver goods and services to communities.

78. Development of vertical linkages was the weakest element of the MDTF-SS framework. South Sudan’s institutional framework places emphasis on the delivery of public goods and services through sub-levels of government. Coordination and communication between the different levels of government is not well developed, which places constraints on the system. The centralized management of MDTF-SS projects and the limited participation of States in project design both reflected and reinforced the central bias of the overall system. In turn, limited participation in the design of projects hindered the ability State governments to make the most effective use of MDTF-SS outputs. In the future, more emphasis will be needed on the expansion of State and local institutions to build their authority, coordination capacity, and capability to deliver services.

79. Two additional external factors affecting Strategic Priority1 outcomes. First, the expansion of South Sudan’s public sector to a size several times larger than original estimates overwhelmed capacity-building efforts. Expansion created additional requirements for infrastructure and training that were not planned and could not be addressed. It resulted in a neglect of merit and placed civil servants in positions for which they were not qualified, affecting the overall efficiency of institutions. Expansion reduced the number of persons trained, as a relative percentage of the total number of civil servants. Many officials advised that they were not able to create a “critical mass” of trained personnel.28

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28 The original size of the civil service was to be approximately 35,000 persons. By 2011, the civil service had approximately 120,000 persons and recurrent costs for salaries were the largest annual expenditure
80. Second, financial management and procurement systems have been strengthened. However, these are still nascent, and gaps in systems remain that affect transparency and accountability. These have been identified by the World Bank and the government as priorities moving forward, and are a priority in the Bank’s current Interim Strategy Note for South Sudan (2013g). They were also identified as a future priority at the South Sudan Partners’ Forum (April 2013), which was convened to strengthen cooperation on governance and development-related issues in light of the current financial situation.

**Strategic Priority 2: Rapid Access to Basic Services and Education**

**Output Summary**

*Strategic Priority 2: Provide access to basic services with rapid scale-up of education.*

81. The fund delivered a significant body of outputs under SP 2 that, from very low initial levels, expanded access to basic services (health, education, water and sanitation). However, rapid scale-up of service delivery was not fully achieved given capacity constraints and other challenges in the operating environment.

82. Three MDTF-SS projects fell under Strategic Priority 2:

   a. The Rapid Impact Emergency Project (RIEP) aimed to (i) provide basic pharmaceutical stocks and learning materials; and (ii) put in place critical government infrastructure at national and state levels. The RIEP model was an effort to improve the MDTF-SS’ flexibility. As the first MDTF-SS project, the RIEP had little institutional capacity and infrastructure to build on. It relied, therefore, on United Nations agencies for much of the implementation.

   b. The Sudan Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Development Project (SETIDP) was to rehabilitate and develop critical transport and basic urban infrastructure, contribute to the physical infrastructure for government offices, and build capacity in the Ministry of Roads and Bridges and Ministry of Housing and Physical Planning for planning, construction, sustainable operation, and maintenance. It also had a more focused portfolio than the RIEP.

   c. The development objective of the Education Rehabilitation Project (ERP) was to improve access to and the quality of primary education and alternate learning opportunities.

83. **Education:** Outputs included supply of learning materials (RIEP alone distributed 2.2 million textbooks), construction of primary schools and other alternative learning centers, and training of teachers for the regular school system and for alternative educational programs.

for government. Expansion began in 2007 as the government sought to integrate demobilized soldiers, opposition militia members, and others. The expansion of the civil service, therefore, served various political and social functions, but resulted in a civil service that was larger than required, was not merit-based, and diverted resources from other priority areas. A large number of persons were not qualified for their positions, adding to inefficiency. Reform of the civil service became a key financial issue during 2012, as the government’s financial situation worsened.
In addition to slow implementation in the initial years, the overall scope was also reduced due to the need to revise original cost and time estimates. Only 52 of the targeted 100 schools under ERP were delivered, the original design of each school was reduced from 10 to six classrooms, and completion was delayed.

84. Health: RIEP contributed to expanded access to basic health services through the distribution of pharmaceuticals. Given the amount of pharmaceuticals consumed at the 1,000 health facilities that benefitted, the project ICR estimates that 2.5 million persons benefited from the medical supplies provided by the project. The construction of small roads, hospitals, boreholes, and sanitation facilities led to further increases in access to health and health-related services.

85. Infrastructure: SETIDP outputs, in terms of improvements in roads and urban infrastructure, were substantial, especially at the central level. Due to significant cuts in project budgets, only the first of three planned phases was completed. SETIDP had an estimated cost of USD 777 million, with government contributing two-thirds as counterpart funding. Actual financing was USD 85.49 million from GoSS and USD 89.91 million from MDTF, for a total of USD 175.40 million, or 23 percent of the originally planned funding. As a result, the rehabilitation of priority infrastructure in the major state capitals was limited to preparatory activities (e.g., proposals and designs).

86. Public Service Sector: Both RIEP and SETIDP supported the construction and rehabilitation of government buildings. RIEP also supported the establishment of key fiduciary functions in government by contracting an interim procurement agent and an interim accounting agent who carried out the functions of procurement and financial management while providing on-the-job training to staff in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) and line ministries.

87. Field study revealed important deficiencies related to the quality and sustainability of some public works and rehabilitation works:

a. The RIEP activities visited did not have clearly assigned responsibilities or resources for maintenance. Works observed were either in disrepair, were nonfunctional, and/or had deteriorated to the point where it was difficult to identify what work had been done. This pattern was consistent and attributed to the combination of mixed relevance, low quality work, and weak supervision and local ownership. It was noted that many RIEP activities were intended to be consumed (such as pharmaceuticals) or have a “quick impact” in restoring services, and did not have measures for sustainability built into their design.

b. Local officials attributed deterioration of physical structures in the education sector to poor materials and workmanship. Support from MDTF-SS includes latrines and textbooks from RIEP and the rehabilitation of schools and classroom buildings from either SETIDP or ERP. Schools visited showed structural cracks, and several had shifted on their foundations. Furniture showed wear after only a few years of use. According to school officials, rehabilitated structures showed cracks in floors and walls almost immediately. Officials at one school noted that MDTF-SS investments had temporarily increased
physical capacity but that the assets were lost within two years due to poor quality work. Officials expressed the view that the school now had less capacity than prior to rehabilitation.29

c. There was also frustration with implementation delays under SETIDP and lack of plans for road maintenance. State officials repeatedly expressed a frustration that “the MDTF-SS should have done more, and should have done it better.”30 Trunk roads are under the jurisdiction of the central government and have not been well maintained. State ministries do not have the mandate or resources to contribute to maintenance of the main roads, which falls under the jurisdiction of the national ministry.

SP2 Outcomes

88. Outcomes for Strategic Priority 2 are assessed against the objectives of both meeting urgent needs and the rapid delivery of tangible and material benefits associated with the “peace dividend”.31 While urgent needs aligned with the recovery objective of kick-starting service delivery, the promise of delivering a “peace dividend” was explicitly political. There were high expectations in Sudanese society for such a dividend, and significant pressure on MDTF-SS stakeholders to deliver it. Expectations were the result of promises made during the CPA negotiations, particularly by the SPLM, to build support for the agreement.

89. At the same time, Strategic Priority 2 projects were being planned even before the institutional structure of government was established. The RIEP, SETIDP, and the Education Rehabilitation Project (ERP), therefore, had limited institutional capacity to work through. This situation presented significant challenges for the MDTF-SS’ recipient execution modality. Problems with the inter-operability between World Bank and United Nations systems further contributed to delays until 2007, as two organizations worked out a financial management agreement at the corporate level.32

90. Much of the delivery under Strategic Priority 2 was not “rapid” and local stakeholders voiced concern with the quality of some outputs delivered. MDTF-SS projects pushed a

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29 This perception was encountered in many situations where rehabilitation work was done, including at the Bor Teaching Hospital. Officials stated that the quality of building rehabilitation (presumably through SETIDP) was poor, and that improvements were lost within one to two years. Some buildings have since been torn down, and others cannot be used. Officials expressed frustration for the poor quality, the loss of facilities and the fact that investments will have to be made twice. According to one, “it might not be the right thing to say because people were suffering, but in the long-term it would have been better to use more time and do the job right.” This kind of statement was made at a number of Strategic Priority 2 project sites.

30 The MDTF-SS was often incorrectly associated with other road work, beyond its scope. By saying “better” officials expressed that the grade of road being constructed had not improved, noting the lower grade roads required more maintenance.

31 Some additional outcome information is presented under Strategic Priority 3.

32 A 2007 Fiduciary Principles Accord facilitated the pass-through of funds to UN agencies, and improved the speed of implementation.
large body of funds, materials, and activity out to the communities, aimed at a humanitarian and recovery benefit and at jump-starting education systems. The delivery of pharmaceuticals at the community level also had a positive result, given urgent humanitarian needs. These were understood as a material component of the peace dividend promised by government, and they were recognized as important accomplishments under difficult physical and institutional conditions. However, the field study concluded that concerns over implementation delays and the quality of some outputs often overshadowed the results. In this regard, Strategic Priority 2 did not fully meet the political intention behind delivering a peace dividend.

91. **Outputs delivered under Strategic Priority 2 were important to scaling up primary school enrolment and to kick-starting and strengthening service delivery.** This finding was reached with the recognition that the MDTF-SS’ contribution was important early in the Interim Period and its effect was catalytic. School officials observed that the construction and rehabilitation of schools and classrooms increased physical capacity in the sector. The textbooks were used and contributed to improving the quality of education. However, the MDTF-SS channeled only a small percentage of international assistance to the education sector during the evaluation period, as government and donors moved to a sector approach.

92. The field study confirmed that:

a. **Pharmaceuticals and medical supplies were delivered to State health facilities and were distributed down to the County level.** State health officials credited the RIEP with stocking-up State and County facilities on a one-time basis, meeting an urgent need with a positive result. The supplies contributed to broader efforts at expanding the healthcare system. However, State officials expressed concern with the quality of some supplies (such as expired drugs) and the lack of proper storage facilities at the state level. Also, a system for predictable re-supply was not established.

b. **School textbooks and supplies were delivered and acknowledged by State education officials as being important to expanding school access.** The concern expressed by officials was late delivery. Also, transport difficulties meant that some books were not delivered to schools and remained in storage.

c. **Office furniture and equipment was delivered,** and made an important contribution to the basic functionality of ministries. Materials were delivered relatively early in the process of consolidating ministries, and were essential in establishing core capacity.

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33 The evaluation had difficulty confirming the MDTF-SS funding source due to the limited monitoring data at the level of project sites and issues related to local knowledge. RIEP outputs were particularly difficult to identify. In addition to incomplete activity data (i) many of the materials delivered were by nature perishable (e.g., medical supplies and textbooks); (ii) some components delivered goods that were difficult to distinguish from other projects; and (iii) institutional memory concerning early RIEP projects was weak by the time of the field visits.
93. **SETIDP and RIEP delivered critical infrastructure that expanded connectivity in early in the Interim Period,** delays and problems with the inter-operability of World Bank and United Nations systems notwithstanding. SETIDP opened key internal and regional transport routes. There were important outcomes related to integrating the territorial space of South Sudan, improving connectivity among people, opening access for public security to isolated areas and increasingly the flow of commercial traffic. The field study showed that:

a. **In Central and Eastern Equatoria,** SETIDP helped re-open the main transport and commercial routes, from Juba through main population centers and markets into Kenya. Among the impacts, State officials point out revitalized internal markets and production (there was no data available to demonstrate the scope of improvements).

b. **For the government, improved traffic was a source of revenue, through payment of duties at the border.** Government officials also stressed the political importance of integrating the territorial space of South Sudan, for expanding the presence of the state and building a common identity within the population.

c. **Public security also improved, with improved access to previously remote areas of the country.** SETIDP was also perceived as helping open some areas for improved public service delivery.

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34 This finding takes into account the fact that insecurity escalated in some parts of the South after 2007 and that improving access to isolated areas was only one element of a strategy to strengthen rule-of-law institutions. While SETIDP addressed the rehabilitation of key roads early in the Interim Period, the scope of work was only a small percentage of total needs.
94. **Most Strategic Priority 2 outputs were not designed to be sustainable or to be used by the government and communities over an extended period, since they were emergency in nature.** For instance, many outputs, such as pharmaceuticals and textbooks, were intended for consumption. Furthermore, capital investments were also designed in response to urgent needs and to increase the presence and visibility of the state. Their design lacked clarity around responsibility or resourcing for maintenance. However, in some cases there was an assumption that service delivery capacity would expand and build on Strategic Priority 2 outputs. This often did not occur. As an example, infrastructure-related outcomes were not fully sustained, given the grade of roads and maintenance challenges. The health system is still designed to “push” medical supplies to the County level, even though a “pull” system based on ordering supplies according to local needs would be more effective.

95. **Current austerity measures have further contributed to the lack of investment in maintenance or lack of further improvement to transport networks and service delivery systems.** Most visible, the condition of all the roads visited had deteriorated due to the lack of maintenance and other issues beyond the scope of SETIDP. Under austerity spending constraints, government has not been able to afford even basic maintenance on essential roads. With the deterioration of roads, the initial gains from connectivity and economic development either have not been expanded or are being reversed. For instance, commercial traffic between Kenya and Torit has ceased, since the road is no longer passable for trucks.

96. **The deterioration of project works has also become a source of frustration and political sensitivity.** Implementation delays notwithstanding, early delivery of activities was appreciated and considered to have a positive impact. However, as project works deteriorated, the appreciation turned into frustration that was focused on local government. One official in Jonglei State observed, with regard to RIEP investments: “I preferred to take longer and do the job well. It is more trouble that the work was done badly, because now we have to do it again now- the same job is done twice and we have to pay for it again.” Another stated, “it is like giving something and then taking it away again- of course people get frustrated and they blame [the closest and most visible level of Government], even if we were not involved.”

97. **Strategic Priority 2, therefore, showed partial outcomes, meeting some urgent needs and jump-starting service delivery.** Strategic Priority 2 did not fully have the intended political effect of helping consolidate momentum or legitimizing government. Where materials deteriorated quickly or were delivered through a non-state entity, they appeared to undermine the government’s credibility and cause reputational damage. Officials noted that community members tended to assign blame to the nearest visible level of government, even if that level was not involved.

98. **Even with optimal performance, Strategic Priority 2 would likely not have satisfied the political intent behind delivering on a peace dividend.** Expectations were inflated beyond what limited-scope projects could deliver. The scale of urgent needs also exceeded the project scope. However, these were matters for political management and not related to design problems in the projects themselves.
Strategic Priority 3: Priority Sector Programs

Output Summary

Strategic Priority 3: Priority sector programs, including basic infrastructure, education, and health.

99. The JAM determined that “expanding access to education, health, and water and sanitation would be a critical component of the peace dividend because it redresses one key dimension of the historical neglect of the people of the South” (2005: 43). In addition to the investments under Strategic Priority 2 aimed at kick-starting service delivery in education and health (RIEP and ERP), the MDTF-SS portfolio included five projects to improve basic service delivery:

   a. *A two-phased umbrella health project and an HIV/AIDS project*, to develop core health sector systems and capacities and increase the population’s access to basic health services.

   b. *Two water and sanitation projects* to increase access to safe water supply and sanitation in all states by building a sustainable management system and developing the knowledge on water resources in Southern Sudan.

   c. *An additional roads project*, building on the results of SETIDP to “preserve road the asset in Southern Sudan by maintaining priority roads, and strengthening the capacity for strategic and project planning, construction and sustainable maintenance of roads.”

100. *Health*: Access to basic health packages was expanded and improved. MDTF-SS projects distributed 1,062,000 LLINs, 10,000,000 water guard tablets, 250,000 diarrhea treatment kits, and 250,000 therapy medications. Furthermore, access to comprehensive HIV/AIDS services was expanded through the establishment of VCT centers, HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns, the distribution of condoms, and the provision of Ante-retroviral Treatment to People Living with HIV and AIDS.

101. *Water and Sanitation*: The fund contributed to increased access to safe water and sanitation facilities in South Sudan. Activities included the construction and rehabilitation of water facilities such as boreholes, small water distribution systems, and haffirs (water reservoirs). Similarly, the fund supported the construction of sanitation facilities such as public and household latrines. The ICRs estimate that the RWSSP and WSSP met or exceeded their targets, reaching more than 1.2 million direct beneficiaries.
102. **Infrastructure:** The Road Maintenance Project (RMP) provided comprehensive support to the road sector, furthering the transition from emergency mode of operation toward a more sustainable development and management of the road network. For instance, procurement, contract management, finance management, environmental and social assessment, and maintenance management units were created—all crucial contributions to the South Sudan Roads Agency. While substantial outputs were produced, the overall physical targets of the project fell short of original targets. For example, 1,424 km of roads were maintained under the project and are in use, as opposed to the anticipated 1,771 km.

103. **By working through government structures, the MDTF-SS projects strengthened national systems and key stewardship functions of relevant line ministries at both Central and State levels,** thus building the basis for further improvements in access to basic services.

   a. In all basic sectors, the Fund supported the development of line ministries’ capacity for strategic planning and policy development through the development of policies, standards, procedures and management tools.

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35 Targets were revised in 2010 but without a formal restructuring, which means that reviews such as the ICRs are carried out against original targets.
b. In the health sector, such investments include a health sector strategy, state health plans, monitoring and evaluation framework, information systems registers/manuals/instructions, health personnel training curriculum, pharmaceutical quality assurance guidelines, supply chain operation procedures, and pharmaceutical procurement and distribution plan. When projects were launched, the Ministry of Health was essentially an interim secretariat that operated from Kenya. However, by the closing of UPHSD I, the Ministry of Health was fully established with 11 directorates and staff.

104. Outputs from MDTF-SS projects have also strengthened core infrastructure and information systems in support of basic service delivery. For example, line ministry buildings have been constructed, upgraded and renovated and office supplies and equipment (laptop, copy machines, internet) and vehicles have been provided. In the water and sanitation sector, the RWSSP and WSSP supported the development of a water information management system and related website and databases in addition to the rehabilitation and construction of physical facilities.

105. The field study confirmed the contributions that MDTF-SS outputs made to improving the government’s institutional capacity and to expanding its services down to the County and Payam levels.

a. Officials at all health facilities visited in three States and in Juba expressed appreciation for the support provided under the MDTF-SS. Officials credited the fund with helping to establish the core physical infrastructure, systems, and human resources needed to expand health service delivery and access. Fund resources helped build/rehabilitate and operate primary health care centers, with the provision of equipment, training, and medical supplies. The three primary health care centers visited were functioning, delivering rudimentary services, and had expanded local access to services. There was also evidence that local funding is being generated by asking communities to contribute to the purchase of gas for vehicles so that health personnel can visit. According to one State official, “the policy refers to free health care, but on realizing that government lacked funding people are paying to keep basic services going.”

b. Similar gains in both capacity and expansion of services were confirmed for the water and sanitation sector. RWSSP and WSSP project sites were visited in all three States, and local water officials were generally appreciative of the support received. Of the five borehole sites visited (Jonglei and Western Bahr el Gazal State) all were in good working order and in heavy use by communities. In each location, the boreholes were appreciated as the only source of potable water; resolving contamination and scarcity problems in the dry season and contamination during the rains. At one water distribution point in Eastern Equatoria beneficiaries were found haggling to be first in the long line of people waiting for water, as diesel related power rations limited the hours that people could obtain running water from a shared tap. Water laboratories visited in three States were all complete and in good condition. The testing facilities in two other States were pending delivery and installation of equipment. Several personnel at each site had completed training in Juba.
106. **However, the field study also documented concerns over sustainability and a lack of consultation with state and local stakeholders during the planning and implementation of the project.** Informants noted the mixed quality of construction works and materials and the lack of plans and resources for maintenance that threatens sustainability. They pointed to weak supervision from Juba and a failure to consult at the state and community level during design and implementation as the main contributing factors. While The RMP contributed to overall improvements in connectivity, roads have not been maintained and were in poor repair at the time of the field study. Officials believed that earlier gains in security, connectivity, and commercial traffic had been reduced accordingly. There were also punctual concerns at most health facilities visited regarding the quality of some construction, materials and training, as well as at a few of the water and sanitation sites.

**SP3 Outcomes**

**Health**

107. **MDTF-SS projects in health contributed to the expansion of access to basic health services and laid the building blocks for a comprehensive national health system.** While the UPHSD I fell short of its target of increasing birth attendance in a facility from 10 to 18 percent, the increase by 5.3 percentage points achieved can still be expected to contribute substantively to improved maternal health. Furthermore, the immunization of close to 180,000 children is a real contribution to child health. Similar outcomes in improved health are expected from the distribution of medicines under UPHSD I and the HIV/AIDS project and the distribution of malaria nets under UPHSD II. Under UPSHD I, the outcomes in terms of delivery of drugs were compromised by severe delays and a lack of storage capacity and distribution arrangements.

108. **MDTF-SS projects in the health sector also demonstrated how capacity building under sectorial MDTF-SS projects contributed to harmonizing aid (Strategic Priority 5).** For instance, under UPHSD II the Ministry of Health management team was established to coordinate and monitor UPHSD and other donor health project activities, and performed relatively well by the end of the project. The ministry’s enhanced ability to carry out core stewardship functions was displayed in 2011 when it and its development partners agreed to restructure support to the health sector and opt for a geographic focus. Coordination and mutual accountability will improve, ensuring a more equitable distribution of basic health services throughout the country as each development partner concentrates its support to the defined geographic area (one or more states). Similarly, the South Sudan Aids Commissions established under the HIV/AIDS project are coordinating the implementation of HIV/AIDS activities by different implementers, submitting monthly reports summarizing on going HIV/AIDS activities and their achievements.

36 UPHSD II Implementation Status and Results, December 2012.

37 HIV/AIDS Implementation Status and Results, June 2012
109. The field study documented concerns with sustainability, and informants emphasized that state ministries of health have limited resources to sustain or expand on gains made during the interim period. Concern was expressed that the MDTF-SS lacked an exit strategy and that resources to sustain and expand gains were not available. Austerity was identified as the principal constraint, in the current context. However, officials also noted they were receiving only limited national resources even prior to austerity. With closure of the MDTF-SS and severe austerity-related cuts, dependence on donors and NGOs has increased. Officials expressed serious concerns about aid fragmentation, increased transaction costs, and uneven development within institutions, when driven by the priorities of international entities and not the state ministry of health. One official observed, “if most of the money is going outside of the ministry again because the donors are afraid of risk, how can we possibly sustain [the progress made] with the MDTF-SS?”

110. Furthermore, service delivery mechanisms for basic services are still nascent and delivery remains heavily reliant on NGOs, especially at the Payam level.

a. Both the primary health care center structure and the services that centers provided were viewed as rudimentary and seriously affected by austerity cuts and the lack of predictability in the delivery of pharmaceuticals and supplies. Informants and reporting both indicate that some, if not many, primary health care centers functioned sub-optimally due to the lack of personnel and/or supplies. In all locations visited, key pharmaceuticals had been exhausted (for example, anti-malarial treatments) or were close to expiration.

b. Given the current dependence on international assistance, these predictability concerns are partly related to fragmentation in South Sudan’s aid architecture and assistance being delivered outside of government institutions.

c. Finally, the limited storage facilities remain an issue. In Western Bahr el Gazal State, the supply chain had been disrupted by poor and incomplete construction work on a regional storage facility, which has been sitting empty since 2011 and could not be used for storage. Construction on the facility was incomplete and the contractor had abandoned the site. Efforts by State officials to locate the contractor to complete the work were unsuccessful. State officials had also asked the central ministry to intervene, but without a result.

Water and Sanitation

111. Available data indicates improvement in access to safe water and sanitation facilities. The RWSSP ICR cites a 2010 study showing that access to safe water supply increased from 14 percent in 2005 to 34 percent by 2010. Also, the prevalence of Guinea worm in South Sudan showed a 92 percent reduction, from 20,581 cases in 2006 to 1,686 cases as of 2010.

38 Building on the lessons learned from MDTF-SS activities in the sector, the World Bank has designed a new health project, the South Sudan Health Rapid Results Project (USD 28 million) that aims to reduce maternal, infant and child mortality through the expansion of healthcare from 13% of the population (baseline) to 40%.
The achievements belong to multiple interventions, but with the two MDTF-SS projects contributing to sector achievements.

112. **During the field study, local informants also cited improved access in formerly underserved communities, a decrease in water-borne disease and some increase in economic activity.** Local water and health officials in three MDTF-SS project locations credited the boreholes with reductions in water-borne disease and parasites and with reducing the time spent daily transporting water. The only concern expressed by state water officials was that the geographic coverage and beneficiary population tended to exceed the capacity specifications for the model of pump in use, which could result in premature wear. Also, under austerity the State ministries had limited capacity to perform any required maintenance. However, beneficiaries interviewed on site did not express concerns related to water quality or breakdowns. Finally, it was noted that improved access to water also contributed to an increase in the local brick-making industry, which had expanded along the pipeline routes.

**Infrastructure**

113. The target for transport infrastructure set by the JAM was that “by 2007, a basic transport infrastructure network mainly involving roads, river transport and aviation will be in place in the South. This requires opening up (de-mining and enabling passage across) 15,000 kilometers of the South” (2005: 41). The target was not realistic, given conditions, costs and the time frame.

114. **The Interim Period saw limited progress in establishing transportation infrastructure in South Sudan.** Road density in South Sudan is still among the lowest in Africa and connections with neighbors are limited. South Sudan is not expected to “catch-up with neighboring countries, even those in a similar income bracket, in a period of 10 years or even more,” and a spending target of USD 1.4 billion is required per year, over a decade to catch up (Ranganathan and Briceño-Garmendia, 2011). This is significantly larger than the annual budget allocation made to infrastructure during the Interim Period.

115. **Yet, the Field Study documented real improvements in connectivity as a result of MDTF-SS activities.** The RMP contributed to improved connectivity, although results have been scaled back by the ongoing lack of maintenance. For instance, SMoRs officials interviewed noted that the Rumbek-Tonj-Wau road, which was rehabilitated under the RMP, is a critical link between the southern states and the Western Bahr el Gazal, Northern Bahr el Gazal, Lakes, Warrup and Unity States. Initial rehabilitation works had improved security, connectivity and commercial traffic. Bridge repair was also critical, given the number of rivers and lakes along the route, and addressed by the MDTF-SS in two projects.

116. **Despite concerns related to sustainability of outcomes, the MDTF-SS contributed to building GRSS capacity to plan and manage the roads sector and the country’s overall connectivity and integration.** While a modest contribution given the overall requirements, SETIDP and RMP met their targets by enabling the rehabilitation and/or maintenance of a total road length of 3,000 km. Given the lack of resources to maintain or expand the road
Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan

system, early outcomes achieved have in some cases deteriorated. However, at closing, MDTF-SS activities in this sector contributed to five principal outcomes:

a. **Strengthened GRSS capacity to plan and manage the roads sector**, which forms the basis for future expansion.

b. **Improved connectivity of persons, and integration of the territorial space of South Sudan**. GRSS officials identify these as essential nation building tasks. Commonly cited under “connectivity” also was transport of the returnees to their places of origin.

c. **Improved delivery of public goods and services**, both at the State level and moving to communities.

d. **Establishment of a link to agricultural areas in Yei, Kajo-Keji, Western Equatoria, and Eastern Equatoria**, with a food security and economic benefit. The linkage was also credited with supporting the scale-up of agriculture in these areas.

e. **The economic benefit** of opening commercial routes to neighboring countries.39

**Education**

117. **Significant Education gains were made during the MDTF-SS implementation period.** Since 2005, primary school enrolment in South Sudan has grown by 20 percent per year, on average. Primary school enrolment doubled between 2005 and 2009 from 0.7 million to 1.4 million, and has remained at this level until 2012. Similarly, gross enrolment rates in primary school grew from 38 percent in 2005 to 72 percent in 2009. While this rate remains significantly lower than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (88%), it is still an impressive accomplishment.

118. **The MDTF-SS made an important early contribution to scaling up and establishing as well as strengthening the institutional capacity of the GRSS to manage growth in the education sector.**40 Given the large number of actors in the education sector, it is nevertheless difficult to determine attribution. In addition to government investments in education, donors, United Nations agencies, and NGOs are also heavily involved. The scope of these programs greatly exceeds the contribution channelled through the MDTF-SS. For example, enrolment in schools constructed or rehabilitated under the ERP is estimated at 21,000, a small portion of the overall expansion.

119. **The fund’s investments have contributed to enhanced quality of education.** Unfortunately, nationally representative data on learning outcomes are not yet available for South Sudan. However, intermediate measures such as textbook-to-student ratios and teacher qualifications indicate that the fund (RIEP and ERP) contributed to the enhanced quality of education. In terms of textbooks, at project closing of the ERP the ratio in South

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39 The statements are based on field observation and interviews. The evaluation had difficulty finding supportive empirical data.

40 Outputs from MDTF projects that directly contributed to the education sector are detailed under Strategic Priority 2.
Sudan was one textbook for every four students in both English and Math, which exceeded the original target of 1:5. In terms of teacher qualification, about 80 percent of the 25,000 primary teachers were unqualified, and most had no training at project start. Project activities reduced the percentage of untrained teachers by 7 percent, to about 73 percent.41

120. **For alternate learning opportunities, the ERP contributed to access in a context where there were few other programs.** Initial implementation was based on NGO activities, largely continued by implementing already existing programs. Consequently, implementation was relatively smooth. At the same time, the project supported the development of government capacity to take on more of the management of the country’s Alternative Education System.

**Strategic Priority 4: Transition from Subsistence to Development-oriented Economy**

**Output Summary**

**Strategic Priority 4: Facilitate the transition from subsistence-based livelihoods to a development-oriented economy.**

121. **Four MDTF-SS projects delivered support under Strategic Priority 4; private sector development, agriculture, livestock and gender.** Together, these represented nine percent of the total allocation, indicating Strategic Priority 4 received less priority in funding allocations than projects under Strategic Priority 1, Strategic Priority 2 and Strategic Priority 3. The portfolio worked across the four key sectors for Southern Sudan’s economy: agriculture, livestock, fisheries and forestry (Livestock and Fisheries Development Project or LFDP and Support to Agriculture and Forestry Development Project or SAFDP). The JAM estimated that these accounted for 85 percent of economic activity in 2004 (2005: 15). The Strategic Priority 4 portfolio also included an investment to strengthen the private sector, and to create livelihood opportunities for women. Other MDTF-SS projects reinforced Strategic Priority 4 objectives: the two roads projects improved connectivity and markets while RIEP and SETIDP also offered some short-term jobs in construction and labor.

122. **Strategic Priority 4 responded to the 2005 JAM call to prioritize agriculture (including forests, livestock and fisheries) and promote private sector development as “central to the challenge of sustainable peace and development in Southern Sudan, with a requirement for substantial policy and program investment” (2005: 41-43).** The JAM concluded that:

- **Private sector activity in Southern Sudan was almost non-existent,** and making only a marginal contribution to the economy. Supportive government policy, legislation and enabling services would need to be developed from scratch.

- **Agriculture was subsistence based and needed to be developed across the full value chain,** from inputs and credit schemes to transport and development of internal markets for

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41 ERP Implementation Completion Report (World Bank 2012)
produce. As a result, over half the Counties in the South were assessed as “highly” or “moderately” food insecure. Supportive government policy, a legislative framework and extension services would also need to be built, focusing on State- level capacity.

- *Southern Sudan was heavily dependent on livestock* as a significant proportion of agricultural and livelihood activity. The assessment did not discuss the cultural or traditional dimensions of livestock ownership but noted the importance of animal health and the need to establish government disease surveillance and extensions services.

123. Outputs delivered under Strategic Priority 4 (detailed in Annex F) contributed to enhanced capacity of state institutions for the private sector, agriculture and forestry, livestock and fisheries, and livelihoods for women, at the central and State levels. Outputs responded to the following objectives:

   a. *Increased productivity and marketed output achieved by the agricultural producers* participating in the project. The project also sought to increase labor productivity. The production of food grains and production of high value crops increased. These actions would contribute to both food security and economic development.

   b. *Enhanced performance of the Livestock and Fisheries Sectors in five States of Southern Sudan*, by improving animal health, reducing fish post-harvest losses and improving market infrastructure. For both livestock and fisheries, the project would also increase the volumes of fish and livestock that reach markets, for commercial sale.

   c. *Increased private sector activity and job creation in the formal sector*, by creating enabling conditions for private sector growth, providing micro-credits and other forms of support for business creation and registration.

   d. *Economic opportunities for women through the implementation of income-generating sub-projects in the 10 states.*

124. **The scope of outputs delivered under Strategic Priority 4 was reduced due to project funding cuts, revisions of original cost estimates, and partial completion of construction work.** Three out of four projects went through restructures that limited the scope of outputs—SAFDP, PSDP and LFDP due to shortfalls in funding, the PSDP in response to operational and personnel costs exceeding original estimates. These were significant changes. For instance, under the LFDP, due to a shortfall in funding from the government, the project could count on only 40 percent of the funds originally estimated at appraisal. Under the Gender Support Development Project (GSDP), one component was only partially completed (construction of a ministry building).

125. **Activities aimed at developing market capacity were particularly hard hit by these reductions.** Under the LFDP, the revised livestock and fish marketing component was significantly more modest than planned, having borne the brunt of the project funding shortfall. Similarly, The PSDP at appraisal set out to build a wholesale market and to develop a related market assembly system and market information system. However, since funds were insufficient and Phase 2 of the project was cancelled, these activities were dropped, although the preliminary design for the market was completed.
Box 5.7
MDTF-SS Achievements under Strategic Priority4:

Transition from subsistence to development-oriented economy

- 1,182 community animal health workers and veterinary pharmacists trained and operating in all of the five target states; 329,589 animals treated for systemic diseases; 580,226 animals vaccinated for diseases; 12 functional mobile veterinary clinics deployed; 800,000 animals vaccinated against diseases; and 384,750 animals treated for systemic diseases (LFDP).

- 34,512 feddans cultivated with crops and trees by project participants; 334.4 Metric Tons of improved seeds produced by project; 777 farmer groups supported, with 15,369 members, of which 6,100 (40%) were female; 10,044 farmers trained in various agronomic and agro-forestry practices; 10 special projects implemented serving 3,440 farmers; 115 micro projects supported during the period in the five states covering the 27 counties; 78,041 farmers benefited out of a population of 234,123; 138,066 tree seedlings raised, planted, and/or sold by participating farmers; 97,294 direct beneficiaries, of which 48% were female (SAFDP).

- 14,540 microfinance loans to women and 7,274 to men; 10 new microfinance institutions operational in Southern Sudan; 45 entrepreneurship grants awarded through the Business Plan Competitions; USD 1.67 million in loans provided through microfinance institutions (PSD).

- 1,260 women trained in non-farm income-generating activities; 2,430 women trained in agricultural production activities.

- As a result, 2,090 women use at least one new agricultural production technology or practice; 2,300 women perceive an increase in crop yields or harvests due to project interventions; 36 sub-projects will continue after project closure; 2,070 women have joined associations: 520 collective actions taken by women in project sites (GSDP).

Outcomes

126. The higher-level objective of transitioning from subsistence-based livelihoods was not achieved, despite strengthened state capacity in the productive sectors and productivity gains among direct beneficiaries for MDTF-SS projects. Two main factors contribute to this unachieved outcome. First, the objective was ambitious given the initial conditions and the resources that were eventually dedicated to project activities in these sectors. Second, government expenditure and support for the productive sectors has been weak and declining, especially since 2008.42

Livestock, Fisheries and Agriculture

127. Both SAFDP and LFDP outputs contributed to productivity-related outcomes. The following outcomes are attributable to MDTF-SS activities:

a. Increased production in agriculture and forestry: SAFDP support to farming communities through extension (introduction of the improved production technologies) contributed to increased productivity and production by participating smallholder farmers. When

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42 World Bank, South Sudan Economic Brief, No. 2 (2013h).
the project launched, farmers’ access to basic agricultural advisory services was limited and their productivity was dismal. The project reports an increase in staple yields, including sorghum (138%), maize (120%) and ground nuts (73%).

b. Improved animal health: Under the LFDP, improvements in animal disease surveillance systems and the provision of veterinary services to the rural households contributed to animal health, affecting productivity in the sector. Project investments in the disease surveillance system were particularly important as a protective measure against the risk of system breakdown and consequent disease outbreak after NGOs withdrew from providing animal healthcare.43

128. In collaboration with other development partners, the SAFDP developed policies and drafted legislation that contributed substantially to planning and development in the sector. The ICR also notes skill advancement and higher staff morale at the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry as a result of the project’s investments in physical infrastructure and capacity building activities, which have resulted in more efficient government institutions, as witnessed by the continuous improvement in project implementation. The LFDP also contributed significantly to institutional capacity building within the Ministry of Animal Resources and Fisheries and five States.

129. In the 2011 budget, natural resources accounted for only 2 percent of expenditure, almost 80 percent of the population lives in rural areas, mainly engaged in agriculture and livestock. Looking ahead, the lack of government support for agriculture and livestock warrants continued efforts by other development partners to consolidate and sustain gains made over the CPA period. Government expenditure indicates a low priority given to these sectors.44

130. In the agricultural sector, support to farming communities through extension has helped beneficiaries achieve higher productivity and production. For instance, the adoption of productivity-enhancing measures by project beneficiaries will have a long-lasting impact in many communities, while the introduction of informal seed production and bulking within farming communities has laid the foundation for a modern seed industry.

131. The field study raised concerns over the use of outputs delivered under the livestock and fisheries project. While the evaluation interviewed national and State officials involved in all projects mapped to Strategic Priority 4, site visits included only livestock and fisheries project activities. The field study found that project assets were not in use in these two sites:

a. The Veterinary Centre in Magwi County, Eastern Equatoria State, was completed in 2010/11 and still in good condition. However, the clinic had never been operated. There were no pharmaceutical goods or furniture on site, and no dispensary log or registry of activities. A local official advised there were no resources to sustain operations, and extension work continued instead with mobile officers and a limited supply of pharmaceuticals.

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43 LFDP Implementation Completion Report (2011b)
44 World Bank, South Sudan Economic Brief, No. 2 (2013h).
b. A Bush Shop in Bor had been constructed and equipped, including with a generator and cold storage facility. However, problems with financing the maintenance of a boat to bring goods for sale from upriver and for the generator meant that the Bush Shop had never been used. After a year of sitting unoccupied, the building was deteriorating and infested with bats. There was discussion of transferring the property to another branch of government.

Private Sector Development and Improved Livelihoods for Women

132. The PSDP made significant contributions to an improved business environment in South Sudan and strengthened policy and legal frameworks. As mentioned under Strategic Priority 1, the PSDP also contributed through its support to the development of regulatory frameworks and key legislation, including the Limited Partnerships Act (2008), Business Registration Act (2008), Contracts Act (2008), and the Investment Promotion Act (2009).

133. However, most of the bills drafted have yet to be codified into law. The project’s ICR attributes delays to two factors: (i) the lack of a champion within government and (ii) the frequent turnaround of key staff at the ministerial level. Here again, the responsibility of transforming key outputs into sustainable outcomes ultimately rests with government.

134. However, the results of a more enabling business environment can be seen in the increased activity in the private sector. For instance, the total number of businesses operating in South Sudan increased from less than 1,000 in 2005 to more than 7,300 in 2010. More than 2,200 of these were founded in 2010 alone. This is a staggering increase in registrations. Direct attribution of this outcome to project activities is mitigated by the impact of special grain import declarations by the government in 2008, which allowed only registered companies to be awarded contracts. Yet while there were important external drivers of the increase in registration, the project clearly contributed by enabling the streamlining of procedures to set up and register a business.

135. There are also results in the area of entrepreneurship and job creation. Through the establishment of a regulatory framework for microfinance institutions and increased access to microfinance, the PSDP supported entrepreneurship. In parallel, targeted activities such as the Business Plan Competition contributed to the development of small to medium-sized businesses. The employment target was greatly exceeded for the Business Plan Completion, while the microfinance target (number of microfinance institution clients) fell slightly short of target, primarily due to one of the largest institutions’ being forced to write off 60 percent of their portfolio in mid-2011.45 The measures taken by the project to support an enabling business environment also indirectly contributed to job creation.

136. The strengthening and regulation of the microfinance sector has contributed to the growth of a nascent private sector. Consultation with beneficiaries of targeted microfinance

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45 The microfinance institution was BRAC, and the reason for the write-off was the collapse of the Nile Commercial Bank, which handled its deposits.
institutions during the ICR also indicated outcomes beyond increased entrepreneurial opportunities. These include poverty reduction through the growth of small businesses, and the ability of previously un-banked persons to build credit histories and strengthened savings habits, especially among women.

137. Finally, there were also outcomes with increased formal employment. Under the Business Plan Competition, creation of formal employment by far exceeded targets. In addition, a beneficiary assessment revealed that the participating firms created outcomes beyond employment, providing communities with financial credit, seeds and farming equipment, medical supplies, and support to widows, orphans, and students.

138. MDTF-SS projects also contributed significantly to improved livelihoods for women. The GSDP provided grants to local women’s Community Based Organizations and training to women in agricultural and non-farm-income-generating activities, benefitting more than 7,000 women. However, economic opportunity was also extended to women as a result of activities under the PSDP and SAFDP.

Strategic Priority 5: Harmonizing Aid

139. The MDTF-SS did not fully achieve the Strategic Priority 5 objective of harmonizing international assistance. The MDTF-SS was designed to be the primary channel for international assistance to South Sudan. However, its relevance in this role declined over time, as a result of both the changing context and performance concerns.

140. The original process of establishing the aid architecture to support the CPA was highly effective, in mobilizing resources and coordinating the activity of international donors. The MDTF-SS was subsequently effective prior to 2007-08, with mobilizing and coordinating resources and aligning them with the GoSS’ development priorities. These were significant accomplishments under the prevailing conditions.

141. However, aid coordination in South Sudan was fragmented by the time the MDTF-SS closed. Data indicates a gradual shift away from channeling through pooled modalities after 2009. On average, in 2012 the top 12 donors delivered 28 percent of their aid budgets through pooled funds, down from 33 percent in 2010, reflecting a continued trend toward bilateralism. The South Sudan Donor Book (GRSS 2013b) noted that this trend is expected to continue over the course of 2012-13 with the closure of both the MDTF-SS and the Basic Services Fund.

142. The trend towards greater allocation though bilateral programs reflects changes in the South Sudan context. With Independence, major donors now relate to the GRSS as a sovereign government and not as a semi-autonomous entity. Donors have strengthened their presence and operational capacity in South Sudan as one aspect of strengthening bilateral relations with the GRSS. They are less reliant on external capacities, such as trust funds, and have more options with allocation channels. The government also chose to channel less of its resources through the MDTF-SS, as its own priorities evolved to focus on security and recurrent costs. There is also now a preference for sector-based planning and
funding modalities, which are distinct from the MDTF-SS’ “state-wide” focus. With these shifts, the MDTF-SS became less relevant as a coordinating mechanism.

143. However, shift away from the MDTF-SS was also the result of door and government frustration with the fund’s performance. These emerged as early as 2006-07, with delays in standing-up MDTF-SS operations and project implementation. The shifting of resources elsewhere by donors and the government was motivated by the perception of poor performance, and that there were gaps in the recipient execution modality’s ability to address certain needs. Political pressure from slow delivery of a “peace dividend” was an important factor. As a result, the fund’s effectiveness against Strategic Priority 5 declined over time.

144. The channeling of assistance through the MDTF-SS declined steadily after 2007, even before performance concerns emerged. Figure 5.1 shows donor deposits to MDTF-SS from 2006 through 2011, compared to total donor commitments over the same period. The figure indicates that while MDTF-SS deposits corresponded to 89 percent of total donor commitments in 2006, the relationship quickly changed to 11 percent by 2008 and 2 percent by 2010. Instead of relying on MDTF-SS, donors channeled resources bilaterally or through new pooled funding mechanisms.

\[\text{Figure 5.1: Donor Deposits to MDTF-SS versus Total Aid Commitments}\]

Source: Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2012-13 (GRSS 2013b)

145. The result is a growing burden on GRSS capacity to coordinate assistance, and to manage its collaboration with a large number of individual players. The field mission noted that the higher transaction costs are acutely felt at the State level. Under the current policy of austerity, State ministries are dependent on assistance for their capital and operating revenues. At the same time, the capacity of State ministries to manage multiple initiatives has declined significantly. Officials in Eastern Equatoria, Western Bahr el Gazal, and Jonglei States expressed concern that the coordination burden overwhelmed their capacity. Also, the view was expressed that the tendency of individual donors and NGOs to focus on their own priority areas is promoting uneven institutional development and service delivery. In this regard, State officials showed a clear preference for the MDTF-SS’ integrated approach.
146. **At the same time as the architecture has fragmented, some aspects of government capacity to coordinate assistance have strengthened.** The central government has developed a national development plan and sector policies and a system in the MoFEP for tracking assistance. In 2011, the *South Sudan Aid Strategy* was launched to provide a framework for improving the effectiveness of development assistance and humanitarian aid. Some national ministries show improved capacity and experience in managing assistance at the sector level, and states completed their development plans in 2011. As a result, the GRSS is in a better position to provide a framework for alignment. The trend indicates that institutional capacity has been built within the GRSS to formulate policy and communicate plans and strategies. The MDTF-SS projects have provided key inputs into this process in the form of sector policies, plans, and strategic frameworks.
Part 6: MDTF Performance by Evaluation Criteria

147. The evaluation was asked to assess the performance of the MDTF-SS against five standard evaluation criteria: relevance; national ownership; efficiency, effectiveness and accountability; reasonability of cost; and cross-cutting issues.

Relevance

148. The relevance of all projects in the MDTF-SS portfolio was satisfactory, as was the relevance of the fund’s final outputs and outcomes. From the ICRs, the composition of the MDTF-SS portfolio was aligned with the fund’s overall goal of “coordinated response to Government priorities”, as outlined in the Joint Assessment Mission framework and subsequent government development plans. There was no instance where a project was assessed as falling outside of the government’s strategic framework, or was not a priority activity.

149. The exception to satisfactory relevance was late approval and implementation of a gender-specific project (see section below on Cross-Cutting Issues). Mainstreaming gender into MDTF-SS projects did not compensate for lost opportunity to make an earlier contribution towards strengthening the GRSS’ policy framework and institutional capacity. Further, mainstreaming gender into MDTF-SS projects was done without the guidance of a comprehensive gender assessment, which was not completed by the Ministry of Gender until 2011, when most projects were in the final stages of implementation.

150. Projects generally demonstrated satisfactory internal relevance. Activities and final outputs were aligned with the MDTF-SS development objectives and generally displayed good internal coherence. Some ICRs identify specific concerns for the relevance of project design, and for specific components or activities. The field study further identified concerns for some unsustainable rehabilitation activities, where mixed quality or the deterioration of assets delivered undermined the project objectives. However, these do not detract significantly from the portfolio-level findings.

151. The finding of satisfactory relevance was made notwithstanding two factors:

a. The MDTF-SS was relevant to JAM priorities. However, the JAM itself did not have satisfactory relevance to the contextual reality of South Sudan during the Interim Period. JAM targets were overly ambitious and the report did not provide an operational framework. By adopting the JAM framework, the MDTF-SS portfolio was not effectively aligned with the contextual reality, and individual projects had to be restructured. The Oversight Committee did not re-assess the fund’s objectives or scope of work at the portfolio level, to improve alignment. In this regard, the governance process did not provide clear strategic guidance.

b. MDTF-SS’ relevance to GoSS /GRSS priorities arguably shifted over time. Government decision-making on resource allocation was influenced by re-occurring financial shocks and by volatile political and security conditions, internal and external. Both were
directly related to lack of progress towards core CPA implementation targets. In this context, the government prioritized expenditures to security and public administration, with smaller than expected investments made in public service delivery and development-related activities that would reinforce MDTF-SS accomplishments.

National Ownership

152. Integration of the MDTF-SS into the CPA and the fund’s design created good conditions for national ownership. Ownership was robust during the process leading to establishment of the MDTF-SS, and during the early period of operations. However, ownership by government, donors and NGOs weakened over time as performance concerns emerged, new aid channels were created, and the government’s priorities shifted.

153. The government was a full participant in the MDTF-SS from its inception. The government was party to the CPA and played a deciding role in design of the MDTF-SS and selection of the modality. Similarly, the JAM occurred under government leadership and was adopted as the initial development framework. Throughout these processes, government decisions were motivated by a clearly stated position that the transition from conflict to peace should occur under national leadership.

154. The MDTF-SS structure provided an opportunity for ownership at the governance level. The government was a full and active participant in the Oversight Committee and in the committee’s activities and a party to major decisions. National ownership at the operational level remained strong throughout the implementation period. The majority of projects were managed through national institutions and systems, and all projects strengthened those institutions. The recipient execution modality depended on government involvement at every level of design and implementation, with World Bank supervision and technical assistance. In this regard, the ICRs rated ownership at this level as falling between satisfactory and moderately satisfactory, with institutional capacity being the main variable.

155. Government often lacked the capacity to assert its leadership and take full advantage of the MDTF-SS structure, regardless of its intentions and MDTF-SS provisions. Ownership was also influenced over time by changing conditions and priorities. The following observations are taken largely from interviews with current and former government officials and reflect their perceptions of ownership. The key issues emerging are government’s capacity to take ownership within the recipient execution model and shifting priorities within the CPA context:

a. The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement’s pre-2005 “war to peace” transition strategy was based on robust national ownership. After many years of humanitarian assistance delivered outside of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, there was a conscious effort to bring resources under government control.

b. Government lead the JAM, was a full participant in the process, and endorsed the assessment report. However, government had limited capacity to lead. Officials were simultaneously engaged in multiple transition processes. They were overwhelmed and could not fully internalize the JAM results.
c. **Within the MDTF-SS, at the governance and operational levels, the government lacked the capacity to exert leadership at the level of its aspirations.** The situation varied by ministry and project and within the governance structure. It also improved with time as the capacity of the state expanded. However, government officials often perceived that they were not able to participate in design and decision-making at the level desired, particularly given timelines and the pressure to proceed.

d. **The 2:1 match was intended to channel government resources through the MDTF-SS and leverage the government’s leadership position.** However, adjustment to the matching ratio resulted in a smaller investment moving through the MDTF-SS, both in real terms and relative to the donor contribution. At the same time, government’s actual expenditures were increasingly out of alignment with JAM and MDTF-SS priorities, focusing on security and the recurrent costs of an expanding civil service.

156. **Over time, therefore, government’s leverage within MDTF-SS decision-making and relevance to expenditure priorities decreased.** While a valuable resource to social service and capacity spending, the overall importance of the MDTF-SS to government declined, also with an implication for ownership of the MDTF-SS as an aid modality. Within the MDTF-SS’ governance dynamic, officials also expressed frustration with donor interventions and the limits of their own influence over decision-making.

157. **While strong at the centre, ownership of individual projects and activities often weakened during implementation at the state and sub-state levels.** State ownership depreciated where project-level decision making was centralized, and did not involve state-level beneficiaries. Consequences were particularly evident in the sustainability of projects.

158. **The ownership of other MDTF-SS stakeholders also declined over time.** Arguably, the World Bank’s institutional ownership improved and was sustained over time, as the Bank addressed performance concerns and strengthened its presence in South Sudan. However, donor financial investment in the MDTF-SS peaked in 2008, and performance concerns led donors to establish other modalities. NGO interest in the MDTF-SS declined after 2008, as the fund was not able to identify clear contributions and roles for NGOs and community based organizations (CBOs).

**Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Accountability**

**Establishing the MDTF-SS Architecture**

159. **Stakeholders were highly efficient in establishing the MDTF-SS, as part of the overall architecture for international assistance to the CPA process.** Discussions on the MDTF-SS began at least two years prior to signing the CPA, ensuring full integration into the negotiation process. Signing of the CPA was followed in rapid succession by approval of a United Nations peacekeeping mission,\(^4^6\) finalization of the JAM report (March 2005),

a donor pledging conference (April 2005), and launch of the two Sudan MDTFs (April 2005). These were significant achievements, achieved under difficult conditions that demonstrated the commitment of the GoSS and its international partners to the CPA process.

160. **The design of the MDTF-SS’ architecture was efficient.** The architecture linked high-level political support and oversight (the Sudan Consortium) to an inclusive governance structure (the Oversight Committee), an implementation arrangement (the Technical Secretariat and the government), and monitoring and evaluation (ongoing Bank reviews, the monitoring agent, and independent evaluation). The vertical linkages created enabling conditions for a mutually reinforcing relationship between political support and field operations.

161. **The actual use of the architecture by stakeholders had mixed efficiency.** Among the concerns that emerged were these:

   a. *The Sudan Consortium met on four occasions*, with the last meeting taking place in May 2008. After 2008, the MDTF-SS lost its linkage with any high-level political forum monitoring overall progress towards CPA targets and supporting compliance by the two parties.

   b. *The MDTF-SS governance system showed mixed performance against its mandate*, including providing strategic guidance in a dynamic context. Governance, therefore, was not used to its full potential in addressing the challenges confronted by the fund. This was particularly the case when the Oversight Committee began to engage performance concerns in 2008.

   c. *Technical-level entities were created to address specific issues and coordinate information and action on implementation concerns.* These were not a part of the original governance structure but emerged in 2007 to address performance difficulties. The most effective of these appeared to be the Directors and Coordinators’ Meetings that occurred quarterly (2009-13). From interviews, the Implementation Working Group (2007-10) appeared contentious, with concerns expressed by government and the Technical Secretariat that the group crossed its mandate and became involved in ongoing management and operational issues.47

   d. *The tension between building capacity and rapid delivery of a peace dividend was not resolved.* The fund did not create the conditions for effective integration of United Nations capacity until 2008, while the means for integrating NGOs were never established.

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47 The evaluation did not find a complete list of the different technical entities, their Terms of Reference or supporting documentation, such as the minutes of meetings. Findings are based on Oversight Committee minutes and interviews.
Stakeholder Performance

162. Stakeholders showed mixed performance against defined roles and responsibilities. Performance shifted over time and was influenced by the way stakeholders interpreted their roles and by their level of commitment to the MDTF-SS.

163. The World Bank over-promised what it could reasonably deliver in the South Sudan context, and then under-performed during the first years of operations as a result. The Bank lacked the operational capacity in the field to effectively deliver programs, particularly given difficult conditions and limited capacity in state institutions. The Bank’s performance improved over time, as it committed more resources and personnel to field operations and institutional support strengthened.

164. Other stakeholders were guided by unclear definitions and understandings of their roles and responsibilities. These were most pronounced in the MDTF-SS’ governance process. The Oversight Committee provided important strategic direction during the initial phase of confirming the MDTF-SS portfolio. Regardless, the focus of the committee was largely technical and operational rather than strategic. This was increasingly the case after 2007-08 when performance concerns emerged; the committee focused on operational factors to improve implementation speed. There was limited discussion at the strategic level about the contextual, political, and structural factors behind the operational problems.

165. From the review of Oversight Committee minutes and stakeholder interviews, the Oversight Committee provided limited strategic direction. It did not effectively guide the adjustments needed to resolve performance concerns or adapt to the changing context in South Sudan. Rather, the committee’s focus became increasingly technical over time. There was limited substantive discussion of the non-technical factors that were having a decisive impact on performance.

166. Further, informants all described an acrimonious environment, charged with interpersonal tensions between key Oversight Committee members. From the statements made by all stakeholder groups, these tensions were a factor hindering effective debate and problem solving. Tensions related back to the lack of consensus on expectations, rules, roles, and responsibilities among stakeholders. Government and World Bank officials expressed particular concern about donor interventions into operational areas, which they believed fell within the responsibility of implementing entities.

167. Some government officials and some former Bank officials believed donors were micro-managing operations, which added to project management costs. For their part, current and former donor officials expressed frustration that the Technical Secretariat did not provide important information in a timely manner, which hindered strategic discussion as donors then sought details during the meetings.

Mutual Accountability

168. The MDTF-SS had no formal mechanism for mutual accountability between stakeholders. The fund had robust measures for fiscal and program accountability. However, these were not balanced with mutual accountability between stakeholders. Accountability is achieved when there are mechanisms in place to measure performance,
transparency for results, and meaningful debate on mutual performance among the stakeholders. For the MDTF-SS, there were no such instruments to report on stakeholder performance against assigned roles and responsibilities. Limits to accountability were reinforced by the lack of constructive dialogue within the Oversight Committee on the non-technical factors affecting MDTF-SS performance.

**Program and Financial Efficiency**

169. **The MDTF-SS was moderately efficient at the program level.** In terms of the five strategic priorities, the fund delivered significant outputs under at least four and contributed to outcomes in all five. At the same time, the fund only partially delivered on some aspects. First, delays in implementation due to failure to fully grasp constraints on the ground, including in terms of capacity, and reliance on procedures that were not fit for quick delivery made rapid scale-up of services and delivery of peace dividends an unrealistic target. Also, while capacity building at the sector level contributed to increased aid harmonization in some sectors, the fund as such never played the role intended in terms of coordinating and harmonizing donor activities.

170. **At the project level, the fund was moderately efficient.** For most projects, delays in implementation were the most common contributor to inefficiency. What often redeemed these efficiency losses were projects’ contributions to efficiency gains in the different sectors, for instance in the health sector by focusing on moving delivery away from poorly coordinated NGO mechanisms to national systems. In some cases, the ICRs attempt a more traditional analysis of economic and financial returns. For instance, RIEP was rated as moderately efficient based on the finding that modest per capita investment had brought benefits to nearly half the population in terms of health and educational supplies. What reduced the rating to “modest” were delays in implementation.

171. The efficiency assessment is difficult given that none of the projects, with the exception of the ERP and PSDP, conducted any economic or financial analysis of expected returns. Consequently, frames of reference by which expected and realized outcomes could be compared are lacking. At completion, economic and financial analyses were generally constrained by a severe lack of cost data as well as effectiveness data. Finally, across completion reports, the difficulty of finding comparable projects elsewhere with conditions similar to South Sudan’s was noted.
### Table 6.1: Efficiency Ratings from ICRs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Driver of ‘inefficiency’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RIEP</td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>Delays in construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Census</td>
<td>Moderately Efficient</td>
<td>Increased costs due to emphasis on speed as dictated by the CPA, which meant drawing on international experts and organizations. There were also concerns with the quality of outputs delivered, particularly from one organization (UNOPS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMP</td>
<td>Efficient</td>
<td>Efficient because all components were delivered and development objectives achieved. Also supported by a positive rating under the monitoring agent’s value-for-money assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPHSD I</td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>There were severe delays in implementation. However these were weighed against the project’s focus on cost-effective and high-impact interventions and contributions to efficiency gains in the sector by beginning to move delivery from poorly coordinated NGO mechanisms toward a national system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWSSP</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>The ICR does not carry out any analysis, but the project is deemed efficient based on the conclusion that benefits to the population from the provision of water supply and sanitation services are far higher than the cost of investment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSSP</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Based on a comparison of the average per capita investment costs of schemes financed through the project with African averages. Attributes efficiency (low unit cost per beneficiary) to the choice of low-cost technology and the competitive award of contracts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CABIHRD</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>The ICR does not provide a rating. However, the assessment notes that the project was particularly vigilant and conscious about the need for efficiency and “value for money.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFDP</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>The ICR assesses efficiency but does not provide rating. An assessment is challenging because the main benefits of the project were capacity and systems – both of which are difficult to quantify. However the ICR notes that these outputs contributed to significant efficiency gains in the sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERP</td>
<td>Substantial</td>
<td>The ICR justifies the rating through analysis of (i) external rates of return, e.g. rates of return on investments in education; (ii) the cost effectiveness of project interventions; and (iii) cost-benefit. The latter show significant net present value of investments in the construction of schools and CES, teacher training and Alternative Learning programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDP</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>The ICR assesses value-for-money and the reasonability of means to carry out objectives. However, it does not provide a rating. Concerning value-for-money the study raised issues about the failure of the ministry to assign proper counterpart staff for training in Financial Management and procurement to ensure transfer of skills. It deems the means used to be reasonable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSDP</td>
<td>Modest</td>
<td>The ICR related the rating to the costs of consultancies being much higher than what had originally been budgeted for. Efficiency was affected not only by monetary costs but also by substantial transaction costs accrued through the length of time required to meet related costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project</td>
<td>Rating</td>
<td>Driver of ‘inefficiency’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SETIDP</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>The ICR notes significant increases in unit costs between appraisal and completion due to underestimation of costs, but does not rate efficiency. The ICR also conducts a comparative unit cost analysis with previous transport project (WFP-ERRP). The analysis shows a significant drop in roads maintenance costs and a modest increase in road repair.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAFDP</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>The ICR does not assess efficiency as there is not sufficient data or accurate comparators. It does however note that the project is understood to have made a significant impact on the livelihoods of participating farmers and in improving food supply in the targeted counties.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Project Implementation Completion Reports

Restructuring: Reduction in the Scope of MDTF-SS Outputs

172. The majority of projects experienced at least one restructuring, producing a reduction and/or changes in the scope of outputs against what was originally intended. Restructuring generally refers to changes to design (components, development objectives, or indicators) or financing. Extensions of closing dates were a common cause of project restructuring. Project restructuring changed the scope of outputs and/or the speed at which the outputs were delivered.

173. At the project-level, there were two main sources of changes in the scope of outputs delivered: (i) Financial contributions to the MDTF-SS from the GRSS fell sharply between planned and actual; and (ii) Costs of implementation were routinely underestimated at the design and appraisal stage, especially in the early days of the fund. These two trends affected projects across the MDTF-SS portfolio. However, projects launched in the first years were particularly affected. These were designed under more uncertain conditions, with significant information gaps and with greater time pressure during the inception phase.

174. The inability to accurately assess the cost of implementation often led to significant changes in the project budgets, resulting in changes to the design project development objectives, indicators, components that ultimately limited the output delivered. These were corrections to match reality and reflect the challenges of designing projects with limited knowledge of personnel and operating costs at the time of appraisal. Projects that had to amend original budgets and the allocation of funds across components to suit the realities on the ground include the CFSSP, the RIEP, the UPHSSD, and the PSDP. In the case of the PSDP, the final costs relating to project management were over four times higher than the appraisal estimates; USD 2.21 million compared to the estimated USD 0.52 million. The difference is explained by the actual costs of hiring trained personnel and operating costs greatly exceeding the appraised budget estimates.

175. The SAFDP exemplifies how the reduction in the GRSS contribution to MDTF-SS projects played out at the project level: In 2009, the GRSS reduced its contribution to the
project from USD 17.1 million to USD 1.8 million, following the decline of international oil prices. While the contributions from donors increased from USD 25.8 million to USD 30.17 million in response to the shortfall, total project funds were just about 75 percent of the amount at appraisal. The immediate consequence was a restructuring of the project to align its scope with available funds – an exercise that among others resulted in a reduction of the project reach from 44 counties to 27 counties.

176. **In other cases, cuts in government's allocation were made up for by increased donor commitment.** For the CABIHRD, the government contribution was revised from the original USD 5.53 million to USD 1.57 million. In response, the donor share of the fund was increased from USD 8.2 million to USD 12.16 million so as to retain the total project amount at USD 13.7 million.

**Speed of Implementation: Improvements over Time**

177. **The speed at which outputs were delivered contributed to discrepancies between what was promised and what was delivered.** The slow speed of implementation became a key concern among stakeholders early on in the process, beginning in 2007-08. One of the most frequent reasons for restructuring at the project level was the need for an extension of closing dates. A contributing factor was the delay between approval and effectiveness in the early days as government experienced difficulty meeting the World Bank conditions for grant effectiveness. These included the requirement to deposit funds equivalent to four months of expenditure in the project accounts.48

178. To assess whether there was an improvement over time in the speed of project launch, the evaluation compared averages of projects launched in 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2009-10 (see Table 6.2). The findings show that average time between approval and effectiveness fell from 29 weeks for projects launched in 2005 to nine weeks for the 2009-10 projects. Similarly, average time between approval and first disbursement was halved between 2005 and 2007, from 43 weeks down to 23 weeks. On average, MDTF-SS projects were 21 months delayed in closing. This lag also improved with time, which is to be expected given the end date of the fund itself.

179. Overall, the fact that all projects except one were restructuring reflects the actions being taken at the project level to adapt to overly ambitious project designs, funding shortfalls, and a challenging operational environment. At the inception of the fund, stakeholders across the board failed to fully internalize the enormous implementation challenges stemming from capacity, conflict, and logistics in South Sudan. At the same time, the call for quick action to respond to urgent needs and support a fragile peace process weighed heavier than the need for a more in-depth appraisal of the operational environment. At inception there was a tremendous pressure from all stakeholders’ constituencies to deliver outputs quickly.

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48 This particular condition was later waived by the Bank, given its negative impact on the liquidity of government finances.
Table 6.2: Speed of delivery: Average lag times and completion delays

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lag time, approval to effectiveness (weeks)</th>
<th>Lag time, approval to first disbursement (weeks)</th>
<th>Delay in closing dates from original (months)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1 (2005-2007)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2 (2009-10)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Core project documentation (ICR and ISR); monitoring agent quarterly reports; and the MDTF-SS First Comprehensive Portfolio Review (2009).

180. Given the need for frequent adjustments, several informants questioned the aptness of World Bank procedures for amending project budgets and design in the South Sudan context. Restructuring a project involves labor-intensive processes for both the TTL and recipient counterpart, not only in terms of documentation and justifications but also in terms of seeking approval for legal amendments to grant agreements.49

Reasonability of Cost

181. The main drivers of costs for MDTF-SS outputs were: (i) Capacity constraints and institutional weaknesses; (ii) underdeveloped markets; (iii) fiduciary and procurement procedures; and (iv) logistics and security. These factors were ascertained from the project reporting and were confirmed during the field mission.

Capacity Constraints and Institutional Weaknesses

182. Capacity constraints were a significant driver of cost. When comparing the MDTF-SS to other pooled funding mechanisms, it is important to note different levels of engagement with the government. The MDTF-SS’ reliance on recipient execution is unique in South Sudan, and there is in this sense no clear-cut comparator modality. Given the intensity of the fund’s reliance on government and government systems for implementation, capacity constraints were a more significantly higher driver of cost for the MDTF-SS than other pooled funding mechanisms, which had direct implementation.

183. Early appraisals of capacity proved unrealistic regarding human capital and government institutional capacity. As a result, project designs (i) were often too ambitious and complex; (ii) underestimated the timing required for contracting and other procedures

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49 Projects also revised results frameworks (targets and baseline) without any formal restructuring (e.g., ERP).
related to fiduciary and procurement procedures; and (iii) underestimated the level of technical assistance needed and related costs. Design flaws introduced inefficiencies into projects that had to be addressed later through time consuming restructuring.

**Underdeveloped Markets and Nascent Private Sector**

184. **Underestimation of costs at appraisal is partially explained by the absence of functioning markets and a private sector.** In the early days of the fund, there were limited local markets in South Sudan for goods and services and very few qualified consultants and contractors, if any. Domestic production of agricultural or manufactured goods for sale in markets was minimal. As a result, contracting took longer than intended, while internationally sourced personnel, material, and other inputs became more costly. There was also a heavy reliance on regional and international contractors that needed to mobilize and adjust to conditions.

185. The increasing cost of construction under the SETIDP exemplifies this cost driver. As detailed in the project’s implementation completion report, the capacity of the construction industry in South Sudan was very low at the time of implementation, while the contractors that existed had limited financial and technical capacities. As a result, all contracted firms were foreign and often hired workers from outside the country.

186. Another example is the UPHSD, which took three years to finish all the procurement work for technical assistance and lead agencies (for service delivery). An important part of the reason was the lack of capable candidates interested in participating in the bidding process. In six states, the Ministry of Health did not receive enough “expressions of interest” from NGOs to start the competitive bidding process.

187. **The evaluation did not have good comparators, as the documents reviewed were silent on the costs associated with different context-specific factors.** However, some of the MDTF-SS implementation completion reports attempt to assess efficiency through comparison. To follow the above example, the SETIDP completion report compares the cost of roads maintenance and repair with the costs under the Emergency Road Repairs Program (EERP) implemented by the World Food Programme (2003-06). For maintenance, the cost dropped by a whopping 282 percent in two years between the EERP (2005) and SETIDP (2007). Road repair costs on the other hand increased by about 8.5 percent over a period of 3.5 years between ERRP (2005) and SETIDP (2009), driven by factors such as increased material and transport costs.

**Fiduciary and Procurement Procedures**

188. **Fiduciary and contracting procedures under the MDTF-SS were procedurally heavy and a burden given the capacity constraints in South Sudan.** At the same time, these addressed the very real concerns that stakeholders had regarding the general environment in terms of governance and transparency. A case in point is the Macmillan incident, in
which an international company was detected trying to bribe local officials. Concerns led the fund to place more emphasis on institutional risk than on performance and contextual risk. Assigning “sole fiduciary responsibility” to the World Bank further introduced an institutional incentive to be conservative and avoid rather than manage fiduciary risk.

189. The MDTF-SS system transferred risk from the donors to the implementing partners in the World Bank, United Nations and NGOs, particularly given that the Oversight Committee was not effective providing strategic guidance. This resulted in a perception by some officials with implementing responsibilities that all risks were being passed on to them. The same officials noted that when performance problems occurred they were publically held accountable and bore most of the reputation risk.

190. **At the same time, government and implementing agencies were unfamiliar with the Bank’s fiduciary procedures.** They were not aware of necessary steps to be followed or the time-consuming nature of some procedures. Under the UPHSD, for instance, severe delays in requesting no-objection letters were documented, thus delaying the overall procurement process.

191. **Finally, the model used for contracting affects cost.** An assessment of the water project under the Basic Services Fund shows that drilling costs varied greatly from an average of USD 7,280 to USD 15,500 per borehole: this variation is related to the different types of contract used; in this case, Bills of Quantities contracts were more cost-efficient. While there is no detailed analysis of the cost efficiency of the mode of contracting used under the MDTF-SS, the value-for-money assessment (see later in this section) looked at contracts and, in particular, whether the bid that won also was the bid with the lowest price. Given the weight given to quality and technical proposals of MDTF-SS tenders, this was not regularly the case.

**Logistics and Security**

192. **Logistics and security were significant drivers of cost during project preparation and implementation and for supervision.** Interactions and communications were often limited by poor road conditions, limited availability of security compliant vehicles, and lack of communication means (phone, post, and internet). Further, the nascent banking system made financial transactions more complex.

193. The security situation in South Sudan was a challenge to project implementation across the portfolio. This uncertainty greatly increased the difficulty and cost of both implementation and supervision. As reported in completion reports of both the RWSSP and the WSSP, security affected project staff movements, construction activities and maintenance of water and sanitation services. This driver of costs affected all development projects in the country, including those funded by the MDTF-SS, and other pooled or bilateral modalities.

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50 Macmillan Publishers was banned from participating in World Bank tenders for a minimum of three years and ordered to pay a fine of more than USD 17.7 million for paying officials to win an education deal in South Sudan.
194. Administrative costs at the project level were reasonable in that they followed the Bank’s established practices. These practices are relatively well defined at the project level, for instance in terms of percentages spent on preparation and supervision of lending operations.

195. At the same time, the fund did operate under very different circumstances than regular operations. Most importantly, the role of task teams went well beyond the Bank’s normal support role. Supervision involved a great deal of de facto technical assistance to support implementing agencies that had limited capacity for implementing programs and no familiarity with complex World Bank regulations. The large amount of time involved for this type of supervision was noted by the Bank technical staff interviewed. The consensus was that if anything, supervision costs were set too low. Bank technical staff also showed continual awareness of the fiduciary challenges that Bank procedures imposed on GoSS and a willingness to be creative within the rules in helping GoSS respond.

196. Another respect in which MDTF-SS projects differed from other World Bank operations is that there was no regular Bank program in the country. The costs of preparing and supervising trust-funded projects are often understated when compared to lending operations. For instance, staff time and travel are not always charged against the trust fund. Since Sudan was in arrears during the implementation period and was a non-borrower country, there was no parallel ‘regular’ bank program in place. This means that there were few opportunities for economies of scale in using staff time and travel. For instance, Bank task teams were not able to ‘bundle’ missions for MDTF-SS-funded activities with other Bank missions for regular projects, as is often done in settings with an ongoing regular country program. Project supervision was also supported by the Monitoring Agent, which played a role in supporting on-the-ground supervision.

Assessment of Value for Money

197. In 2012, the Monitoring Agent completed a value-for-money assessment, which examined 15 contracts/activities from 9 MDTF-SS projects active at the time. Each project activity received an average value-for-money score and separate scores in three performance parameters: economy, efficiency, and effectiveness.

198. About 73 percent of the project activities assessed achieved full or partial value-for-money, under the agent’s assessment. The main findings under each criteria were these:

- Activities performed the best in the area of economy, e.g. acquiring appropriate resources at least cost. Here the assessment examined performance in terms of cost of contracts. Eight out of 15 activities scored full achievement of value-for-money.

- Only 3 out of 15 activities delivered full achievement of value-for-money in efficiency, e.g. by obtaining a maximum output for a given input. Here the assessment focused on the match between expected and actual output. Drivers of poor scores in this area were linked to partial deliveries or cancellations of contracts and to low quality of outputs.
The worst-performing criteria was effectiveness, e.g. ensuring that the output achieves the expected outcome. Here, half of activities were rated as not achieving value-for-money. Drivers of poor value-for-money in this area were linked to late delivery or non-completion of activities. Poor performance could to some extent be linked to the fact that the assessment looked at active projects with ongoing activities, where outcomes could not yet be determined.

199. The main drivers of low value-for-money include these six factors: (i) the cost of inputs was high, especially in terms of material; (ii) weighted scores were used based on financial and technical bids, resulting in contracts not always being awarded to lowest bidders. While the Monitoring Agent’s assessment punishes this approach, the longer-term cost efficiency gains from emphasizing the quality of bids appear considerable in a context such as South Sudan; (iii) there were delays in contracting and implementation of activities, (iv) activities experienced cancellations, in all cases linked to delays in delivery. (v) The quality of outputs was poor, requiring additional input. The Monitoring Agent report (2012) also indicates an impact of high staff turnover in implementing agencies (ministries) on the capacity for cost efficiency.

Cross-Cutting Issues

200. Gender did not emerge as an MDTF-SS priority until late into implementation of the portfolio, either at the governance or operations levels. Gender was identified as a cross-cutting theme in the JAM (2005: 14). Regardless, it does not appear among the five MDTF-SS Strategic Priorities or in the original definition of MDTF-SS cross-cutting issues. Gender was also not a core issue in the design and early implementation of projects. With some exceptions (health and education), early projects lacked gender-specific objectives, indicators and/or a mainstreaming strategy. Early Interim Oversight Committee and Oversight Committee meetings make some reference to the importance of addressing gender. As early as 2007, GoSS representative to the Oversight Committee signaled their interest in expanding the portfolio’s gender focus. However, gender was not taken up by the committee in a substantive manner until 2008-09.

201. In 2009, the World Bank responded to OC requests by hiring a Juba-based gender specialist to support mainstreaming across the portfolio, albeit noting that many projects were well into implementation. Further, the MDTF-SS launched a stand-alone gender project to “achieve quick wins through activities targeted at empowering women and enhancing the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MGCSW).” The Gender Support and Development Project (GSDP) became effective in August 2009. The Bank also developed a Gender Guidance Note to provide guidelines to support gender sensitive project design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of results.

202. Actions later in the implementation notwithstanding, the MDTF-SS’ performance in mainstreaming gender into the portfolio was uneven. Gender was mainstreamed into projects with objectives related to social service delivery (health and education) and
productive activities. This tended to occur on an \textit{ad hoc} basis and in response to service demands. These projects had some gender-sensitive objectives, targeting and indicators (for example, improvements to maternal health and girls’ enrolment in primary school). However, neither the portfolio nor projects had a specific gender mainstreaming strategy. Contributions to the South Sudan’s policy framework on gender and strengthening of state institutions did not occur until after 2009, in contrast to the MDTF-SS’ overall strategy of strengthening institutions while delivering services.

203. \textbf{Across the portfolio, project monitoring and reporting systems often failed to register sex-disaggregated data.} From available data, some of the key outputs achieved were these:

- \textit{Health}: Improvements in access to basic health services benefited women and girls, in particular in terms of maternal health. Significant improvements were achieved in access to antenatal care and access to antiretroviral treatment for pregnant women living with HIV.

- \textit{Education}: Expanding access to education as a result of MDTF-SS investments in the education system benefitted girls who were at a disadvantage vis-à-vis boys. Rehabilitation and construction of schools in particular reduced the distance to school, which affects children’s non-enrollment in school, especially girls.

- \textit{Private sector development}: More than half of the entrepreneurs that were granted start-up capital following a Business Plan Competition were women. As an unintended positive consequence of the project, some of these female grant-winners proceeded to establish the country’s first women’s entrepreneurs association, which continues to function as an independent body, facilitating business contacts and knowledge exchange across businesswomen in South Sudan. The microfinance component also provided tangible results for women with female borrowers accounting for more than 69 percent of the total loans provided. The value of loans to women far exceeded initial targets.

- \textit{Water and sanitation}: The RWSSP project achieved a strong gender orientation despite the fact that gender was missing from initial project design. Women were viewed as the largest primary users of water for productive and domestic purposes and the first beneficiaries of the project.

- \textit{Agriculture}: The SAFDP identified women groups as important project beneficiaries, and this was incorporated in the beneficiary selection criteria. During implementation, the participation of women was actively encouraged and monitored and nearly half of farmers in the supported farmers’ groups were women.

- \textit{DDR}: The DDR project addressed gender issues in the design and implementation, identifying women associated with the Armed Forces as a special needs group. The project also supported eight pilot projects for this group. There were however gaps in monitoring and reporting results from a gender perspective.

204. \textbf{The MDTF-SS approach to gender became more systematic with the GSDP.} A national gender policy was drafted and is being translated into an action plan, and the
different project components contributing improvements in women’s access to economic opportunities. As key outputs, the project delivered:

- **Institutional strengthening**: Officials from the national and state level ministries were trained in gender mainstreaming and project management. Related training manuals have been adopted as the ministry’s standard training material for all future training programs on gender mainstreaming.

- **A comprehensive country gender assessment** was completed and used as the basis for policy, program development, and the ministry’s strategic plan. The policy work has contributed to the growing number of analytical works to support gender policies and programs in the country.

- **Support for productive activities**: 108 women’s groups received grants for economic empowerment projects benefitting a total of 7,600 women. Nearly a third of the women received training in agricultural production activities, while 20 percent received training in non-farm income generating activities. At the end, 40 percent of female beneficiaries perceived an increase in income as a result of the project interventions.

205. **Gender officials interviewed in two states considered the GSDP’s support to productive activities generally to be successful**. However, they expressed concerns about the sustainability of many projects, given their short duration and lack of resources for follow-up. Projects were managed by the central government with limited involvement from the States, so officials were not always informed about activities or performance. Further, the project did not include resources to support the involvement of state gender ministries.

206. **Gender mainstreaming into the MDTF-SS portfolio, therefore, was ad hoc prior to 2009**. It received limited attention at the project level, the Oversight Committee did not call for substantive changes until 2008-09, and South Sudan did not have a policy framework around which to align work. Corrective action was taken in 2009, midway through implementation, and some projects did deliver substantial outputs, both prior to and after the shift. Important results include the current gender assessment and policy. However, the results are difficult to assess due to weak sex-disaggregated data collection. From what was reported, the results still indicate that important steps were taken toward addressing key gender disparities in the country under MDTF-SS projects.

**Sustainability**

207. **The sustainability of MDTF-SS outcomes is uncertain**. Concerns are driven by three factors: (i) the absence of an effective exit strategy in project design; (ii) severe resource constraints related to South Sudan’s fiscal crisis. On-going since 2012; and (iii) fragmentation of the country’s aid architecture. The choices of government and donors emerge as key variables affecting sustainability.

208. **Many MDTF-SS projects lacked an exit strategy, while not all activities or projects under Strategic Priority 2 were designed to be sustainable**. Projects under Strategic
Priorities 3 and 4 included provisions for sustainability after handover, maintenance planning among them. However, as recipient-executed projects, government assumed responsibility for their sustainability after handover. The MDTF-SS’ responsibility was to ensure that sustainability was built into design, including ongoing funding commitments. A common concern emerging from the field study is that state-level institutions lacked resources, even prior to austerity, to assume responsibility for MDTF-SS assets or to build on them. Economic volatility notwithstanding, the government’s choices concerning resource allocations within its own budget, including the recurrent costs for expansion of the civil service, was an important factor.

209. The current situation of austerity undermines the sustainability of MDTF-SS projects. Institutional capacity built with MDTF-SS support is helping to preserve the core functionality of institutions, at the central and State levels, while operations and service delivery have been severely curtailed. However, the government lacks the resources to sustain the gains made during the MDTF-SS implementation period, let alone maintain many of the physical assets delivered, such as fuel for vehicles and generators, ongoing road maintenance to sustain connectivity, and supplies for health and education services at the sub-state level, among other examples. The situation becomes more acute when one moves from the center out to the sub-levels of government. Many physical assets are likely to deteriorate prematurely or be lost. Further, the risk period will be prolonged. Austerity measures are expected to be in place for all of FY 2013-2014 and at least one additional year, as the government repays its debts.

210. Sustainability is further undermined by fragmentation of South Sudan’s aid architecture. The strengthening of donors’ in-country presence and capacity, MDTF-SS performance concerns, and the current situation of austerity has all contributed to aid architecture fragmentation. Data indicates that assistance is being delivered through a larger number of channels, with an increase in the amount of assistance being delivered outside of state institutions and systems. The shift appears driven by concern for the current humanitarian situation, the government’s absorptive capacity, and donors’ preoccupation with institutional risk. This trend reverses the core MDTF-SS objective of building capacity by working through state institutions and systems.

211. The impacts observed during the field mission include these:

a. High transaction costs place an added burden on limited capacity, particularly at the state level where most services are delivered, as weak ministries attempt to coordinate and monitor multiple international entities.

b. Institutional development has been uneven, as have service development and delivery, as multiple organizations fund activities within the specific scope of their mandates and priorities, rather than taking a systems approach.

c. Core institutional capacity (physical, systems, and human) has been atrophying, as institutions have gone unfunded and unused. “Aligning” externally delivered resources with government priorities does not address the problem of atrophying capacity, where state institutions and systems are bypassed.
d. Ownership has been undermined. The experience of the MDTF-SS demonstrates that goods and services that are not delivered by government do not meet its strategic interests and priorities and/or strengthen systems that have weak ownership and are less likely to survive.
Part 7: Lessons Learned from the MDTF-SS Experience

MDTF-SS Lessons Learned at Four Levels

212. There is a large body of documentation assessing the MDTF-SS experience, including routine MDTF-SS project documents that report lessons learned. The reporting identifies lessons at four levels:

a. **Level One: Operational lessons** – these relate to the challenges of project implementation under difficult physical conditions, in a low-capacity and sometimes insecure environment.

b. **Level Two: Institutional lessons** – these are lessons for the planning, assessment, design, management and monitoring of projects and the effective application of World Bank procedures in the South Sudan context. Most of these lessons relate to (i) government capacity and implementation arrangements within the “recipient execution” modality; (ii) management and coordination between multiple levels of government; and (iii) effectiveness and realism in the assessment, planning, and design of projects.

c. **Level Three: MDTF-SS governance and technical support systems** and their performance, ensuring strategic-level direction, resource allocation and oversight, and predictable financing. These lessons also relate to the performance of key stakeholders in carrying out their roles and responsibilities.

d. **Level Four: Interaction between the MDTF-SS and the larger political, peace, and security dynamics**, recognizing that the MDTFs for Sudan were embedded in the Wealth Sharing Agreement and carried significant responsibility for aspirations and expectations associated with some aspects of CPA implementation. Lessons learned relate to the interaction between politically generated objectives and expectations and the overall design of the MDTF-SS.

213. **Lessons from Level One and Level Two, therefore, focus on institutional and implementation arrangements at the operational level.** Level Three and Level Four relate to the governance process and larger political management: (i) the actions of principal stakeholders to sustain the political consensus that anchored the MDTF-SS and from that consensus to (ii) sustaining financial predictability; (iii) providing strategic direction and oversight in a dynamic context; and (iv) managing the interaction between the larger CPA process and fund operations.

214. **Cutting across each of these levels are lessons on:**

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51 Documents with lessons learned include the *Final Project Papers, Implementation Status Report, Implementation Completion Report* and the quarterly and annual *Monitoring Agent Reports*. Lessons learned also emerge in internal and external evaluations and in stock-taking exercises, as well as in strategy documents such as the World Bank Group’s *Interim Strategy Note* (2013).
a. The World Bank’s institutional competence, systems and procedures in the South Sudan context; identifying the situations where the World Bank is most effective and how to combine with other stakeholders where their systems and procedural effectiveness are greater;

b. The effectiveness of government working through a “recipient executed” modality; how effective “ownership” can be exercised in a low-capacity situation and then transitioned as capacity expands;

c. The effectiveness of all stakeholders in their mandated roles and responsibilities, from operations (implementing organizations and contractors) to governance (Oversight Committee members); and

d. The inter-relationship between the political and technical dimensions of the process, including (i) how political aspirations and expectations (Level Four) influenced technical and operational decisions (Levels One and Two) and (ii) what the role of MDTF-SS governance (Level Three) was in mediating between the political and technical levels.

Existing Lessons at the Operational Level

215. The existing body of MDTF-SS lessons learned is almost exclusively focused at the operational (Level One) and institutional (Level Two) levels. Much less knowledge has been generated on governance, including the effectiveness of the MDTF-SS in coordinating assistance and managing the relationship between the political and operational dimensions of the MDTF-SS. These lessons appear only in the high level report, Taking Stock and a Way Forward (2010) and the World Bank Group’s Interim Strategy Note (2013).

216. The operational focus of existing MDTF-SS lessons learned reflects the design of monitoring and evaluation systems. Monitoring and evaluation occurred primarily at the project level, with a focus on implementation arrangements. There is no mechanism for monitoring the governance process or the performance of principal stakeholders against their mandated roles and responsibilities at this level. Therefore, existing procedures engaged only a part of the overall MDTF-SS system.

Summary of Lessons Learned from the MDTF-SS Experience

217. The following summarizes lessons learned from the evaluation field mission, stakeholder interviews, and document review. Some cross reference has been made with the experience of other MDTFs. Lessons on MDTF-SS operations are generated from all sources, while lessons on governance and managing political expectations emerge primarily from the field study and interviews, in addition to the 2010 high-level Taking Stock and a Way Forward (2010) report.

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52 Exceptions include the Comprehensive Portfolio Performance Review (2009a) and the high level Taking Stock and a Way Forward (2010a).
Lesson: Political aspirations and public expectations must be managed and not be inflated beyond what an MDTF can deliver. While a Technical Secretariat can implement an operational-level communications strategy, the responsibility for defining and communicating realistic aspirations and expectations rests with the national government and the MDTF governance body. An effective assessment of the operating environment is essential for establishing a realistic mandate and scope of operations.

218. **MDTF governance must manage the interaction between political aspirations and expectations and fund operations.** The MDTF-SS was established as a financial and technical instrument to support some aspects of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Embedding the fund within the Protocol on Wealth Sharing created an explicit linkage between the aspirations of the CPA and the fund’s technical mandate. The linkage opened the MDTF to politically-driven expectations that were unrealistic and beyond the scope of what could reasonably be delivered in the context of South Sudan. Regardless, these expectations came to form the benchmarks for success and failure. Interaction between the political and technical, therefore, must be closely managed; under government leadership and through the MDTF’s governance process.

219. **Long-term MDTF effectiveness depends on the pre-establishment assessment and political economy analysis done by the principal stakeholders.** Government leadership is essential to the assessment process, as the basis for both relevance and long-term national political commitment. In the South Sudan context, stakeholders were challenged to develop a framework of priorities and a financing modality that would translate: (i) the aspirations and expectations of the CPA and the realities of the operating environment, in ways that helped transition to civilian governance, into (iii) an effective MDTF design and portfolio. However, this process reinforced inflated expectations, and many of the constraints and risks identified at the assessment stage were not internalized into the MDTF-SS design.

220. **Expectation management is critical, from the first moment that a fund is being established.** Expectations of what an MDTF can and cannot deliver must be clearly articulated within the scope of a fund’s mandate (based on a consensus between the principal stakeholders) and communicated to stakeholder constituencies in national and international society. Expectations must be realistic, given the context, and must avoid burdening a fund with aspirations and responsibilities that are beyond its scope and means.

221. **Expectation management is a political act and different from a communication strategy.** A communications strategy can be part of expectation management, but it is not a substitute. Expectation management is political; principal stakeholders, usually in the governance entity, define what a fund can reasonably accomplish and the messages that will be conveyed to different constituencies. The Secretariat can then implement a communication strategy to reinforce and deliver those messages. However, a communications strategy is not a substitute for an expectation management strategy.

222. **South Sudan demonstrates that expectations are difficult to revise, once they have been broadcast and set in the minds of stakeholders and the public.** Among other effects, inflated expectations:
a. Leave an MDTF vulnerable to being held accountable for events beyond its scope.

b. Create benchmarks for assessing performance and credibility. They define the performance “narrative” and can also lock stakeholders into political positions before their respective constituencies.

c. Can undermine the credibility of a fund and create reputation risk for the principal stakeholders.

d. May contribute to instability, where MDTF performance is tied to perceptions of success and/or the political justification for a peace process and fails to deliver to society on such expectations.

223. The World Bank has important responsibility for the technical aspects of an MDTF. However, the Bank has limited influence as fund manager over the larger political aspirations that stakeholders attach to a fund. Influence may vary, depending on whether the Bank is also a stakeholder in the governance body and whether the Bank has an established country program. The Bank, therefore, should regularly do its own “reality assessment” on the alignment of stakeholder aspirations and the capacity of the fund to deliver.

224. A balanced approach to risk is needed in fragile-state and conflict-affected situations. Current good practice from the OECD DAC’s International Network on Conflict and Fragility identifies three forms of risk. (i) Contextual risk is related to volatility or change in the broader development and program environment. This affects an MDTF’s policy framework and the ability of stakeholders to sustain a political consensus. (ii) Program risk is the possibility that the portfolio will not achieve its strategic objective and the possible harm caused if this occurs. Program risk in an MDTF is derived from the technical dimensions of design, implementation, and monitoring, among other factors, but is also influenced by poor relevance and alignment. (iii) Institutional risk derives from poor financial management, corruption and inadequate value-for-money, resulting in reputational and political damage for stakeholders.

225. MDTF stakeholders, and particularly donors, gave priority to institutional risk when establishing the Sudan MDTFs, which influenced decisions on design of the modality and in the governance and management of the portfolio. Notwithstanding the existence of real institutional risks in South Sudan, privileging that set of risks over contextual and program risks undermined the relevance of design to context and affected performance.

Lesson: The design of an MDTF modality, including the choice of administrator and managing agent, must be requirement-based. Fragile-state and post-crisis situations will often call for a variety of implementation arrangements which cannot be delivered by a single organization. Pragmatic solutions, such as the “two-window common governance” model, allow for the use of different implementation arrangements and organizational capacities within a single modality that provides strategic coherence.

226. Trust Funds are an integrated system. Performance and progress towards objectives depends on how well each part of the system functions. MDTF-SS focus tended to be placed
on the operational dimensions, with less attention to the performance of governance arrangements and stakeholders.

227. The “two window-common governance” model allows for different organizations to apply their comparative advantage, within a coherent strategic framework. Multiple priorities and operational requirements may call for the use of different systems and procedures within a single fund modality. From the experience of South Sudan, these often relate to: (i) meeting the long-term challenges of strengthening state institutions, governance processes, civil society participation, and economic development, while simultaneously addressing (ii) short-term needs for core public service delivery and popular expectations that daily life will improve (tangible “peace dividends”).

There is no global consensus on the most effective MDTF model for achieving these objectives simultaneously. However, a “two-window common governance” model would have allowed different organizations to deliver through their institutional advantages. This effectively occurred in South Sudan after 2008, as new pooled modalities were established with different managers.

228. The MDTF-SS experience demonstrates that organizations are most effective when working within their own systems and procedures. Initial collaboration between the World Bank and United Nations agencies required negotiation and agreement at the corporate level, which contributed to significant implementation delays during the critical early period of MDTF-SS operations. Ongoing use of the pass-through modality produced further delays and transaction costs.

229. The recipient execution modality depends on government leadership and capacity. It must be designed based on a realistic assessment of capacity. The recipient execution modality made an important contribution in South Sudan in strengthening ownership and institutions and in delivering services. However, the modality had difficulty outperforming government systems in low-capacity environments. Pushing beyond existing government capacity creates a tension with ownership as well as long-term sustainability concerns. The tension also makes it difficult for the recipient execution model to deliver on some short-term needs in a low-capacity environment. It calls for a phased approach that expands the scope of activity in tandem with building capacity.

Lesson: Realism in technical assessment and design should not be eroded by undue political influence.

230. Realism in the technical assessment and design process must not be unduly influenced by political considerations. While recovery and development are open-ended process, the CPA process was a time-bound political agreement. This dichotomy was not taken into account in the JAM targets, which formed the basis of the MDTF-SS program framework. The pressures of time and inflated expectations and the perception of an urgent need to deliver a “peace dividend” had a significant influence on the realism of the MDTF-SS portfolio. These contributed to ineffective project design, transaction costs, forms of political and reputation risk, and inefficiencies through delays and restructuring. Therefore: (i) the technical process of project development should be aligned with the mandate and
priorities of an MDTF but deliver realistic and achievable proposals, and (ii) the governance process has responsibility for ensuring that expectations are aligned with what can realistically be achieved while protecting the integrity of design and reducing unhelpful political pressure.

Lesson: Governance is the core and indispensable element of an MDTF “system”. Under government leadership, the governance system should be strategically focused and ensure that there is a political consensus among the principal stakeholders. Transparency and mutual accountability require that governance fall within the scope of a fund’s monitoring and evaluation process.

231. **Governance is essential to MDTF effectiveness in post-crisis situations.** Governance systems must be based on clearly defined roles, responsibilities, assumptions, and expectations of what the principal stakeholders will contribute. Consensus on these issues should be embedded in the foundation documents and reaffirmed, revised, and sustained over time. The experience in South Sudan is that the lack of consensus on institutional roles and mutual accountability can confuse responsibilities and undermine results.

232. **The key performance variable is government leadership, with donors and the MDTF modality aligned behind the government’s agenda.** In South Sudan, the government had firm aspirations to lead but lacked the capacity to assert its voice until well into the MDTF-SS implementation process. Weak government leadership can create a vacuum that other stakeholders will fill with their own perspectives and priorities. Over time, weak national leadership can erode ownership and the fund’s strategic direction, all with performance implications.

233. **The first responsibility of governance is to sustain the political consensus that anchors an MDTF**, that is, the fundamental agreement among stakeholders about the purpose of the fund and what it is intended to achieve. Where the consensus erodes, stakeholder commitment, strategic coherence, and working relationships will erode. This began to occur early during the MDTF-SS implementation period; as the context shifted and with slow progress on CPA targets, GoSS priorities shifted and early MDTF-SS performance concerns emerged.

234. **MDTF governance also has a critical responsibility for providing strategic direction and oversight**, particularly in a dynamic context. Strategic direction assures the relevance of the fund; it also serves as the basis for effective allocation decisions and actions to adjust the MDTF for contextual change and performance concerns. The experience of South Sudan is that stakeholders tended to micromanage operational details when performance concerns emerged, rather than taking corrective action and focusing on the broader enabling conditions.

235. **The highest level of a governance system should minimize its involvement in operational details.** Technical tasks, such as the detailed reviews, assessments, and recommendations on individual projects, are most effectively tasked to working entities reporting to the governance body. Focusing governance attention at the technical level is generally outside of a Governance Committee’s mandate and contributes to inefficiencies.
236. The governance structure should include the appropriate technical entities, mandated to review technical and implementation issues and to support decision-making within the Oversight Committee. These functions help ensure that the governance structure is able to allocate the resources necessary to carrying out leadership roles, and they minimize direct governance engagement in operational issues while still ensuring oversight of key technical issues.

237. The scope of monitoring and evaluation systems should include the performance of the governance mechanism, and of the principal stakeholders in their mandated roles and responsibilities. Effective governance requires transparency and mutual accountability among the principal stakeholders. In turn, transparency and mutual accountability are framed by: (i) clearly defined roles and responsibilities with (ii) monitoring and evaluation as an indispensable support instrument, generating analysis and concrete options for improving the performance of governance systems and that of the individual stakeholders.

Lesson: Effective project delivery depends on realism in design and appropriate support systems and procedures. When World Bank procedures are in use, these should recognize the advantages and limits of the “recipient execution” model in low-capacity environments. Procurement is essential to attaining efficiency.

238. The MDTF-SS experience is that successful project:

a. Have strong national leadership and are clearly embedded in the priorities and policies of government.

b. Are well prepared, have simple design, and have realistic development objectives, scope, and implementation schedules.

c. Do not exceed the capacity of national implementing institutions, even as they build capacity, and take into account a realistic assessment of field conditions.

d. Avoid top-down approaches, when delivering on national implementation through sub-levels of government and communities. Enhancing long-term ownership and sustainability sometimes requires a community-based approach.

e. Internalize risk assessment and mitigation measures into the actual design.

f. Are implemented with a robust field implementation presence, strong management oversight, and regular and direct contact with national counterparts.

239. Projects in fragile and conflict-affected situations are usually developed with incomplete information and under dynamic conditions. Assessment and design are likely to be imperfect. As mitigation measures, (i) information gaps should be acknowledged and explicitly stated, and steps should be taken to develop such information during implementation; and (ii) risk assessment must be internalized into design and not unduly influenced by unrealistic political aspirations. Given the continued gaps in data and analysis, South Sudan provides a particularly challenging context for program and project design. In other post-conflict settings, such as Afghanistan, MDTF operations have been able to draw on the World Bank country program and its International Development Association
lending, which provides not only economies of scale but also access to high-quality knowledge products, such as the Bank’s Analytical and Advisory Assistance.

240. **Some projects can be done “quick and well,” while other projects can only be done well with time.** There has been extensive debate in South Sudan about the trade-offs between speed and quality, not only within the MDTF-SS but across the entire international assistance portfolio. The debate in South Sudan has been driven by the perceived need for rapid delivery of a material “peace dividend,” a key expectation generated by the CPA process that came to form a benchmark for the MDTF-SS’ success. However, the trade-off is a false choice. South Sudan demonstrates there are a limited number of things that can be done “quick and well,” depending on the context. Most projects can only be done “well” with adequate time and resources, especially when they depend on building institutional capacity. Delivering “quickly and badly” has a corrosive effect on public perception when the goods and services delivered as a “peace dividend” are of poor quality, not sustainable, and/or do not produce meaning changes in living conditions. The recipient execution model challenges stakeholders to determine what can be done “quick and well” through existing institutional capacity, and direct implementation modalities offer more flexibility.

241. **More provision for stakeholder capacity building is required in fragile contexts.** The assumption is that only government requires capacity building. The South Sudan reality was that all stakeholders, including the World Bank, needed to build their capacity to function effectively in the country context.

242. **The World Bank should continue to strengthen its experience with institutional development through the recipient executed modality,** while at the same time adapting related processes to fragile and conflict settings. The World Bank model of delivering through key national institutions is central to institutional development in fragile settings, such as South Sudan. However, “recipient execution” implies choices where the urgent delivery of public goods and services is expected. The model could be implemented more effectively in four ways: (i) by developing an overall capacity building strategy that moves beyond the more *ad hoc* technical assistance-led model used under the MDTF-SS; (ii) by identifying and exploring contexts/projects where the recipient execution modality can be most effectively used, for instance in service delivery through community-driven approaches; (iii) by assessing other models of capacity building, including emerging South-South learning and mentoring initiatives; and (iv) by working with other entities to strengthen modalities for collaboration, such as the “two-window one governance” modality, where recipient execution does not fully meet requirements.

243. **In response to institutional capacity constraints, local market conditions, and other risks, procurement policies need to be more flexible.** The South Sudan MDTF experience shows that project performance is inextricably linked to procurement. Procurement performance had a significant impact across the MDTF-SS portfolio. It delayed projects aimed at rapid rehabilitation and expansion of basic services as well as those focused on mid- to long-term development, including capital investments. Problems also emerged throughout the procurement process, from planning to contract management and oversight, leading to high transaction costs and substantial delays in the delivery of outputs.
244. All stakeholders need to accept that in a fragile and conflict setting some programs will fail, and they must be willing to adapt rapidly in response. In the case of South Sudan, stakeholder expectations with respect to project success contributed to the MDTF’s inability to quickly revise and adapt. The Bank’s procedures are also not geared toward accepting a certain degree of failure and enabling quick revisions. At the same time, donors often prefer the World Bank precisely because of its strict fiduciary management procedures, which need to be adjusted to the assessment of risk to be effective.
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